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Arthur Schopenhauer, a nineteenth-century German philosopher, advocated a unique 
theory of immortality (athanasia). The present study attempts to indicate that, in spite 
of the ingeniousness and consolatory appeal of his theory, it is ultimately – according 
to an orthodox interpretation which wholly identifies the Will with the so-called “thing-
in-itself” – untenable and erroneous. In arriving at the aforementioned conclusion, the 
study attempts to argue that the two pillars upon which Schopenhauer’s theory of 
athanasia is based are flawed, viz., that the world cannot be entirely mind-dependent 
and that the Will cannot be considered an explication of the elusive Kantian “thing-in-
itself”. The study explores, among other topics, Schopenhauer’s arguments for radical 
idealism, the compatibility of Schopenhauer’s evolutionary views with that of his 
radical idealism, the status of the mind within his philosophy, the notion of the Will as 
a concept and as a product of intellectual intuition, as well as the Will being susceptible 
to the influences of time, space and causality. 
The study has been divided into two primary sections: in the first part, a detailed 
overview of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is presented; this is necessary in so far as 
Schopenhauer is a systematic thinker, hence, in order for one to fully comprehend his 
theory of athanasia, it is necessary for one to first acquaint oneself with his two most 
significant and fundamental notions, viz., his radical idealism and his claim that the 
Will is the “thing-in-itself”. Once these matters have been presented and discussed, the 
study turns in earnest to a consideration of Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality. In 
the second part of the study, the two fundamental pillars of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
are subjected to a thorough critique in order to ultimately illustrate the untenability of 
his theory of athanasia. As part of this enterprise, the study includes an appendix which 
attempts to illustrate that the Will as “thing-in-itself” is not insusceptible to the law of 





Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘n negentiende-eeuse Duitse filosoof, het ‘n unieke teorie van 
onsterflikheid (athanasia) voorgestaan. Hierdie studie poog om aan te toon dat, ten 
spyte van die vindingrykheid en die vertroostende appél van die teorie, dit uiteindelik 
onhoudbaar en onjuis is. Ter begronding van die bogenoemde konklusie, poog die 
studie om aan te toon dat die twee pilare waarop Schopenhauer sy teorie van athanasia 
basseer, naamlik dat die wêreld nie volledig afhanklik van die bewussyn kan wees nie, 
en dat die Wil nie beskou kan word as ‘n veruiterliking van die ontwykende Kantiaanse 
“ding-in-sigelf” nie, gebreke vertoon.  Benewens ander onderwerpe, verken die studie 
Schopenhauer se argumente vir ‘n radikale idealisme, die versoenbaarheid van 
Schopenhauer se opvatting van evolusie en sy radikale idealisme, die status van die 
bewussyn in sy filosofie, die idee van die Wil as ‘n konsep en as ‘n produk van 
intellektuele intuïsie, asook dat die Wil onderhewig is aan die invloede van tyd, ruimte 
en oorsaaklkiheid.  
Hierdie studie is verdeel in twee primêre afdelings: in die eerste deel word ‘n 
gedetaileerde oorsig aangebied van Schopenhauer se filosofie; wat noodsaaklik is 
omdat Schopenhauer ‘n sistematiese denker is, en dus vereis ‘n volledige begrip van sy 
teorie van athanasia, dat ‘n mens eers op hoogte gestel moet word van sy twee mees 
belangrike en fundamentele opvattings, naamlik sy radikale idealisme, en sy stelling 
dat die Wil die “ding-in-sigself” is. Teen die agtergrond hiervan word Schopenhauer se 
teorie van onsterflikheid in alle erns oorweeg. In die tweede deel van die studie word 
die twee fundamentele pilare van Schopenhauer se denke onderwerp aan ‘n deeglike 
kritiek, om uiteindelik die onhoudbaarheid van sy teorie van athanasia aan te toon. As 
deel van hierdie onderneming sluit die studie ‘n aanhangsel in wat poog om te illustreer 
dat die Wil as “ding-in-sigself” nie onafhanklik is van die wet van oorsaaklikheid nie, 
waardeur een van die gronde wat Schopenhauer aanbied vir sy aanspraak dat die Wil 
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As a prelude to my dissertation I wish to give a synopsis of the contents to be found 
herein, as well as to offer a personal note on the primary subject-matter of the 
exposition. To begin with, there must necessarily be a psychological reason for one 
favouring a particular philosopher and paradigm over another, for our interests are, 
perhaps much to our personal mortification, perpetually self-interested. My fascination 
with Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia began when I experienced the traumatic loss 
of someone extremely dear to me. The event triggered an existential crisis wherein I 
found myself questioning the meaning of life, why innocent creatures suffer 
unnecessarily and what happens to us after we die. To my great delight, I found all these 
topics sufficiently explored and, as I initially and naively thought, resolved in 
Schopenhauer’s work. Indeed, I maintain that these topics are of universal interest in 
so far as we are all mortal and subject to the vicissitudes of life; they can consequently 
remain uninteresting to none of us.  I admit that upon my initial contact with the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy I became possessed with what I can only describe as a 
“religious fanaticism”; Schopenhauer’s teaching became an indisputable creed I 
fervently believed in, akin to the devotion which a pious man shows for his religion – 
Schopenhauer was my messiah and his principal work, Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung, was my bible! However, I ultimately became an apostate, for I gradually 
came to realise that, in spite of its beauty and consolatory power, the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy is riddled with numerous inconsistencies, and I endeavoured to make these 
as perspicuous as possible in order for me to determine the ultimate veracity thereof; 
for like every genuine lover of wisdom I seek the truth above all else and I cannot be 
consoled by the false and the spurious. This work is the culmination of that enquiry 
which occupied my mind for so many years. In a sense then, I wrote it primarily for my 
own elucidation and edification; and this I believe is the best way in which to write, for 
one is then not attempting to impress others with their erudition but merely writing in 
order to understand for one’s own purposes. I hope that this will be evident to all who 
take the time to earnestly consider my work. I would also like to add that the process 
of writing a critical examination on the philosophy I admire so much has been 
incredibly therapeutic, for in creating (and criticizing!) I have been able to heal myself 
of a particular psychological wound.  
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However, I do not wish to give the erroneous impression that my critical examination 
renders the Schopenhauerian philosophy worthless; for in spite of my numerous 
criticisms I maintain that there is still a great deal in Schopenhauer’s philosophy which 
encourages earnest thinking and offers genuine consolation. Indeed, even though we 
live in a largely secular and materialistic age, one in which metaphysical theories are 
often neglected and excoriated, science has still not succeeded in vanquishing death; 
hence a philosophy which is both atheistic and yet offers the hope of immortality is, in 
my estimation, potentially capable of offering an alternative view scarcely considered; 
for most individuals who contemplate the inevitability of death vacillate between two 
extremes, i.e. they regard death as either the eternal continuation of our individual 
characters in the form of an immaterial “substance” or as an absolute oblivion. The 
Schopenhauerian philosophy, even if erroneous in its particular details, offers a third 
possibility which I believe is worthy of our earnest consideration.   
Let me now turn to a synopsis of the contents to be found in my exposition. In writing 
my dissertation I wanted, as far as possible, to trace the intellectual development of 
Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality, for like a masterful architect Schopenhauer 
constructs the edifice of his theory upon particular and well-thought out foundations; I 
was therefore compelled to commence the first half of my dissertation with an overview 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, in order for one to comprehend the theory in its entirety 
before I began excoriating it in earnest. Unfortunately, it was impossible to present 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy without critically engaging with it, and consequently one 
will find a certain amount of critical content in the first part of the exposition. I do not, 
however, believe that this vitiates the work, but it seems to me to contribute to a fuller 
understanding of Schopenhauer’s views in so far as I am constantly engaging with his 
notions and trying to make sense of them. In connection with this procedure, I have 
presented the outline of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in accordance with the way in 
which he expounds it in his principal work: I begin with his notion of radical idealism, 
I then turn to his attempt to positively characterise the so-called “thing-in-itself”, which, 
once discussed, inevitably leads me to discussions on suffering, suicide, death and 
Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality. I have followed this general layout in both 
primary sections of the dissertation. 
In the second section of the exposition I have amassed a collection of arguments which 
I take to refute Schopenhauer’s two pillars upon which he constructs his theory of 
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athanasia. One will, of course, find some of these notions anticipated in the first part of 
my discussion, for, as mentioned, I was not able to present Schopenhauer’s views 
without critically engaging with them. The two fundamental notions upon which 
Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia is based are (i) radical idealism and (ii) the 
identification of the Will with the Kantian “thing-in-itself”. My first goal in this second 
primary section is to refute Schopenhauer’s radical idealism, which I attempt to 
accomplish by way of a critical consideration of Schopenhauer’s arguments for radical 
idealism, the status of the mind within Schopenhauer’s philosophy, the compatibility 
of evolutionary views with the radical idealist position, and considerations to illustrate 
that time, space and causality must in fact be mind-independent. My second intention 
is to illustrate that the Will cannot be considered the solution to the way the world is in 
itself; in short, and among other things, I argue that the Will is located within time and 
space and is furthermore subject to the causal principle. This last topic is treated at 
length by way of a consideration of Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine, which I 
have attached as an appendix to the dissertation. As this discussion is a self-contained 
study on a particular aspect of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, I wanted neither to vitiate 
it nor my dissertation by attempting to incorporate it into the main section of my 
exposition; however, given its significance to my study I could not justifiably omit it, 
and hence I have rather incorporated it as an addendum. As will be seen, the ultimate 
rejection of these two fundamental pillars necessarily renders Schopenhauer’s theory 
of athanasia untenable. I ought to add that in arriving at this conclusion I have made 
extensive use, not solely of Schopenhauer’s primary texts, but also of the vast 
secondary literature dealing with various aspects of Schopenhauer’s thought; I am 
greatly indebted to many of these sources and their authors (even when I have argued 
in opposition to them) for facilitating my comprehension of certain, and often 
complicated, aspects of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In particular, I have found the 
works of Christopher Janaway, David E. Cartwright, Julian Young and Robert J. Wicks 
exceptionally beneficial in this regard. 
A recurrent theme throughout my dissertation, which I hope readers will notice, is my 
insistence upon the finitude of the human brain and its ability to entirely comprehend 
all types of phenomena: I incessantly emphasise that we as humans are limited in our 
capacity to comprehend the universe in its totality. By this, I should not be misconstrued 
as portending that there are phenomena for which no causes exist, but rather that there 
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are some causes we cannot fathom owing to the finitude of our minds. There is a 
possibility that athanasia is one such unfathomable issue; and I consequently conclude 
my dissertation with the notion that the ultimate state of the phenomenon is a mystery. 
I indicate that depending on the interpretation we take of the thing-in-itself within 
Schopenhauer’s system, i.e. if we consider ultimate reality to be pluralistic, it leaves 
open the possibility that something totally ineffable survives the demise of one’s 
physical form and remains immortal. But, following Schopenhauer, I preclude the 
possibility of athanasia entailing any continuation of consciousness or personal identity. 
However, for two primary reasons I have not attempted to positively characterise what 
such an immortality might consist of. Firstly, such a characterisation would necessarily 
require me to surpass the mind’s limits, thus descending into mere dogmatic opinion; 
secondly, I wanted my study to remain true to its initial aim, viz., to critically engage 
with Schopenhauer’s thoughts and attempt to determine the ultimate veracity thereof. I 
reiterate that although I ultimately find the theory erroneous there is still much that one 
can acquire by way of an engagement with Schopenhauer’s notions. 
In the course of my discussion I engage with material which is little, if ever, considered 
in the secondary English literature on Schopenhauer, such as the metaphysical Will’s 
consciousness and purposiveness in forming objects in the phenomenal world, in what 
sense Schopenhauer ought to be understood in declaring it “better not to exist”, a novel 
interpretation of Schopenhauer’s theory of salvation and Schopenhauer’s unique 
evolutionary views. I have endeavoured to incorporate these interesting topics within 
the primary discussion of my exposition and I believe that I have succeeded in so doing; 
furthermore, I maintain that these discussions contribute immensely to the study as a 
whole. Finally, it is my sincere hope that my critical examination of Schopenhauer’s 
theory of immortality will contribute to the growing English literature on 
Schopenhauer, and that it will encourage other Schopenhauerian scholars to further 
explore points I have raised in my dissertation. For those readers who do not have an 
interest in the Schopenhauerian philosophy, but who happen for one reason or another 
to read my exposition nonetheless, I hope that they can discover herein one or two 








Throughout the annals of human existence there have been perpetual hopes that, by 
some means or other, the evils of old age and death will ultimately be vanquished. In 
the bygone era of superstitious beliefs and religious fanaticism, humankind’s hopes for 
immortality rested squarely upon biblical dogma (cf. John 3:16); yet the advent of 
science has rendered such beliefs untenable in the minds of many – for one simply 
cannot be consoled by notions which one does not accept as veracious. The 
development of the scientific method, contrary to popular belief, however, has not 
extirpated humankind’s hope of immortal life, it has merely substituted the 
metaphysical for the physical, i.e. where once the general belief was that the soul would 
continue to exist in secula seculorum,1 so it is hoped by many nowadays that science 
will eventually unlock the secret of extending human existence indefinitely, much as in 
a bygone era alchemists maintained that consumption of the fabled lapis 
philosophorum2 would do the same; however the ambition remains a reverie as elusive 
now as it was with the alchemists centuries ago. In light of the fact that science has 
hitherto not discovered the modern equivalent of the lapis philosophorum, and has 
simultaneously vitiated the old consolations of religious dogma by revealing them to 
be inconsistent and erroneous, what possibility is there of consolation regarding the 
inevitability of death for a modern individual? Ought one to cling thoughtlessly to the 
deflated religious notions or accept that a physical immortality is, for now at least, an 
impossibility and that one ought consequently to live by the “bestial” (cf. 
Schopenhauer, 1969b: 464) maxim: “edite, bibite, post mortem nulla voluptas”?3 I 
maintain that the Schopenhauerian philosophy, albeit flawed, offers a third alternative 
																																																								
1 “Unto the age of ages”; expressing the notion of eternity. 
2 “The Philosopher’s Stone”; a substance purported to be an elixir of immortal life and to turn 
base metals into gold. 
3 “Eat and drink, after death there is no more rejoicing” (Payne’s translation, cf. page 464). In 
his lengthy discussion on death and immortality in the second volume of his magnum opus 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 464) observes that most Western people tend to vacillate “[…] between 
the conception of death as absolute annihilation and the assumption that we are, so to speak 
with skin and hair, immortal”.  Schopenhauer (quoted in Cartwright, 2005: 37) considers both 




worthy of earnest consideration. For although Schopenhauer was an open and 
unapologetic atheist (Edwards, 2009: 173), rejecting much of the dogma of the Judaeo-
Christian religion concerning immortality, he (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463-509) 
nonetheless constructed an elaborate metaphysical theory of athanasia, which in many 
respects is not at variance with modern scientific views.4 In this sense, and despite the 
fact that I shall excoriate Schopenhauer’s theory in great detail in my exposition, I 
maintain that many of his views are of great benefit and consolation to our modern 
civilisation, which has, as mentioned, largely lost its religious belief and has not yet 
discovered the means by which to extend human life indefinitely. Moreover, the 
possibility of immortality – whether one accepts it as veracious or not – must be of 
interest to all in so far as everyone is, as it were, condemned to death; “[n]ature”, as 
Montaigne (1946a: 118) rightly states, “forces us to it”: 
“‘Go from this world,’ she says, ‘as you came into it. […] Your death is one 
of the parts of the order of the universe; it is a part of the life of the world […] 
Death is the condition of your creation, it is a portion of yourself; you fly from 
yourself. This existence of yours, which you have the enjoyment of, is equally 
divided between death and life. The day of your birth starts your steps towards 
dying as well as towards living. 
The first hour that gave us life shortened our life. 
From our birth we die, and our end hangs upon our beginning.’” 
Given the ubiquity of the phenomenon of death I maintain that a philosophy such as 
Schopenhauer’s which maintains a unique form of athanasia cannot be uninteresting 
and of no concern to all who live and breathe.5 Hence, I consider my thesis vindicated 
																																																								
4 For instance, V. J. McGill (1971: 21 and 26) considers Schopenhauer to be a precursor to both 
modern Darwinian evolutionary theory and “important movements in modern psychology”. 
5 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Socrates (quoted in Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463) 
defined philosophy as “θανάτου µελέτη” (“thanatou melete”), i.e. “preparation for death” 
(Payne’s translation, cf. Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463). It seems to me that the notion of 
philosophy as a “preparation for death” is reiterated continuously throughout the Western 
philosophical tradition, most notably, in my estimation, in Plato’s famous works Apology, Crito 
and Phaedo, Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus and in one of the sections of Montaigne’s (1946a: 




in occupying itself with a critical examination of Schopenhauer’s (cf. 1969b: 463-509) 
theory of athanasia. 
However, in order to fully arrive at a conclusion regarding the veracity thereof, it is 
necessary to scrutinize Schopenhauer’s (cf. 1969a: xii) system in its entirety. This is 
due to the fact that Schopenhauer is, as Kathleen M. Higgins (2003: 330) notes, “an 
emphatically systematic thinker. In claiming that his philosophy is an ‘organic’ whole, 
composed of elements that stand or fall together, Schopenhauer invites the reader who 
rejects a part of it to reject the theory in toto”. In particular, a sound assessment of the 
Schopenhauerian doctrine of immortality requires a pedantic consideration of the two 
pillars upon which the theory is based, viz., Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) radical idealism, 
i.e. the view that the world is entirely mind-dependent, and his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
100) claim that the essence of the world is a metaphysical Will, impervious to the 
influences of time, space and causality. I maintain that by illustrating the untenability 
of radical idealism on Schopenhauer’s terms on the one hand, and by proving that the 
Will cannot be the enigmatic Ding-an-sich on the other hand, Schopenhauer’s theory 
of immortality necessarily founders. In essence, this is due to the fact that Schopenhauer 
(1969b:487-488, et al.) claims that, unlike the world of appearances, the metaphysical 
Will is impervious to the influences of time, space and causality; as such the Will as 
Ding-an-sich must necessarily be indestructible and consequently it is that which is 
immortal. 
To that end, I have divided the exposition into two main sections: the first is intended 
as a preliminary discussion, structured in accordance with Schopenhauer’s presentation 
of these themes in his principal work6 – however, I fully acknowledge that some 
																																																								
Consequently, I consider the theme of my exposition, viz., Schopenhauer’s theory of 
immortality, to be a continuation of a noble tradition in Western philosophy, initiated all those 
centuries ago by Socrates. 
6 The exposition commences with a detailed discussion on “the world as appearance”, in 
accordance with Schopenhauer’s (cf. 1969a: 1) primary theme, viz., “the [appearance] subject 
to the principle of sufficient reason: the object of experience and of science”, in the first book 
of Die Welt; I then turn to a consideration of “the world as Will”, which accords with 
Schopenhauer’s (cf. 1969a: 93) attempted positive identification of the elusive Kantian Ding-




unavoidable, albeit significant criticisms of Schopenhauer’s thought are presented in 
the course of my discussion; this is unavoidable and necessary in so far as I could not 
merely present Schopenhauer’s views without simultaneously engaging with them in a 
critical manner, for my intention herein is not merely to present an outline of 
Schopenhauer’s views, but rather, to actively engage with them in order to arrive at a 
conclusion regarding their ultimate veracity – whereas the second main part is devoted 
entirely to a critical consideration of Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia in particular 
as presented and detailed in the first part. I shall commence the exposition with a 
discussion on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) radical idealism; this necessarily requires an 
introductory discussion on Kant’s identification of the mind as an active entity, i.e. as 
contributing to the creation of the experienceable world. The presentation of Kant’s 
views is significant in so far as in the course of my discussion I wish to contrast 
Schopenhauer’s radical idealism with that of Kant’s (partial) idealism as presented in 
the second (1787) edition of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft; ultimately, I wish to 
illustrate that Schopenhauer’s radical idealism is susceptible to numerous criticisms 
																																																								
which the entire dissertation is constructed. I have not accorded great consideration to the third 
book of Die Welt, viz., Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory, as it does not have much pertinence to 
the primary discussion, viz., death and immortality; however, it has been necessary to devote a 
portion of my discussion to a clarification of the role played by the Platonic Ideas within 
Schopenhauer’s architectonic, as these mysterious entities play a crucial role in the way in 
which Schopenhauer (1969a: 127-130) believes the world of appearances presents itself to 
consciousness. I have also devoted a considerable portion of my discussion to Schopenhauer’s 
(cf. 1969a: 309-310) pessimism, which can be found in the fourth book of Die Welt. I vindicate 
this inclusion for the sake of excoriation: were my intention merely to present and discuss 
Schopenhauer’s views on death and athanasia, I may have been permitted to exclude such a 
discussion altogether; however, in order to undermine Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality it 
was necessary to engage with his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 398-402) views on suicide, which 
naturally entail his pessimistic characterisation of life. Ultimately, I illustrate that for 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 400-402) solely one form of suicide, viz., intentional death by starvation, 
is avowable and, on his terms, commendable. This observation intimates a significant fact for 
the excoriation of Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia: ultimately it illustrates that the 
metaphysical Will is not impervious to alteration (an essential aspect for Schopenhauer’s theory 
of immortality). This seemingly perplexing notion is discussed in great detail in the exposition, 




which Kant’s partial idealism is not. I then turn to a consideration of Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 100) attempted solution of the enigmatic nature of the way the world is in-
itself. Now the word by which Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) characterises the essence of 
the world, viz., “Will”, has generated some confusion and consequently there are 
Schopenhauerian scholars, such as Bryan Magee (1997: 144) and S. Jack Odell (2001: 
54), who have erroneously ventured to supplant Schopenhauer’s intentionally chosen 
term for the concepts of “force” or “energy”. In order to fully comprehend why this is 
inadmissible, I turn to a detailed consideration of Schopenhauer’s (1889b: 246) view of 
the way in which his metaphysics can be taken as completing the scientific 
Weltanschauung. Thereafter, I examine the way in which this enigmatical essence 
manifests itself in the world of appearances (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 146-147), 
generating a pessimistic view of existence. In the course of my discussion I indicate 
that Schopenhauer did not, contrary to popular belief, proscribe the begetting of 
children; instead I illustrate that he encouraged the production of children in so far as 
they hold out the hope of an utter, i.e. metaphysical, abrogation of the Will. This topic, 
viz., Schopenhauer’s (cf. 1969a: 378-402) views on asceticism and suicide, naturally 
leads me to the primary section, i.e. a discussion of Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 463-509) 
views on death and immortality. As mentioned, Schopenhauer’s fascinating theory is 
necessarily dependent upon his (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 3-18) claims for radical 
idealism and his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100) theory of the Will being the Ding-an-sich. 
I vindicate the structure of my exposition by reiterating that due to the fact that 
Schopenhauer (1969a: xii) claims that his system is essentially the imparting of “a 
single thought”7 wherein “every part supports the whole just as much as it is supported 
by the whole; a [connection] in which no part is first and no part is last, in which the 
whole gains in clearness from every part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully 
understood until the whole has been first understood”; it is therefore necessary to 
consider the philosophical system in toto.  
My ultimate intention, however, is to persuasively illustrate the untenability of 
Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 500) claim regarding the immortality of the metaphysical Will. 
Consequently, in the second part of the exposition in particular – but throughout the 
																																																								
7 There is some controversy regarding precisely what Schopenhauer (1969a: xii) meant by his 




course of my discussion in general, as mentioned – I shall attempt to indicate that the 
metaphysical Will is in fact spatially and temporally situated and that it is subject to the 
causal principle. It is interesting to note that since the publication of his magnum opus 
in December 1818, Schopenhauer (1969a: 112-113) has been excoriated for claiming 
that the Will is atemporal (Cartwright, 2010: 388). However, to my knowledge, no one 
has yet – at least in the secondary English literature – attempted to illustrate that the 
Will is spatially bound or susceptible to the influence of causality. I have arrived at the 
view that the Will is actually capable of alteration by way of a consideration of 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 378-398) soteriological doctrine. In short, the only way in 
which Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 382) claim that the metaphysical Will dissolves at the 
moment of the ascetic’s death can be comprehended is to construe the phenomenal 
ascetic practices as affecting what I have termed a “transcendental change” (cf. 
Schopenhauer, 1969a: 403), whereby the metaphysical Will is caused to “contract”. 
However, the possibility of this occurring necessarily entails the metaphysical Will 
being subject to the causal principle. It is hoped that these notions will be made 
persuasively perspicuous in the course of the discussion. 
I shall also attempt to illustrate that Schopenhauer’s (1969a:3) radical idealism is 
incompatible with a modern scientific view of the universe. In particular, I shall argue 
that Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 152-154) evolutionary views are utterly at variance with 
his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 3) radical idealist claim and his (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273-
274) view of consciousness as dependent upon the physical brain.8 To my knowledge 
there is a lacuna in the secondary English literature regarding Schopenhauer’s 
evolutionary views and their compatibility with his radical idealism. Ultimately, I shall 
argue that Schopenhauer’s particular radical idealism is incompatible with the modern 
scientific view of the universe and consequently one cannot avow both positions 
simultaneously. I hope that in this way I shall convince my readers that Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 3) particular form of idealism ought to be rejected, thereby destroying the 
second pillar upon which his theory of immortality is based. 
																																																								
8 However, in stating this, I wish to make emphatically perspicuous that I fully accept 
Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 273-274) materialistic view of the brain; I only argue that it is 
incompatible with a radical idealist conception of the world. The materialistic view of the brain 




Before I commence the exposition in earnest, it is necessary to mention the numerous 
idiosyncrasies pertaining to the language employed herein; for whereas Schopenhauer 
was not an English philosopher, I am, unfortunately, not a native German speaker. As 
a consequence, I have been compelled to study Schopenhauer in translation.9 Now 
although the gist of his thoughts are easily acquired by way of the translations; there 
are certain words, the translation of which, have always excited controversy.  
The most famous of which is undoubtedly the German word “Vorstellung”. The famous 
translator of Schopenhauer’s works, E. F. J. Payne (1949: 97), translates the word as 
“representation”, whereas David and Jill Berman (1995: xxxv), the translators of an 
abridged version of Schopenhauer’s opus maximum, prefer the term “idea”. The latter 
translators (cf. Berman, 1995: xxxv-xxxvi) offer as a corroboration of their choice the 
fact that Schopenhauer himself chose the word “idea” for the German “Vorstellung” 
when he began an English translation of Kant’s Kritik der Reinen Vernunft; 
furthermore, it is argued by David Berman (1995: xxxv) that the term “idea” indicates 
Schopenhauer’s affinity with the British philosophers (such as Locke, Hume and 
Berkeley) who preceded him. Although I, too, favour the word “idea” for the English 
rendering of the German “Vorstellung”, the term unfortunately generates a twofold 
difficulty within Schopenhauer’s system. Firstly, “idea” intimates thoughts as opposed 
to material objects; thus the term may erroneously be construed to refer to concepts – 
which are in fact derived from experience and are consequently truly representations 
thereof (I have, therefore, reserved the term “representations” for abstract ideas, i.e. 
concepts). Secondly, in connection with his aesthetic and evolutionary theories, 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 127-130) makes use of the Platonic Ideas or Forms; thus, the 
simultaneous use of the words “idea” and “Idea” may cause some confusion for readers 
who are unfamiliar with Schopenhauer’s thought in particular and philosophy in 
general. I have consequently decided to render the German word “Vorstellung” as 
appearance,10 even though “appearance” is not listed by Payne (1949: 96) as one of the 
																																																								
9 I hope to one day rectify this shortcoming by learning the German language fluently. I can 
only hope that the translations I have utilised are not entirely mutilated or deficient, but 
accurately reflect Schopenhauer’s meanings and intentions. 
10 The Oxford dictionary defines the term “appearance” as “the way that someone or something 
looks”. Now this definition accords immaculately with the way in which I utilise the term; for 




acceptable renderings of the German term; however, I maintain that this term is far less 
confusing than either “representation” or “idea”. But I felt it unconscionable to translate 
Schopenhauer’s principal work as “The World as Will and Appearance”, therefore I 
have retained the original German title of Schopenhauer’s opus maximum – Die Welt 
als Wille und Vorstellung – throughout my exposition. Accordingly, the retention of 
one German title compelled me, for aesthetic reasons, to retain the German titles of 
Schopenhauer’s oeuvre in toto, as well as the German titles of Kant’s two works I have 
referred to herein, viz., Kritik der Reinen Vernunft and Prolegomena zur einer Jeden 
Künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten Können (which I simply 
refer to as the “Prolegomena”). 
A second term I have opted to retain in the original German is that of “Wille-zum-
Leben”. As Janaway (2008: 8) notes, the term’s literal translation in English is “Will-
to-live” – and this is the way in which Payne (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 275, et al.) 
translates it – however, it is not an entirely accurate translation as Janaway (2008: 8-9) 
notes, because “(a) […] it implicitly excludes the drive to reproduce life, and hence 
towards sexual behaviour, to which Schopenhauer gives great prominence and (b) 
because it lets in the wrong assumption that Schopenhauer is talking about a conscious 
desire to live, whereas Will-zum-Leben primarily operates to originate and shape the 
organism prior to any question of its having desires”. I may also be permitted to add, 
as a clarification to Janaway’s (2008: 8) first point, that, for Schopenhauer (1969a: 275), 
the Will does not solely seek to prolong the life of the individual, but life in general, 
i.e. “what the Will wills is always life”, “was der Wille Will immer das Leben ist” 
(Cartwright, 2005: 187); hence it is undoubtedly more accurate to render the term as 
“Will-to-life” in English. But due to the fact that Payne (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 275, 
et al.) renders the term as “Will-to-live”, whereas other commentators such as Janaway 
																																																								
– is essentially an item within the mind which corresponds to an entity within the world. This 
notion is to be distinguished from the Berkeleyan (2004a: 61) theory of radical idealism, 
wherein objects are said to be solely ideas, without a corresponding external object to ground 
them. On Schopenhauer’s account, and in contradistinction to the Berkeleyan variety, every 
object is essentially a concoction of the mind which must necessarily correspond to the 
metaphysical Will as the ens realissimum, i.e. “the most real being”. Upon my interpretation, 
an object is therefore an appearance of the metaphysical entity; and this I take to be a 




(2008:8-9) render it as “Will-to-life”, I have decided to retain the original German 
expression throughout my exposition. 
Another term I have retained in the original German is that of “Ding-an-sich”. My 
reason for this is that I believe it better facilitates for a construal of the world as it is in-
itself as a unity, in accordance with Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 113) pronouncements. In 
my estimation, the English translation, i.e. “thing-in-itself”, inadvertently detracts 
therefrom. Furthermore, the retention of the original German compliments the other 
German term previously discussed; for the Wille-zum-Leben is, upon an orthodox 
interpretation of the Schopenhauerian philosophy, the Ding-an-sich (cf. Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 100, Schopenhauer, 1889b: 216, and Schopenhauer, 1974b: 90, et al.). 
It is also necessary to note that throughout the thesis I intentionally avoid utilising the 
Kantian term “noumenon”. A noumenon literally means “things that are thought” 
(Beck, 2005: 694). Now, according to the Kantian philosophy, a noumenon (plural: 
noumena) refers to the inscrutable reality, i.e. the way in which reality exists 
independently of human consciousness (cf. Kant, 1950: 60) – consequently one cannot 
positively characterise the world in-itself according to Kant (1950: 37); one can solely 
define it in negative terms, i.e. one can only assert that it exists – its existence can be 
thought, but one cannot know it in the same way as a perceptible object is known 
(Scruton, 2001: 55-56). Of course, in Kant’s (1950: 80) philosophy it is entirely 
acceptable to utilise the term “noumenon” or “noumena” to refer to this inscrutable 
mind-independent reality, for Kant never, to my knowledge, attempts to positively 
characterise the world as it is in-itself; however, it is inadmissible to do so within 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, for the traditional or orthodox interpretation, which 
construes Schopenhauer (1969a: 100, et al.) as identifying the Will as the Ding-an-sich, 
intimates that the world in-itself is known to us, and moreover, “better known than 
anything” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 376).11 As a consequence thereof, it is erroneous, 
																																																								
11 That which I refer to as the “traditional or orthodox interpretation” is the identification of the 
Will with the Ding-an-sich, as presented by Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) in the second book of 
the first volume of Die Welt. The contrary, or “maverick”, interpretation is simply the 
qualification to the central thesis explicitly propounded by Schopenhauer (1969b: 196-197) in 
the second volume of his principal work, wherein he (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 197) claims that 




from an orthodox interpretation, to refer to the Ding-an-sich as a noumenon within the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy, for therein it is not, as in the case of Kant’s philosophy, 
a mysterious, inscrutable unknown or mysterious X, but something positively known 
(cf. Schopenhauer, 1974b: 90).  
However, the censure of the one Kantian term does not extend to its counterpart, viz., 
the term “phenomenon”. For by this term one literally means “things that appear” 
(Beck, 2005: 694); and, indeed, I have argued that a perceptible object is nothing other 
than an appearance of the Ding-an-sich in the perceiving mind. Consequently, I have 
not refrained from utilising the terms “phenomenon” (plural: “phenomena”) and 
“phenomenal” throughout my exposition.  
  
																																																								
intimating that there are other inscrutable aspects to the Ding-an-sich. As a consequence 
thereof, it is erroneous to apply the term “noumenon” to the traditional or orthodox 
interpretation of the Schopenhauerian philosophy, which considers the Ding-an-sich to be 
positively identified as the Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100, et al.); it would, however, be 
perfectly acceptable to utilise the term upon a maverick interpretation, for according thereto the 
Ding-an-sich cannot be known in its entirety (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969b: 196-198). For reasons 
I shall fully explicate in the course of my discussion, I subscribe wholeheartedly to the 
traditional or orthodox interpretation wherein the Ding-an-sich is fully identified with the Will; 
hence I cannot, in good conscience, utilize the terms “noumenon/noumena” and “noumenal”. 




Part I:  An Introductory Account of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy 
	
The doctrine of athanasia is ordinarily associated with a religious conception of life: 
God, the immortal soul, heaven and hell are inextricably bound in the minds of many. 
It will therefore astonish those who make this erroneous association that Schopenhauer 
was both an atheist (Edwards, 2009: 173) and an advocate of life after death 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 501). Yet there is absolutely no contradiction in avowing both 
doctrines, for athanasia is as little dependent on the existence of a God as genuine moral 
behaviour is upon religious or legal injunctions.  
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: xv) thought is, as he himself admitted in the preface to the first 
edition of his principal work, indebted to three antecedent philosophical systems, viz., 
the Upanishads, Plato, and Kant. Undoubtedly, it is the last of which that is the most 
significant as Schopenhauer constructs his entire philosophy upon the bedrock of what 
he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 417) praisingly refers to as “Kant’s greatest merit”, viz., 
Kant’s dichotomisation between the world-as-it-is-in-itself (Ding-an-sich) and the 
world-as-it-appears-to-perception (appearance), which is “based on the proof that 
between things and us there always stands the intellect, and that on this account they 
cannot be known according to what they may be in themselves” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
417-418). Kant (1950: 62) claims (rightly in my opinion) that the Ding-an-sich cannot 
be known independently of the mind, for any characterization thereof presupposes the 
mind. Schopenhauer (1969a: 100), in contradistinction thereto, maintains that this 
Kantian proscription applies solely to objects of the outer-sense and that consequently, 
by way of introspection, one is able to identify the Ding-an-sich with the volitional 
strivings in one’s body:  
“To the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only through the 
identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is 
given in intelligent perception as [appearance], as an object among objects, 
liable to the laws of these objects. But it is also given in quite a different way, 
namely as what is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word 
Will” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100). 
It is this concept, viz., the identification of the Ding-an-sich with the Will, which has 




called “great philosophers” of the Western canon (cf. Bertrand Russell’s History of 
Western Philosophy, 1946, pages 786-787).  
Thus, in so far as Schopenhauer attempts to positively characterise the way the world 
is in-itself, it is no exaggeration to say that the Schopenhauerian philosophy can be 
conceived as an emendation and a continuation of the Kantian. Consequently, it is 
necessary to commence this study at the same point at which Schopenhauer begins his 
opus maximum, namely with a discussion of his Berkeleyan-inspired interpretation of 
Kantianism. As shall soon become apparent Schopenhauer’s arguments for radical 
idealism12 form the foundation of his entire philosophy, including his doctrine of 
athanasia, and as such they are to be considered in earnest.  
  
																																																								




2. Kant Identifies the Mind as an Active Entity 
	
Few people are probably aware of the protracted and arduous development of the 
scientific method, which is arguably humankind’s most sacred possession – despite its 
necessary limitations.13 Yet its origins can be traced to the discipline of philosophy 
(Russell, 1999: 112) and in particular to “one of the greatest historic controversies” 
(Russell, 1999: 51) therein, viz., that “between the two schools called respectively 
‘empiricists’ and ‘rationalists’” (Russell, 1999: 51).14 A pivotal stage in the 
development thereof occurred with the advent of René Descartes’ Meditations in 1641, 
which ushered in the modern period of philosophical enquiry (Russell, 1999: 10). 
Descartes, as is generally well known, maintains that knowledge can be acquired by 
way of a consideration of the experience-independent “innate principles” contained 
within the mind (Bracken, 2002: 37). What this ultimately portends is that one can 
obtain knowledge about the world merely through the act of contemplation. Although 
this may now seem conspicuously erroneous to our modern, empirically-saturated 
minds, it did not initially appear so, for it is possible that by way of laborious 
concentration and a rigid application of logical principles one may be able to attain 
apodictic knowledge about the world. However, in the course of time, opposition to the 
rationalistic view inevitably mounted, ultimately culminating in the antithetical school 
of empiricism. According to these philosophers, of which the most famous are 
undoubtedly the three colossal British thinkers: Locke, Hume and Berkeley, knowledge 
can only be obtained by way of experience (Russell, 1999: 51). Thus, an early schism 
in modern philosophy, which unwittingly led to the development of the modern 
scientific method, is that between the rationalists on the one hand, who maintain that 
knowledge is derivable by way of a rigorous application of logical principles and, on 
the other hand, the empiricists, who maintain that all genuine knowledge can solely be 
																																																								
13 I maintain that the scientific method is limited in its explanatory power due to the fact that it 
is dependent on the human mind. However, in propounding this view I do not portend that other 
forms of knowledge-acquisition, such as philosophy, religion and mysticism, are capable of 
filling the void, thereby supplying humankind with exhaustive knowledge. I discuss this matter 
in numerous parts of my disquisition.  
14 Roger Scruton (2001: 21) notes that “[t]his convenient, though contentious, division of […] 




acquired by way of experience. Yet, upon a close consideration of the matter, it is 
evident that both the rationalists and the empiricists are unable to account for certain 
difficulties and facts. The rationalists, for instance, may apply rigorous logical 
principles to a plethora of notions, none of which have a corresponding object to which 
they refer; while the radical empiricists are coerced to repudiate mathematics, even 
though it is evident that modern physics is capable of answering questions about 
phenomena insusceptible to empirical observation solely by way of mathematics.15 It 
has taken centuries for the refinement of the modern scientific method, which is 
essentially an amalgamation of the rationalist and empiricist philosophies. What I mean 
by this is the following: a hypothesis, which is nothing but a fabrication of reason, must 
always be corroborated by empirical observation; yet after numerous instances of 
observing a phenomenon wherein Y proceeds from X one assumes, by way of inductive 
reasoning, that X (always) causes Y and thus the latter is assumed to follow the former 
as night does day. It is significant to note that this last generalisation is nothing but an 
assumption of reason, i.e. it is not based upon logical principles or empirical 
observation.  
In offering this overly-simplistic illustration I have attempted to make evident that the 
modern scientific enterprise is founded upon an amalgamation of empiricism and 
rationalism, i.e. it oscillates between the two. It is erroneous to maintain that science is 
merely a form of radical empiricism, for, as I shall shortly discuss, the view which 
rigidly maintains that all knowledge is derivable from experience alone is actually 
inimical to the scientific enterprise. Now given that the scientific method is dependent 
on both logical formulations and experience (observation) it is no exaggeration to say 
that another colossal milestone in the history thereof is to be found in the “marvellous” 
(Schopenhauer, 1889a: 1) German philosopher, Immanuel Kant’s attempt to reconcile 
both views. However, Kant’s reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism generates 
one extremely interesting and significant consequence for our present study, viz., that 
the mind actively assists in the construction of reality. In so far as this notion forms the 
																																																								
15 For instance, how do scientists measure the size of celestial bodies or the distance between 





bedrock of Schopenhauer’s system, let us consider in more detail the way in which Kant 
arrives at this revolutionary conclusion.  
Initially Kant had been a rationalist, maintaining – like his mentor Leibniz – that all 
knowledge is derivable from the application of logical principles (Scruton, 2001: 21). 
Thus, Kant’s writings until the publication of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft in 1781 
are considered inconsequential for the most part. The development of his so-called 
“Critical Philosophy”, for which Kant’s name is rightly forever immortalised, is to be 
found in his encounter with the work of his empirical predecessor, David Hume, from 
whom, Kant (1950: 8) states, he was awoken from “dogmatic slumber”. Hume was a 
radical empiricist, maintaining that all genuine knowledge is acquired solely by way of 
experience.  Now this may be taken to intimate that Hume was committed to the 
scientific enterprise, for science is primarily based upon empirical investigation, but 
Hume’s arguments must be construed to intimate that science does not fare any better 
in producing genuine knowledge than pure reason; this is ultimately due to the fact that 
the radical empiricist maintains that only that which is experienced can be known with 
certainty. To make a claim about the world which is not based upon an experience 
thereof is to inadmissibly move from the empirical world to pure reason. Let us take as 
an illustration of this perplexing notion that of a flame. I think that I can confidently 
state that all mentally coherent individuals will agree that flames possess, among other 
properties, the quality of heat. But the radical empiricist maintains that such a general 
claim as to the properties of flames in general cannot be made: if one has not 
experienced every single flame – past, present and future – how can one know with 
certainty that all flames are hot? As Hume (2007: 36) states: 
“[…] If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that 
the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can 
give rise to no inference or conclusion.” 
The point here is that general claims about the universe surpass empirical observation, 
and so far as the radical empiricist is concerned such general statements are 
inadmissible. The radical empiricist insists that in order for one to make the claim that 
all flames are hot, one must first have experienced every single flame – past, present 
and future. Of course, such a requirement is unsatisfiable owing to the finitude of 




conclusion is that the scientific enterprise is impossible on the radical empiricist 
account. 
Thus, radical empiricism inevitably leads to scepticism (Scruton, 2001: 25). For if one 
insists on empirical observation for every claim to apodictic knowledge then one cannot 
rely on inductive reasoning, which is tacitly assumed by the modern method of 
scientific research. This last point is of immense significance and I shall therefore 
reflect on it at some length. A scientist, by way of pure reflection, might formulate a 
hypothesis, which he subsequently attempts to confirm by way of numerous 
experiments (empirical observations), thereafter, he assumes, by way of inductive 
reasoning, that the hypothesis must be veracious in so far as the postulated cause 
repeatedly produces the hypothesized effect; thus he concludes – and here is the leap 
from obstinate empiricism to assumptive rationalism – that the hypothesis will always 
hold true. Yet, from the perspective of the radical empiricist it is not certain that the one 
shall always and inevitably follow upon the appearance of the other. For instance, 
perhaps somewhere in the universe at present, or in the distant past or future, there is, 
was or will be a flame which does not emit heat. If this is so, then the statement “all 
flames are hot” is in fact erroneous, but ignorance owing to the finitude of human 
existence prevents one from realising this.  
It ought to be evident then that closely associated with the predicament of inductive 
reasoning is that of causal connection, i.e. one often assumes a causal relationship 
between two objects even though “[…] there is not, in any single, particular instance of 
cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary 
connection” (Hume, 2007: 60). In a sense, the causal law is a form of inductive 
reasoning, for it permits the generalisation of a connection between phenomena: i.e., to 
say that X causes Y portends that wherever one encounters Y one must necessarily 
assume X as its antecedent cause; yet what gives one the right to avow such a claim? 
The radical empiricist must here remind the modern scientist that it is not impossible 
that Y may have arisen due to factors other than X – in which case the generalisation 
or causal law which states “X causes Y” is erroneous.  The attribution of a causal 
connection is in the last analysis, according to Hume (2007: 41), merely a product of 
“custom or habit”. In other words, one witnesses the pairing of two phenomena on 
numerous occasions, such as a flame and heat (Hume, 2007: 42), and concludes that 




why the one must necessarily follow from the other; we merely anticipate the one from 
the other owing to the constant pairing or conjunction of those events, i.e. one arbitrarily 
assumes the necessary connection of two events based solely on the fact that one event 
follows another on numerous occasions (Hume, 2007: 69). Hence Hume (2007: 42) 
declares that “[c]ustom, […] makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events 
with those which have appeared in the past” (Hume, 2007: 42). But it must be observed 
that custom originates within us, not the external world; therefore, empirically 
speaking, there is no cogent reason for maintaining that the two events will not admit 
of at least one exception; in which case the supposed causal connection between certain 
phenomena would be swiftly annulled (Hume, 2007: 36). It ought to be evident, then, 
that Hume’s scepticism pertains to two fundamental features of scientific investigation, 
viz., inductive reasoning and the causal law. 
Now, if one were to take this radical empiricist notion seriously one would not be able 
to arrive at any certainty by way of the scientific method: at best, one could only state 
that science offers what appears to be the most accurate description of the universe. 
But, as a thought experiment, we can entertain the radical empiricist view by imagining 
the possibility that perhaps the matter is not as it appears to us finite creatures, in spite 
of the repeated association of certain phenomena, such as the association of heat with 
flames. We modern humans confidently and erroneously assert our domination over the 
world by way of our imagined superior understanding thereof, thinking that the 
scientific method is infallible, its conclusions irrefragable and that it is capable of 
disclosing the absolute Truths of this mysterious universe in which we all find 
ourselves; however, we must necessarily humble ourselves before the radical 
empiricist’s objection; for upon closer consideration it is evident that the scientific 
method is not as infallible as we often assume it to be.   
Nowadays the discipline of science has become for many a surrogate form of religious 
belief, where once the words of Jehovah were accepted blindly as eternal truths, so now 
are the utterances of eminent scientists. As a consequence thereof many individuals are 
apt to disregard Hume’s concerns as aberrations of an overly-sceptical mind. But this, 
in my estimation, intimates an absence of recondite thought, for Hume’s observations 
are as pertinent now as they were when he first proposed them. For what – besides the 
unfounded assumptions of custom or habit – gives one the right to generalise an 




answered – Hume’s scepticism remains a haunting spectre ever-looming over the 
scientific enterprise, which persists as humankind’s most sacred possession in spite of 
that scepticism. Try as I might I must confess that I am unable to counter Hume’s 
sceptical objections with cogent responses; as a consequence thereof I maintain that 
science ought to humble itself and not erroneously portray itself as a discipline capable 
of definitely solving every mystery of the universe.16 
But although I am unable to counter Hume’s scepticism, the “marvellous” 
(Schopenhauer, 1889a: 1) and, I might add, ingenious Kant attempted to do so; for he 
realises that an adequate answer to the predicament of how necessity can belong to the 
causal law would salvage science from the scepticism of the radical empiricist (Scruton, 
2001: 25). In order to solve the difficulty one must first discover the source of universal 
and necessary knowledge and then indicate how that knowledge pertains to experience. 
To this end Kant (1950: 14), following Hume (2007: 25-26), dichotomised between 
two categories of knowledge, viz., analytical a priori knowledge and synthetical a 
posteriori knowledge. The former form of knowledge is founded upon and concerns 
pure reason alone. This type of knowledge does not require experience to confirm its 
claims and is consequently either true or false according to the principle of 
																																																								
16 In stating this I must however emphatically insist that I do not portend that religion and 
philosophy can offer knowledge where science cannot; for all three disciplines depend on the 
human brain, which is by its very nature finite and subject to error. The notion maintained by 
some pious individuals, viz., that religion can answer the unanswerable, is based upon the 
erroneous view that revelation is handed to humankind by a transcendent omniscient being, i.e. 
a being not limited by sense organs and a finite brain has handed humankind profound 
knowledge about the universe and the origin of life. But in response thereto, and along with 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 361), I may be permitted to state that “[…] whoever can seriously think 
that beings who were not human had ever given information concerning the existence and 
purpose of our race and the world, is still only a big child. There is no revelation other than the 
thoughts of sages, although these are subject to error, as is the lot of everything human. These 
are often clothed in strange allegories and myths that are then called religions”. In other words, 
all knowledge emanates from the human brain, which is, by its very nature, limited. Although 
it might be uncomfortable, the mature mind must accept that many mysteries of the universe 
are insoluble by the finite human mind, ignoramus et ignorabimus (“we do not know and we 




contradiction. The logical form of the principle of contradiction can be formulated as 
“the law [according to which] a proposition cannot be both true and false or that a thing 
cannot both have and not have a given property” (Grooten & Steenbergen, 1958: 90). 
Kant brilliantly defines analytical propositions as “explicative” statements, “adding 
nothing to the content of knowledge” (Kant, 1950: 14). These are propositions in which 
the subject-concept is contained within the predicate; so, for instance, “a vixen is a 
female fox” is true by virtue of the fact that the term “vixen” portends “female fox” and 
is merely a synonym thereof. Such a statement does not augment one’s knowledge 
regarding the concept of a vixen, and, moreover, one need not consult experience to 
confirm the truth of that statement, it is known a priori. Given that analytic a priori 
statements are not based on experience they are universally veracious and necessary. In 
connection with my foregoing example of analytical a priori propositions this amounts 
to the claim that ten thousand years previously a vixen was a female fox, and ten 
thousand years hence a vixen will still be a female fox, even if these beautiful creatures 
should become extinct or the term to designate them should alter. The truth of this 
statement is universal and necessary.  
The latter form of knowledge, viz., synthetical a posteriori knowledge, Kant describes 
as “expansive”, “increasing the given knowledge” (Kant, 1950: 14). As such, all 
propositions in which the predicate is not contained within the subject-concept, and 
thus requires experience to confirm their truth, are synthetical a posteriori in nature. If 
I were to state that “my dog’s coat is white in colour” one would not be able to 
determine the colour of my dog based on the subject-concept alone, for “my dog’s coat” 
does not contain within itself any allusion to the colour thereof. Thus one must have 
recourse to experience in order to determine the truth of most17 synthetical statements. 
Significantly, unlike analytical a priori statements, the principle of contradiction cannot 
determine the veracity of synthetical a posteriori propositions, and consequently these 
statements are conditional – neither universal nor necessary. Now, prima facie, it would 
appear that science is based solely on synthetical a posteriori propositions, for the 
scientific enterprise aims at augmenting knowledge by way of experimentation and 
inductive reasoning. But to return to Hume’s concern: how can one know with any 
																																																								





degree of certainty that synthetical propositions are universally true and necessary?  
According to the perspective of the radical empiricist the proposition that “all flames 
are hot” can only be shown to be veracious if the concept of “flame” were to contain 
within itself, i.e. a priori, the notion of “hot”.  
This dichotomisation between analytical a priori knowledge and synthetical a 
posteriori knowledge leads inevitably to the conclusion that scientific knowledge is 
impossible because one can make universal and necessary statements solely about 
thoughts generated by pure reason, which have no pertinence to the world of 
experience, and not about notions acquired from experience. Kant’s ingenious solution 
to this impasse was to identify a third type of knowledge, viz., synthetic a priori 
knowledge (Kant, 1950: 14-19). This knowledge incorporates elements from the two 
aforementioned types of knowledge: its statements pertain to experience and hence are 
expansive, “increasing the given knowledge” (Kant, 1950: 14); however, this 
knowledge precedes experience and is therefore both universal and necessary (a 
priori).18 What this ultimately portends, and expressed more succinctly, is that there is 
a type of knowledge which precedes experience and is yet pertinent to experience. This 
is perhaps the most significant notion in Kant’s philosophy as it identifies the human 
mind as active; by which is meant that the mind is (partly, according to my 
interpretation; but not according to Schopenhauer’s) responsible for the construction of 
reality. Prior to Kant it was thought that the mind passively receives impressions from 
the world – a tabula rasa upon which the world imprints itself (Kant, Bxvi). By 
identifying synthetic a priori knowledge Kant maintains that he has unequivocally 
shown the mind to be an element in the construction of experience; as he (Kant, Bxvi, 
xvii) states in the preface to the second edition of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft: 
“If the intuition had to conform to the constitution of objects, I would not 
understand how we would know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as 
object of senses) conformed to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I 
could very well conceive such a possibility.” 
																																																								
18 Synthetic a priori knowledge accords perfectly with the modern scientific method which 




Kant compares his notion of the “active mind” to that of Copernicus’ revolutionary 
heliocentric theory (Bxvi, xvii), but, as Jacques Choron (1963: 142) notes, the analogy 
is not an accurate one, because: 
“[…]  Copernicus, by making ‘the spectator revolve’ instead of having the 
universe, the sun, and planets revolve around him, broke with geocentrism and 
dealt a crushing blow to anthropomorphism. Kant, however, by making nature 
conform to man’s intuition and understanding, by insisting that ‘the laws of 
nature are the laws of the experience of nature’ (as Alois Riehl puts it), 
reaffirms anthropocentricism. In this sense it has been correctly said that what 
he calls his Copernican revolution in philosophy is rather a Ptolemaic counter-
revolution.”19 
It must be noted that in so far as the general causal law is identified by Kant as synthetic 
a priori in nature it appears that Hume’s scepticism regarding causality has not in fact 
been adequately addressed.  For in the last analysis Kant’s thesis regarding causality 
merely states: “the mind knows a priori that one event must precede and cause 
another”; it cannot explicate the particular causal connection between two particular 
phenomena. For instance, imagine that an individual afflicted with lung cancer 
approaches a medical doctor. The physician knows that something must have caused 
the illness, yet he cannot easily determine what it is. Naturally, in the case of an 
individual who inhales poisonous fumes it is tempting to attribute the aetiology of the 
illness thereto; but such an association does not always appear to be the case, i.e. there 
are instances of non-smokers developing lung cancer. Now if the particular instantiation 
of the causal law were synthetic a priori in nature then one would know immediately 
that X is the cause of Y. Yet, in actu,20 this is never the case. In medicine and physics 
many aetiological explanations remain pure conjecture; thus does Hume’s scepticism 
return: perhaps the majority of aetiological explanations are nothing more than 
formulations of custom or habit, i.e. a constant conjunction of unrelated phenomena. 
For instance, the doctor who notes that most patients afflicted with lung cancer smoked 
at some point in their lives attempts, by way of “custom” or “habit”, to attribute the 
																																																								
19 In due course it shall become apparent how Schopenhauer adds to this anthropocentricism 
by identifying the Ding-an-sich with the volitional strivings of humankind (cf. Tanner, 1999: 
16). 




cause of the cancer to the poisonous fumes of the cigarette, pipe or cigar; yet, in spite 
of his assertion, he cannot truly explicate how such fumes are able to produce a 
malignant growth.  Thus, even though the general law of causality may be intrinsic to 
the brain, i.e. although one knows a priori that “every effect must have an antecedent 
cause”, it does not follow that every causal explanation conjured thereby is veracious. 
Thus, Hume’s scepticism persists in spite of Kant’s thesis being correct; i.e., even 
though the mind may be said to contain within itself a causal mechanism it cannot 
accurately determine aetiological relationships in the real world. In spite of this 
difficulty, Kant was, as Roger Scruton (2001: 129) notes, “regarded by his immediate 
successors as having irreversibly changed the course of philosophy”. In particular, 
Kant’s identification of the mind as an active entity which assists in the construction of 
reality forms the foundation of the entire Schopenhauerian philosophy. For 
Schopenhauer’s magnum opus commences with a lengthy discussion on “the 
[appearance] subject to the principle of sufficient reason” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 1), 
wherein Schopenhauer (1969a: 3) attempts to argue “that everything that exists for 
knowledge, and hence the whole of this world, is only object in relation to the subject, 





3. The World as Appearance: First Part 
	
Schopenhauer (1969a: 5-6) concurs with Kant in maintaining that the mind is an active 
organ. By “active” it is meant that the mind does not passively receive sensory data, 
but that it actively assists in the construction of perception (reality). Let us reflect on 
this recondite notion.  
Most individuals assume that the world one perceives is akin to the world as it is prior 
to perception; thus, on this understanding, the universe is not mysterious: as it presents 
itself to us, so it is. For instance, one unacquainted with philosophy may assume that 
an object he perceives is akin to the object as it is in-itself, i.e. he maintains that the 
object is of a certain shape, colour and texture independently of his perception of it. 
This means, in effect, that the qualities attributed by him to the object inhere therein 
and continue to exist even when it is not being perceived. Indeed, nothing seems so 
obvious as the real existence of the perceptible world.21 However, Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 417-418) maintains that these philosophically naïve individuals forget that 
between sensory data and perception there stands the mind, which acts as a filter, so to 
say, which thus transforms mere sensation into perception.  
 
3.1. Sensations vis-à-vis Perceptions 
	
Now before we proceed with the intricate discussion as to how the mind constructs 
reality, it is necessary to linger a while longer on the distinction between that of 
sensation/intuition on the one hand and perception on the other, as it is extremely 
significant to the development of the subsequent discussion. It must be noted that this 
distinction is not a superfluous idiosyncratic concoction which I have formulated in 
order to better comprehend – or complicate – the Schopenhauerian philosophy; on the 
contrary, as D. W. Hamlyn (2009: 18) notes, Schopenhauer (cf. 1889a: 59-60) himself 
emphatically insists on it.  
Now for the sake of comprehensibility the sensations may be compared to rough, 
unpolished diamonds: in this state they are raw, i.e. they are senseless, without 
																																																								




meaning: a kaleidoscope of colours, shapes, sounds and such like. Just as it is difficult 
for the untrained individual to identify an unpolished stone as being a diamond, so too 
would it be impossible (if one could experience them directly, i.e. without the 
mechanisms of the mind) to make sense of raw sensations. Sensations are essentially 
of a subjective nature (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 60), i.e. they are experienced solely by 
the knowing subject and exist solely for that subject. But we must remark, even at this 
undeveloped stage, that the sensations admit of a twofold nature: they can either 
originate from within or from without the subject. The former are illusions or figments 
of one’s imagination, wherein no real or external object corresponds to or grounds the 
sensations; whereas the latter require a derivation from something external to the 
subject, otherwise such sensations are nothing but those of the former sort, i.e. mere 
chimeras of the subject’s imagination. Let us reflect on this significant point.  If, for 
instance, one experiences a burning sensation on one’s limb one may attribute the cause 
thereof to either an external or an internal source. 22 In the latter case we may speak of 
hallucinations: the mind fabricates a sensation to which no external or real object 
corresponds. Indeed, this is precisely the definition of the term “hallucination”. In 
contrast, the former requires the postulation of some object impinging upon the body 
from without and thus producing sensations therein. In the case of sensations without 
any external validity one would be expected to speak of chimeras or “figments of the 
imagination”, whereas sensations which rely on external objects may be referred to as 
genuine and real, i.e. existing independently of the mind.23 Thus, in order for one to 
distinguish between figments of one’s imagination (hallucinations) and empirically real 
																																																								
22 By “external” I portend something which actually exists external to the subject; whereas by 
“internal” I portend that which exists solely within the mind of the subject and does not have a 
corresponding object. 
23 In propounding this view I do not wish to give the erroneous impression that sensations which 
originate from within the subject’s body are hallucinatory in nature. For instance, a blockage 
in an artery may cause pain and such must be considered as genuine. Here, even though the 
sensations are caused from something within the subject’s body, they are external in so far as 
they are not mere illusions of the brain. Internal sensations refer specifically to those which 
originate within the brain and do not correspond to anything external to it; whereas external 
sensations refer to anything external to the brain (even within the subject’s own body) which 




objects we must acknowledge the necessity of an external, empirically real object 
causing sensations within the subject’s body. This, however, is, as we shall see, 
problematical on Schopenhauer’s account for two reasons: (i) Schopenhauer (1969a: 
81, cf. also page 100) does not think that the causal law can be applied to sensations or 
to the object as it is in-itself, and (ii) Schopenhauer (1969a: 80) does not think that the 
essence or source of objects is empirical or material, but rather a unified metaphysical 
entity.24 In spite of these potential difficulties, which I will discuss in due course, I wish 
for the moment only to emphasize the necessity of some externally real object in the 
case of non-hallucinatory sensations; for if one rejects the existence of such external 
objects as a cause or grounding of sensations then it becomes impossible to distinguish 
illusion from reality. We shall return to this matter in connection with Schopenhauer’s 
teaching in due course, but for the moment I hope that I have illustrated the essential 
characteristics of sensations, viz., that they are immediate and unintelligible, i.e. 
without form or meaning.  
We may determine the idiosyncratic veracity, i.e. in connection with the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy, of the abovementioned characterisation of sensations by 
noting that in the second edition of his doctoral dissertation, Über die vierfache Wurzel 
des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde,25 Schopenhauer (1889a: 59-60) describes 
sensations as “a miserably poor thing”; and he states, further: 
“Even in the noblest of our organs it is nothing but a local, specific feeling, 
susceptible of some slight variation, still in itself always subjective and, as such 
therefore, incapable of containing anything objective, anything like perception. 
For sensation is and remains a process within the organism and is limited, as 
such, to the region within the skin; it cannot therefore contain anything which 
lies beyond that region, or, in other words, anything that is outside us.26 A 
																																																								
24 However, that is not to suggest that reality cannot be distinguished from hallucination within 
the Schopenhauerian philosophy, for as we shall see, one can argue that real objects are 
manifestations of the world as it is in-itself, whereas hallucinations have no such grounding. 
This issue will be made perspicuous in the course of the discussion. 
25 On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (first edition published in 1813; 
second and definitive edition in 1847). 
26 Although it is true that sensations are experienced subjectively it seems to me that they must 




sensation may be pleasant or unpleasant – which betokens a relation to the Will 
– but nothing objective can ever lie in any sensation. In the organs of the 
senses, sensation is heightened by the confluence of the nerve-extremities, and 
can easily be excited from without on account of their extensive distribution 
and the delicacy of the envelope which encloses them; it is besides specially 
susceptible to particular influences, such as light, sound, smell; 
notwithstanding which it is and remains mere sensation, like all others within 
our body, consequently something essentially subjective, of whose changes we 
only become immediately conscious in the form of the inner sense, Time: that 
is, successively.” 
Now if sensations are akin to the asperous, opaque diamond-stone then, to continue the 
analogy, perceptions may be compared to the cut and polished diamond: they are thus 
intelligible and meaningful. In the parlance of the Schopenhauerian philosophy 
perceptions are intelligible appearances, i.e. empirical and experienceable objects. 
Now, in just the same way as the hands and instruments of the craftsman alter the 
asperous raw stone into a symmetrically glistening diamond, so too does the mind, by 
way of certain innate mechanisms, transform the jumble of sensations into intelligible 
perceptions. In other words, following Kant, Schopenhauer (1969a: 6-13) maintains 
that the mind contains mechanisms, which he refers to as the “principle of sufficient 
reason”, which transform unintelligible sensory data into meaningful perceptions. 
Sensation, then, is not akin to perception, and anyone who remains doubtful of the 
mind’s ability to transform sensations into perceptions need only consider the following 
examples. In the first place, our incredulous individual may consider Wittgenstein’s 
rabbit-duck drawing. In-itself this illustration is neither a rabbit nor a duck, it is solely 
black lines upon a white page: it is the active, engaging mind that causes one to see at 
one moment a rabbit and at another a duck.  But the phenomenon can also be observed 
in an activity which most, if not all, have undoubtedly experienced in the course of life, 
most probably in childhood, viz., the construal of objects in the clouds. The ability to 
see mundane earthly objects in the irregular shapes of the clouds is a wonderful 
illustration of the way in which the mind transforms chaotic sensations into orderly 
perceptions. In a similar vein, this notion was the leitmotif of the surrealist artist René 
																																																								
to emphasise the subjectivity of sensations in order to argue in favour of radical idealism. This 




Magritte’s famous painting La trahison des images.27 The painting, as is well known, 
depicts a pipe, below which is the caption which reads “ceci n’est pas une pipe”.28 The 
painting intimates the notion that the mind constructs the image (or perception) of a 
pipe from a conglomeration of senseless colours and lines (i.e. sensations). Sensations, 
therefore, precede perceptions and I reiterate that in due course we shall enquire as to 
the origins of the former within the Schopenhauerian philosophy.   
Schopenhauer (1889a: 67-83) himself offers a few compelling empirical observations 
in support of the thesis that the mind is capable of assisting in the construction of 
perception, and I shall reiterate the two I consider to be the most pertinent for the sake 
of persuasion. In his doctoral dissertation he (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 68-69) presents in 
favour of this view the fact that the image perceived by the eye is inverted; this is due 
to the fact that light from the top of an object reflects at the bottom of the retina, whereas 
light projected from the bottom of an object reflects at the top of the retina. Hence the 
image reflected in the eye is an upside-down one; but the brain corrects this error by 
placing objects in their correct position (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 69). Furthermore, and 
no less compelling, is the fact that we see with two eyes and yet we perceive a single 
image (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 69); this is due to the fact that the brain combines the two 
separate sensations received by each eye and transforms them into a single coherent 
perception (ibid.). 
All this undoubtedly proves that the mind assists in the construction of one’s image of 
the world, but it does not necessarily prove that the world, in toto, is a mere idea or 
appearance in the mind of an observer. We must, consequently, consider in more detail 
the way in which the mind is said to construct the world. To this end, Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 6) maintains that the mind contains certain innate mechanisms through which 
all sensations are filtered prior to becoming perceptions. But, I have been referring very 
generally to the so-called “innate mechanisms of the mind” and the “principle of 
sufficient reason” without explicitly describing them. To return to an earlier discussion, 
the significance of which will now become perspicuous, the innate mechanisms of the 
mind are properties which precede perception and yet pertain thereto; in a word, these 
innate mechanisms are the synthetic a priori forms identified by Kant (Schopenhauer, 
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1969: 5-6).29 As such, these synthetic a priori mechanisms are essential components of 
perception and they are thus necessary and universal. Kant had argued that these 
mechanisms comprise of twelve categories (which include causality, substance, 
accident and so on), and two forms of intuition, viz., time and space (Scruton, 2001: 
40). In this way the mind transforms senseless sensory data into intelligible perception. 
But it is at this point that the first major schism between Schopenhauer and Kant occurs. 
For the former (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 448) amends the latter’s theory by rejecting 
eleven of the so-called categories and retaining solely that of causality30 and the two 
forms of intuition (time and space), which Schopenhauer came to refer as the 
principium individuationis.31 To this end Schopenhauer (1969a:6) transforms the 
synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind into the principle of sufficient reason, which 
according to the law of homogeneity,32 i.e. according to its general expression, renders 
the world entirely comprehensible and thus acts as the bedrock for both ordinary 
experiences and scientific endeavours. In short, the general expression of the principle 
of sufficient reason states that there exists a cogent explanation for absolutely every 
observable and possible phenomenon in the world. It can thus be succinctly expressed 
																																																								
29 As a consequence of this observation, it would be more correct to refer to these mechanisms 
as the synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind. I shall therefore henceforth refer to the 
synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind, as opposed to the hackneyed and technically 
erroneous expression “innate mechanisms of the mind”. 
30 I must confess that I have been unable to comprehend Schopenhauer’s reason for this 
emendation of Kant’s theory. Initially I maintained that perhaps Schopenhauer thought that the 
eleven categories were ultimately reducible to that of causality, but he never explicitly states 
this. He (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 458 and Schopenhauer, 1969b: 305) merely equates accident 
and substance (which he identifies with matter, cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 458) with causality. 
Thus, we must suppose that due to the fact that substance and accident are ultimately reducible 
to causality, it is redundant to list them separately. I can only tentatively conjecture that this is 
true of the remaining nine Kantian categories, i.e., perhaps Schopenhauer (1969a: 448) rejects 
eleven of Kant’s twelve categories because he believes all of them to be ultimately reducible to 
causality. 
31 “The principle of individuation”. 




by Christian Wolf’s expression: “Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non sit.” – 
“nothing is without a reason for its being” (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 5).  
But according to Schopenhauer (1889a: 30) the principle of sufficient reason contains 
subtle distinctions and these must be acknowledged in accordance with the law of 
specification, which attempts to identify diversity in unity (Cartwright, 2005: 160).33 
Thus Schopenhauer (1889a: 30) identifies four forms of the principle of sufficient 
reason, which I shall now list and explicate in accordance with his presentation of them 
in his doctoral dissertation: 
(1) Principium fiendi – the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, which 
concerns the law of causality and has as its object intuitive appearances, i.e. 
reale Objekte, which are material or physical objects.34  
(2) Principium cognoscendi – the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, which 
concerns the laws of logic and has as its object abstract representations, i.e. 
concepts. 
(3) Principium essendi – the principle of sufficient reason of being, which is 
concerned with the non-empirical intuitions of time and space; and finally 
(4) Principium agendi – the principle of sufficient reason of acting, which occupies 
itself with a unique form of the causal law, viz. that of motivation (which 
Schopenhauer (1889a: 171) identifies as “causality seen from within”), and 
consequently has as its object the Will of the individual. 
 
3.2. Principium Cognoscendi 
	
I shall shortly elaborate upon the way in which the principium fiendi (the principle of 
sufficient reason of becoming, i.e. the law of causality) and the principium essendi (the 
																																																								
33 It may be useful for one to conceive of this distinction between that of homogeneity and 
specification in terms of a family. The family may be considered as a collective according to 
their family name (i.e. the law of homogeneity) or they may be considered individually, by their 
first names (i.e. the law of specification).  
34 Cf. Footnote 4 (p. 88) in F. C. White’s essay The Fourfold Root in The Cambridge 




principle of sufficient reason of being, i.e. time and space) contribute to the construction 
of appearances (perceptions). But, before I do, I must also acknowledge and turn to a 
discussion of a third form of the principle which in due course shall be of much 
significance to the discussion on humankind’s knowledge of the inevitability of death, 
viz., the principium cognoscendi, i.e. the principle of sufficient reason of knowing.  
In the appendix to the first volume of his magnum opus, Schopenhauer (1969a: 431-
432; 437) excoriates Kant for not properly distinguishing between perceptual and 
abstract knowledge. It is by way of the identification of the principium cognoscendi 
(the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, i.e. the laws of logic) that Schopenhauer 
attempts to correct this serious deficiency of his mentor. He (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 
114) claims that one of the regions of the brain, which he refers to as the faculty of 
reason, is responsible for forming concepts (abstract knowledge), which is distinct from 
perceptual knowledge. We shall shortly see that immediate knowledge, i.e. knowledge 
of the perceptible world, is acquired by way of the faculty of the Understanding, i.e. the 
principium fiendi; and Schopenhauer (1889a: 115) maintains that concepts are derived 
from these primary perceptions, i.e. they are representations drawn from appearances. 
Now it must be understood that concepts are essentially universal abstractions of 
particular objects. For instance, the universal concept of “dog” is something intangible 
and impossible to express pictorially, for it is an abstraction of many particular types 
of dogs: one may observe numerous breeds, such as Yorkshire Terriers, German 
Shepherds, Maltese Poodles, Chihuahuas, Pit Bulls, Pomeranians, etc., and form 
therefrom the abstract conception of “dog”. In other words, the mind discards all that 
is inessential and retains solely those characteristics which are constitutive of the 
concept of “dog” in general (cf. Schopenhauer, 1889a: 116). Now, just because the 
concept is a general abstraction, it cannot pictorially represent every particular type 
owing to the diversity thereof. In other words, the universal concept of “dog” 
encompasses every single breed of dog, both extant and extinct, and therefore cannot 
be pictorially depicted, for if one were to attempt to draw an image of the universal 
concept of “dog” it would undoubtedly adhere to the characteristics of one sort of breed, 
while omitting an array of characteristics essential to others.35 This is an extremely 
																																																								
35 In attempting to sketch a silhouette of this universal dog one might, for instance, depict it 




significant point for it intimates that concepts (abstractions), unlike perceptions which 
are certain and tangible, are extremely vague and intangible: “[t]hey must of necessity 
be exceedingly empty, poor, and therefore also dreadfully tiresome” (Schopenhauer, 
1889a: 116). In spite of this potentially problematic fact, it is evident that the concept 
is derived from the perceptible world (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 114); in other words, the 
universal concept of, for instance, “dog” is an abstraction of many particular 
instantiations of different types of perceptible dogs. To this end Schopenhauer (1889a: 
115) states:  
“[Abstract representations] have been called conceptions, because each 
comprehends innumerable individual things in, or rather under, itself, and thus 
forms a complex. We may also define them as representations drawn from 
perceptions. For, in forming them, the faculty of abstraction decomposes the 
complete, intuitive [perceptions] into their component parts, in order to think 
each of these parts separately as the different qualities of, or relations between, 
things. By this process, however, the representations necessarily forfeit their 
perceptibility; just as water, when decomposed, ceases to be fluid and visible. 
For although each quality thus isolated (abstracted) can quite well be thought 
by itself, it does not at all follow that it can be perceived by itself. We form 
conceptions by dropping a good deal of what is given us in perception, in order 
to be able to think the rest by itself. To conceive therefore is to think less than 
we perceive. If, after considering divers objects of perception, we drop 
something different belonging to each, yet retain what is the same in all, the 
result will be the genus of that species. The generic conception is accordingly 
always the conception of every species comprised under it, after deducting all 
that does not belong to every species. Now, as every possible conception may 
be thought as a genus, a conception is always something general, and as such, 
not perceptible. Every conception has on this account also its sphere, as the 
sum-total of what may be thought under it. The higher we ascend in abstract 
thought, the more we deduct, the less therefore remains to be thought. The 
highest, i.e. the most general conceptions, are the emptiest and poorest, and at 
last become mere husks, such as, for instance, being, essence, thing, becoming, 
etc., etc.” 
Now it may be thought that within the Schopenhauerian system the concept can be 
equated with the notion of a Platonic Idea; for the latter, like the former, are general 




128-130). However, it must be observed that concepts are derived from perceptions, 
and not vice versa; hence it is erroneous to equate them with the Platonic Ideas. In order 
to elucidate this point it is necessary for one to become conscious of the fact that 
Platonic Ideas precede perception as prototypes to ectypes (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 129-
130), whereas concepts, being a unique type of appearance, are a derivation from 
perception; and must, therefore, themselves be considered ectypes (of perceptions) 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 40). Thus, abstract knowledge is secondary, twice removed 
from the object as it is in-itself: it is a representation36 of a perception; whereas Platonic 
Ideas are primary and are said to precede extant objects, they are thus referred to by 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 175) as the most “adequate objectivity” of the Ding-an-sich. In 
the parlance of the Schopenhauerian philosophy we may say that concepts exist on the 
side of appearances, whereas the Platonic Ideas exist (with difficulty, cf. 
Schopenhauer’s discussion of the matter in 32 of the first volume of Die Welt) in the 
realm of the Ding-an-sich.37 It is for this reason that the abstract concept should not be 
confounded with the notion of the Platonic Idea. Although I do not wish to anticipate 
the development of my exposition, I wish, in presenting the foregoing discussion on 
abstraction and concepts, to impart one extremely significant observation, viz., that 
concepts – being doubly removed from the Ding-an-sich, i.e. given that they are 
representations of appearances (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 115) – cannot disclose 
knowledge about the world as it is in-itself. This is significant in so far as in a later 
section I argue that Schopenhauer’s notion of the Will may be considered a concept, 
																																																								
36 I reiterate that I intentionally use the word “representation” here, as concepts are essentially 
copies of perceptions and thus stand to them as representations; just as painted pictorial images 
stand to real objects as representations thereof. I argue, however, that the term “representation” 
should not be used in connection with the objects constructed by the Understanding and 
Sensibility (which I have termed “appearances”) as these do not, on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 
99 and 502) account, represent the mind-independent object but are toto genere different 
therefrom. 
37 The matter is difficult because Schopenhauer (1969a: 113), as we shall see, claims that the 
Ding-an-sich is atemporal and aspatial, i.e. it is a unity. Consequently, it follows therefrom, 
that it cannot contain a plethora of individual objects such as the Platonic Ideas. Be that as it 




i.e. an abstraction of perception, and thus it is questionable whether the term can truly 
be regarded as a genuine characterisation of the way the world is in-itself. 
 
3.3. Principium Fiendi and Principium Essendi 
	
Now, it is by way of an appeal to the principles of becoming and being that 
Schopenhauer attempts to argue that the mind constructs an appearance.38 But how 
exactly does it do so? The answer may be succinctly expressed thus: the mind receives 
raw, unintelligible sensory data which come into contact with the synthetic a priori 
mechanisms residing therein; in this way it constructs an appearance out of the 
disorganised and unintelligible data. This notion can be best illustrated by way of an 
equation: sensations + the synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind = perceptions 
(ideas, appearances). To elaborate: the mind instantaneously applies two principles of 
sufficient reason in order to create perceptions from sensations, viz., the principles of 
becoming and being. It employs the principium essendi, which is comprised of a 
twofold nature, i.e. it applies “the faculty of the inner sensibility [which] imposes the 
form of time, [and the] faculty of the outer sensibility [which] imposes the form of 
space” (White, 2008: 66) onto sensations; thereby producing innumerable, individuated 
objects. But time and space are, as White (2008: 67) notes, insufficient in producing 
perceptible objects, a third component is required if one is to have experience of a 
perceptible world. This component is found in the Understanding, which has the sole 
																																																								
38 It ought to be recalled from the introductory section that due to the fact that the term 
“representation” may erroneously and inadvertently intimate that Schopenhauer thought 
perceptions in the minds of perceiving individuals are nothing more than replicas, i.e. 
representations, of similarly constituted external objects, I have opted for the less ambiguous 
word “appearance” in lieu thereof. Moreover, “appearance” indicates something illusory and 
insubstantial, which accords with Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 17) characterisation of life as a 
dream. As I mentioned, the word “idea” would also have been suitable because it illustrates 
Schopenhauer’s connection to Locke and Berkeley (cf. pages xxxv - xxxvi of David Berman’s 
introduction to the abridged version of Schopenhauer’s principal work); however, there is a 
potential for one to confuse it with the Platonic Idea. I have therefore selected “appearance” 




task of applying the principium fiendi, i.e. the law of causality, to sensations, as 
Schopenhauer (1889a: 60) explicates: 
“It is only when the Understanding begins to act – a function, not of single, 
delicate nerve-extremities, but of that mysterious, complicated structure 
weighing from five to ten pounds, called the brain39 – only when it begins to 
apply its sole form, the causal law, that a powerful transformation takes place, 
by which subjective sensation becomes objective perception.” 
It seems, then, that the complicated process whereby sensations are transformed into 
perceptions can be succinctly explained thus: two regions of the brain, which 
Schopenhauer (1889a: 58 and 154) refers to as “the Understanding” (der Verstand) and 
“the Sensibility” (Sinnlichkeit) are responsible for the formation of appearances. In 
other words, the principium fiendi and the principium essendi work in unison to create 
a perceptible object. Allow me to elaborate. Schopenhauer, as Cartwright (2005: 175) 
notes, maintains that the Understanding has the sole function of applying the law of 
causality to sensory data, thereby transforming a senseless jumble of sensations into a 
meaningful appearance, i.e. an object. The Understanding does this by positing an 
object in space and time for every sensation it receives (Cartwright: 2005: 175).  In this 
way the Understanding causes the image of an object to appear in the mind without 
postulating the existence of an objective causality. In other words, the mind receives 
sensations from the Ding-an-sich, which immediately come into contact with the 
principium fiendi and the principium essendi: the latter by means of inner sensibility 
places the sensation in time, and by means of the outer sensibility in space; the 
Understanding then apprehends that a sensation must have an external cause and posits 
the existence of a spatial and temporal object, subject to the law of causality. This is, in 
essence, the way in which the active mind creates appearances (perceptions), according 
to Schopenhauer (1889a: 60).  
 
																																																								
39 Schopenhauer’s materialist theory of mind generates profound complications for his claim 
that “die Welt ist meinen Vorstellung” (“the world is my appearance”). This difficulty will be 




3.4. Objective Causality 
	
However, we must observe that two pressing difficulties arise on this account. The first 
concerns the problem of what I shall refer to as “objective causality”, i.e. mind-
independent causality.  
It is evident – even though Schopenhauer tends to avoid an explicit admission of the 
fact for reasons I shall shortly attempt to explicate – that the raw, unintelligible sensory 
data must be akin to or, rather, originate from the Ding-an-sich; for sensations, in 
contrast to perceptions, must have a mind-independent origin. However, in saying this, 
I do not wish to give the false impression that idealism, even of the radical kind, is 
always committed to the view that some substance or entity must necessarily underlie 
perceptions (as in the case of Berkeley’s idealism, no such substance or entity is 
considered extant), but this is in fact the only way in which Schopenhauer’s idealism 
can be comprehended; for unlike Berkeley, Schopenhauer (1969a: 98-99 and 1969b: 7) 
does not wish to propound a philosophy of immaterialism, i.e. the view that appearances 
are hollow, by which I portend that they lack an inner, underlying substance as a 
foundation for their existence. I shall, for the moment, disregard the fundamental nature 
of this essence which underlies appearances; but I wish to make lucid a serious 
inconsistency inherent in this view, i.e., that something external to the perceiver can 
cause sensations therein. If causality is an a priori form of the mind it cannot be utilised 
in an explanation as to how appearances appear therein (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 13), i.e. 
causality cannot form a bridge (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 19) between appearances and the 
world as it is in-itself. In other words, one cannot appeal to an objective form of 
causality in attempting to explicate how perceptions are generated within the subject’s 
mind if one maintains the a priority of the causal law. However, the view here presented 
is committed to just such a contradictory notion: for some external entity, i.e. the Ding-
an-sich, is said to cause sensations in the subject, and thus causality is unwittingly 
assumed to have a mind-independent existence. For, I reiterate, if sensations which 
cause perceptions, originate from without then the causal bond between the external 
object and the subjectively experienced sensations cannot be conditioned by the mind, 
but must exist independently thereof. The difficulty is that for the radical idealist 
appearances cannot be said to be caused by anything external. But if that were the case 




figments of one’s imagination to which no externally real object corresponds; yet if all 
appearances are mere fabrications of the mind then it does indeed become impossible 
to distinguish illusion from reality. However, it is erroneous to construe 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy in this sense for he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 99-100) thinks 
that something does in fact underlie appearances, viz., the Ding-an-sich. The difficulty 
arises when Schopenhauer attempts to explicate how the Ding-an-sich produces 
appearances in the subject’s mind; for he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100) dogmatically 
adheres to the a priority of causality and refuses to accept that there may in fact exist 
an external, i.e. a non-mind-dependent, causal bond between the Ding-an-sich and 
sensations. Yet the difficulty cannot be avoided: Schopenhauer’s theory demands the 
postulation of two types of causality, viz., one uncontroversially subjective, which 
transforms sensations into perceptions, and another contentiously objective, which 
produces sensations in the body from some external entity one cannot experience or 
know in the ordinary sense, viz., the Ding-an-sich. Of course, the admission of an 
external form of causality would tacitly admit the “absolute reality” of the world 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 19); which is, of course, inimical to Schopenhauer’s argument 
for radical idealism; but the difficulty as to how non-hallucinatory sensations occur 
cannot be explicated without recourse to the notion of such an “objective causality”. 
Indeed, Schopenhauer (1969a: 435-437) excoriated Kant for applying the law of 
causality in this objective, mind-independent sense but I maintain that he himself 
cannot avoid the difficulty. Now instead of admitting the possibility of a mind-
independent form of causality he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 14) finds subterfuge in arguing 
that the correlativity thesis, which is the thesis which states that every object 
presupposes a subject and vice versa (Cartwright, 2005: 164), precedes the application 
of the principle of sufficient reason. For, as mentioned, Schopenhauer (1969b: 7) does 
not wish to propounded an immaterialist form of radical idealism, i.e. he does not wish 
to argue that perceptions (appearances) are hollow or that they do not have an existence 
apart from the perceiving subject. As a consequence thereof, it is necessary for 
Schopenhauer to explicate how the Ding-an-sich can underlie appearances without the 
former causing the latter. To this end Schopenhauer (1969b: 14-15) argues that the most 
fundamental mechanism of the brain is the so-called “correlativity thesis”. This latter 
principle may be succinctly defined by the proposition “no object without a subject” 




thesis states that every object presupposes the existence of a subject: for in order for 
one to acquire knowledge it is necessary for some entity to become a perceptible object 
for consideration by a particular subject; i.e. for everything that is known there must of 
necessity be a knower, but the former is not knowing and the latter is not known (Cf. 
Schopenhauer 1969b: 197). But just as every object presupposes a subject, so too does 
every subject presuppose the existence of perceptible objects (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
14), for “[a] consciousness without object is no consciousness at all” (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 15). This aspect of the correlativity thesis is not as easily comprehensible as its 
aforementioned counterpart; however, it appears that Schopenhauer (1969b: 14-15) is 
intimating that it is impossible for the consciousness of a subject to be utterly devoid 
of material: hence, the appearance of the subject necessarily entails the existence of the 
object, just as its converse is said to do: 
“[…] The intellect and matter are correlatives, in other words, the one exists 
only for the other; both stand and fall together; the one is only the other’s 
reflex. They are in fact really one and the same thing, considered from two 
opposite points of view.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 15-16) 
Thus, it is by way of the correlativity thesis that Schopenhauer attempts to avoid the 
claim which would inevitably refute radical idealism, viz., that the Ding-an-sich is the 
cause of sensations and is consequently a real, i.e. material, object. Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 14-16) appeals to the correlativity thesis in an attempt to illustrate that the 
subject and object exist simultaneously, i.e. as mutually complementary entities, 
without invoking the notion of an objective form of causality. Now given that the 
correlativity thesis is said to be so fundamental that it even precedes the application of 
the causal law (Cartwright, 2005: 164) it is evident that Schopenhauer utilises it in an 
attempt to avoid the difficulty of objective causality. In this way, the problem as to how 
some external object can cause sensations in the subject when causality is said to be 
strictly a priori is seemingly averted, for the subject and object are said to presuppose 
one another without invoking the notion of cause and effect. However, I must observe 
that the solution generates a unique difficulty of its own: for does not the 
dichotomisation between subject and object presuppose the principium individuationis? 
In order for the subject to be separate from the object both must occupy a different 
space at the same time, or appear in the same space at different times. Consequently, 




sufficient reason of being, which is concerned with time and space) and it therefore 
cannot be said to precede the application of the principle of sufficient reason 
(Cartwright, 2005: 164). Thus, in spite of Schopenhauer’s bold attempt, the matter 
remains an unresolved difficulty within his philosophy. 
 
3.5. Heterogeneity from Homogeneity 
	
The second difficulty generated by Schopenhauer’s epistemological theory is how 
manifold heterogenous objects can be derived from a homogeneous unity. In short, one 
may justifiably wonder why the Understanding posits numerous objects if the 
sensations emanate from a homogeneous entity; for it is obvious that on such an account 
the Understanding must ultimately be held responsible for the appearance of the 
manifold objects one experiences. But if this is so, then why should the mind generate 
the particular appearances it does? Why does the mind not, for instance, conjure up 
flying pink elephants or fish with hands and feet? Schopenhauer, unfortunately, does 
not address this concern and the matter is left unresolved within his philosophy. In my 
discussion on the different forms of idealism, and in particular my discussion of the 
way in which I comprehend Kant, however, I shall offer a cogent explication of this 
phenomenon, but my answer stands in opposition to Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 112-113) 
teaching: for I maintain that the only cogent explanation for the appearance of 
multifarious objects is the postulation of the world as it is in-itself possessing 
heterogeneity. On my account, therefore, there are manifold objects owing to the 
disparity in the essence of the objects themselves. Thus, although I concur with the 
Kantian notions that the world as it is in-itself is impervious to knowledge and that the 
mind constructs reality, I argue that it does so only partially and that the world as it is 
in-itself cannot be an homogeneous unity, but must, in contradistinction to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 112-113) teaching, be divergent.40 For if one refuses to 
																																																								
40 Schopenhauer (1969a: 113) declares that “[the Ding-an-sich] is free from all plurality, 
although its phenomena in time and space are innumerable. It is itself one, yet not as an object 
is one, for the unity of an object is known only in contrast to possible plurality”. In short, this 





acknowledge the veracity of my observation then he must either confess the 
impossibility of being able to explicate the fact of the world appearing as it does, or he 
must attempt to discover something inherent to the Understanding which causes it to 
create a multifarious appearance of objects. The two alternatives seem to me untenable, 
for in the former case we are not brought to any deeper comprehension of the world, 
and in the latter case we would be compelled to arbitrarily postulate an explanation 
which is bound to be subject to intense scrutiny.   
 
3.6. Schopenhauer’s Arguments for Radical Idealism 
	
The appeal to considerations such as the inversion of an image in the eye 
(Schopenhauer, 1889a: 67-69) and the phenomenon of “double vision” (Schopenhauer, 
1889a: 69-72) offer compelling evidence that the mind (brain) does indeed assist in the 
construction of one’s idiosyncratic view of the world, but they do not prove 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) ultimate thesis, viz., that the world in toto is mind 
dependent. To that end we must turn to a consideration of the arguments Schopenhauer 
propounds in favour of idealism. In his article Schopenhauer and Transcendental 
Idealism, Douglas McDermid (2012: 73-79) identifies twelve such arguments. 
McDermid’s is the most exhaustive list I have discovered hitherto, however, some of 
the arguments are less convincing than others and I shall consequently omit some of 
them and follow the eminent Schopenhauerian scholar Christopher Janaway (2002: 30) 
by discussing at length solely five of the arguments in favour of idealism.41 It must be 
said, however, that these five arguments are the most convincing and they may 
accordingly be considered Schopenhauer’s primary arguments in favour of the radical 
idealist position. These are (in accordance with McDermid’s headings): 
1. The argument from immediacy 
2. The argument from inconceivability  
3. The argument from certainty  
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not make mention of the “argument from immediacy”, which is in my estimation, an extremely 




4. The argument from simplicity  
5. The argument from the subject-object antithesis  
 
3.6.1. The Argument from Immediacy 
	
A convenient point of commencement is that of the so-called argument from 
immediacy. Essentially this argument states that the only thing of which an individual 
has absolute certainty is his own consciousness. The argument is clearly indebted to 
Descartes’ famous “method of doubt” and I shall therefore utilise it in the presentation 
of my explanation. Schopenhauer (1974a: 4) observes that “[Descartes] was struck by 
the truth that we are above all restricted to our own consciousness and that the world is 
given to us only as [appearance]42 or mental picture [Vorstellung]. Through his well-
known dubito, cogito, ergo sum43 he tried to lay stress on the only certain thing of 
subjective consciousness in contrast to the problematical nature of everything else, and 
to express the great truth that self-consciousness is the only thing really and 
unconditionally given”.  
Allow me to explicate how Descartes arrives at this so-called “great truth”. Following 
the father of modern philosophy (Descartes, 1960b: 102-103) we may observe that the 
objects in our dreams seem as real as those of wakefulness, consequently how can one 
know that the world one takes to be so real is not equally as illusory? Perhaps the sun, 
moon, stars, mountains, continents, oceans – in short, the entire universe – is nothing 
more than a figment of one’s imagination? And perhaps this illusoriness extends to my 
own person: perhaps I am not as I imagine myself to be, that my body does not in fact 
exist. I can doubt the existence of all these objects, but I cannot doubt the existence of 
my consciousness, for it is a presupposition of my doubting: for only a conscious being 
has the ability to doubt (Descartes, 1960b: 108). Following Descartes, Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 4) maintains that “everything of which [one] has certain, sure, and hence 
immediate knowledge, lies within his consciousness. Beyond this consciousness, 
therefore, there can be no immediate certainty […]”. It is not unreasonable to doubt that 
																																																								
42 Payne uses the imprecise term “representation”, which I have previously censured in my 
discussion. 




objects (even one’s own body) exist, but it is absurd to doubt the existence of one’s 
consciousness – which is immediate and antecedent to all experiences, and therefore 
certain. Thus, the argument from immediacy may be succinctly expressed thus: “if 
nothing is immediately known except the subjective contents of one’s own mind or 
consciousness, then everything else must be mediated by consciousness; but whatever 
is mediated by consciousness is necessarily conditioned by it, and therefore dependent 
on it. Consequently, physical objects cannot exist independently of mind or 
consciousness” (McDermid, 2012:73-74); ergo, radical idealism is veracious. 
 
3.6.2. The Argument from Inconceivability  
	
The second primary argument is that of inconceivability.44 This argument can be 
succinctly expressed as the impossibility of imagining a world devoid of consciousness; 
for in the act of imagining such, the conscious subject is presupposed. Thus 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 5) states: 
“That the objective world would exist even if there existed no knowing being 
at all, naturally seems at the first onset to be sure and certain, because it can be 
thought in the abstract, without the contradiction that it carries within itself 
coming to light. But if we try to realize this abstract thought, in other words, 
to reduce it to [appearances] of perception, from which alone (like everything 
abstract) it can have content and truth; and if accordingly we attempt to 
imagine an objective world without a knowing subject, then we become aware 
that what we are imagining at that moment is in truth the opposite of what we 
intended, namely nothing but just the process in the intellect of a knowing 
being who perceives an objective world, that is to say, precisely that which we 
had sought to exclude. For this perceptible and real world is obviously a 
phenomenon of the brain; and so in the assumption that the world as such might 
exist independently of all brains there lies a contradiction.”  
I wish to observe that the argument from inconceivability is not, however, novel to 
Schopenhauer; for it had been propounded over a century earlier by Berkeley in his 
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Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (first published in 1710). 
Therein, part one, section six, Berkeley (2004a: 55) states: 
“Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only 
open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, that all the choir 
of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a word all those bodies which compose 
the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that 
their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are 
not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other 
created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the 
mind of some eternal spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all 
the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence 
independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect 
and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its 
being perceived.” 
According to the argument from inconceivability, therefore, the world – with its 
animate and inanimate objects – is inconceivable without a conscious mind because 
one cannot think of or imagine the world without consciousness. In other words, 
consciousness is already presupposed in the act of imagining and consequently, so the 
argument intimates, it is impossible – or inconceivable – to even imagine a world 
devoid of consciousness. 
 
3.6.3. The Argument from Certainty 
	
The argument from certainty is essentially concerned with Hume’s scepticism. If one 
imagines the world as possessing a mind-independent existence then it becomes 
impossible to have any certainty regarding it. For instance, thus far in my life I have 
been led to the conclusion by way of experience that flames emit heat, but if the world 
has a real existence beyond my consciousness then I cannot be certain that heat is an 
essential property of flames, for it may be that somewhere in the vast universe a flame 
exists – or existed or will exist – which does not emit heat. Therefore, the only means 
by which this radical scepticism may be surmounted is to follow upon the path of Kant: 
we must consider the existence of the world as entirely dependent on the conscious 




(time and space) and causality as emanating from consciousness which thereby stamp 
experience with indubitableness. In this way one acquires certainty about the world. On 
the other hand, if one stubbornly persists in the materialist view and maintains that the 
world has an existence beyond the conscious mind then he must accept the predicament 
of scepticism; for causal connections (as well as spatial and temporal relations) possess, 
according to the materialistic view, a real (mind-independent) existence, and thus – 
owing to the finiteness of the mind – one cannot be certain of empirical knowledge-
claims. It is for this reason that Schopenhauer proposes the argument from certainty in 
favour of idealism as “the only viable solution to scepticism” (Janaway, 2002: 30).  
 
3.6.4. The Argument from Simplicity 
	
The fourth primary argument utilised by Schopenhauer in his attempt to convince 
readers of the truth of radical idealism is concerned with the positing of two 
homogenous worlds, one of which becomes redundant (Janaway, 2002: 30). Allow me 
to elaborate. The materialist maintains that the world has an independent-existence and 
this world is merely replicated in the mind (consciousness) of a subject, just as an object 
is reflected in a mirror. “Thus to the first world a second has been added, which, 
although completely separated from the first, resembles it to a nicety” (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 9). This second world is a redundancy and can consequently be dispensed with. 
But why should one reject the objective mind-independent world in favour of the 
subjective mind-dependent world? Schopenhauer (1969b: 9) maintains that the 
subjective world has a decided advantage over the objective: for the former (as was 
previously discussed) possesses a certainty which the latter lacks – “it can state 
beforehand most minutely and accurately the full conformity to law of all the relations 
in that space which are possible and not yet actual; and it does not need to examine 
them first. It can state just as much about the course of time, as also about the relation 
of cause and effect which governs the changes in outer space.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
9). For this reason Schopenhauer (ibid.) concludes that it leads to  
“[…] the conviction that that absolutely objective world outside the head, 
independent of it and prior to all knowledge, which we at first imagined we 




subjectively, the world of the [appearance], and that it is this alone which we 
are actually capable of conceiving. Accordingly the assumption is 
automatically forced on us that the world, as we know it, exists only for our 
knowledge, and consequently in [appearance] alone, and not once again 
outside that [appearance].” 
 
3.6.5. The Argument from the Subject-Object Antithesis 
	
I turn now to the fifth and final argument, which Janaway (2002: 31) describes as “the 
one Schopenhauer most relies on”, viz., the subject-object antithesis. According to 
Schopenhauer the most fundamental, elementary division of all cognition is that 
between subject and object (Cartwright, 2005: 164). As such the antithesis precedes 
even the principle of sufficient reason and is a crucial component in the possibility of 
one experiencing appearances – for every object known presupposes a knower (i.e. a 
subject), just as much as every subject, in order for it to be consciously cognizant, must 
necessarily presuppose objects (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 18).  
Materialists err, Schopenhauer (1969b: 14) claims, by neglecting the subject and 
starting from the object: they thus erroneously maintain that “the world is matter” or 
that “matter alone positively exists” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 14); as a consequence 
thereof they are led to the view that matter persists even without the existence of 
sentient beings; which, Schopenhauer (1969b: 12) claims, “it is impossible even to 
conceive”. It will be recalled, however, that every object presupposes a conscious 
subject; for every individual only knows the objects of experience in so far as they 
appear in his mind; but as to the actual existence of such objects of perception one must 
ultimately remain ignorant: for perhaps the objects one considers so real are nothing 
more than fleeting illusions conjured up by the mind like a dream without any external 
corroboration. Materialism is therefore false, in so far as it is founded upon an uncertain 
principle, viz., “matter alone positively exists”. Radical idealism, in contrast, is correct 
in so far as it commences from that which is immediately known, and known moreover 
with certainty, viz., the subjective standpoint, i.e. consciousness. But the subjective 
standpoint does not – and cannot – prove the actual existence of the objects of 




appearances in the mind. In this way Schopenhauer (1969b: 14-15) argues in favour of 
radical idealism by way of the subject-object antithesis.  
 
3.7. A Discussion on Three Different Varieties of Idealism 
	
For the moment, I shall postpone my criticism of Schopenhauer’s five primary 
arguments in favour of the radical idealist position; for this is merely a detailed outline 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and a criticism thereof at this point in my discussion will 
inevitably vitiate my intended presentation. For the present, however, I wish to make a 
detailed comparison of three varieties of idealism, viz., Berkeleyan, Kantian and 
Schopenhauerian, in order to illustrate the similarities and dissimilarities between the 
three types. I maintain that this will facilitate a better understanding of my criticism of 
Schopenhauer’s radical idealism and it will also make clear that, unlike Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 435-436), I esteem, in contradistinction to the first, the second edition of Kant’s 
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, in which Kant (B275) attempts to distance himself from 
radical (Berkeleyan) idealism (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 435). 
Let us commence with the oldest form of idealism, viz., the Berkeleyan variety, which 
I have elsewhere referred to as “radical idealism”.45 In two of his principal works, viz., 
The Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous, Berkeley sought to propound his doctrine of immaterialism. This term, 
although it is no longer generally used in connection with his philosophy, is, in my 
estimation, extremely illuminating, for it intimates the notion that Berkeley rejected the 
actuality of all matter (Collinson and Plant, 2006: 115) – he was consequently a radical 
idealist par excellence. However, it must be borne in mind that idealism is not 
necessarily committed to the impossibility of the existence of matter; on the contrary, 
in the case of Kantian idealism, for instance, it leaves the question of the actual 
existence of material objects a mystery and is in the strictest sense simply the view that 
the world of perception and experience (appearances) exists in the perceiving mind. 
Thus, it will be beneficial to the discussion to define the notions of idealism and 
immaterialism. The notion of idealism with which we are at present concerned may be 
																																																								




succinctly defined as “the doctrine that the idea or the thought has priority to reality or 
existence” (Grooten and Steenbergen, 1972: 200), in other words philosophical 
idealism is the doctrine that the world one experiences exists solely in a perceiving 
mind. Immaterialism, on the other hand, is the view “that no material things exist, but 
only spirits with their spiritual ideas” (Grooten and Steenbergen, 1972: 200); in other 
words, “there is no purely material, or mind-independent reality” (Woolhouse, 2004: 
4). We may observe here that although idealism can exist independently of 
immaterialism, the latter presupposes the former and cannot therefore be maintained 
independently thereof. Now due to the fact that Berkeley denies the existence of matter 
(Collinson and Plant, 2006: 115) it follows that he is an idealist in the most extreme 
sense, i.e. Berkeley (2004a: 54) maintains that the world exists solely in the mind 
without any external or material object grounding the perceptions or appearances one 
experiences. It is for this reason that I refer to the Berkeleyan form of idealism as 
radical idealism and contrast it with partial idealism, which does not reject the 
possibility of a material object grounding one’s perceptions or appearances.  
In order to comprehend Berkeley’s doctrine, viz., that all objects are merely 
appearances in a perceiving mind – that, in other words, for something to exist it must 
be perceived – esse est percipi (Berkeley, 2004a: 54) – mention must be made of John 
Locke’s (2004: 135) distinction between primary and secondary qualities. For it is 
essentially in response to Locke that Berkeley arrives at this view (Collinson and Plant, 
2006: 117) which is undoubtedly his greatest philosophical achievement and the one 
for which he is remembered by posterity. As my intention in this section is not to subject 
the Berkeleyan philosophy to a rigorous critique I shall not enter into the details thereof, 
but merely sketch the most general outline in order to make perspicuous to readers the 
essential and fundamental difference between Berkeleyan idealism and my construal of 
the Kantian variety, thereby attaining my primary aim, viz., illustrating the relation of 
both forms of idealism (radical and transcendental) to the Schopenhauerian variety 
thereof.  
Locke (2004: 135-136) maintains that some qualities attributable to objects are mind-
dependent, whereas others are mind-independent – those of the former sort he 
characterises as secondary qualities, whereas the latter are said to be primary, in so far 
as they are considered essential attributes of an object and therefore possess an absolute 




motion, number, figure and solidity are five such primary qualities. In contrast, 
secondary qualities are inessential properties of objects, contributed to the perception 
of an object by the perceiving mind; these include the qualities of sound, taste and scent 
(Locke, 2004: 135). For the sake of comprehension Locke’s position can be expressed 
in Kantian terms in the following manner: the secondary qualities are akin to the world 
of appearance, whereas the primary attributes are equivalent to the Ding-an-sich. Thus 
the real, mind-independent world for Locke is one inhabited by numerous colourless, 
scentless, tasteless objects. Locke, it may be said, is a partial idealist in so far as he 
holds secondary qualities to be entirely mind-dependent; but he still retains the 
existence of a real, albeit dreary, material world. It was Berkeley (2004a: 54) who made 
the leap from partial to radical idealism, for although he does not dispute the fact that 
secondary qualities are mind-dependent, he does reject Locke’s (2004: 135) claim that 
the primary qualities exist independently of all perception. To this end Berkeley (2004a: 
56) advances the “inseparability argument”46 which ultimately establishes the radical 
idealist claim that objects (which include both primary and secondary qualities) exist 
solely in the mind, as perceptions of a perceiver:  
“They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original 
qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same 
time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such like secondary 
qualities, do not, which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, 
that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture and motion of 
the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which 
they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now if it be certain, that those 
original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and 
not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows 
that they exist only in the mind. But I desire anyone to reflect and try, whether 
he can by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a 
body, without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that 
it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I 
must also give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged 
to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted 
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from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible 
qualities are, there must these be also, that is, in the mind and nowhere else.” 
I shall not attempt to discuss the veracity of this argument, suffice it to say that it is not 
impervious to criticism. However, for the incredulous reader I shall offer a more 
tangible proof of the mind-dependentness of the primary qualities which Locke (2004: 
135) took to be absolutely real. To that end let us consider a wooden table. In essence 
Locke’s theory amounts to the following: the colour and scent of a wooden table, as 
well as the sound it emits when I rap my knuckles upon its surface, exist only in so far 
as a sentient perceiver is present: for these secondary qualities are not essential to the 
table but exist only in my (or some other) mind as a result of the interaction between 
conscious perception and the primary qualities the table possesses. The mind-
dependency of secondary qualities is perhaps most conspicuous with regard to colour. 
For suppose I observe the table under a bright light: I may see its hue as a light brown 
as opposed to the mahogany colour I perceive under darker conditions. Or, the colour I 
perceive from my vantage point may appear different to that of the colour from another 
position. Colour, therefore, cannot be an objective (i.e. primary) attribute of objects. 
But, if we consider the matter in more depth we may even dispute the mind-
independentness of the so-called primary qualities: for depending on where I stand in 
relation to the wooden table it may appear rectangular, square or even triangular; 
depending on where and how I touch it, it may feel at one moment course and hard, the 
next smooth and soft. In this way we may arrive at the view that even the primary 
qualities of objects are mind-dependent; and if we concede this point then we have – 
perhaps unwittingly – passed into the radical idealist position.  
But as I mentioned at the outset of this discussion, Berkeleyan idealism is unique in so 
far as it dispenses with the material object as a grounding or a foundation for the 
appearances one perceives. In other words, Berkeley rejects the view that some 
mysterious material object causes the sensations and perceptions one perceives 
(Collinson and Plant, 2006: 115). The reason for this has already been mentioned in 
connection with the arguments propounded by Schopenhauer in favour of idealism, 
viz., the fact that every object is necessarily an object for a subject and it is therefore 
impossible to imagine a mind-independent world, for the act of imagining presupposes 
the mind; consequently “the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without 




of my exposition I wish to emphasise that Berkeleyan idealism is a radical form thereof 
due to the fact that it explicitly rejects the existence of material objects. Therefore, 
radical idealism can be defined as a fusion of idealism and immaterialism. There are, 
of course, numerous difficulties with this view. Two of which are extremely significant 
to the development of the exposition, viz., (i) how are genuine sensations caused 
without an external entity? And (ii) how do objects continue to exist, even when 
unperceived by a finite mind? Berkeley (2004a: 84-87) takes the possibility of real 
sensations and the continued existence of unperceived objects to be indicative of an 
omniscient mind; i.e. God is said to produce real sensations in the mind of a perceiver 
and to cause objects to subsist even when unperceived.  So much then for Berkeleyan 
Idealism. 
The second form of idealism I wish to consider at some length is that of the Kantian 
variety, viz., transcendental idealism. In order to sufficiently contrast it with the 
Berkeleyan sort, let us commence this discussion with a definition of the term: 
transcendental idealism may be succinctly defined as the study of the cognitive 
preconditions for any possible experience, i.e. the view that the mind, of whatever 
substance it may ultimately be – (or, more precisely, the synthetic a priori mechanisms 
therein) assist in the construction of experience (appearances) (Grooten and 
Steenbergen, 1972: 442-443). I shall briefly recapitulate the Kantian position for the 
sake of the discussion: it will be remembered that Kant (1950: 14-19) identified a third 
type of knowledge, viz., synthetic a priori knowledge, as possessing both universal 
certainty and empirical applicability. In this way Kant maintains that raw sensations 
come into contact with these synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind, thereby 
transforming unintelligible sensory data into meaningful perceptions. As such, the 
world is (at least partially) mind-dependent and Kant is evidently an idealist of sorts. 
The view that the mind assists in the construction of appearances or experience leads 
to what Schopenhauer (1969a: 417) refers to as “Kant’s greatest merit”, viz., the 
distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves.47 Here we discern the first 
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major distinction between the Berkeleyan and Kantian varieties of idealism: for 
Berkeley the mind does not assist in the construction of the appearances one perceives, 
whereas Kant’s idealism is evidently committed to the view that the mind is an essential 
ingredient in the production thereof. Thus, Berkeley’s idealism does not lead to the 
postulation of two distinct worlds, whereas Kant’s does (Scruton, 2001: 55). 
Nonetheless, both are philosophical idealists in so far as they maintain that the world 
is, to some extent in the case of Kant, mind-dependent. However, I termed Berkeley’s 
idealism radical in so far as it rejects the actual, mind-independent existence of material 
objects. But the status of the material object is not at all perspicuous in Kantian 
idealism; for an extremely contentious aspect of Kant’s thought is his attitude towards 
the material object: in short, does Kant maintain that the material object is mind-
independent or, like Berkeley, does he consider appearances to be without any material 
foundation?  
It is possible to find textual corroborations for both positions in the Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft; but, in the second edition of the work Kant (B275) explicitly and emphatically 
attempted to distance himself from Berkeleyan, i.e. radical, idealism (cf. the section 
entitled Refutation of Idealism); which essentially portends that he did not wish to deny 
the reality of material objects and thus avow a form of immaterialism. Thus, in the 
Prolegomena, published only two years after the first edition of the Kritik and intended 
as an introductory text thereto, Kant (1950: 36) states: 
“[Radical] idealism consists in the assertion that there are none but thinking 
beings, all other things which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing 
but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them 
in fact corresponds. I, on the contrary, say that things as objects of our senses 
existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in 
themselves, knowing only their appearances, that is representations which they 
cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that 
there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us 
as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which 
their influence on our sensibility procures us. These representations we call 
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‘bodies’, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is 
unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed [radical] 
idealism? It is the very contrary.” 
It is thus evident that Kant emphatically wishes to distance himself from the view that 
there are no material objects, and, so it seems to me, for good reason. It will be 
remembered that the mind constructs a Vorstellung – an appearance – by way of the 
synthetic a priori mechanisms coming into contact with sensations. Sensations are in-
themselves unintelligible, i.e. raw data, which are transformed into perceptions by the 
forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories (causality, accident, substance, 
et al.). Now, if Kant had denied the existence of mind-independent objects he would 
not have been able to speak meaningfully of genuine sensations – for without a mind-
independent world where would those sensations originate? But let us, for the sake of 
illustrating the point I am attempting to make, imagine that Kant had been a radical 
idealist, advocating the immaterialism of Berkeley. In such a case the only possible 
source of genuine sensations would be from the mind of another perceptible being. For, 
as mentioned, if all sensations originate within the mind and none refer to an externally 
real object then it becomes impossible to distinguish reality from illusion; thus, the only 
solution to this serious problem is to argue that real sensations must originate from 
another mind.48 In this way one could potentially distinguish illusion from reality, i.e., 
the latter must be said to originate from other minds, while the former from one’s own 
mind. But if a real object were to originate from another finite mind then it would exist 
only for as long as that mind entertains it; but such a theory contradicts experience for 
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objects, these same entities must be considered illusions in the mind of the being in whom they 
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in so far as they originate within His supposedly “infinite mind”, and hence do not correspond 
to any externally real objects. Thus, in the last analysis, everything must ultimately be an 
illusion on the radical idealist account. I note that this accords with Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 




there is evidently continuity in the existence of objects, even those which have not been 
perceived for millennia such as buried ancient relics and the most distant planets and 
stars which have only recently been detected by scientists. The only solution if one 
insists on denying the existence of matter, therefore, is to postulate an infinite 
perception, thereby permitting the continuation of objects unperceived by finite minds. 
But such a solution is not accessible to Kant, for in the first Kritik he concludes that the 
existence of God cannot be known with certainty (Scruton, 2001: 66-68); hence it seems 
unlikely that he would attempt to argue for Berkeley’s immaterialist view, which is 
necessarily committed to the existence of an omniscient being. It seems that 
Schopenhauer did not realise the gravity of this difficulty; indeed, as will become 
evident in due course, the radical idealist position is in many respects at variance with 
Schopenhauer’s teaching which has its foundations in the Kantian philosophy. As a 
consequence of these observations I conclude that Kant – contrary to Schopenhauer’s 
view which I shall shortly discuss – was not a radical idealist, for he does not reject the 
existence of the material object; and for good reason. 
Here, therefore, we discover what is perhaps the fundamental distinction between 
Berkeleyan idealism and transcendental idealism: the former rejects the existence of a 
mind-independent material world, whereas the latter does not but endeavours rather to 
show that the world one knows is partially constructed by the mind and is therefore not 
identical to reality as it is in-itself (Kant, 1950: 36). The extent of this divergence 
between the real and the ideal is the ultimate mystery of the Kantian philosophy; for 
reality might be extremely similar, identical or radically at variance with the world one 
perceives. Nonetheless, this is a question which unfortunately remains unanswerable 
by the finite human mind, for the world as it is in-itself can be thought of solely in the 
negative sense, i.e. as existing – no positive attributes can be ascribed to it (Scruton, 
2001: 56). So it may be that the world as it is in-itself is vastly dissimilar to the way in 
which we perceive it – as, of course, Schopenhauer (1969a: 110) imagined it to be – or 
it may be that the world as it is in-itself accords extremely closely with the way in which 
we perceive it. Ultimately, we cannot know either one way or the other, according to 
my interpretation of Kant’s philosophy in the Kritik. But I must observe, as I have 
previously, that even though one cannot know with any degree of certainty what the 
world is like in-itself, the fact that the phenomenal world presents itself to us as it does 




contain within itself the grounds for this phenomenal variation. I shall return to this 
significant point shortly. 
Let us now turn to a consideration of Schopenhauer’s interpretation of transcendental 
idealism. He (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 434-435) is insistent on construing Kant’s 
idealism in radical, i.e., Berkeleyan, terms – contrary to Kant’s explicit assertions in the 
second edition of the Kritik (B275) and the Prolegomena (1950:36) – and he 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 434-435) maintains that his predecessor had vitiated his 
masterpiece thereby:  
“In my first edition [to Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819], I explained 
Kant’s avoidance of this Berkeleyan principle as resulting from a visible fear 
of decided idealism, whereas, on the other hand, I found this distinctly 
expressed in many passages of the [Kritik der Reinen Vernunft], and 
accordingly accused Kant of contradicting himself. And this reproach was well 
founded, in so far as the [Kritik der Reinen Vernunft] was at that time known 
to me only in its second edition, or in the five subsequent editions printed from 
it. Now when later I read Kant’s principal work in the first edition, which had 
already become scarce, I saw, to my great joy, all those contradictions 
disappear. I found that, although Kant does not use the formula ‘No object 
without a subject’, he nevertheless, with just as much emphasis as do Berkeley 
and I, declares the external world lying before us in space and time to be mere 
[appearance] of the subject that knows it. Thus, for example, he says there (p. 
383) without reserve: ‘If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material 
world must cease to exist, as it is nothing but the phenomenon in the sensibility 
of our subject, and a species of its [appearances]’. However, the whole passage 
from p.348 to p.392, in which Kant expounds his decided idealism with great 
beauty and clarity, was suppressed by him in the second edition. On the other 
hand, he introduced a number of remarks that controverted it. In this way, the 
text of the [Kritik der Reinen Vernunft], as it was in circulation from the year 
1787 to 1838,49 became disfigured and spoilt; it was a self-contradictory book, 
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whose sense therefore could not be thoroughly clear and comprehensible to 
anyone […] Let no one imagine he knows the [Kritik der Reinen Vernunft], 
and has a clear conception of Kant’s teaching, if he has read only the second 
or one of the subsequent editions. This is absolutely impossible; for he has read 
only a mutilated, spoilt, and, to a certain extent ungenuine text. It is my duty 
to state this here emphatically, as a warning to everyone.”  
Now it seems to me that Schopenhauer’s interpretation of his mentor’s idealism must 
be construed as a denial of the existence of mind-independent material objects. In other 
words, Schopenhauer would like Kant to be understood as a radical idealist in the 
Berkeleyan sense, i.e. as an immaterialist. However, a great difficulty arises on such an 
interpretation, for if one is committed to the view that perceptions (appearances) are a 
product of sensations interacting with the synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind 
how is one to account for the sensations? The provenience of sensations must be sought 
in something external, i.e. something “out there” must produce the raw, unintelligible 
jumble of data which the mind receives; for only thus can illusion be distinguished from 
reality. But moreover, and equally as significant, I cannot desist from stating once again 
that if the existence of numerous mind-independent material objects is denied then it 
becomes extremely difficult to account for the appearance of multifarious objects in the 
phenomenal world. If we follow Schopenhauer (1969a: 113), and construe the world as 
it is in-itself to be a unity, then why should the mind take a homogeneous entity and 
transform it into an array of objects, some of which are unpleasant and life-threatening? 
What could explicate the mind’s construction of, for instance, harrowing diseases, 
tyrants and predatory animals? In contradistinction to the Schopenhauerian thesis, I 
																																																								
subsequent editions of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft and urged him to include the first, 
“unmutilated”, edition of the work therein (Cartwright, 2010: 425). Furthermore, Schopenhauer 
suggested that the editors indicate the various omissions and additions to the second and 
subsequent editions of the work by way of an appendix (Cartwright, 2010: 426). As Cartwright 
(2010: 426) notes: “Rosenkranz accepted Schopenhauer’s advice and published the first [Kritik] 
in its first edition, relegating to an appendix the additions and variants of the second – a form 
in which the book would endure for years”. Nowadays this has become a standard practice and 
university students of the Kantian philosophy unwittingly follow Schopenhauer’s advice by 
studying translations of the Kritik which include material from both editions (differentiated as 




argue that the Ding-an-sich must contain within itself characteristic elements, by which 
I mean fundamental attributes, which, in conjunction with the synthetic a priori 
mechanisms of the mind, produce particular appearances. It is only if we consider the 
Ding-an-sich as containing such characteristic elements within itself that we can 
explicate the plethora of objects (appearances) found throughout the universe. But then 
it would be more correct to speak of things-in-themselves as opposed to the misleading 
“thing-in-itself”. If, however, my interpretation is correct it will necessarily lead to an 
objective view of time, space (the principium individuationis) and the law of causality; 
for my interpretation requires the individuation of objects in-themselves and the 
postulation of a causal-bond between these objects and the sensations produced in the 
mind/body of the perceiver.  
However, I wish to enquire as to Schopenhauer’s motivations for interpreting the 
Kantian philosophy in such a way, and to offer a conjecture as to a possible cause 
thereof. Schopenhauer (1969b: 463) held that death was the veritable inspiration for 
genuine philosophical wonder and speculation and he claims, further, that the only 
genuine consolation for death is a doctrine of athanasia (Cartwright, 2005: 36). Now if 
we take these remarks seriously, then it seems to me that Schopenhauer was so 
emphatic upon interpreting Kant as a radical idealist in order to propound a unique 
doctrine of immortality. For, as will become apparent in due course, Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine of athanasia is founded upon the radical idealist dichotomisation between the 
world of appearances on the one hand and the Ding-an-sich on the other. The former 
realm, in which one exists as a spatially-temporal creature, is transitory and illusory, 
whereas the latter sphere, to which one’s essence belongs, is unchanging and eternal.  
Thus, it may be the case that one of Schopenhauer’s primary motivations for being 
emphatically committed to the radical idealist interpretation of transcendental idealism 
was his desire to propound a consoling doctrine of athanasia.  It is for this reason that 
in the second section on “The World as Appearance” I subject Schopenhauer’s idealism 
to such intense scrutiny; for by illustrating the untenability thereof I maintain that I shall 
simultaneously vitiate the foundation upon which Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia 
is based. 
In the subsequent discussion what follows has largely been anticipated; however, I shall 




points of convergence and divergence from the two forms of idealism previously 
considered. 
It may come as a surprise to some that Schopenhauer, although admittedly an heir of 
the Kantian philosophy, must be classed in the same category as that of Berkeley, viz., 
as a radical idealist.  This is due to Schopenhauer’s insistence on the fact that perception 
and experience are wholly mind-dependent and that the world in-itself does not, in the 
least, correspond with the world as it appears to a conscious mind; that it is, in fact, 
non-material. However, we must acknowledge, that although Schopenhauer is a radical 
idealist his idealism differs to that of Berkeley in significant respects. Firstly, 
Schopenhauer was an avowed and unapologetic atheist (Edwards, 2009: 173), 
consequently he does not, like Berkeley, have recourse to an omniscient deity in his 
explanation of the continued existence of the world and the existence of genuine 
sensations. Secondly, and again in contradistinction to Berkeley, Schopenhauer did not 
entirely reject the notion of an external entity as the source of one’s sensations. The 
Kantian dichotomisation between appearances and the Ding-an-sich allows 
Schopenhauer to maintain that sensations originate from the latter source, although he 
never, to my knowledge, explicitly makes this assertion. Indeed, I observe that 
Schopenhauer’s atheism necessarily leads him to base his idealism on a foundation 
other than that of the existence of God, viz., on the Ding-an-sich. Where Berkeley posits 
God as the ultimate source of appearances, Schopenhauer must necessarily posit the 
Ding-an-sich. Thus, Schopenhauer’s idealism lies midway between that of the 
Berkeleyan and Kantian varieties, if I may be permitted to express it thus. 
Schopenhauer rejects both the existence of God and a mind-independent material object 
as the source of one’s sensations, and instead he must be construed as postulating the 
existence of an immaterial, i.e., metaphysical, substance as the source thereof. In a 
strange way Schopenhauer’s idealism is therefore a fusion of the Berkeleyan and 
Kantian varieties: Kant’s Ding-an-sich is said to be an immaterial “spiritual” substance; 
but it is not – and I wish to emphasise this point – denied to be extant. In due course we 
shall positively identify this immaterial substance, but for the moment I wish only to 
emphasise the way in which Schopenhauer’s idealism accords with and diverges from 
the Berkeleyan and Kantian varieties.  
I have not read any English secondary literature which attempts to compare the three 




inherent to the Schopenhauerian form of idealism and one we have already touched 
upon; viz., the issue of causality. Schopenhauer (1969a: 436) excoriates Kant for 
applying the law of causality beyond its circumscribed realm, i.e. by maintaining that 
the Ding-an-sich is the cause of one’s sensations. If causality is, as Kant declared, an a 
priori category then it cannot subsist in the realm of the Ding-an-sich. In other words, 
the causal law cannot be applied beyond the mind, and in declaring the material object 
to be the source or cause of sensations one is guilty of just such an offence. For this 
reason, Schopenhauer attempts to evade this difficulty by way of the correlativity thesis 
and semantics. As discussed, Schopenhauer (1969a: 14) argues that the correlativity 
thesis is the most fundamental mechanism of the mind, thus every subject necessarily 
presupposes an object and vice versa. In this way Schopenhauer believes he has avoided 
the difficulty as to how the Ding-an-sich can be said to cause sensations. On other 
occasions, Schopenhauer (1969a: 130, 131, 141, et al.) merely speaks of the Ding-an-
sich as “manifesting” or “objectifying” itself into the phenomenal world. However, this 
is to my mind merely a disguised form and fanciful way of stating the obvious. For if 
we closely attend to the matter we can discern what is really meant by such empty 
phrases as “objectification” or “manifestation”; i.e., the Ding-an-sich is the source of 
sensations, which are transformed, when they come into contact with the a priori 
mechanisms in the mind, into sensible perceptions. To say that the Ding-an-sich 
“manifests” or “objectifies” itself as particular appearances is to intentionally obscure 
the process whereby sensations are transformed into perceptions. Schopenhauer cannot, 
despite his ingenious attempt, evade this difficulty. Just as in the Berkeleyan philosophy 
God is the source or cause of objects, so too, in the Kantian and Schopenhauerian 
philosophies is there a cause and source of sensations, but this is more complicated in 
so far as there are in the latter philosophies two elements necessary for the production 
of perceptible objects: one source lies within the mind itself, as that which confers order 
and sense (meaning) onto an unintelligible assortment of sensations; the other lies 
within the world in-itself, i.e. the Ding-an-sich. Thus, the provenience of sensations 
must be the Ding-an-sich, problematical as this may be to both Kant and Schopenhauer 
who deny a mind-independent form of the causal law.50 
																																																								
50 Kant and Schopenhauer failed to consider the possibility of what is nowadays referred to as 




In concluding this rather abstruse discussion I wish to offer a few more pertinent 
remarks on the topic in the hope of rendering it more intelligible. The most significant 
observation derivable from our discussion is the observation that, on a transcendental 
idealist account, the things-in-themselves must ultimately contribute something to 
perception. Indeed, this seems to me the most credible interpretation of Kant’s 
philosophy, for it is able to explicate the existence of unpleasant and life-threatening 
objects; for the things-in-themselves possess characteristic attributes which contribute 
to their appearances. But, if we deny the mind-independent material existence of the 
world in-itself and wish to persist with the radical idealist claim that the world is solely 
a fabrication of one’s mind then we are at a loss to explicate the existence of 
innumerable unpleasant objects and scenarios. For what motivation could the mind 
possess to portray to itself harrowing objects and scenes? If the source of sensations is 
a unitary Ding-an-sich (as is the case on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 113) account) then 
what motivations could the mind possibly possess to produce multifarious perceptions 
(appearances), some of which are disagreeable and even life-threatening?51 That the 
																																																								
However, the possibility of distinguishing the real from illusion seems to intimate the existence 
of a causal connection between sensations and the object in-itself which produces them. In this 
sense, then, we can dichotomise between two types of causality: a subjective and an objective. 
Of the former, one may be said to possess absolute knowledge and can speak with certainty of 
it. The latter, however, cannot be known with any degree of certainty and it may or may not 
correlate with subjective causality. Now if such an objective causality is permitted then it is not 
incoherent to speak of the Ding-an-sich as causing sensations. But it must be borne in mind 
that this objective causality is not a priori or a posteriori and consequently cannot be known to 
exist; it can only be postulated as possibly extant as an explicative device. In the second section 
on idealism I shall return to the problem of objective causality. 
51 The recourse to Platonic Ideas in an attempt to dispense with this difficulty seems to me 
utterly inefficient because it shifts the difficulty from the mind to the Ding-an-sich, without 
actually resolving it. In section 25 of the second book of the first volume of Die Welt als Wille 
und Vorstellung Schopenhauer (1969a: 127-130) introduces the concept of the Platonic Ideas, 
which are to be construed as perfect prototypes of the imperfect appearances (ectypes) found 
in the world. However, that the Ding-an-sich should “manifest” itself as numerous Platonic 
Ideas does not solve the problem initially posed: we are then left wondering as to the Ding-an-
sich’s motivations for bringing such Platonic Ideas into existence, and thus I stated that the 




Ding-an-sich is, on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 113) account, said to be a unity precludes 
it from possessing characteristic elements which could explicate the multitude of 
appearances. This is a difficulty which is no less problematic to the Berkeleyan idealist 
than to the Schopenhauerian idealist. For in the case of Berkeley’s idealism – based as 
it is on the existence of a God with particular attributes – what justifiable reason could 
a benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent being possess for allowing the appearance of 
dreadful objects and scenes? It seems to me that were the Berkeleyan philosophy 
veracious we should perceive nothing but agreeable objects and scenarios. Experience, 
however, reveals the contrary: for we are often confronted with the most harrowing 
situations: dangerous objects, whether they be infinitesimally small such as bacteria 
and viruses or monumentally formidable such as volcanoes or large predatory animals, 
which threaten the continuation of our existence. 
Now I maintain that even if one attempted to dispense with God and yet persist with 
radical idealism the problem is no less serious. For the harrowing images must be 
thought to originate from within the individual. As in the case of nightmares, the 
frightening incidents and objects experienced are conjured up by the unconscious mind 
and are consequently meaningful and purposive; in other words, a sagacious 
psychologist can determine the unconscious motives for the appearance of nightmares. 
But such a psychological explanation cannot be posited as the cause of the harrowing 
scenes one experiences in the case of idealism: for instance, one cannot cogently 
maintain that an ophidiophobic individual finds himself trapped in a pit of serpents 
because of his fear thereof. Thus, we must enquire once again as to the cause of the 
manifold perceptions we experience, for it is evident that they cannot originate entirely 
within the mind of the perceiver (for then they are mere illusions). It seems to me that 
both the Berkeleyan and Schopenhauerian forms of idealism fail to explicate why our 
minds or that of an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent deity should conjure up at one 
moment a loving, docile pet and on another occasion a ferocious predator which 
threatens to destroy us. For if one persists in the view that perceptions are entirely and 
in toto the product of a conscious mind then he must necessarily be able to offer a 
cogent explication thereof; but I confess that I cannot discover a satisfying answer to 
																																																								





this phenomenon in either Berkeley’s or Schopenhauer’s philosophical systems.  The 
only cogent explanation I can posit is that there is something inherent in the object as 
Ding-an-sich which causes such variation in perceptions, for such variety cannot be 
attributed to the active mind or to an all-powerful benevolent God alone. This I take to 
be the correct interpretation of the Kantian philosophy and I consequently exempt it 
from the criticism here propounded. However, it must be stated that if the things-in-
themselves are accorded a material mind-independent existence then one cannot 
advocate radical idealism. Consequently, in the second section on idealism, I shall 
argue in favour of what I term “partial idealism”.  
The above observation, viz., that there must be something inherent to the objects (i.e. 
in-themselves) which (partly) determine their appearances, inevitably leads to a certain 
conclusion, viz., that the Ding-an-sich is inherently multifarious. Although I do not 
wish to anticipate and vitiate the development of Schopenhauer’s argument, I must 
acknowledge that contrary to his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 113) claim the Ding-an-sich 
cannot be considered as a unity and therefore identical in every object. For the 
postulation of such a notion immediately raises the difficulty as to how the multiplicity 
of heterogeneous objects is possible. For as we have seen, it cannot be cogently argued 
that the mind alone is responsible for the existence of a world of manifold (often 
disagreeable) objects. In contradistinction to the Schopenhauerian view I affirm that 
one should speak of things-in-themselves as opposed to the singular Ding-an-sich, thus 
alluding to the fact that the world as it is in-itself necessarily contributes in an active 
way to the existence of perceptible objects. I would also like to observe that my position 
seems to be in accordance with Kant’s as stated in the second edition of the Kritik 
(1787) and in the Prolegomena (1783). For in those works Kant attempts to distance 
himself from Berkeleyan idealism because, I conjecture, he does not wish to deny the 
existence of the material object (cf. “Remark Two” in Part One of the Prolegomena 
(pg. 36-37) and “Refutation of Idealism” in the second edition of the Kritik B275), 
which he correctly acknowledges as an essential element in the production of 
perceptions. I reiterate that it is only if we conceive of the Ding-an-sich as a material 
object possessing inherently diverse qualities that we can explicate the phenomenon of 





The abovementioned discussion also affords an ample opportunity to return to the 
controversy surrounding the rendering of the German word “Vorstellung” into English. 
As the Ding-an-sich is considered by Schopenhauer to be atemporal and aspatial it 
cannot correspond to the world of appearances and consequently I have avoided the 
word “representation”, which seems to suggest a similarity between the two. For 
instance, the term “representation” may be used in connection with the pictorial arts, as 
when an artist paints a tree: we say, then, that the painted tree is a depiction or 
representation of the actual tree and in so doing we intimate a similarity between the 
real object and its pictorial representation. However, no such similarity may be said to 
exist between the world of appearances and the world as it is in-itself, which is said by 
Schopenhauer (1969a:110) to be toto genere different therefrom. For this reason I 
emphatically insist on the rejection of the world “representation” as an acceptable 
rendering of the German term “Vorstellung” in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and I have 
consequently spoken solely of appearances in connection with Vorstellungen. 
 
3.8. Concluding Remarks 
	
In concluding this section we may succinctly express Schopenhauer’s view thus: the 
principle of sufficient reason of becoming (principium fiendi) along with the principle 
of sufficient reason of being (principium essendi), given that they are a priori and hence 
necessary preconditions for perception, work in unison to construct the perceptible 
world by transforming raw, unintelligible data into meaningful appearances. In this way 
Schopenhauer is (1969a: 3) able to state that the experienceable world is essentially a 
product of cognition. But, as was discussed at length, in order to distinguish illusion 
from reality it is necessary to postulate the existence of something “out there” causing 
the sensations one experiences. Consequently, as Schopenhauer (1969a: 98-99) states,  
“We want to know the significance of those [appearances]; we ask whether this 
world is nothing more than [appearance]. In that case, it would inevitably pass 
by us like an empty dream, or a ghostly vision not worth our consideration. Or 
we ask whether it is something else, something in addition, and if so what that 




But, whatever that mysterious something which causes sensations is, one thing is 
certain, viz., that that ulterior world must necessarily be toto genere different 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 113) to the world of perception (appearances) because it lies 
outside the province of the correlativity thesis and the principle of sufficient reason 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 99). As mentioned, Kant referred to the realm of sensory data 
as that which can only be conceived of in a negative sense, i.e. one can only affirm that 
a mind-independent world (Ding-an-sich) exists; it can solely be thought of but never 
positively known or characterised (Scruton, 2001: 56). On this view, the world as it is 
in-itself could be entirely identical to the world we perceive or it could be vastly 
dissimilar. But such a question is – at least for Kant – utterly impervious to human 
investigation and thus the Kantian philosophy has an element of mysteriousness to it. 
As we shall see in the subsequent section, Schopenhauer (1969a: 99-100) maintains 
that, in opposition to Kant’s teaching, there is a way in which knowledge of the essence 
of the world may be attained. We shall now turn to Schopenhauer’s attempt to 





4. The World as Will: First Part 
	
Schopenhauer (1969a: 99-100) proceeds to positively identify the essence of the world, 
but in order to do so he cannot travel upon the path of perception utilising the principle 
of sufficient reason, which will inevitably lead only to knowledge of appearances. He 
must consequently search for the essence of this mind-independent world by some other 
means, and he (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 195) therefore attempts to discover it by way of 
introspection. The motivation for this seemingly odd method of philosophizing is to be 
found in the fact that every individual is, like all other phenomenal objects, a 
manifestation of the Ding-an-sich; one’s body is the only object in the world of which 
one has a dual knowledge52 – outer knowledge of it is an object among manifold other 
objects, but also, and more significantly, an inner knowledge of it, which is entirely 
unique (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 99).  Hence that which stands before the individual as 
mysterious as the sphinx (i.e., the world at large) can be best comprehend by way of 
that which is known more intimately than any other object (i.e., the body). It is primarily 
for this reason, as Cartwright notes (2005: 15), that Schopenhauer has been called “the 
philosopher of the body”.  As Schopenhauer (1969b: 195) explicates in his picturesque 
style: 
“[…] A way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to 
which we cannot penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean 
passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the 
fortress that could not be taken by attack from without. Precisely as such, the 
[Ding-an-sich] can come into consciousness only quite directly, namely by it 
itself being conscious of itself; to try to know it objectively is to desire 
something contradictory. Everything objective is [Vorstellung], consequently 
appearance, in fact a mere phenomenon of the brain.” 
By means of this introspective modus operandi Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) focuses on 
his self-consciousness, which is the pith of the internal realm, and when he analyses it 
he (Schopenhauer, 2005: 12) discovers it to be “intensely, really even exclusively, 
occupied with willing”. This leads to the conclusion that the essence of one’s being, i.e. 
																																																								
52 One should not construe this as a dualistic theory. Schopenhauer is not saying that the world 
is comprised of two distinct substances; but rather one substance comprehended in two different 




the Ding-an-sich, is akin to one’s volitional strivings to which Schopenhauer (1969a: 
100) attaches the term Will.53  
Let us now reflect upon the Will in order to determine its essential inner 
characteristics.54 Given that the Will as Ding-an-sich is antithetical to the phenomenal 
world, it must, as Schopenhauer (1969a: and 1969b: 193) emphatically reiterates, be 
toto genere different therefrom. Now, it will be remembered that the defining feature 
of the world of appearance is the fact that it is subject to the principle of sufficient 
reason. In other words, the world of perception and experience is essentially subject to 
the laws of temporality, spatiality and causality. To say then that the Will as Ding-an-
sich is toto genere different from the world of perception (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 103 
and Schopenhauer, 1969b: 193) simply portends that the former is not subject to the 
same principles as the latter. Consequently, we can conclude that the Will as Ding-an-
sich, unlike the world of appearance, is both atemporal and aspatial and it is also 
impervious to the law of causality. These notions can also be positively characterised 
by stating that the Will is a unity (aspatial), it is eternal (atemporal) and it is unchanging 
(acausal). The Will is the sole constant in a world of fleeting forms; it is that which was, 
it is that which is, and it is that which will be (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 278-279). The 
outward manifestations of the Will – the ideas of perception – are in a constant state of 
flux: coming into being and passing away like the changing of the day into night and 
back again; but the Will, like the sun in the firmament, burns brightly without 
intermission. These notions, as will become conspicuous in due course, are the 
																																																								
53 Although it would be extremely interesting to trace the provenance of this notion in the works 
of some of Schopenhauer’s philosophical predecessors – such as, for instance, in Spinoza’s 
concept of conatus and in the vis viva of Leibniz – as, likewise, it would be to explore the 
influence of Schopenhauer’s most renowned claim upon the development of subsequent 
philosophical enquiry – such as the influence it had upon Nietzsche’s formulation of his notion 
of the Wille-zur-Macht and Henri Bergson’s concept of the élan vital – such discussions would, 
I fear, lead my study too far astray from the primary topic of the dissertation. Consequently, I 
have omitted such considerations, although I fully acknowledge the significance they have 
within the field of Schopenhauerian scholarship. 
54 At this point in my exposition I am concerned solely with the Will as Ding-an-sich; in a later 
section I shall consider the essential outer characteristic of the Will, i.e. a consideration of the 




foundations upon which Schopenhauer (1969b: 498) constructs his doctrine of 
athanasia and consequently I cannot overemphasize their importance to the central 
theme of my exposition. But before I proceed with the general outline of the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy I wish to reflect a while longer on the three characteristics 
of the Will as Ding-an-sich, viz., the fact that the Will is said to be aspatial (a unity), 
atemporal (eternal) and acausal (unchanging). 
 
4.1. The Will as Aspatial 
	
We have seen that for Schopenhauer the principium essendi (the principle of sufficient 
reason of being) is responsible for the application of time and space (the so-called 
“principium individuations”) to perceptions. Thus, the possibility of the inner reality 
being a plurality is precluded by the fact that the principium individuations – and in 
particular spatial dimensions – does not subsist within that particular realm 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 113). It follows that the world as it is in-itself must be a unity 
of sorts; hence Schopenhauer (1969a: 417) speaks of the Ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself), 
i.e. in the singular, and not things-in-themselves, i.e. in the plural. But it must be borne 
in mind that this unity – for want of a better word – is unlike anything we have ever 
experienced before, for our comprehension of the concept of “unity” is inextricably 
bound to the principle of sufficient reason and therefore it does not adequately describe 
the Will’s aspatiality and atemporality, as Schopenhauer (1969a: 113) explicates:   
“[The Will] is itself one, yet not as an object is one, for the unity of an object 
is known only in contrast to possible plurality. Again, the Will is one not as a 
concept is one, for a concept originates only through abstraction from plurality; 
but it is one as that which lies outside time and space, outside the principium 
individuationis, that is to say, outside the possibility of plurality.” 
As will be seen, the assertion that the Will is a metaphysical unity generates serious 
complications for Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation (cf. the appendix), for if the 
Will is one then the abrogation thereof in the ascetic saint ought to lead to the 
dissolution of the Will in toto. Therefore, that the Will is a unity or aspatial leads 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 128-129) to the conclusion that “if, per impossible, a single 




inevitably be destroyed with it”. This remark may seem vindicated on Schopenhauer’s 
terms, but as will become apparent once we discuss the way in which the ascetic saint 
attains salvation from the world, it generates a contradiction within Schopenhauer’s 
system. In this connection, and as I do not wish to vitiate my discussion with an 
extremely prolix matter – which, in order to do it justice, requires an independent 
examination, I refer readers to the appendix where they shall find just such a discussion.  
But that is not to say that our considerations regarding the ascetic concept of salvation 
lead us to a rejection of this claim at this stage in the discussion; on the contrary, the 
notion of the unity of the Will occupies an extremely significant position within 
Schopenhauer’s system, for it is the foundation upon which his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
350-351) theory of compassion and concept of “eternal justice” are based. Even though 
somewhat tangential to the current discussion, I shall now turn to a brief consideration 
thereof. Schopenhauer (1969a: 350) distinguishes eternal justice from temporal justice 
by claiming that the latter “has its seat in the State” and requires the possibility of future 
retribution (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 350). The former, in striking contrast  
“[…] rules not the State but the world; this is not dependent on human 
institutions, not subject to chance and deception, not uncertain, wavering, and 
erring, but infallible, firm, and certain. The concept of retaliation implies time, 
therefore eternal justice cannot be retributive justice, and hence cannot, like 
that, admit respite and reprieve, and require time in order to succeed, balancing 
the evil deed against the evil consequence only by means of time.” 
According to Schopenhauer (1969a: 350) the unity of the metaphysical Will intimates 
that an injustice to another creature is in fact an injustice to oneself, for “[h]ere the 
punishment must be so linked with the offence that the two are one” (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 351). Now although this notion is extremely beautiful in so far as it claims “that 
the world itself is the tribunal of the world” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 352), intimating 
that every punishment is meted out simultaneously with every wicked act so that “[i]f 
we could lay all the misery of the world in one pan of the scales and all its guilt in the 
other, the pointer would certainly show them to be in equilibrium” (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 352), upon closer reflection it does not in fact offer a genuine consolation for 
the perpetration of injustices. For suffering, as Copleston (1947: 147) correctly notes, 
concerns solely the individual phenomenal appearance and not the Will as Ding-an-




instance, suffered vicariously in all the millions of people who perished in the 
Holocaust and the Second World War; for the fact remains that suffering concerns 
solely the individual, i.e. the phenomenal appearance of the Will and not the Will as 
Ding-an-sich. Thus, along with Copleston (1947: 147) we can rhetorically enquire:   
“[…] if it is the Will that is guilty of the crime of the world’s existence and it 
is the individual alone that pays for that guilt, where is the ‘eternal justice’?” 
Nonetheless, it is essential to comprehend that for Schopenhauer (1969a: 372-374) 
genuine moral actions emanate from compassion (in German: Mitleid, literally, “to 
suffer with”), which is founded upon the realisation of the unity of the metaphysical 
Will. Hence, although it generates complications for Schopenhauer’s soteriological 
doctrine and does not, upon close consideration, offer a cogent argument for “eternal 
justice”, the unity of the Will as Ding-an-sich is an extremely significant notion within 
Schopenhauer’s system. 
 
4.2. The Will as Acausal 
	
I turn now to Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) insistence that the Will as Ding-an-sich is 
impervious to the law of causality. This is an extremely significant point in connection 
with Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality in so far as it intimates that the Will is not 
susceptible to alteration and thus perpetually remains as it always is and was. In 
contradistinction thereto, the phenomenal world is in a constant state of flux, i.e. 
perpetually undergoing transformation and never remaining constant. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that death is a consequence of this process of alteration: illness 
is a biological change which affects further changes in the organism which, in turn, 
ultimately leads to death: the latter is therefore the effect of a long concatenation of 
causes. Thus, without the principium fiendi it seems death would not exist.  
Now, that the principle of causality is a form of the principle of sufficient reason 
(Schopenhauer, 1889a: 37-38) intimates that the causal law cannot be applied to the 
world as it is in-itself, i.e. the world independent of cognition. In the previous section I 
discussed at length that this view controversially maintains that the world as it is in-




discussed in relation thereto, viz., that the metaphysical Will does not, according to 
Schopenhauer cause particular appearances, but rather, that it (somewhat mysteriously) 
“manifests” them into the perceptible world. Given that, as a radical idealist, 
Schopenhauer (1889a: 58) is committed to the a priority of the causal principle, he 
refuses to speak, as discussed, of the Will as Ding-an-sich as causing the existence of 
phenomenal objects. Now let us consider the matter in relation to the object in which 
one discovers the Will to be the essence of the world, viz., the subject’s own body. 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) argues that  
“[t]he act of Will and the action of the body are not two different states 
objectively known, connected by the bond of causality; they do not stand in 
the relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing, though given 
in two entirely different ways, first quite directly, and then in perception for 
the Understanding. The action of the body is nothing but the act of Will 
objectified, i.e., translated into perception.” 
This leads Schopenhauer (1969a: 108) to the startling teleological55 conclusion that: 
“[…] the whole series of actions, and consequently every individual act and 
likewise its condition, namely the whole body itself which performs it, and 
therefore also the process through which and in which the body exists, are 
nothing but the phenomenal appearance of the Will, its becoming visible, the 
objectivity of the Will.” 
																																																								
55 Although it may strike us nowadays as bizarre, it was not uncommon, prior to the Darwinian 
theory of evolution by means of natural selection, for even the most erudite of people to 
maintain that there was an intelligent purposiveness active within the manifold productions of 
nature. In this connection one ought to consider Hume’s famous work Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion, wherein even the sceptical character Philo is purported to subscribe to the 
teleological view; for Hume (1998: 77) has him state: “[a] purpose, an intention, a design strikes 
everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd 
systems as at all times to reject it”. It is interesting to note, as does Gardiner (1967: 326), that 
Schopenhauer so “greatly admired” this work by Hume that he even contemplated translating 





This is extremely significant in so far as it intimates that the Will, contrary to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115) assertions, is not blind but intentionally manifests itself 
in the phenomenal world as certain bodily organs and in specific animal behaviours. In 
due course I shall return to a lengthy discussion on this matter. For the moment we can 
disregard the inconsistency this notion generates and merely observe that in an attempt 
to evade the claim that the Will is the cause of objects, Schopenhauer (1969a: 108) 
maintains that every bodily organ is merely the Will phenomenalised: 
“[…] the parts of the body must correspond completely to the chief demands 
and desires by which the Will manifests itself; they must be the visible 
expression of these desires. Teeth, gullet, and intestinal canal are objectified 
hunger; the genitals are objectified sexual impulse; grasping hands and nimble 
feet correspond to the more indirect strivings of the Will which they represent.”  
 
4.3. The Will as Atemporal 
	
Finally, it is necessary to consider the fact that the Will is said to be atemporal, i.e. not 
located within time (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 113). It must be understood that for a radical 
idealist time is a synthetic a priori feature of the mind and thus it applies solely to the 
phenomenal world and not to the world as it is in-itself. It follows therefrom that if time 
is brought to experience by way of the mind then the world as it is in-itself must be 
utterly devoid of temporal relations. Schopenhauer (1969a: 176) consequently 
construes this atemporality as akin to eternity; but here “eternity” must not be 
comprehended as an eternal duration (which, unwittingly, implicates the notion of 
time), but rather, as a form of timelessness. Thus, the metaphysical Will is said to be 
eternal only in so far as it is devoid of time.  Even at this stage in my exposition I must 
acknowledge that this significant claim is extremely problematic for Schopenhauer, 
because, as Paul Edwards (2009: 170) notes, our volition strivings “can be dated and 
their duration can be measured”. Therefore, in the second edition of Die Welt 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 196-197) acknowledges that the Will is in fact located in time 
and hence it cannot be entirely identical with the Ding-an-sich. The mature 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 197) consequently refers to the Will as “the nearest and clearest 
phenomenon of the thing-in-itself”; as such the Will must be the Ding-an-sich’s most 




multidimensional view of the essence of the world. I shall leave this matter for a later 
section in which I attempt to excoriate Schopenhauer’s theory in order to illustrate the 
untenability of his doctrine of athanasia. However, for the moment one must realise the 
significance the atemporality of the Will has for Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 282) theory 
of immortality:  
“For it is true that everyone is transitory only as phenomenon; on the other 
hand, as thing-in-itself he is timeless, and so endless. But also only as 
phenomenon is the individual different from the other things of the world; as 
thing-in-itself, he is the Will that appears in everything, and death does away 
with the illusion that separates his consciousness from that of the rest; this is 
future existence or immortality. His exemption from death, which belongs to 
him only as thing-in-itself, coincides for the phenomenon with the continued 
existence of the rest of the world.” 
In short, the phenomenon of death belongs solely to the world of appearances, whereas 
the Will – given that it is atemporal and hence eternal – does not arise and pass away. 
Now this atemporality of the Will manifests itself in the phenomenal world as the so-
called “nunc stans of the scholastics” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 279). The notions of past, 
present and future belong solely to the temporal (phenomenal) world; but when applied 
to the Will as Ding-an-sich they necessarily lose all meaning. Thus, reflection reveals 
that the Will which manifested itself a million years ago is absolutely identical to the 
Will which manifests itself in the objects of the present: for the Will is eternal, 
unchanging and one. As such, “the present [is] the only form in which the Will 
manifests itself. It will not run away from the Will, nor the Will from it” (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 280). Consequently, the one, eternal Will perpetually exists in the ever-abiding 
present. 
Now given that every individual is essentially a manifestation of Will it follows that 
one’s inner essence is indestructible: the phenomenal form is subject to individuality, 
alteration and finitude and thus the phenomenon of death belongs solely thereto; but 
the Will as Ding-an-sich is impervious to all such conditions. Hence, it is by way of 
focusing on our inner being that we discover our immortality. Thus Schopenhauer 




“If, therefore, a person fears death as annihilation, it is just as if he were to 
think that the sun can lament in the evening and say: ‘Woe is me! I am going 
down into eternal night’ […] The Earth rolls on from day into night; the 
individual dies; but the Sun itself burns without intermission, an eternal noon.” 
Although I admit that Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia is extremely beautiful I shall, 
in later sections, attempt to illustrate that the Will is in fact subject to time, space and 
causality; thereby undermining Schopenhauer’s claim that the Will is immortal. Yet, 
although Schopenhauer advances a doctrine of immortality – something many other 
philosophers have done – it is important to note that it is unique in the Western 
philosophical canon. 
 
4.4. Schopenhauer’s Thought in Relation to his Philosophical Predecessors 
	
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) claim that the Will constitutes the essence of the world 
amounts, in my estimation, to a revolution in philosophical thinking. However, like all 
iconoclastic thoughts it retains elements of the system from which it originated, viz. 
Enlightenment thought. Allow me to elucidate. The identification of volitional strivings 
as the most fundamental aspect of human beings is antithetical to many cherished 
philosophical and religious principles, one such view is that of the human as an animal 
rationabile.56  Bertrand Russell (1946: 786) notes in his History of Western Philosophy 
that one of the most important consequences of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is “his 
doctrine that [W]ill is superior to knowledge”. By maintaining that the Will is prius and 
the intellect posterius Schopenhauer (1969b: 198) broke with an old philosophical 
tradition which maintains that the intellect is primary.57 As Schopenhauer (1889b: 238) 
states in his work Über den Willen in der Natur: 
“The fundamental truth of my doctrine, which places that doctrine in 
opposition with all others that have ever existed, is the complete separation 
between the Will and the intellect, which all philosophers before me had 
																																																								
56 A rational animal. 
57 Cartwright (2005: 90) describes this as “[a reversal] of some of the main tendencies found in 
Western philosophy, especially as articulated by such figures as Plato, René Descartes, and G. 




looked upon as inseparable; or rather, I ought to say that they had regarded the 
Will as conditioned by, nay, mostly even as a mere function of, the intellect, 
assumed by them to be the fundamental substance of our spiritual being. […] 
With me, that which is eternal and indestructible in man, therefore, that which 
constitutes his vital principle, is not the soul, but – if I may use a chemical term 
– its radical: and this is the Will.” 
It is primarily for this reason that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is often pejoratively 
described as “irrational” (Cartwright, 2005: 89) or as venerating the irrational;58 
intimating, perhaps, that the philosophy is the product of insanity or that it is an illogical 
system, unworthy of serious philosophical consideration. However, to maintain such a 
view is to betoken a misunderstanding of Schopenhauer’s philosophy considered in 
toto. For although Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) identifies the pith of reality as an 
irrational striving he does not believe that it should triumph; on the contrary, the third 
and fourth books of Schopenhauer’s principal work59 intimate that the ideal is for 
rationality to triumph over the irrational urges of the Will. To this extent I maintain that 
Schopenhauer retains an element of Enlightenment thought and he is consequently, in 
spite of his iconoclastic notions, not entirely outside that tradition.  
 
4.5. Schopenhauer’s Selection of the Word “Will” 
	
Now the claim for which Schopenhauer is perhaps most renowned is certainly not 
without ample criticism, and in due course I shall subject it to thorough scrutiny. 
However, I do not wish to vitiate this outline with prolix criticisms which will 
undoubtedly confuse the presentation of my exposition, and I shall therefore postpone 
these comments for a later discussion. For the moment I wish to explicate 
Schopenhauer’s choice of the world “Will” as opposed to more familiar terms such as 
“energy” or “force”. Some commentators on the Schopenhauerian philosophy, such as 
																																																								
58 Karl Popper, for instance, called Schopenhauer “the father of modern irrationalism” (cited in 
Cartwright, 2005: 90) 
59 “The [appearance] independent of the principle of sufficient reason: the Platonic Idea: the 





Bryan Magee60 and S. Jack Odell,61 have ventured to equate the Will with the concept 
of force or energy, in spite of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 111) explicit warning to the 
contrary:  
“[…] I should be misunderstood by anyone who thought that ultimately it was 
all the same whether we expressed this essence-in-itself of all phenomena by 
the word Will or by any other word.” 
To fully comprehend why it is a serious error to equate the Will with such concepts as 
“force” and “energy”, and why it should consequently not be done, it is necessary to 
make mention of Schopenhauer’s views regarding science and metaphysics. 
At the very outset of the second book of the first volume of his magnum opus 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 96) distinguishes between two branches of natural science, viz., 
morphology and aetiology. The former concerns the classification and description of 
forms and shapes (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 96) – it is concerned in the main with the 
outward appearance of things and not with their inner content; while the latter is 
concerned with the causal law (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 96), i.e., a form of the principle 
of sufficient reason,62 and is likewise entirely occupied with the outward appearance, 
as opposed to the inner essence, of objects. As such, the scientific method thus defined 
can only offer “superficial” knowledge, i.e. knowledge regarding appearances within 
the realm of the principle of sufficient reason, and not knowledge pertaining to the 
essence thereof. As Schopenhauer (1974b: 91) states: 
“Just as we know only the surface of the globe, but not the great solid mass of 
its interior, so we know empirically of things and of the world generally 
																																																								
60 “The term ‘force’, rejected by [Schopenhauer], would have been vastly preferable [to the 
word ‘Will’]. ‘Energy’ would have been better still.” (Magee, 1997: 144) 
61 “[…] The reader may feel some uncertainty concerning exactly what Schopenhauer meant to 
refer to with the word ‘Will’. I have considered all of the following: desire, drive, impulse, 
striving, and Magee’s view that it is what physicists refer to as force or energy” (Odell, 2001: 
54). Were it not for the pernicious influence of Magee, Odell could have been forgiven for his 
“elucidation” of the term. 




nothing but their phenomenal appearance, i.e. their surface. The precise 
knowledge of this is physics taken in the widest sense.” 
As such the scientific method cannot offer complete knowledge about the world, for it 
is, by its very nature, occupied solely with appearances and it cannot, therefore, 
penetrate into the essence of things (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 98-99). But, closely 
associated with that criticism is the fact that science, according to Schopenhauer 
(1889b:219), must necessarily utilise inexplicable concepts in order to fully explicate 
the world;63 these concepts, such as “force” or “energy”, do not readily admit of a 
definition, they act merely as explicative devices for unknowns; they are in a word 
qualitates occultae, i.e. “occult qualities, necessary but scientifically inexplicable 
elements of scientific explanations of the world” (Cartwright, 2005: 52). As 
Schopenhauer (1889b: 219) states in his work Über den Willen in der Natur: 
“Physical science is wont to designate this unknown, inaccessible something, 
at which its investigations stop short and which is taken for granted in all its 
explanations, by such terms as physical force, vital force, formative principles, 
etc., etc., which in fact mean no more than x, y, z.” 
Thus it is evident that the terms “force” and “energy” – thought by Magee (1997: 144) 
to be more comprehensible than, and consequently preferable to, the term “Will” – are 
in fact, for Schopenhauer (1889a: 52), mysterious terms which stand in lieu of 
ignoramus – “we do not know” – i.e. ignorance. It is primarily for this reason that 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 110-112) rejects them. But the reason that physical science 
inevitably reaches the unknown is due to the fact that, for Schopenhauer (1969a: 98-
99) at least, the phenomenal world is founded upon the metaphysical. But due to the 
fact that physical science must necessarily utilise the principle of sufficient reason 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 96) it cannot transcend the phenomenal world and positively 
determine the nature of the way the world is in-itself. 
																																																								
63 This is due, of course, to the fact that the perceptible world is essentially a “manifestation” 
of the mysterious Ding-an-sich; or, in other words, the Ding-an-sich is the cause of the 
perceptible world (cf. the section above entitled “Objective Causality”). Thus, physical science 
inevitably arrives at mysterious, inexplicable phenomena when it reaches the point at which the 




But what, if anything, can correct this defect in the scientific method? In a word 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 112) response is philosophy, and in particular, metaphysics. 
This is due, of course, to the fact that the mysterious Ding-an-sich is the cause of 
sensations: thus, physical science investigates natural, i.e. perceptible, phenomena until 
it reaches the point at which appearances end and the metaphysical realm begins. As 
Schopenhauer (1889a: 52) states: 
“Every true, consequently, really primary force of Nature – and every 
fundamental chemical property belongs to these forces – is essentially a 
qualitas occulta, i.e. it does not admit of physical, but only of metaphysical 
explanation: in other words, of an explanation which transcends the world of 
phenomena.” 
Of course, physical science – which is committed to the observation of phenomena as 
they relate to the principle of sufficient reason – cannot enter into that metaphysical 
realm and thus is the scientist coerced to utilise mysterious terms in lieu of those 
phenomena which transcend his apprehension, which is, of course, perennially 
committed to the principle of sufficient reason. In other words, the physical scientist 
must ultimately use mysterious, uncertain terms for metaphysical phenomena, which 
are necessarily presupposed in every scientific hypothesis, given that the phenomenal 
world is founded upon the metaphysical.  
But the suggestion that metaphysics can complete the scientific view of the world has 
tremendous appeal to many philosophers in so far it seems to intimate that the 
philosopher and the physical scientist can work in unison to achieve a complete 
understanding of the world and existence. In this way philosophy is rendered less 
impracticable than is ordinarily assumed. But of the two disciplines philosophy is, to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 102) mind at least, the greater, in so far as it supplies recondite 
knowledge about the essence of the world and completes the superficial, i.e., principle 
of sufficient reason-based, scientific view of reality. I shall return to this significant 
discussion in my criticism of Schopenhauer’s views, but I imagine that such a claim as 
to philosophy’s elevation above that of the scientific method must necessarily incense 
the modern mind because nowadays science has become a surrogate for decrepit 
religious beliefs. This striking phenomenon is most evident in the zeal with which many 
secularists cite “scientific evidence” from journals and research studies as confirmation 




although there is an obvious distinction between scientific and religious thought – in so 
far as the former requires numerous empirical corroborations for every propounded 
view, whereas the latter does not – one would do well to remember that science is a 
discipline dependent on the finite human brain – it has not been bestowed upon 
humankind as a generous gift from outside, by some superior omniscient being. 
Moreover, it must be retained in consciousness that the human brain, as a product of an 
extensive process of evolution, did not evolve to deal with abstract thought and 
scientific endeavours. This is due to the fact that science and abstract thinking are not 
conducive to animal survival64 in so far as such endeavours would require the creature 
to expend a tremendous amount of energy upon superfluous intellectual pursuits while 
leading a sedentary lifestyle, both of which would hinder the animal’s ultimate survival. 
Now, bearing in mind the aforementioned discussion, the question I seek to address 
here is the following: is the Will, like the scientific terms “energy” and “force”, a 
qualitas occulta, i.e. an inexplicable X which one utilises quite arbitrarily, in spite of 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 111) assertions to the contrary, to explicate all natural 
phenomena? And if so, could those more familiar scientific terms be used in lieu of the 
term Will as both Magee (1997: 144) and Odell (2001: 54) intimate? 
First, we must observe that the Will, being an entity of inner-sense, has no form, no 
scent and no texture; it cannot, as Schopenhauer ought contentedly admit, be known as 
an item of outer experience and, consequently, if it is known (whatever that ultimately 
means), it is not known in the same way that a physical object is known; that is to say 
that the Will is not known according to the principle of sufficient reason. But, 
Schopenhauer (1889b: 376) insists, it is still known to us, albeit in a unique and distinct 
way: 
																																																								
64 I maintain that the modern view of science as a device to improve the lot of humankind is 
spurious. Genuine scientific pursuits are those which strive to comprehend nature in its entirety, 
unconcerned with the practicability of such endeavours. If, of course, science inadvertently 
improves humankind’s condition in some way then that is to be considered an adventitious 
advantage; but the benefits of science for humankind as a whole should never be considered its 





“[…] It is fair to let me, as a serious man, only speak of things which I really 
know and only make use of words which I attach a quite definite meaning; 
since this alone can be communicated with security to others, and 
Vauvenargues is quite right in saying: ‘la clarté est la bonne foi des 
philosophes’.65 Therefore if I use the words ‘Will, [Will-to-Life]’, this is no 
mere ens rationis, no hypostasis set up by me, nor is it a term of vague, 
uncertain meaning; on the contrary, I refer him, who asks what it is, to his own 
inner self, where he will find it entire, nay, in colossal dimensions, as a true 
ens realissimum. I have accordingly not explained the world out of the 
unknown, but rather out of that which is better known than anything, and 
known to us moreover in quite a different way from all the rest.” 
And again, in the second book of the first volume of Die Welt, Schopenhauer (1969a: 
111) states: 
“But the word Will, which, like a magic word, is to reveal to us the innermost 
essence of everything in nature, by no means expresses an unknown quantity, 
something reached by inferences and syllogisms, but something known 
absolutely and immediately, and that so well that we know and understand 
what Will is better than anything else, be it what it may. Hitherto, the concept 
of Will has been subsumed under the concept of force; I, on the other hand, do 
exactly the reverse, and intend every force in nature to be conceived as Will. 
We must not imagine that this is a dispute about words or a matter of no 
consequence; on the contrary, it is of the very highest significance […].” 
But what precisely is one to make of this argument, viz., that although the concept of 
the Will cannot adequately be explicated or fully communicated to others, it is “better 
known than anything” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 376)? Were an individual to tell me that 
he is unable to convey a concept he wishes to propound I would assume one of two 
possibilities: either he does not possess the sufficient vocabulary to express his thought, 
or his thought cannot be communicated, eloquence notwithstanding, because the notion 
itself is vacuous. Schopenhauer, however, is renowned in the sphere of articulacy; he 
cannot claim, therefore that he lacks the ability to explicate the concept of the Will. 
Indeed, no one could do the term more justice than him. Therefore, we are obliged to 
assume that either the notion is vacuous (in which case we may as well cease our 
																																																								




exploration of the philosophy) or that Schopenhauer does not explicate the term because 
the concept itself will not permit of an explanation: it is, in a word, incommunicable. 
This may appear an inadmissible fact within Schopenhauer’s philosophy – viz., to base 
an entire philosophical system upon such an uncertain foundation as that of an 
incommunicable concept. However, in defence of Schopenhauer’s thesis, I maintain 
that there is another phenomenon as incommunicable as the concept of the Will, and 
yet known with certainty by all who have experienced it. I shall consequently use this 
phenomenon in an analogous manner in the hope that it shall render the concept of the 
Will more intelligible.  
In this regard the Will may be compared to the sensation of being in love.66; 67 The state 
of being in love is, like the Will, incommunicable, but it is entirely comprehendible to 
																																																								
66 This is no arbitrary analogy, for in volume one of his principal work Schopenhauer (1969a: 
369-370) explicitly states that “goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue, and pure nobleness 
of mind […] do not come from abstract knowledge; yet they do come from knowledge. But it 
is a direct and intuitive knowledge that, just because it is not abstract, cannot be communicated, 
but must dawn on each of us. It therefore finds its real and adequate expression not in words, 
but simply and solely in deeds, in conduct, in the course of a man’s life.” It is interesting that 
both knowledge of the Will and knowledge of compassion (which emanates from the 
knowledge of the Will’s unity) are said by Schopenhauer (1969a: 370) to emanate from an 
immediate knowledge which cannot be communicated. In an attempt to further illustrate the 
connection between the sensation of being in love and the metaphysical Will I note that 
Schopenhauer likens compassion to practical mysticism (Neeley, 2012: 115). However, I fully 
acknowledge that this analogy is at variance with Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 154) view that the 
Will is the ultimate source of all conflict and suffering. However, the contradiction can easily 
be resolved by way of an appeal to the dichotomisation of the Ding-an-sich and the phenomenal 
world: contemplation of the world as it is in-itself generates compassion in so far as one 
recognises oneself in the suffering other; whereas strife and pain belong solely to the 
phenomenal world wherein the principium individuationis places one organism in conflict with 
another. 
67 It ought to be borne in mind that in my comparison of love with the metaphysical Will I am 
referring solely to a genuine, compassionate love (caritas) and not to a selfish, lustful love 
(eros). The latter Schopenhauer (1969b: 534) characterises as nothing more than “[…] the 
composition of the next generation”, thereby precluding it from a comparison with the 




an individual who is, or has been, in love. Neither a poem, nor a sonnet or a musical 
composition can ever hope to convey the true idea of love to one who has not been 
intoxicated by this tormenting fiend. Romeo’s amorous words to his sweet Juliet are 
meaningless until one has directly experienced the phenomenon of being in love. In 
other words, he who wishes to know the meaning of the term love must experience the 
state of being in love. I maintain that as it is with love, so it is with the Will. Thus, on 
this account, the Will is either known or it is not known, but it is not something 
communicable to another – one must, as it were feel the Will from within to 
comprehend it. Now as the Will constitutes our fundamental essence all humans possess 
the potential to know what the Will is; yet none can verbalise and explicate it.68 This 
necessarily raises the significant question as to whether the knowable essence can be 
associated with any communicable term. In the second section of my discussion on the 
Will, I attempt to argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of the term “Will” to the essence 
of the universe actually renders it a phenomenal entity in so far as it is subsumed 
																																																								
but as something actually known in the everyday sense. However, in a later section, viz., 8.2. 
Knowledge of the Will as a Product of Intellectual Intuition, I explicitly reject the argument 
here propounded by indicating that one cannot have knowledge (even if it is a unique form 
thereof) of something which transcends the necessary preconditions of all knowledge claims. 
68 I wish to note here that, in spite of an obvious similarity in views in so far as both maintain 
that the essence of all objects is one or unified, Schopenhauer (1974b: 99-102) was highly 
critical of Spinoza’s pantheism, which identifies God as the essence of the world, principally 
because it does not actually explicate anything. Schopenhauer (1974b: 99) maintains, correctly 
in my opinion, that the pantheist attempts to explicate the world – something unknown – from 
something even more unknown, viz., God; pantheism thus substitutes one mysterious entity for 
another. To say that the world is God is therefore to say nothing, but “to enrich the language 
with a superfluous synonym for the word world” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 99). In other words, 
the claim that the world is akin to God amounts, in the last analysis, to mere sophistry: it states 
nothing, for God is in fact a qualitas occulta. This observation stands in contrast with 
Schopenhauer’s (1889b: 376) claim that his identification of the ultimate reality with the Will 
is “no mere ens rationis […] nor [an identification] of vague, uncertain meaning” but a 
genuinely meaningful concept. Thus, Schopenhauer’s philosophy, unlike that of pantheism, 
does not attempt to explicate “the world out of the unknown, but rather out of that which is 
better known than anything, and known to us moreover in quite a different way from all the 




according to the principium cognoscendi; i.e., the inner essence one discovers by way 
of introspection is necessarily rendered an abstract representation (a concept) when a 
term – be it what it may – is applied to it. But, for the moment, one need not trouble 
oneself with this criticism; at this point in the discussion it is sufficient for one to 
comprehend that Schopenhauer (1969a: 111) took his concept of the Will to be an 
adequate term for the Ding-an-sich, as that which is best known and known, moreover, 
in a distinct way from everything else.  
As a consequence of these observations we can confidently conclude that, unlike the 
vague scientific terms of “force” or “energy”, the Will is not a qualitas occulta; it is 
something known immediately (intuitively), albeit incommunicable (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 111). We can, therefore, confidently reject Magee (1997: 144) and Odell’s 
(2001: 54) equation of the Will with a force or an energy because, for Schopenhauer 
(1889b: 219), such terms are qualitates occultae, whereas the concept of the Will – as 
the only numinous entity actually known by us – completes and compliments the 
scientific Weltanschauung. Thus Schopenhauer (1889b:246) remarks: 
“Wherever explanation of the physical comes to an end, it is met by the 
metaphysical; and wherever this last is accessible to immediate knowledge, the 
result will be, as here, the Will.” 
Now if the Will is indeed the Ding-an-sich then it must certainly not be supposed, as 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) notes, that “the act of Will and the action of the body are 
[…] two different sates” and, further, that the former is connected to the latter by way 
of “the bond of causality”. To comprehend Schopenhauer’s insistence upon this point 
it is necessary to return to Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena: for 
Kant intimates, as Schopenhauer (1969a: 436) observes in his Criticism of the Kantian 
Philosophy, that sensations (noumena) are actual substances which cause perceptions 
(phenomena) in the subject’s mind; but it ought to be evident by now that to apply the 
a priori laws of substance and causality beyond their designated realm, i.e. the realm 
of appearances, is inadmissible for a radical idealist. As a consequence, Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 108) speaks of the Will as “manifesting” or “objectifying” itself in the 
phenomenal world in an attempt to evade the accusation of applying the aforementioned 
a priori concepts to the Ding-an-sich. On this account the Will is not one particular 




relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing, though given in two entirely 
different ways, first quite directly, and then in perception for the Understanding. The 
action of the body is nothing but the act of Will objectified, i.e. translated into 
perception” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100). This leads Schopenhauer (1969a: 108) to a 
startling conclusion, which I have previously mentioned, viz., that every bodily organ 
“must be the visible expression” of the Will’s desires:  
“Teeth, gullet, and intestinal canal are objectified hunger; the genitals are 
objectified sexual impulse; grasping hands and nimble feet correspond to the 
more indirect strivings of the Will which they represent.” 
This view, as we shall see in the subsequent sections, generates another problem within 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy; viz., it intimates that the Will is not “blind” as 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 115, et al.) emphatically insists, but that it purposefully and 
consciously manifests itself as certain bodily organs in order to ensure the survival of a 
particular creature. Thus, I argue that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100 and 113) 
(unsuccessful) attempt to evade the difficulty of an objective form of causality and a 
heterogenous view of the world as it is in-itself unwittingly generates the notion that 
the metaphysical Will is not in fact blind, but purposefully creates the multitude of 
creatures found throughout the world.69  
But, in connection with the central theme of my exposition, one may justifiably wonder 
as to the Will’s independent existence from the phenomenal body. As we shall see, 
Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia is based primarily on the view that the Will, given 
that it is unhindered by the principle of sufficient reason, is both eternal and 
unchanging. Thus, although the phenomenal body is subject to destruction, the Will is 
said to be impervious thereto. But if the connection between the body and the Will is 
one of such inseparability then it seems impossible to “really imagine this Will without 
[one’s] body” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 102). As such, Schopenhauer’s attempt to closely 
associate the phenomenal appearance with the Ding-an-sich in an attempt to avoid the 
postulation of an objective form of causality unwittingly vitiates his theory of athanasia; 
for it would appear that the Will can only exist in connection with a physical body. Just 
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possibility of “objective causality” the problem of the Will being conscious and intentionally 




as it seems meaningless to me to speak of a non-brain-based cognition so too does it 
strike me as absurd to speak of a disembodied hunger or a disembodied sexual lust. The 
Will’s inseparability from the phenomenal body seems to intimate that upon dying 
one’s Will perishes therewith. I shall return to this matter in due course.70 
 
4.6. The Solipsistic Problem 
	
Thus far we have considered Schopenhauer’s argument egocentrically, i.e. solely in 
terms of the individual. From this perspective only the enquiring individual engaged 
with Schopenhauer’s philosophy and his introspective modus operandi can be certain 
that he is both appearance and Will; for, as was discussed, one’s inner nature is 
accessible solely to oneself. But how can one know that this non-Cartesian dualistic 
description is true of other animate, perhaps even inanimate, objects of which he 
experiences solely as appearances? Indeed, when an individual observes other creatures 
he experiences only their bodies and not their Wills, consequently how, I reiterate, can 
one be certain that other animate objects are, like oneself, both appearance and Will? 
This doubtfulness Schopenhauer (1969a: 104) maintains is:  
“[…] Theoretical egoism [i.e. solipsism], which in this way regards as 
phantoms all phenomena outside its own Will, just as practical egoism does in 
a practical respect; thus in it a man regards and treats only his own person as a 
real person, all others as mere phantoms.” 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 104) proceeds in his discussion by noting that the solipsistic 
problem generated by his radical idealism “can never be refuted by proofs, yet in 
philosophy it has never been positively used otherwise than as a sceptical sophism, i.e., 
for the sake of appearance. As a serious conviction, on the other hand, it could be found 
only in a madhouse; as such it would then need not so much a refutation as a cure”. 
This has led to the not entirely unfounded criticism that Schopenhauer is “soft on 
solipsism” (Young, 2005: 70).71 But following the eminent Schopenhauerian scholar, 
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71 For instance, Patrick Gardiner (1963: 59) states: “[i]t is, I think, true that [Schopenhauer] 




Julian Young (2005: 70), albeit with qualifications, I maintain that Schopenhauer does 
tacitly offer a refutation of the solipsistic position, viz., in his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
154) discussion of the Will at variance with itself. It must be understood that it is of the 
utmost significance for Schopenhauer to illustrate that other phenomenal objects are 
manifestations of the Will, for if he cannot prove this then those appearances “would 
inevitably pass us by like an empty dream, or a ghostly vision not worth our 
consideration” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 99). 
 
4.7.1. The Analogical Argument 
	
However, before I present and discuss what I consider to be the most cogent refutation 
of theoretical egoism, I wish to observe that there is another far more accessible 
argument which can be used to surmount the difficulty.72 This is the so-called 
“argument from analogy”, whereby perceived similarities in one object (i.e. one’s own 
body) may be used to infer something that has yet to be observed in another (i.e. the 
bodies of other organisms). In short, the argument maintains that if I observe other 
bodies similar to my own then it is not unreasonable to assume – by way of analogy – 
that they must be homologous to it in inner respects. Thus, on this account,  as T. L. S. 
Sprigge (2005: 846) notes: “if it is true that my body is Will in its real inner being, then, 
since the physical world outwardly seems homogenous with it, and belongs to the same 
unitary interacting system, it is reasonable to suppose that the same is true of physical 
nature, not only in other humans and animals, as is quite easily granted, but 
																																																								
conceived of as animated beings with an inner life like our own, or took account of the 
difficulties which some of his own theoretical presuppositions might be held to raise in this 
regard”. 
72 So as to avoid any confusion, I must explicitly state here that there is, in fact, a third argument 
for extending the Will throughout organic nature, viz., the teleological argument. This 
argument, however, intimates that, contrary to Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115) assertions, the 
Will is not “blind”, but that it knowingly manifests itself as it does in the phenomenal world. 
As the matter is significant, albeit extremely complex, I have placed it at the conclusion of this 




throughout”.73 However, there is a difficulty with the analogical argument generated by 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 196-197) with regard to the qualification he makes concerning 
the identification of the Will with the Ding-an-sich in the second volume of Die Welt. 
Therein, Schopenhauer (1969b: 196) states that he has: 
“[…] always kept it in mind, that even the inward observation we have of our 
own Will still does not by any means furnish an exhaustive and adequate 
knowledge of the thing-in-itself.” 
The reason for this is due to the fact that the Will, as Schopenhauer (1969b: 197) 
reluctantly admits, is located within time. This is a significant matter to which I shall 
return in due course; however, for the moment it is necessary to reflect solely on the 
fact that if the Ding-an-sich is not entirely identical to the notion of the Will, then one 
cannot confidently assert that the Ding-an-sich manifests itself in a homologous manner 
in other creatures as it does in oneself. For if we concede credibility to the notion that 
the Ding-an-sich may be multidimensional and that the Will is solely one aspect 
thereof, then one cannot merely assume by way of analogy that because the essence 
manifests itself as Will in oneself, that this must necessarily be the case for all other 
phenomena. Thus, Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 196-197) qualification of his most 
renowned claim, viz., that the Will is the Ding-an-sich, ultimately renders the 
analogical argument untenable.  
 
4.7.2. The Practical Egoist Argument 
	
I turn now, therefore, to my attempted refutation of theoretical egoism by way of the 
so-called “practical egoist argument”, which I take to be the most credible even if it is, 
like the analogical argument, committed to a unitary view of the Ding-an-sich. To 
comprehend it one must attend to the notion of practical egoism, i.e. the phenomenon 
of selfishness which in extreme cases leads to murder, rape and theft; for I maintain 
that it is by way of a consideration of the struggle between creatures that solipsism can 
be effectively surmounted. In order to comprehend my refutation, one must first bear 
in mind that for Schopenhauer (1969a: 104) the claim that solely oneself exists is 
																																																								




tantamount to the view that solely one’s own self possesses the metaphysical Will; thus, 
it follows, that if it can be shown by some indirect means that other creatures possess 
what appears to be the Will the difficulty can be averted. But how exactly is that to be 
achieved?  
It will be recalled that in connection with my criticism of radical idealism I argued that 
the world as it is in-itself must contribute something to the nature of phenomenal objects 
in so far as the latter often present themselves as disagreeable and consequently cannot 
be mere figments of the subject’s imagination, which, I observe, if they were, would 
necessarily present agreeable objects and scenarios thereto. In a like manner I shall now 
attempt to argue that the conflict and strife generated between different creatures is in 
fact proof of their independent existence; for the individuated Will is said by 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 154 and 1974b: 323) to be the cause of perpetual conflict 
between creatures. However, if solely oneself were to possess the Will and all other 
entities were hollow appearances, i.e. fabrications of one’s own mind, would they not 
then perpetually present themselves as congenial? Thus, it seems to me that the answer 
to the solipsistic predicament is to be found in Schopenhauer’s discussion of the way 
in which the metaphysical Will manifests itself in the world of appearance: for if other 
creatures were mere “hollow appearances” – i.e., fabrications of one’s mind, and by 
implication of one’s Will – they would not, I conjecture, be experienced by the subject 
as disagreeable and hostile.74 If solely the subject were a manifestation of the Will and 
all other objects were mere ideas, would the mind, and by extension the Will, not 
present to itself agreeable scenarios – given that they originate therefrom – just as it is 
thought by psychoanalysts that unconscious desires are presented and fulfilled – albeit 
in a disguised form – in dreams (cf. Freud, 2001: 11)? What possible motivation could 
the Will – which is said to perpetually will life (Cartwright, 2005: 187) – possess to 
portray, for instance, the image of a ravenous carnivorous predator or a scene devoid 
																																																								
74 Previously (in 4.6.), I acknowledge the fact that I am indebted to Young (2005: 70) for this 
interpretation. However, it is to be noted that Young (2005: 70) intimates that it is by way of 
compassion, i.e. Schopenhauer’s “ethical philosophy”, that solipsism is ultimately refuted; 




of nourishment and comfort?75 I maintain that the competitive state existing between 
organisms in nature, which I shall subsequently present and discuss in detail in the 
following primary section of my thesis, is a refutation of the solipsistic position within 
the Schopenhauerian system – for it is only by way of recourse to the metaphysical Will 
manifesting itself in various individuals that the hostility within nature can be cogently 
explicated. In other words, it is only if we conceive of the Will as acting (as an instinct 
towards the preservation and continuation of life) within each individual (as it does in 
the subject) that we can explicate the discord we observe in the phenomenal world. For 
instance, both the predator and the fleeing prey which it pursues must be manifestations 
of the Will, for if the prey were a mere appearance, i.e. idea, in the mind of the predator 
it would not flee but readily present itself thereto; likewise, if solely the prey animal 
were a manifestation of the Will it would undoubtedly portray to itself a scene devoid 
of dangerous predatory animals. But given that each individual organism is a 
manifestation of the ever-hungry, insatiable metaphysical Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
154 and Schopenhauer, 1974b: 323) we see discord and strife abound everywhere in 
the world. That, so it seems to me, is a cogent refutation of the claim that solely the 
pensive subject is a manifestation of the Will. 
 
4.8. The Extension of the Will to Inanimate Objects 
	
Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 296-297) extension of his thesis to include inanimate natural 
phenomena is far more controversial; for the claim that inanimate phenomena are to be 
comprehended as manifestations of a Will seems conspicuously contradictory. 
However, the Ding-an-sich must ultimately be the foundation for even the appearance 
of inanimate objects, for otherwise they would be nothing but hollow phantasmagoria, 
i.e. figments of the subject’s imagination; thus Schopenhauer (1889b: 309) insists that 
nature in its entirety is to be comprehended as a manifestation of the Will:  
																																																								
75 Here, of course, it would be senseless to postulate a “death drive”, given that the Will is said 
to be perpetually directed towards life: “Was der Wille will immer das Leben ist” 




“[…] I am the first who has asserted that a Will must be attributed to all that is 
lifeless and inorganic.” 
And again, in the second volume of Die Welt, Schopenhauer (1969b: 296-297) states: 
“[…] an essential point of my teaching is that the phenomenal appearance of a 
Will is as little tied to life and organisation as it is to knowledge, and that 
therefore the inorganic also has a Will, whose manifestations are all its 
fundamental qualities that are incapable of further explanation […].” 
Now, it is evident that this must necessarily be the case for “matter itself is only 
perceptibility of the [Ding-an-sich]” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 309), which, of course, 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) has identified as Will. Thus, it follows that every 
phenomenal appearance, including inorganic matter, must in essence be identical with 
the Will found in oneself. But the primary objection to this identification, as I see it, is 
generated by Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 274) claim that the term “Wille-zum-Leben” can 
be used as a synonym for “Will”: 
“We have […] called the phenomenal world the mirror, the objectivity of the 
Will; and as what the Will wills is always life [was der Wille will immer das 
Leben ist], just because this is nothing but the presentation of that willing for 
the [appearance], it is immaterial and a mere pleonasm if, instead of simply 
saying ‘the Will’, we say ‘the Will-to-[Life]’.” 
Now if the Will is synonymous with the term Wille-zum-Leben a conspicuous 
contradiction arises when the term is applied to the inorganic realm. In short, how can 
that which is not alive be said to possess a Will directed towards the continuation of 
life? Such a claim, in the last analysis, is evidently meaningless in so far as it amounts 
to a contradictio in terminis. Thus, I observe that in his discussion of the Will 
manifesting itself in inorganic nature Schopenhauer (1969b: 297-298) consciously 
avoids utilising the contradictory term “Wille-zum-Leben” in connection therewith; 
however, in no way does his omission resolve the difficulty. In light of Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 274) claim that the Will perpetually wills life and is therefore synonymous with 
term “Wille-zum-Leben”, one would justifiably think that he ought not to have extended 
the Will to the inorganic, i.e. lifeless, realm. But in this way, a categorical 
dichotomisation between the organic and inorganic would appear and the “inner 




difficulty generated by Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 274) assertion that the Will is 
perpetually directed towards life, I acknowledge three arguments in favour of the 
extension of the Will to inanimate phenomena, viz., (i) the Ding-an-sich as the 
substratum of all phenomenal appearances, (ii) the analogical argument and (iii) 
metaphysics as the foundation of scientific knowledge (Young, 2005: 75-76).  
 
4.8.1. The Ding-an-sich as the Substratum of All Phenomenal Appearances 
	
Firstly, it must be acknowledged, as was done in an earlier discussion, that the 
appearance of real inanimate objects intimates that they correspond to something 
external from the mind, i.e. they must emanate from something genuinely “out there”. 
For if there is not an external substratum to ground the perceptions of those inanimate 
objects they must ultimately be figments of the subject’s imagination, i.e. 
indistinguishable from hallucinations, and consequently unreal. But if, following 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 112-113), we argue that the principium individuationis is mind-
dependent then it necessarily follows that the mysterious mind-independent reality 
which underlies all phenomenal appearances must consequently be a unity, as 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 113) acknowledges. 
It follows therefrom that the substratum of all objects is one and the same; and thus, 
whatever I discover it to be in myself must accord with the way in which it exists in 
other objects. This is the most fundamental argument for extending the Will to 
inanimate objects, but ultimately it depends on the veracity of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 
112-113) claim that time and space do not apply to the world as it is in-itself. In the 
first section of my exposition, however, I attempted to illustrate that the existence of 
multifarious forms in the phenomenal world intimates that there must be such variance 
in the world as it is in-itself, for otherwise one would have to illustrate how and why 
the mind presents the objects it does – many of which are harrowing and threatening. I 
shall shortly return to this matter in connection with Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 127-130) 
problematical postulation of Platonic Ideas. In short, I shall argue that the Platonic Ideas 






4.8.2. The Analogical Argument 
	
The analogical argument for the extension of the Will, which has already been 
discussed in connection with the refutation of theoretical egoism (solipsism), is closely 
related to the aforementioned argument for the extension of the Will to inanimate 
objects. To briefly recapitulate the essence of the argument, it maintains that the bodies 
of other phenomena are analogous to the only object one knows in a dualistic manner, 
viz., one’s own body: thus, just as one’s own body is known from the external 
perspective as an appearance and by way of introspection as a volitional entity 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100), the analogical argument holds that all other bodies – by 
analogy – are likewise both appearance and Will simultaneously. The obvious difficulty 
with the analogical argument is that one cannot know for certain whether the analogy 
is correct, for it may be – especially upon a multidimensional interpretation of the Ding-
an-sich (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 196-197) – that the essence of inanimate objects is 
vastly dissimilar to that of animate creatures. In response to this criticism, however, I 
observe that this possibility would violate what I shall refer to as “the principle of 
continuity”, which, according to my meaning, maintains that there must be an element 
of continuity throughout nature; hence the principle of continuity declares that: natura 
non facit saltus;76 an adage Schopenhauer (1969b: 296) is fond of quoting. As a 
consequence thereof, the reluctance to extend the Will to inanimate nature violates the 
principle of continuity by creating, as Julian Young (2005: 75) notes, “a sharp division 
between the organic and inorganic”.  
But now we must enquire as to the admissibility of utilising the law of continuity in 
connection with the Schopenhauerian philosophy. Let us commence the discussion by 
noting that Darwin (2009b: 689) utilised the principle of continuity in his revolutionary 
work On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection.77 Therein Darwin (2009b: 
676-677) argues that every mutation within nature occurs by means of a gradual process 
of evolution: although it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible – owing to the 
extinction of intermediate creatures and the imperfect state of the fossil record – to 
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delineate the gradual evolution of creatures,  nature does not produce colossal bounds 
between one generation and the next. Thus Darwin (2009b: 689) states:  
“[…] Natural selection can act only by taking advantage of slight successive 
variations; she can never take a leap, but must advance by the shortest and 
slowest steps.” 
Now if we compare Darwin’s understanding of the way in which creatures evolve with 
that of Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 152) form of evolutionism, viz., generatio in utero 
heterogeneo,78 we will at once be utterly surprised that Schopenhauer (1969b: 296) 
could have approvingly quoted the dictum natura non facit saltus; for Schopenhauer’s 
form of evolutionism assumes the existence of tremendous leaps within nature. In short, 
Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 152) evolutionism maintains that one distinct species can 
produce, by way of an egg or a uterus, an entirely distinct species! That, for instance, a 
snake emerged from the egg of a fish or that a whale emerged from the egg of a turtle 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153) is, in fact, a flagrant violation of the principle of 
continuity. We cannot, therefore, take Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 296) insistence on the 
aforementioned principle as an argument in favour of extending the Will to inorganic 
nature, as Young (2005: 75) attempts to do. In other words, one cannot invoke the 
principle of continuity, viz., natura non facit saltus, in an attempt to extend the Will to 
inanimate objects, when Schopenhauer (1974b: 153) so blatantly violates the principle 
in connection with his particular form of evolutionism. Of course, I do not mean to 
portend that the principle of continuity is incompatible with the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy; however, I wish only to illustrate that one cannot arbitrarily assume and 
then discard a principle at whim, one must remain consistent. Thus, if the principle of 
continuity is accepted then Schopenhauer’s evolutionism must be rejected or vice 
versa.79  
																																																								
78 “Generation in the uterus of a different kind”. I refer the reader to the later section on 
evolution as a refutation of radical idealism for a more detailed discussion on this particular 
topic. 
79 The former option may in fact appear congenial, for one may feel that Schopenhauer ought 
to have rejected his evolutionism in favour of Darwin’s. However, in the second part of my 
exposition I argue that radical idealism is utterly incompatible with all forms of evolutionism; 




However, the aforementioned criticism notwithstanding, it is also highly doubtful that 
the analogical argument shall convince most that the Will does indeed inhere in 
inorganic phenomena for, as mentioned, the imputation that inanimate objects possess 
a Will-to-Life (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 274) is conspicuously contradictory and bizarre; 
I mention it, therefore, solely for the sake of meticulousness.   
 
4.8.3. Metaphysics as the Foundation of Scientific Knowledge 
	
The third argument propounded for the extension of the Will is more complicated – in 
short, it concerns what I have referred to as establishing metaphysics as the foundation 
of scientific knowledge. In connection with the discussion on Schopenhauer’s selection 
of the word “Will”, we have seen that, for Schopenhauer (1889b: 219), the fundamental 
concepts utilised by physical scientists in their theories about the world are qualitates 
occultae, i.e. “necessary but scientifically inexplicable elements of scientific 
explanations of the world” (Cartwright, 2005: 52); these are essentially metaphysical 
postulates which every physical explanation requires given that the phenomenal world 
is a manifestation of the metaphysical. But Schopenhauer’s point is far more 
fundamental than I intimated in the foregoing discussion: he (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
296) claims that every law of nature is essentially an expression of the metaphysical 
Will. This is an odd pronouncement in so far as a law of nature may essentially appear 
to be a particular causal relation between two properties or objects: one says, for 
instance, that water freezes at zero degrees Celsius – here, a necessary and universal 
causal connection is assumed to exist between that of temperature and the solidification 
of water. Now it will be remembered that causality is said by Schopenhauer (1889a: 
66) to be a synthetic a priori mechanism of the mind; hence it is justifiable to assume 
that Schopenhauer would have attempted to propound a thesis in which laws of nature 
– understood here as particular instantiations of the causal law – are comprehended as 
																																																								
idealist claim that the world in toto is mind-dependent) can be salvaged is to utterly reject all 
forms of evolutionism. But in so doing, it seems to me that Schopenhauer’s theory would be 
left with the difficulty of attempting to explicate the existence of multitudinous forms. In other 
words, why has the metaphysical Will brought into existence the creatures that presently exist 




emanations of the mind. Indeed, as Richard Taylor (1967b: 61) notes in his article 
Causation in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, “there is, obviously, a close connection 
between statements expressing causal connections and those expressing laws of nature, 
and it is therefore natural to suppose that the former might be explained in terms of the 
latter” – or, we might add, vice versa. Surprisingly, however, Schopenhauer (1969a: 
130) does not do this, but seeks instead to ground laws of nature upon a metaphysical 
foundation. Thus, he (Schopenhauer 1969a: 131) explicitly states:  
“[…] the force itself is by no means effect of a cause, or a cause of an effect. 
[…] The force itself lies entirely outside the chain of causes and effects, which 
presupposes time, since it has meaning only in reference thereto; but the force 
lies also outside time. The individual change always has as its cause yet another 
change just as individual, and not the force of which it is the expression. For 
that which always endows a cause with efficacy, however innumerable the 
times of its appearance may be, is a force of nature. As such, it is groundless, 
i.e. it lies entirely outside the chain of causes, and generally outside the 
province of the principle of sufficient reason […].” 
As such “laws of nature” are not to be construed as particular instantiations of the 
principium fiendi (the principle of sufficient reason of becoming); instead they are, 
according to Schopenhauer (1969a: 131), to be conceived as independent of the 
principle of sufficient reason and thus directly emanating from the Will as Ding-an-
sich. Schopenhauer (1889b: 309) therefore claims that all laws of nature are ultimately 
to be construed as manifestations of the metaphysical Will: 
“[…] Let us consider attentively and observe the powerful, irresistible impulse 
with which masses of water rush downwards, the persistence and 
determination with which the magnet always turns back to the North Pole, the 
keen desire with which iron flies to the magnet, the vehemence with which the 
poles of the electric current strive for reunion, and which, like the vehemence 
of human desires, is increased by obstacles. Let us look at the crystal being 
rapidly and suddenly formed with such regularity of configuration; it is 
obvious that this is only a perfectly definite and precisely determined striving 
in different directions constrained and held firm by coagulation. Let us observe 
the choice with which bodies repel and attract one another, unite and separate, 
when set free in the fluid state and released from the bonds of rigidity. Finally, 




its gravitation towards the Earth, incessantly presses and squeezes this body in 
pursuit of its one tendency. If we observe all this, it will not cost us a great 
effort of the imagination to recognize once more our own inner nature, even at 
so great a distance. It is that which in us pursues its ends by the light of 
knowledge, but here, in the feeblest of its phenomena, only strives blindly in a 
dull, one-sided, and unalterable manner. Yet, because it is everywhere one and 
the same – just as the first morning dawn shares the name of sunlight with the 
rays of the full midday sun – it must in either case bear the name of Will. For 
this word indicates that which is the being-in-itself of [everything] in the world, 
and is the sole kernel of every phenomenon.” 
“[…] Matter itself is only the perceptibility of the phenomenon of the Will. 
Therefore we are compelled to recognize volition in every effort or tendency 
which proceeds from the nature of a material body, and properly speaking 
constitutes that nature, or manifests itself as phenomenon by means of that 
nature; and there can consequently be no matter without manifestation of Will. 
The lowest and on that account most universal manifestation of Will is gravity, 
wherefore it has been called a primary and essential property of matter.”80 
Although this may at first appear a rather odd endeavour, i.e. to argue that the laws of 
nature and matter itself are manifestations of a metaphysical Will, there is, of course, a 
significant reason for it: the phenomenal world is a manifestation of the world as it is 
in-itself and hence, in Schopenhauer’s (1889b: 218-219) estimation, the union of 
philosophy (metaphysics) and science is capable of supplying an exhaustive account of 
the universe:  
“For, in pursuing its own road, Physics, i.e., Natural Science as a whole, must 
in all its branches finally come to a point where physical explanation ceases. 
Now this is precisely the Metaphysical, which Natural Science only 
apprehends as the impassable barrier at which it stops short and henceforth 
abandons its subject to Metaphysics.” 
																																																								
80 It is evident, and understandable, that Schopenhauer construed gravity in Newtonian terms, 
i.e. as “a force of attraction” (Stuart, 2018: 31). As such gravity appeared to Schopenhauer to 
be a qualitas occulta in need of further metaphysical clarification. Given that it does not require 
the postulation of volitional activity, I conjecture that Schopenhauer would not have been 




In short, a force or law of nature is essentially a metaphysical entity undiscoverable by 
physical science, which is solely concerned with aetiological explanations 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 125) and consequently remains bound to the principle of 
sufficient reason and its appearance. Only philosophy, which has as its concern the 
unconditioned (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 125), i.e. that which transcends the principle of 
sufficient reason, can offer a cogent explanation of the concept of a force or law of 
nature. It ought to be known by now that, for Schopenhauer (1969a: 131), the closest 
and most immediate solution to this enigma is found in the concept of the Will, which 
is said to constitute the essence of all nature. In this way Schopenhauer considers his 
philosophy to be complementary to natural science, in so far as it elucidates that which 
is perpetually shrouded in mystery to the natural scientist. Thus, in its ability to 
elucidate that which is extremely mysterious we discover an argument for the extension 
of the Will.  
Hence, the scientist who neglects metaphysics is as ignorant as the metaphysician who 
disregards scientific discoveries – for both, working in unison, compliment and 
complete each other. In this sense, we may expropriate a famous Kantian adage by 
stating that, for Schopenhauer, metaphysics without science is empty; whereas science 
without metaphysics is blind. For, on the one hand, science is concerned solely with 
appearances and is thus, by its very nature, limited to the experienceable, which is 
always finite; whereas, philosophy on the other hand, is concerned with the 
investigation of metaphysical phenomena, which, if ungrounded in empirical 
investigations, is capable of soaring into the utterly absurd.81 The combination of the 
two working in unison, however, is, according to Schopenhauer (1889b: 218-219), 
capable of guiding the mind towards ultimate Truth. Now, I maintain that there is 
certainly merit in Schopenhauer’s view of science being founded upon inscrutable 
qualitates occultae, for although some foundational phenomena (such as the mysteries 
of gravity and light) have been sufficiently explicated since Schopenhauer’s era, there 
remain, even at the present moment, inscrutable hypothetical entities, such as, for 
instance, “dark energy”, “dark matter”, and the “singularity” in a blackhole – i.e., 
unknown, enigmatic conceptualisations, which ultimately stand for ignoramus (“we do 
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not know”) –  which scientists are coerced to postulate in order to explicate the universe 
based on current theories of the genesis thereof. Therefore, one should not hastily 
dismiss Schopenhauer’s remarks regarding science as antiquated, for there is still much 
wisdom to be obtained from them, even if the concepts he utilised as illustrations are 
now better understood and consequently appear to us outmoded.  
Yet in spite of my concurrence with and adulation of Schopenhauer’s (1889b: 219) 
notion that physical science necessarily contains inscrutable elements within it, I cannot 
refrain from acknowledging that it seems to me that one of his (Schopenhauer: 1969a: 
100) greatest blunders is to be found in his view that metaphysics82 – and, in particular, 
the introspective method – is capable of supplying knowledge unobtainable by 
empirical, i.e. objective, forms of investigation. In short it seems nonsensical to speak 
of knowledge of something which transcends the possibility of all knowledge; for to 
know something presupposes the conditions whereby knowledge is obtained and one 
must remember that knowledge (if it can even be called that) of the Will as Ding-an-
sich is impervious to and transcends the principle of sufficient reason. Thus the claim 
that the Will is the Ding-an-sich must, in the last analysis, either be phenomenal 
knowledge or, worse, utterly absurd and meaningless. 
I may be permitted to linger a while longer on this significant matter; for I wish to stress 
that it is not solely Schopenhauer’s term which is problematical; but, moreover, the 
dichotomisation between introspective and extrospective forms of knowledge, the 
																																																								
82 Closely related to this criticism is the view that mysticism can supply transcendent 
knowledge. This type of knowledge becomes significant in connection with Schopenhauer’s 
soteriological doctrine, wherein knowledge of the denial of the Will is said to be accessible 
solely to those in whom the “Will has turned and denied itself” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 410-
412). It is interesting to note that, like knowledge of the Will as Ding-an-sich, “[i]n the widest 
sense, mysticism is every guidance to the immediate awareness of that which is not reached 
either by perception or conception, or generally by any knowledge” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
611). Thus it would appear that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) most renowned claim is also a 
type of mystical knowledge in so far as knowledge of the Will as Ding-an-sich is said to 
transcend the principle of sufficient reason; but this raises the difficulty whether such 
“knowledge” is at all meaningful. Mystical knowledge transcends the very conditions for 
knowledge (i.e. the correlativity thesis and the principle of sufficient reason) (Schopenhauer, 




former of which is said to lead to a dubious “metaphysical knowledge”. In this 
connection, it must be borne in mind that metaphysics – like science – is entirely 
dependent upon the finite human brain. Due to the fact that the brain (intellect) is not, 
as Schopenhauer (1969b: 176) so eloquently expresses it, “originally destined to 
enlighten us on the nature of things, but only to show us their relations in reference to 
our will”, it is absurd to maintain that it can transcend its condition and behold the world 
sub specie aeternitatis83 and thereby acquire knowledge denied to it by the method of 
science, i.e. empirical investigation. In a later section I discuss this matter in greater 
detail. However, I wish to emphasize that the assertion propounded by Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 102), viz., that introspection can supply transcendent, i.e. metaphysical, 
knowledge, strikes me as utterly unfounded and erroneous: for we cannot assume that 
the introspective method, which is equally as dependent on the human mind as is the 
objective, i.e. extrospective, method of the scientific enterprise, is capable of supplying 
a transcendent knowledge. In theory all phenomena are knowable; but, in reality, the 
finitude of the human mind limits the human race to what it is capable of 
comprehending, just as our finite existence limits us to a particular place and time 
within history; as such it is impossible for us as a species to acquire absolute knowledge 
of the universe, in spite of humankind’s great advances in scientific knowledge; 
consequently, our ephemeral existences must forever remain cloaked in a blanket of 
darkness – ignoramus et ignorabimus.84  
 
																																																								
83 “Under the aspect of eternity”. 
84 Schopenhauer’s view that philosophy and mysticism can supply knowledge unobtainable by 
way of the scientific method intimates that he was an epistemological optimist. However, I 
acknowledge that there are moments when Schopenhauer (1969b: 287) intimates that absolute 
knowledge of the universe is impossible: “[…] we cannot understand and grasp a single thing, 
even the simplest and smallest, through and through, but in everything there is something left 
over that remains entirely inexplicable to us”. I use the term “epistemological optimist”, which 
I acquire by way of David Berman (2007: 181), in a somewhat different sense to Berman’s 
original and intended meaning. I observe that Schopenhauer’s epistemological optimism 




4.8.4. The Incompatibility of the Schopenhauerian Philosophy with the Scientific 
Method 
	
But let us now consider the matter of the incompatibility of the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy with the scientific method in greater detail. In connection with the foregoing 
criticism of metaphysics being capable of completing the scientific understanding of 
nature and the universe, I must observe that Schopenhauer’s modus operandi is 
problematical in so far as it does not accord with that of modern scientific procedures. 
In particular I take issue with Schopenhauer’s subjectivistic, i.e., introspective, 
approach in discovering the foundational essence as an acceptable means of solving the 
riddle of the world. We have seen that, according to Schopenhauer (1889b: 376), one 
should strive to comprehend the world from “that which is better known than anything, 
and known to us moreover in quite a different way from all the rest”. But, is the self 
truly known as apodictically as Schopenhauer intimates? I observe that oftentimes our 
behaviours, fears and desires perplex us as much as, for instance, the origins of the 
universe. Consequently, it strikes me as odd that Schopenhauer’s (1889a: 97) 
introspective subjectivism should be considered capable of working in unison with 
objective science to supply exhaustive knowledge of the universe; or rather, it seems 
odd that “we must learn to understand nature from ourselves, not ourselves from nature” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 196). Indeed, it can hardly be denied that Schopenhauer’s 
subjectivistic approach seems to clash with science’s objectivism. In my opinion the 
difference in the modus operandi of the two systems renders them incompatible; for 
here, unlike in the case of magnetic attraction, the opposite method of functioning 
renders the two approaches repellent and antagonistic towards each other.  
Furthermore, it must be observed that scientific enquiry takes the existence of the 
external world to be an indisputable fact; whereas Schopenhauer (1969b: 3-4)85 takes 
self-consciousness to be the only immediately certain knowledge and he 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 17-18) therefore maintains that the world in toto is a figment of 
																																																								
85 “For only after men had tried their hand for thousands of years at merely objective 
philosophising did they discover that, among the many things that make the world so puzzling 
and precarious, the first and foremost is that, however immeasurable and massive it may be, its 
existence hangs nevertheless in a single thread; and this thread is the actual consciousness in 




one’s imagination, i.e. “a long dream”. It follows therefrom that the two systems are 
diametrically opposed to each other regarding the existence of the external world. In a 
later section I illustrate the untenability and utter impossibility of maintaining both a 
modern scientific understanding of the world and, simultaneously, a radical idealist 
position by considering the theory of evolution. In short, I argue that if one maintains 
that organisms evolved over the course of millions of millennia then, it follows, there 
was a (lengthy) period in which the world (and perhaps even the universe) was devoid 
of consciousness.86 But for the radical idealist consciousness is a prerequisite for the 
existence of the world; hence it becomes impossible to defend both theses: either one 
must pursue the objective scientific path, or the subjective Schopenhauerian alternative; 
but one cannot avow both simultaneously without contradiction. Primarily for this 
reason, I argue that the scientific method is incompatible with the Schopenhauerian 
system; hence, I cannot in good conscience accept Schopenhauer’s claim for the 
compatibility of science with his subjectivistic philosophical approach; instead I 
																																																								
86 Schopenhauer (1974b: 140) is fully aware of this difficulty when he states that “[…] it must 
be admitted that all those physical, cosmological, chemical, and geological events existed even 
before the appearance of a consciousness and so outside this since, as conditions, they were 
necessarily bound to precede such an appearance by a long interval of time”. He (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 140n1) attempts – unsuccessfully in my opinion – to address this difficulty by claiming 
that “[…] through the lack of any subject, [all those physical, cosmological, chemical and 
geological events] had absolutely no objective existence, that is, they did not exist at all; but 
then what does their having existed signify? At bottom, it is merely hypothetical, namely, if a 
consciousness had existed in those primeval times, then such events would have appeared in it; 
thus far does the regressus [sic.] of the phenomena lead us. And so it lay in the very nature of 
the thing-in-itself to manifest itself in such events”. It seems to me that this so-called “solution”, 
which is extremely uncharacteristic of Schopenhauer in so far as it is obscure, unwittingly 
applies the law of causality to the Ding-an-sich, in spite of Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 141n1) 
emphatic assertions to the contrary; for it means that the world as it is in-itself undergoes a 
process of transformation and thus “if a brain had existed at that time [when, for instance, the 
solar system was forming], then the [specific events pertaining thereto] would have appeared 
in it”. I doubt that many thinking people will readily accept Schopenhauer’s argument and I 
take it to be a further confirmation of my view, viz., that radical idealism is incompatible with 




maintain that they are like oil and water: incapable of ever fusing together, but, instead, 
perpetually remaining apart.    
If we pursue the matter further we shall in fact discover Schopenhauer’s subjectivistic 
approach to be extremely retrogressive. In humankind’s infancy the world was 
construed solely in anthropomorphic terms: a natural disaster, for instance, was 
considered to be a punishment from a paternal deity for wayward behaviour.87 
Regrettably, such anthropomorphism (i.e. construing nature in human terms) is rife 
within the Schopenhauerian system, and hence I would go so far as to state that, in 
connection with its ability to further humankind’s knowledge of the universe, the 
philosophy is not progressive, but, I reiterate, extremely retrogressive. This is due to 
the fact that it utilises a primitive anthropomorphism to comprehend nature, viz., 
“nature as an expression of an anthropoid Will” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100): instead 
of attempting to comprehend humankind as a product of the universe it inverses the 
matter by considering the universe as explicable by recourse to human desires. 
Schopenhauer’s subjectivistic procedure, whereby he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100) 
discovers the Will to be the essence of the world, is, as mentioned, incompatible with 
the scientific enterprise, which strives for objectivity. In other words, science begins 
with the objective, not the subjective, view. For although it is true that the individual is 
a microcosm of the macrocosm, it does not follow that the former contains the solution 
to the riddles of the latter, as Schopenhauer (1969b: 196) emphatically claims. By 
reducing the world to Will Schopenhauer has unwittingly hurled human knowledge to 
an earlier – and vastly inferior – state, viz., that of animism.88 By reducing natural 
																																																								
87 This infantilism is seen most strikingly in the Old Testament’s story of Noah and his ark. It 
also persists in some of the most enlightened individuals when they attempt to assign moral 
guilt to one who suffers from some misfortune; for instance: an individual infected with HIV 
is said to be promiscuous or living an “immoral” lifestyle and so “deserving of his or her 
punishment”, etc. 
88 In his famous book, A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking (2016: 206) states of animism: 
“The earliest theoretical attempts to describe and explain the universe involved the idea that 
events and natural phenomena were controlled by spirits with human emotions who acted in a 
very humanlike and unpredictable manner. These spirits inhabited natural objects, like rivers 




phenomena to the explanation of volitional strivings, Schopenhauer may be justly 
accused of furthering Kant’s “Ptolemaic Revolution” in philosophy (Choron, 1963: 
142), whereby comprehension of the world is further reduced to an anthropoid 
perspective.  For, I reiterate, although it is true that humans are a product of nature, it 
simply does not follow that the macrocosm can be best comprehended by way of the 
anthropoid microcosm. 
 
4.9. The Platonic Ideas as Prototypes for the Phenomenal World 
	
Now the difficulty generated by Schopenhauer’s anthropomorphism is best illustrated 
by way of his teleological argument of the way in which the manifold organisms found 
in the natural world appear. This discussion may be taken as another argument for the 
refutation of solipsism in so far as it construes every bodily structure as a manifestation 
of the Will. Expressed somewhat differently, Schopenhauer’s teleological argument 
identifies the Will as a conscious creative force89 within nature, fashioning every 
organism according to the environment in which it is supposed to live. However, I must 
observe that Schopenhauer’s teleological argument generates a serious contradiction 
within his system in so far as it illustrates that the Will cannot be “blind”, contrary to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 113, et al.) repeated assertions that it is. This is significant in 
so far as Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 282-283) theory of immortality maintains that an 
unconscious metaphysical entity survives the demise of the physical body; however, if 
the Will is found to be conscious then it would appear that Schopenhauer’s theory of 
athanasia is at bottom no different to that of other philosophical and religious systems 
which maintain that a conscious soul constitutes the immortal essence of a human 
being. I observe that, in spite of its significance, this matter, viz., the Will’s awareness, 
is hardly, if ever, discussed in the secondary literature on Schopenhauer’s philosophy.90  
																																																								
to substitute the word “spirits” with the word “Will” one would have a succinct description of 
the Schopenhauerian philosophy. 
89 Julian Young (2005: 83) correctly refers to the Will in this regard as “a designer of things”. 
90 One of the few Schopenhauerian scholars to acknowledge the incorrectness of identifying 




Now in order to comprehend Schopenhauer’s reasons for maintaining a teleological 
view of nature it must be borne in mind that Schopenhauer wrote in a pre-Darwinian 
era;91 hence he could not appeal to the theory of evolution by means of natural selection 
in his attempt to explicate the natural world. Schopenhauer consequently struggled 
without the theory of evolution to explicate in his earlier writings the appearance of the 
manifold, variegated organisms found throughout nature; for how can there exist so 
many numerous creatures so well-suited to their particular modes of life without the 
postulation of a purposeful creator? Prior to Darwin the so-called “argument by design” 
for the existence of God was perhaps the most convincing (Hick, 1990: 24). It seemed 
to a mind devoid of the notion of natural selection that the appearance of so many 
organisms so well-suited to their particular environments must be the work of an 
intelligent designer; for just as, to use an extremely hackneyed analogy, a watch 
presupposes the existence of a watchmaker, so too must the complexity of the creatures 
found within the world presuppose the existence of a creator (Hick, 1990: 23-24). The 
postulation of a deity superficially resolves the predicament of the existence of the 
manifold creatures found within the world. However, how would a pre-Darwinian who 
rejects the existence of God, and who had not yet earnestly entertained evolutionary 
views, resolve the difficulty? One such solution may be found in Schopenhauer’s 
system. Although Schopenhauer did not offer a detailed defence of atheism, he was an 
avowed and unapologetic non-believer (Edwards, 2009: 173) and he attempts – at least 
in his writings prior to 1847 – to explicate the appearance of the manifold organisms 
found in the natural world solely by way of teleology and the Platonic Ideas. It is 
therefore necessary, before I discuss the matter of teleology in earnest, to re-examine 
the role of the Platonic Ideas within Schopenhauer’s philosophical system in connection 
with the existence of multitudinous forms in the phenomenal world.  
But I must observe that the appearance of the Platonic Ideas within Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy is problematic, for they occupy a peculiar position therein. In the first 
volume of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969a: 169) explicitly states that the Idea is 
																																																								
91 The third and definitive edition of Schopenhauer’s opus maximus appeared in the same year 
(1859) as the first edition of Darwin’s principal work. One should also note that Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 153-154) incorporated non-Darwinian evolutionary views into his work only much 




impervious to the principle of sufficient reason, hence “neither plurality nor change 
belongs to it”. But it is also evident that the Platonic Ideas admit, by their very nature, 
of a multiplicity; for Schopenhauer (1969b: 365) maintains that the Ideas correspond to 
every natural object, albeit not to “manufactured articles”. The latter he contends exist 
solely in the perceiving mind by way of concepts (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 365), to which 
no Platonic Ideas correspond. Here, therefore, we discern the first major difficulty with 
the Platonic Ideas: they are said to be impervious to the principium individuationis and 
yet they admit of a multiplicity or plurality. Now, the fact that there are as many 
Platonic Ideas as there are natural objects intimates that the former are not – like the 
Ding-an-sich – atemporal and aspacial; on the contrary, time and space must be 
characteristics of the Ideas and consequently “[they] still do not reveal the being-in-
itself of things, but only their objective character, and thus always only the 
phenomenon” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 364). It is natural to assume, therefore, that the 
Ideas must be akin to appearances. Indeed, Schopenhauer (1969a: 175) himself seems 
to characterise the Ideas as appearances when he states:  
“[…] The Platonic Idea is necessarily object, something known, [an 
appearance], and precisely, but only, in this respect is it different from the 
thing-in-itself.” 
However, the matter is not as simple as it may appear; for, as mentioned, the Ideas are 
said to be impervious to the principle of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 364-
365) and hence they are supposedly not subject to time, space and causality; to which 
ordinary appearances are susceptible. Consequently, given that the Ideas can be neither 
entirely identifiable with the Ding-an-sich nor the appearances, they must be taken to 
constitute a mysterious third entity within the Schopenhauerian philosophy92 – they are 
neither fully Will nor entirely appearance, yet both at the same time. This complication 
generated by the postulation of the Ideas and their subsidiary role in Schopenhauer’s 
architectonics may justifiably lead one to dismiss them as inconsequential. Indeed, were 
the matter not pertinent to the present discussion I would have disregarded a detailed 
																																																								
92 Ergo, Schopenhauer should more accurately have entitled his magnum opus: Die Welt als 
Wille, Platonische Idee und Vorstellung (“The World as Will, Platonic Idea and Appearance”); 





discussion on this topic; for I consider the Ideas to be an utterly superfluous element 
within the Schopenhauerian system, the rejection of which in no way diminishes from 
the presentation or beauty of Schopenhauer’s ultimate telos.  
It is generally well-known by even those who have only a rudimentary knowledge of 
the philosophy in question, that the Ideas find their primary purpose in Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic theory.93 As a detailed account thereon is superfluous to our present 
discussion, I shall not enter into the matter. However, I wish to emphasise a lesser-
known purpose for the postulation of the Ideas, which is extremely pertinent. 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 127-130) first introduces the Platonic Ideas in section 25 of the 
second book of the first volume of Die Welt, wherein he attempts to account for the 
appearance of the numerous natural phenomena in the world. Now a difficulty I 
mentioned and took to be a refutation of radical idealism is the appearance of so many 
distinct objects in the world: why, I enquired, does the mind (from which the principium 
individuations emanates) create the appearance of manifold objects? In my discussion 
on radical idealism I argued that in order to defend the view one would have to offer a 
cogent explanation for the mind creating a plethora of such natural objects. I readily 
confess to the difficulty of such an undertaking and I observe that Schopenhauer does 
not attempt to resolve the issue in the way proposed by me. Instead, he attempts to 
explicate the appearance of numerous natural phenomena by way of recourse to the 
Platonic Ideas. Indeed, it is a curious phenomenon for the radical idealist that the world 
presents itself as orderly as it does: for if appearances are nothing more than 
concoctions of the mind we may marvel at the uniformity of the objects it presents to 
itself. In short, we may speculate as to the reasons the mind presents only certain types 
of real objects to itself, when, in theory at least, it could present to itself (for reasons 
we are not entirely cognisant) any type of creature or object. Now in order to resolve 
this difficulty, Schopenhauer (1969a: 128-130), as mentioned, appeals to the Platonic 
Ideas; but in so doing the mysteriousness of the matter is, in my estimation, augmented 
not mitigated. I shall attempt to explicate myself as perspicuously as possible, in spite 
of the complexity of the matter. We must first observe, as I did previously, that these 
Ideas are, unlike abstract ideas (concepts), not mind-dependent. In other words, their 
																																																								
93 The third book of Die Welt is subtitled: “The [appearance] independent of the principle of 




existence does not depend upon a perceiving mind for their existence; instead they are 
said to be objectifications of the Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 129), and hence they 
precede the existence of appearances.94 This is a rather odd notion, for it intimates that, 
contrary to Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3-4) initial assertions, the world does, to some 
extent, have a mind-independent, pluralised existence. In other words, prior to the 
construction of the world of appearances the Will objectifies itself as Ideas 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 129); and thus the blueprint, according to which the mind will 
eventually present to itself appearances, must already exist prior thereto. We can 
express this complicated notion more simply by saying that the Ideas are essentially 
prototypes of the appearances, which consequently stand to the former as ectypes. In 
this way the natural phenomena the mind can present to itself are foregone in so far as 
the Will has predetermined the general attributes of the species considered as a whole 
and in general, i.e., objectified as Idea, capable of eventual appearance (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 365). The perceiving mind, then, is supplied with a blueprint (the Ideas) which 
it utilises in its construction of the perceptible world. In this way the Ideas offer an 
explanation for the uniformity and limitations of the appearances the mind can present 
to itself. The way in which the prototypes find actualisation in ectypes is, however, not 
at all perspicuous.  
This is arguably one of the most complicated and obscure aspects of the 
Schopenhauerian system, viz., how do the prototypes, i.e. the Platonic Ideas, interact 
with the synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind, thereby eventually producing 
appearances? To my knowledge Schopenhauer does not explicitly and adequately deal 
with this significant difficulty; hence I shall attempt to offer an independent explication 
thereof. Perhaps we are to assume that the Will manifests itself in consciousness as a 
particular general Idea to which the mind, by way of its constructive mechanisms, posits 
the appearance of a particular individual of the type intimated by the Will. In other 
words, the “raw, unintelligible data” which enters the mind from the Ding-an-sich is 
not entirely senseless: it would, on the contrary, be a Platonic Idea which thus supplies 
the mind with a blueprint of the general structure of the particular natural object it is to 
																																																								
94 It was primarily for this reason that the Ideas are said to be distinct from concepts. For the 
latter are abstract representations of the appearances and hence derived from experience; 




eventually present to itself as appearance by applying time, space and causality thereto. 
This, however, generates further inscrutable questions; for instance, there appears to be 
no answer to the question as to the Will’s motivation for encouraging the appearance 
of one phenomenon over another. In other words, for what reason does the Will 
encourage the mind to present to itself an appearance of an oak-tree, for instance, as 
opposed to a tree-fern? Why does the Will bring one Idea to the mind as opposed to 
another? Perhaps, given that the Will is said to be “blind” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 357), 
the Ideas are supplied to the intellect at random, i.e., without any intentional purpose. 
However, in the subsequent sections I shall illustrate that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115) 
statement concerning the Will’s ignorance is, in fact, at variance with his teleological 
explanation of nature. The appearance of one object as opposed to another seems to be 
an insoluble riddle within Schopenhauer’s philosophy. However, let us disregard these 
difficulties and continue with our present investigation, which is primarily concerned 
with an exposition of Schopenhauer’s teleological argument. 
Now it must be mentioned that although Schopenhauer (1974b: 153-154) later adopted 
(i.e., in or after 1847) a theory of evolution it was one in which imperceptible alterations 
leading from one species to the formation of another, did not exist. In this connection 
it is interesting to note, however, that it is not impossible for one to accept both the 
Platonic Ideas and a (particular, non-Darwinian) theory of evolutionism, 
simultaneously. However, it must be emphasised that the Platonic Ideas are antagonistic 
to the view (expressed most eloquently by Darwin)95 that over millions upon millions 
of millennia creatures gradually and imperceptibly mutate into different creatures. Such 
a view was anathema to Schopenhauer’s mind, for it flagrantly undermines the Platonic 
view of nature, which holds that each species is distinct from every other. For 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 365), every particular species has a distinct Platonic Idea 
corresponding thereto; thus, although a snake, for instance, can emerge from the egg of 
																																																								
95 For instance, Darwin (2009b: 913) concludes his masterpiece with the famous words: “Thus, 
from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable 
of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur 
in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms 
or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, 
from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and 




a fish (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153) there are distinct Ideas corresponding to both 
creatures. It seems Schopenhauer could not accept the veracity of the notion of there 
being numerous intermediate species (some of which with only very slight and 
imperceptible alterations which would be difficult to distinguish from the earlier parent-
type) between that of one creature, such as a fish, and that of another, such as a snake. 
In spite of this, it may seem, prima facie, that even the Darwinian theory could perhaps 
be reconciled with the Platonic view, for each intermediate species would accordingly 
have a corresponding Platonic Idea. The difficulty, however, with this attempted 
solution is that many of these Ideas of intermediary species would be identical – given 
that they are only general, universal prototypes – and consequently there would be what 
appears to be numerous replicas of the same Idea. This is inadmissible, for the identical 
Ideas would be superfluous and we may invoke here the famous dictum attributed to 
Ockham: entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Indeed, such a solution 
would bring into question the very need to posit such prototypical entities; inevitably 
leading to the rejection thereof. I conjecture, that this was perhaps one of the reasons 
that Schopenhauer rejected Darwinian evolution; wishing to dogmatically cling, 
instead, to the antiquated views of Plato. Be that as it may, Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 
127-130) acceptance of Platonic Ideas is an essential element in attempting to 
comprehend his view of the way in which the Will manifests itself within the natural 
world; thus, in spite of the obvious absurdities generated within the Schopenhauerian 
system by the postulation thereof, it is necessary for one to accept them as extant entities 
in order to fully comprehend the teleological nature of the Will.  
Now, the Platonic Idea, stands, as I have argued, as a blueprint for the way in which the 
Will shall eventually manifest itself. However, we must observe, that the postulation of 
the Ideas has not really solved the difficulty of the appearance of the orderly 
presentation of natural objects we find in the world of appearances. It seems to me that 
the Platonic Ideas are merely deceptive devices which move the difficulty away from 
the structure of the mind to that of the world as it is in-itself. In other words, 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 129) shifts the difficulty of the question as to why the mind 
presents to itself precisely the objects it does to the realm of the Will, which is said to 
manifest itself as particular universal Ideas. As we have seen, the objectification of the 
Will as Platonic Idea, in turn, generates profound complications; but the point I wish to 




the difficulty of our initial concern (viz., what is the reason that the mind presents to 
itself the particular objects that it does, as opposed to others?) to more transcendent 
concerns (viz., what is the reason for the Will manifesting itself as the particular Idea it 
does?). At bottom, both are identical and the difficulty remains. For this reason I argue 
that, unlike Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection, Schopenhauer’s 
system is incapable of explicating the appearance of the particular creatures we find 
within the world. He attempts to shift this difficulty from the mind (brain) to the Will 
perhaps because the latter is said to be impervious to the principle of sufficient reason 
and thus it enables Schopenhauer (1889b: 189) to argue that the Will cannot possess or 
be attributed a reason for so manifesting itself as it does. This answer, however, will 
hardly satisfy the curiosity of an inquisitive mind and one would be justified in feeling 
disappointed at the suggestion that the objects in the world are such as they are due to 
a liberum arbitrium, i.e. “a free choice of the Will”.96 As we shall shortly see, it is 
possible (upon a maverick interpretation of the Schopenhauerian philosophy) that the 
Will consciously and purposefully objectifies itself as the Ideas it does. This possibility 
is founded upon the observation that the Will is not in fact “blind” but that, for 
pragmatic reasons, it intentionally manifests itself as the creatures it does. Although 
this view seems to contradict Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 357) explicit statements to the 
contrary, it accords with his teleological view of nature (Young, 2005: 71-73), which I 
shall subsequently present and discuss. 
 
4.10. Schopenhauer’s Teleological Argument for Extending the Will Throughout 
Animate Nature 
	
In chapter XXVI of the second volume of Die Welt, entitled On Teleology, 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 337) notes that “three great men (viz., Lucretius, Bacon and 
Spinoza) have entirely rejected teleology or the explanation from final causes; and 
																																																								
96 As the Will is impervious to the influence of the principle of sufficient reason, the law of 
causality cannot pertain to it; hence by the term liberum arbitrium is meant the appearance of 
some phenomenon (in this case the Ideas) without the existence of an antecedent cause. In other 
words, there may be no answer to the question: “why does the Will manifest itself as the 




many small men have echoed them”. Schopenhauer (1969b: 337) boldly claims that the 
reason all three rejected teleological explanations is due to the fact “that they regarded 
teleology as inseparable from speculative theology”. However, Schopenhauer (1969b: 
340) is quick to point out that the postulation of a deity is not inextricably bound to 
teleological explanations of nature, for Aristotle maintained the doctrine of teleology 
without knowing anything of a “physico-theology”, i.e. a teleological argument for the 
existence of God. In this, we must observe that Schopenhauer is indeed correct; 
however, I wish to argue that although teleological explanations of nature do not 
necessarily invoke the notion of an omniscient deity, they do necessarily assume the 
consciousness and intelligence of nature – something unacceptable to both a modern 
scientist and a Schopenhauerian (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 115). 
But before I begin my discussion in earnest on the inadmissibility of Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 115) characterisation of the Will as “blind”, I wish first to elaborate upon the 
notion of final causes, which is extremely pertinent to Schopenhauer’s discussion. 
Following Aristotle, Schopenhauer (1969b: 331) distinguishes between two kinds of 
mechanical causality (principium fiendi), viz., causa efficiens (efficient cause) and 
causa finalis (final cause). The former may be succinctly defined as causes which 
precede phenomena, whereas the latter may be described as causes which proceed 
phenomena. An efficient cause is a cause which produces a change, i.e. efficient causes 
are propositions pertaining to causes and effects, the former always preceding the latter 
– it is consequently the form of causality most familiar to laymen and scientists alike. 
A final cause, however, is a confusing and controversial (Taylor, 1967b: 56) notion in 
so far as it seems to intimate that an effect precedes its cause; for the notion of a final 
cause intimates that the concatenation of causes is set in motion solely for the fulfilment 
of a particular end. Thus, the notion of a final cause assumes – if I may be permitted to 
express the matter so candidly and bizarrely – that a concatenation of causes is set in 
motion for the purpose of fulfilling some particular end (effect).  
But one cannot imagine the existence of some phenomenon (effect) existing and then 
assuming the concatenation of causes leading to it; for it appears that, like the so-called 
“arrow of time” (Hawking, 2016: 164), there is a direction of necessitation – by which 
it is meant that “causes necessitate their effects in a special way in which effects can 
never be said to necessitate their causes” (Taylor, 1967b: 59). The assertion, for 




absurd, for in such a case we cannot comprehend how the stone would induce the sun 
to do so. On the other hand, we find no absurdity in the assertion that the sun shining 
upon a cold stone causes it to become warm. Hence, the direction of necessitation 
appears to be as synthetically a priori as is the law of causality itself. Therefore, the 
difficulty with final causes is the fact that, as Julian Young (2005: 86) correctly notes, 
causality cannot function retrogressively and hence the only way in which the notion 
of final causes makes sense is by way of the postulation of consciousness and 
purposeful intention. For this reason, final causes are most evident in purposeful human 
productions: the development of inventions such as the automobile and aeroplane are 
productions of final causes; these objects were brought into existence for an intended 
purpose, i.e. the transportation of goods and creatures across vast areas of the planet. 
The most significant point to be adduced from these illustrations is the fact that final 
causes presuppose consciousness and purposeful intention.  
Unperturbed by the abovementioned considerations, Schopenhauer (1969b: 329) 
maintains that final causes are operative most conspicuously in organic nature, whereas 
efficient causes are operative primarily in inorganic nature.97 It is possible that one of 
Schopenhauer’s primary reasons for restricting final causes primarily to organic 
phenomena is his rejection of theism: the inanimate world abounds with phenomena 
that do not seem to admit of intentional creation, such as, for instance, the existence of 
many seemingly life-less planets in our solar system, such as Neptune, Uranus, Saturn, 
Mercury and Venus,98 natural disasters, or the saltiness of the oceans. In other words, 
																																																								
97 It is primarily for this reason that the teleological argument may be considered a refutation 
of solipsism. 
98 I have intentionally omitted Mars and Jupiter from this list because of all the planets in our 
solar system, besides Earth, Mars is the best candidate for the possible existence of extra-
terrestrial life. One theory proposed by biochemist Steven Benner (cited by Kaufman, 2013) 
suggests that because Mars is smaller than the Earth the planet would have cooled earlier, thus 
permitting the possibility of life to occur earlier there than it did here, on Earth. Perhaps, then, 
life first appeared on Mars and was transported, by way of a colossal impact by some object, to 
our planet.  As for Jupiter, it may be argued that its colossal size has protected life on Earth 
from cataclysmic impacts, i.e. Jupiter’s gravity draws all large, and potentially lethal, objects 




it is extremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to explicate the purpose of certain 
phenomena in inorganic nature which do not seem to have a purpose or utility. 
However, in organic nature it appears that the whole structure of the organism has an 
intended purpose: it is structured in such a way as to ensure the survival of the creature 
in particular and the species in general. Schopenhauer (1969b: 351) is eager to point 
out that nature – by which he evidently means, the Will – cares solely for the species 
and not for the individual thereof: 
“But if we abstract for a while from this interpretation that is drawn from our 
inner being, and confront nature as strangers, in order to comprehend her 
objectively, we find that, from the grade of organic life upwards, she has only 
one purpose, namely that of maintaining all species. She works towards this 
through immense surplus of seeds and germs, through the pressing intensity of 
the sexual impulse, through eagerness of this impulse to adapt itself to all 
circumstances and opportunities, even to the production of bastards, and 
through instinctive maternal affection whose strength is so great that in many 
kinds of animals it outweighs self-love, so that the mother sacrifices her own 
life in order to save that of her young. On the other hand, the individual has for 
nature only an indirect value, in so far as it is a means for maintaining the 
species. Apart from this, its existence is a matter of indifference to nature; in 
fact, nature herself leads it to destruction as soon as it ceases to be fit for that 
purpose. For what purpose the individual exists is therefore clear; but for what 
purpose does the species itself exist?”99 
																																																								
Jupiter were created with the specific intention (i.e. causa finalis) of producing and protecting 
life on Earth respectively; hence I exclude them. 
99 This last, enigmatic question intimates one of two possibilities: either the Will has no ultimate 
reason for manifesting itself in the Platonic Ideas – in which case Schopenhauer would be an 
existential nihilist par excellence – or, the Will manifests itself in the species for a particular, 
albeit unknown, purpose. In both volumes of Die Welt Schopenhauer, to my recollection, does 
not explicitly attempt to explicate the Will’s ultimate telos; however, in his final work (i.e. 
Parerga und Paralipomena) Schopenhauer (1974b: 321) intimates that the Will’s ultimate telos 
is the production of the human, in order to bring about the denial of the Will. This, however, 
generates a problem of its own, for if the Will always wills life (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 274) 
then it seems contradictory that it should consciously attempt to bring the human into existence 




Schopenhauer (1969a: 115) states on numerous occasions that the Will is “blind”,100 by 
which he (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 257) evidently portends that the Will is without 
consciousness and knowledge. However, the claim that the Will fashions the structure 
of organisms101 intimates that it cannot be unconscious and devoid of knowledge. On 
the contrary, the fact that “every animal form is a longing of the [Wille-zum-Leben] 
which is roused by circumstances” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 255) unequivocally 
intimates that the Will must be aware of its ultimate telos. To take an illustration, the 
Will must know prior to its formation of the organs that in order for the ant-eater to be 
capable of catching and consuming its prey it requires “long claws on its fore-feet, in 
order to break into the nests of the white ant, [as well as] a prolonged cylindrical 
muzzle, in order to penetrate into them, with a small mouth and a long, threadlike 
tongue, covered with glutinous slime, which it inserts into the white ants’ nests and then 
withdraws covered with the insects that adhere to it” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 260). In 
order for the Will to produce the ant-eater’s unique physiological structure it must have 
known in advance the nature of the ant-colony and the way in which such creatures 
construct their nests: such knowledge certainly precludes the Will from being 
characterised as “blind”; consequently, in order merely to be honest and consistent, we 
must reject Schopenhauer’s (1889b: 257) assertion that (on his account) “the world is 
not made with the help of knowledge”.  For, on the contrary, the world is, according to 
his system, the product of a conscious and knowing Will (cf. Young, 2005: 83).  
But what are we to make of the claim that nature consciously and knowingly brings 
into existence the natural phenomena that it does? This seems to me to be a non-
vindicated infantile anthropomorphism. If we contrast and compare it with Darwin’s 
theory of evolution by means of natural selection we shall find the latter to be superior 
and thus worthy of acceptance in preference thereto. The reason for this is that, 
specifically on Schopenhauerian terms, we have no justification for accepting nature 
																																																								
100 For instance, on page 255 in the work Über den Willen in der Natur Schopenhauer intimates 
the blindness of the Will; and again, on page 357 in the second volume of Die Welt 
Schopenhauer (1969b) states: “[…] On closer consideration, we shall find here also that [the 
Wille-zum-Leben] is rather a blind urge, an impulse wholly without ground or motive.” 
101 “[…] Every organ must be looked upon as the expression of a universal manifestation of the 
Will, i.e. of one made once for all, of a fixed longing, of an act of volition proceeding, not from 




(or the Will) as conscious and knowing: such phenomena are said by Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 273) to be entirely brain-dependent and due to the fact that the Will is devoid 
of a brain we must conclude that it cannot, in contradistinction to the conclusion of 
Schopenhauer’s teleological argument, possess knowledge or consciousness. For this 
reason, in addition to the fact that we cannot on naturalistic terms attribute knowledge 
or consciousness to nature, it is logical to reject Schopenhauer’s theory in favour of 
Darwin’s; this applies to teleological arguments in general, and thus we can confidently 
assert along with Spinoza: “Natura finem nullum sibi praefixum habere et omnes causes 
finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta.”102 I shall now attempt to further illustrate the 
Will’s awareness by way of a consideration of Schopenhauer’s theory on male 
homosexuality. 
 
4.11. Schopenhauer’s Views on Love and Male Homosexuality 
	
Before I conclude this section on Schopenhauer’s teleological argument for extending 
the Will throughout organic nature, I wish to offer one further persuasive illustration of 
the way in which the thesis that the Will is “blind” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 115 and 
1969b: 357; 497; 570) reveals a serious inconsistency in Schopenhauer’s thought. For 
I maintain that we can best discern the Will’s consciousness and knowledge in 
Schopenhauer’s discussion of the phenomenon of pederasty (a form of male 
homosexuality widespread in ancient Greece and Rome, whereby a sexually mature 
man would take a prepubescent boy as a lover. Autres temps, autres moeures).103 It is 
interesting to note that at a time when there was widespread condemnation of all forms 
of same-sex love, Schopenhauer – notwithstanding his disdainful remarks on the 
																																																								
102 “Nature has not set herself an aim or end, and all final causes are nothing more than human 
fictions and inventions” (quoted in Schopenhauer, 1969b: 339). 
103 Of course, by today’s standards, such behaviour would constitute a criminal offence; 
however, my intention is not to judge and condemn, but merely to indicate a serious 
inconsistency in Schopenhauer’s thought; therefore, one should suspend one’s moral 
disapprobation and focus solely on the way in which Schopenhauer’s theory of pederasty 




subject104 – was the first philosopher since the ancient Greeks to grapple at length with 
the phenomenon of male homosexuality. Now it may be that Schopenhauer wished to 
discuss this phenomenon owing to his own inclinations, and it is interesting to note that 
many psychologists and scholars have speculated as to Schopenhauer’s sexual 
orientation. Some, such as Edward Hitschmann (1956: 58), B. Friedlaender (quoted in 
Hitschmann, 1956: 59) and Bryan Magee (1997: 347), have argued that Schopenhauer 
must have harboured latent homosexual desires, given “his resistance to a union with a 
woman, to a poor opinion of the female sex, […] his disparagement of the sexual act” 
(Hitschmann, 1956: 58) and his belief in the aesthetic superiority of the male 
physique.105 Hitschmann (1956: 58) also notes, in corroboration of his view, that 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 449n1) detested beards, regarding them as ugly and bestial; 
furthermore, that Schopenhauer (quoted in Hitschmann, 1956: 60) referred to himself 
in connection with his work “in a feminine motherly role, ‘pregnant’ with his work as 
a mother with a child” intimates, for Hitschmann (1956: 60), that Schopenhauer was in 
fact a “passive homosexual”. Now although it is interesting from a psychological 
perspective to speculate on Schopenhauer’s repressed sexual orientation as a possible 
cause of his notorious pessimism (Hitschmann, 1956: 60-61), that is not my intention 
herein. In this section I seek solely to illustrate that the way in which Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 108) construed the Will to function within nature intimates that it cannot be a 
blind and an unknowing entity.   
Only in the third edition (1859) of the second volume of his magnum opus did 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 560-567) insert an appendix to the chapter The Metaphysics of 
																																																								
104 For instance, he refers to same-sex love as “a misguided instinct” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
560) and claims on more than one occasion “that only a thoroughly depraved nature will 
succumb to it” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 565, 561). 
105 In a letter to Julius Frauenstädt, concerning his book Ästhetische Fragen, Schopenhauer 
(quoted in Hitschmann, 1956: 59) wrote: 
“A perfect woman is more beautiful than a perfect man, - quae qualis, quanta! Here you have 
given an extremely naïve confession of your sexual urge […] Wait until you have reached my 
age, and see what you will then think of these short-legged, long-torsoed, narrow-shouldered, 
broad-hipped, teat-bedecked creatures; even their faces are nothing compared to those of the 




Sexual Love106 wherein he attempts to expound upon, and thereby offer a cogent 
explanation to the predicament of the “aberrant, misguided instinct” of pederasty 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 560).107 A common objection levelled against the practice of 
homosexuality is that it appears to work contrary to the ends of nature: for, from a 
biological perspective, the continuance of life – irrational and foolish as that may be 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 299-300) – is of the utmost significance. Each creature must 
ensure that it produces progeny in order for the continuation of its species and life in 
general; hence we witness the production of an abundance of progeny, most of which 
perish in infancy, in many species in order to safeguard the existence of future 
generations. But the union of same-sex couples cannot naturally produce offspring; 
hence it would appear that homosexual unions are unnatural, i.e. contrary to the ends 
of nature.  Schopenhauer (1969b: 561-562), however, argues that given the ubiquity of 
the phenomenon – “we see this vice fully in vogue and frequently practiced at all times 
and in all countries of the world” – it cannot be opposed to the ends of nature; but must, 
rather, be a fully intended production of nature – paradoxical as that may at first appear. 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 561) discusses at great length how the phenomenon of pederasty 
was commonplace in antiquity, and how “the philosophers […] speak much more of 
this love than of the love of women; in particular, Plato seems to know of hardly any 
other, and likewise the Stoics, who mention it as worthy of the sage.” But the 
phenomenon was even conventional among many less cultured nations, such as the 
Gauls (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 561). Moreover, “if we turn to Asia, we see all the 
countries of that continent permeated with the vice from the earliest times down to the 
																																																								
106 Interestingly, this significant appendix is omitted from the first English translation of the 
work, which was done by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp in 1888. It appears that not even the 
translators – some twenty-nine years after the appearance of the original German text – had the 
courage to present Schopenhauer’s thoughts on the subject. To my knowledge, the first English 
translation of the appendix was completed by E. F. J. Payne and published in 1958, almost a 
century after Schopenhauer published on the subject in 1859! Evidently, Schopenhauer’s 
genius was at least a century ahead of the time in which he lived and wrote. 
107 In the second edition (1844) of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969b: 541) made a fleeting 
reference to the phenomenon by comparing it to the misguided instinct of the bluebottle fly 
(Musca vomitoria), which inadvertently lays its eggs “in the blossom of the Arum dracunculus, 
being led astray by the corpse-like smell of the plant”, instead of correctly depositing its eggs 




present day, and likewise with no special attempt to conceal it; Hindus and Chinese, no 
less than the peoples of Islam, whose poets also we find much more concerned with 
love of boys than with love of women […]” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 561). Schopenhauer 
(ibid.) also observes, in his typically negative view of Judaism, that the phenomenon 
was even known to the Hebrews owing to the prohibition of such acts in both the Old 
and New Testaments.108 Now, how can a phenomenon so widespread, transcending 
																																																								
108 Although it is tangential to my primary discussion I wish to state that in my opinion modern 
homophobia has its origin in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. As I readily anticipate incredulity 
and opposition to my assertion, I wish to commence my comment with the astonishing fact, 
which Schopenhauer strangely omitted from his discussion on pederasty, that the Old 
Testament contains the homoerotic story of David and Jonathan – wherein the latter, we are 
told (Samuel 18:3), made a covenant with the former “because he loved him as his own soul”. 
In spite of this blatant love affair between two men in the Old Testament, all know of the 
prohibition pertaining to the love thereto: “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is 
an abomination” (18:22). It is interesting to note that the Jewish prohibition pertains to an active 
engagement in the behaviour and it also attests to the fact that the Old Testament was probably 
written over an extended period of time; hence we find such inconsistencies: if the tale of David 
and Jonathan is older than that of the law in Leviticus we can justifiably assume that same-sex 
love was once permitted within Judaism, but that, for reasons I shall shortly conjecture, it 
became an offence punishable by death. Yet why should the Jews, out of all the nations in the 
world, have come to adopt such retrograde, prejudiced views regarding a natural phenomenon? 
It seems to me that the Jews had a desire, among perhaps many others now unknown to us, to 
distinguish themselves from the pagans; thus I conjecture that we find many absurd and highly 
irrational Jewish laws, such as the prohibition on the consumption of certain foods (most 
notably pork, shellfish and the mixing of diary and meat products). Modern interpretations 
which seek to scientifically explicate these bizarre practices, such as that the kosher food laws 
are “healthier”, are utterly erroneous. For why should we believe that a group of non-scientific, 
indeed primitive, Bedouins comprehended the phenomena of bacteria and viruses or the 
aetiology of congestive heart failure? On the contrary, the only truthful explanation that can 
actually be given for such practices is that Jehovah – an authoritative and harrowing father 
figure – commanded thus; hence his will must be done, regardless as to how irrational or foolish 
such may in fact be. This, of course, is a sufficient reason to adhere to the commandment for a 
believer of the religion. However, the scientifically minded will not feel satisfied with such an 
explanation, hence to these sagacious individuals I offer the following elucidation. I conjecture 




both time and place, be considered as aberrant and unnatural? On the contrary, the 
ubiquity of same-sex love intimates that it is in fact a product of nature. Indeed, we 
observe how even the threat of death and the most horrendous torture cannot put an end 
to homosexual practices (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 562), for nature cannot be silenced: 
naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret (quoted in Schopenhauer, 1969b: 562).109 
We witness throughout the annals of human history – our own period included – 
violent, indeed often barbaric, attempts to silence nature; yet she is such that she 
perennially reasserts herself, impervious to the religious and political attempts to coerce 
her to conform to human idealisations. Nature is like an air-bubble trapped within a 
liquid: she cannot fail but to rise to the surface, no matter how violently one attempts 
to repress her from so doing. The criminalisation of natural acts, the threat of torture, 
imprisonment and death, the deliberate attempt to supress the Truth concerning nature 
in academic institutions and so on, is, in the last analysis, utterly futile. For, like Truth, 
great is nature and mighty above all things. 
																																																								
themselves from their pagan neighbours. Thus, on my account, precisely because the pagans 
loved pork and shellfish it was accordingly prohibited for Jewish consumption – just as, I might 
add, the pagans (in particular the ancient Greeks and Romans) considered an uncircumcised 
penis to be far more aesthetically appealing, so the Jews accordingly made circumcision 
mandatory for all Jewish males in order, so I believe, to distinguish themselves therefrom. In 
like manner, Schopenhauer (1969b: 561-562) eloquently illustrates how commonplace and 
widespread the love of boys was throughout pagan antiquity; thus, following a similar course 
of ratiocination, we may justifiably conjecture that the Jewish prohibition on homosexuality – 
in itself irrational and bizarre – was motivated by a desire to distinguish Jew from heathen. If 
the latter ate pork and shellfish, had uncircumcised penises and lusted for boys, the former, in 
an attempt to distinguish themselves therefrom, would not eat such delicacies, would 
circumcise all males and sexually pursue solely the female of the species. This Jewish 
antagonism towards pagan practices is, of course, now entirely lost to us (for there are no longer 
any great pagan empires); hence we fail to comprehend them as one would have had he lived 
when these laws were initially formulated. Consequently, I maintain that harbouring 
homophobic sentiments is as irrational and absurd as are the Jewish dietary laws. No rational, 
intelligent individual would adhere to the latter, so why should we excuse and condone the 
former? Sors de l’enfance, ami, reveille-toi! [“emerge from your childhood, friend, awake!”]. 




But, in spite of the abovementioned considerations, the characterisation of 
homosexuality as a natural act appears, superficially, to contradict the aims of nature, 
which is ultimately directed towards the continuation of life in the species 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 564) by way of the production of offspring. Consequently, if 
same-sex love is indeed a product of nature it must be cogently reconciled with the 
ultimate telos thereof. Now, I maintain that only the most prejudiced and ignorant 
individuals would assert that the amorousness between individuals of the same sex is 
vastly distinct, and inferior, to that of the love between individuals of the opposite sex. 
In other words, a scientific or philosophical theory on amorousness ought to encompass 
all forms of the phenomenon, just as theories on respiration and circulation of the blood 
apply equally to all human beings. There is no reason to believe that at bottom the love 
between two men or two women is vastly distinct from the love between a man and a 
woman; for we are all the children of mother nature and thus share common 
characteristics. Hence, I maintain that Schopenhauer’s theory on amorousness, which I 
shall shortly discuss, may be applied without prejudice to same-sex love, although I 
acknowledge that its outward manifestation will appear somewhat different in so far as 
it does not attain the same ends as opposite-sex love, i.e. the union of two men or two 
women cannot naturally lead to the production of progeny. If, however, we turn to an 
earnest consideration of the matter, we discover that, according to Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 534), the ultimate telos of all romantic relationships is “the composition of the 
next generation”. Hence, Schopenhauer (1969b: 535) maintains that all love affairs, 
however lofty and ethereal they may seem to one in love, are nothing but nature – or, 
more precisely, the Will, according to Schopenhauer – attempting to bring into 
existence a particular individual:  
“The true end of the whole love-story, though the parties concerned are 
unaware of it, is that this particular child may be begotten; the method and 
manner by which this end is attained is of secondary importance. However 
loudly those persons of a lofty and sentimental soul, especially those in love, 
may raise an outcry over the gross realism of my view, they are nevertheless 
mistaken. For is not the precise determination of the individualities of the next 
generation a much higher and worthier aim than those exuberant feelings and 
immaterial soap-bubbles of theirs? Indeed, of earthly aims can there be one 




I maintain that this unconscious telos functions as much in homosexual as in 
heterosexual love affairs; consequently, it will undoubtedly be of interest to elaborate 
on Schopenhauer’s theory. This view, viz., that all love affairs are directed to the 
production of offspring, led Schopenhauer to an interesting conjecture regarding the 
science of attraction. He (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 546) maintains that individuals tend to 
fall in love with those who cancel, or rather “neutralise”, their own imperfections, 
thereby producing – at least theoretically – well-balanced children. Were individuals 
attracted to those with the same imperfections and weaknesses as they possess, the 
human race would rapidly descend into abnormality (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 546-547). 
Thus, 
“[t]he weaker a man is in regard to muscular strength, the more will he look 
for robust women; and the woman on her part will do just the same […] 
Further, size is an important consideration. Short men have a decided 
inclination for tall women; and vice versa […] Finally, each individual also 
seeks in the particular parts of the body the corrective of his own defects and 
deviations, and does this the more decidedly, the more important is the part. 
Therefore pug-nosed individuals have an inexpressible liking for hawk-like 
noses, for parrot faces; it is just the same as regards all the other parts. Persons 
with excessively slim, long bodies and limbs can find beauty even in a stumpy 
and exceedingly short body. Considerations of temperament rule in an 
analogous manner; each will prefer the opposite of his own, yet only to the 
extent that his is a decided one” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 547). 
Hence, an extremely anxious individual will be attracted to one more courageous; an 
extremely irate man will, according to Schopenhauer’s theory, seek a placid partner, 
and so on. Yet the variance in temperament, which from a sexual perspective proved 
so attractive, inevitably portends that although the lovers will produce well-balanced 
children, they will not lead a harmonious married life, for “it seems as if, in making a 
marriage, either the individual or the interest of the species must come off badly” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 558). The prospect of love beguiles an individual into believing 
that in the pursuit thereof he strives for his own happiness, whereas, in reality, he is 
merely the instrument of the Will attempting to bring into existence a well-balanced 
child (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 557) which requires that the individual seek out a mate 
contrary to himself. According to Schopenhauer, opposites sexually attract; but the 




individual; “accordingly, marriages contracted from love prove as a rule unhappy, for 
through them the coming generation is provided for at the expense of the present” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 557).  
Now, it seems to me, as I previously stated, that these considerations must apply equally 
to homosexual, as to heterosexual, individuals; for, as I mentioned, both are products 
of nature. However, in the case of the former, the end is, according to Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 560), frustrated for a particular reason, which I shall shortly elaborate upon. 
For the moment I wish to stress that the attraction between individuals of the same-sex 
must, unconsciously, be based upon considerations of the production of healthy, well-
balanced children. Hence, even same-sex love tends, if we are to make sense of 
Schopenhauer’s explanation of the phenomenon,110 towards the production of progeny. 
Yet in the case of individuals attracted to members of the same-sex we must here 
assume that nature has “misguided” the sexual instinct for a particular purpose; i.e. 
nature has caused certain individuals to become attracted to members of the same sex 
in order to prevent them from reproducing. The reason for this is that nature, according 
to Schopenhauer (1969b: 563), cannot in this particular instance (for seemingly 
incomprehensible reasons), make a leap and entirely extinguish sexual desire in an 
individual unfit to produce children; hence nature must have recourse to an alternative 
solution: she thus induces same-sex attraction in such individuals, thereby preventing 
them from brining inferior creatures into existence. Following Aristotle, Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 563) argues that procreation in youth or old age produces “inferior, feeble, 
defective, and undersized children”. As a consequence thereof, nature has sought to 
remedy the problem by inducing homosexual desires in the young (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 566) and the old (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 565), thereby preventing them from 
bringing into the world “human beings who would be weak, dull, sickly, wretched, and 
short-lived” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 563).  
Although Schopenhauer’s theory is ingenious and interesting, I cannot neglect to 
mention that it fails to take into consideration some commonplace occurrences, thereby 
																																																								
110 For here we must remember that love is, for Schopenhauer, nothing but the desire to beget 
children: “For all amorousness is rooted in the sexual impulse alone, is in fact absolutely only 
a more closely determined, specialised, and indeed, in the strictest sense, individualised sexual 




failing to give a definitive and accurate description of the phenomenon of male 
homosexuality. For instance, Schopenhauer (1969b: 565) erroneously argues that 
“pederasty is a vice of old men […] To the really manly age it is something foreign, 
strange, and even incomprehensible.” However, one may take as a possible refutation 
of Schopenhauer’s thesis the fact that there are many men in the prime of their sexual 
lives who exhibit exclusively homosexual tendencies. To this criticism, however, 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 565) responds that “it can only be the result of an accidental and 
premature depravation of the procreative power, which could produce only inferior 
offspring; and to prevent this, nature diverts this power”. Yet, I retort, we find among 
many homosexual men in the prime of their lives the characteristics which would allow 
them to beget handsome and healthy offspring; and, conversely, we witness many 
unattractive and feeble heterosexual men reproduce. It appears, therefore, that in many 
instances nature has, upon Schopenhauer’s theory, erred. There is evidently a problem 
with the formulation of Schopenhauer’s attempted explication of the matter, such that, 
unfortunately, I cannot enter into fully; but in my opinion these difficulties attest to the 
erroneousness of the theory and cannot be easily rationalised away. So much, then, for 
Schopenhauer’s theory of male homosexuality. I may be permitted to observe here that 
the phenomenon of same-sex attraction (as indeed, of opposite-sex attraction) remains 
one of the most profound mysteries. Science has hitherto failed to disclose the enigma 
thereof. Perhaps in this case therefore the dictum I have elsewhere propounded may 
equally apply: ignoramus et ignorabimus (cf. pages 28 and 103, et al.). Although this 
topic fascinates me immensely, it is impertinent to my primary intention in this section 
and I shall therefore not enter into an elaborate discussion on it.  
However, for our present purposes, I wish only to raise one significant question in 
relation to the foregoing formularization, viz., how does nature – or more correctly, the 
Will – know that a particular individual is unfit for procreation if the former is said to 
be “blind” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 570)? Indeed Schopenhauer (1969b: 564) maintains 
that “a tendency to pederasty gradually and almost imperceptibly appears at about the 
age stated by Aristotle” [i.e. the fifty-fourth year, cf. Schopenhauer, 1969b: 563]. 
Surely, then, the Will must be aware and know that a particular man is unfit for 
reproduction at that particular age in order to turn his sexual desires towards boys? 
Nature, being the expression of the Will, cannot blindly confer homosexual tendencies 




preventing the most able-bodied from procreating, while, simultaneously, encouraging 
the most infirm of her productions to reproduce. On the contrary, the Will must know 
precisely which of its creations (i.e. at a particular age of life and those unfit for 
reproduction) should pursue a homosexual lifestyle and which a heterosexual course. 
Here, then, we discern the most conspicuous proof for the consciousness and 
knowledge of the Will: it simply cannot be a “blind” entity, as constantly avowed by 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 570, et al.). I conclude, therefore, that the Will is certainly not 
devoid of knowledge and consciousness; rather it works knowingly towards the 
realisation of certain predetermined ends. I shall return to this significant point in 
connection with the discussion on Schopenhauer’s evolutionary views. 
In concluding this discussion I wish to draw attention to one final point which has great 
pertinence to my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation.111 In his 
terminating remarks on the subject of pederasty Schopenhauer (1969b: 566-567) states: 
“[…] [T]he true, ultimate, and profoundly metaphysical reason for the 
objectionable nature of pederasty is that, whereas in it the [Wille-zum-Leben] 
affirms itself, the effect of that affirmation, which holds open the path to 
salvation, and hence the resumption of life, is completely cut off.” 
Now, although I do not wish to anticipate the development of my exposition I feel 
compelled to discuss in brevity the relation the abovementioned remark has to my 
interpretation of Schopenhauer’s theory of salvation from suffering. To begin with, let 
me observe that if the provenience of suffering is to be found in the metaphysical Will 
then a solution thereto ought to aim at the destruction, or at least the attenuation in the 
potency, of that essence. I have found that the only acceptable interpretation of 
Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine is the unorthodox postulation of a causal 
connection between the individual manifestations of Will and the Will as Ding-an-sich; 
although this is immensely problematical on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) account in 
so far as it assumes that the principium fiendi may be applied to the world as it is in-
itself –  something utterly inadmissible on Schopenhauer’s account of the a priority of 
the principle of causality – it is the only way in which the claim that the ascetic saint’s 
essence dissolves upon death can be meaningfully interpreted. For if the Will as Ding-
an-sich were truly impervious to the law of causality it would not be possible to affect 
																																																								




a change therein by ascetic practices or otherwise: the essence of the world would 
continue unremittingly to call forth the ephemeral phenomenon of life without the hope 
of any salvation therefrom. For this reason I insist on the maverick application of the 
principium fiendi to the Will as Ding-an-sich; in this way I argue that the ascetic 
practices are able to affect a transcendental alteration in the metaphysical Will thereby 
causing it to either expand or contract. Every sexual engagement is, as Schopenhauer 
(1969b:569) readily acknowledges, an affirmation of the Will, and from the standpoint 
of my unorthodox interpretation, this essentially portends that the Will as Ding-an-sich 
is caused to expand, whereby through the process of palingenesis more suffering is 
brought into the world. However, the birth of every new human individual brings along 
with it the hope of the possibility of the denial of the Wille-zum-Leben. Indeed, for 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 572), the rational human form is the ultimate telos of all nature, 
for the human alone “is the point where, in the light of distinct knowledge, he decides 
for the affirmation or denial of the [Wille-zum-Leben] […] Consequently, we have no 
ground for assuming that an even more highly developed objectification of the Will is 
reached anywhere, for it has already reached its turning-point here”.  
Thus, paradoxical as it may appear, Schopenhauer encourages the production of 
children in the hope that they will become enlightened and bring about the destruction 
of the essential being which manifests within them. On a purely materialistic 
interpretation it may appear as though merely refraining from having offspring is 
sufficient in bringing about the end of the world, for if every creature were to desist 
from producing progeny every species would, in the course of time, become extinct; 
and because the world is said by Schopenhauer (1969a: 3) to be entirely mind-
dependent it would, along with the destruction of all sentient creatures, vanish. 
However, for Schopenhauer (1969a: 100), such is an illusion in so far as every creature 
is merely an appearance or manifestation of the metaphysical Will. Hence, the mere 
abstention from having children is not in itself sufficient to bring about the end of life 
and its appearances, in so far as such abstention in no way affects the metaphysical 
Will. It follows then, that even if, per impossible, every extant creature were prevented 
by medical procedures from being capable of producing progeny, the metaphysical Will 
would persist and in the course of time it would call forth the phenomenon of life once 
more. Only the denial of the Will is able to destroy the essence which animates all life. 




illustrate that the voluntary chosen death by starvation of the ascetic saint is the sole 
means of abrogating a portion of the metaphysical Will, thereby reducing (even if 
faintly) the amount of suffering in the world. I shall not reiterate here the complex 
argument to be found in the appendix, but I do wish to elaborate upon it from the 
particular stance of sexual intercourse. For this topic affords me an opportunity to 
expound my interpretation in a way I was not able to do in the appendix. Given that 
every sexual act is an affirmation of the Will (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 568) it follows 
upon my interpretation that every act of sexual intercourse is an augmentation of the 
Will as Ding-an-sich; i.e. every engagement in an act of copulation causes, on my 
interpretation, the metaphysical Will to increase in size. In this way suffering is 
augmented. However, as I mentioned, the production of human offspring – although in 
itself also an augmentation in the Will as Ding-an-sich and consequently in the amount 
of suffering in the world – brings with it the hope of the denial of the Will; for it may 
be that at least one of these children may one day follow the ascetic path and abrogate 
the portion of Will which animates his body. Thus, if humans are to engage in sexual 
practices the ultimate end should always be the production of children; because, as 
mentioned, the affirmation of the Will in the parents may potentially one day be 
annulled in the child. For every other sexual act must, upon Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 
318) view, be counted as an offence; in so far as in such cases an individual affirms the 
Will, i.e. causes the metaphysical Will to augment on my interpretation, without the 
possibility of an annulment thereof. In corroboration of the interpretation I have here 
propounded, I refer readers to chapter XIV of the second volume of Schopenhauer’s 
final work Parerga und Paralipomena, entitled Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of 
the Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-Live, wherein Schopenhauer (1974b: 318) 
explicitly states:  
“[…] through [the condemnation of all unnatural sexual satisfaction] the 
impulse is gratified and thus the [Wille-zum-Leben] is affirmed, but 
propagation is suppressed, which alone keeps open the possibility of the denial 
of the [Will]. This is the reason why pederasty was recognized as a grave sin 
only with the appearance of Christianity whose tendency is ascetic.”112 
																																																								
112 It is necessary to mention that this last comment is erroneous, for the Old Testament (that is 




One can now, I think, make sense of Schopenhauer’s remark which induced me to write 
this section; and I regard my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine 
as indispensable thereto. Same-sex sexual relations – as likewise with masturbation and 
opposite-sex sexual relations with protection or other sexual acts which intentionally 
seek to frustrate the production of progeny, such as intercourse per anum and oral sex 
– therefore constitute an affirmation – in my interpretation, an expansion – of the 
metaphysical Will without the possibility of an annulment of that entity in the offspring. 
This last illustrates that the metaphysical objection (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 567) is not 
limited to pederasty, but to all forms of sexual acts which do not lead to the production 
of offspring; “[…] for through [unnatural sexual satisfaction] the impulse is gratified 
and thus the [Wille-zum-Leben] is affirmed, but propagation is suppressed, which alone 
keeps open the possibility of the denial of the Will” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 318). 
 
4.12. Concluding Remarks 
	
In summation, we have seen that by way of introspection Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) 
identifies the Ding-an-sich with the Will in the individual; however, his attempt to 
extend this notion to all animate (and inanimate) objects is extremely controversial. In 
particular, Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 273) insistence on consciousness and knowledge 
being dependent on a physical brain generates a contradiction in his system as to how 
the Will, as a “creative force” or “designer” (Young, 2005: 83), produces the manifold 
organisms found throughout nature, i.e. it would appear that the Will would need to 
possess a physical brain. In spite of the difficulties raised, the claim that the Ding-an-
sich is akin to the Will is fundamental to Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia. In the 
																																																								
in Leviticus (20:13) wherein it is stated that “[i]f a man lies with a male as he lies with a woman, 
it is wickedness. They shall surely be put to death. Their blood shall be upon them.” According 
to Schopenhauer (1969b: 170) Judaism is optimistic and consequently not ascetic, therefore 
Schopenhauer’s supposed reason for the prohibition on same-sex love, viz., that it is opposed 
to the denial of the Will, is conspicuously erroneous. I believe that I have offered a more cogent 
explanation for this prejudiced attitude elsewhere (cf. footnote 108), viz., that the Jews wished 
to distinguish themselves from the surrounding pagan nations which did not prohibit, but in 




second primary section of the thesis I shall attempt at length, by way of numerous 
cogent criticisms, to undermine Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) claim that the Will is in 





5. The Unrelenting Struggle of Life 
	
I now come to the most notorious part of Schopenhauer’s system, viz., his pessimism 
regarding life.113 The pertinence of this section to the primary topic of the thesis is to 
be found in the identification of the pessimistic view with the metaphysical Will; for in 
the next section we shall earnestly enquire as to how consoling Schopenhauer’s doctrine 
of athanasia is if the Will is essentially evil. In short, it would appear more disturbing 
than consoling to be told that the act of dying is a return to the source of all evil in the 
world. However, I shall not address this concern at present, for the moment let us focus 
upon Schopenhauer’s bleak characterisation of existence and attempt to determine 
whether or not it is inextricably bound to his metaphysical doctrine.  
Although the term “pessimism” is often used in connection with Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy (Cartwright, 2005: 124) it may come as a surprise that in his published 
writings Schopenhauer never used the term to describe his thought (Janaway, 2008: 
319).114 Nonetheless, “[t]he popularity of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is due primarily 
to his pessimistic Weltanschauung” (Hitschmann, 1956: 89); and in accordance 
therewith Bertrand Russell identifies pessimism as one of the two most notable 
																																																								
113 Although Schopenhauer does not offer a definition of pessimism, we may succinctly define 
it for our present purposes as the view that suffering is ubiquitous, inescapable and that it 
predominates in the life of all sentient creatures; which consequently leads to the view that this 
is “the worst of all possible worlds” (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 325). This melancholic view is 
based primarily, as I shall argue, on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) identification of the Will 
with the Ding-an-sich, i.e. we all suffer precisely because we are manifestations of the 
metaphysical Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 315). Or, to express the matter somewhat differently: 
due to the fact that the Will underlies all phenomenal manifestations the phenomena of suffering 
and sorrow are unavoidable. In the course of my discussion I shall illustrate that for 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 312) suffering presupposes a “need or “lack” (i.e. unfulfilled volition) 
which he (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 291-292) holds to be akin to the state of suffering. 
114 As Cartwright notes in his Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy: “The word 
‘pessimism’ only became part of Schopenhauer’s philosophical vocabulary after 1827 [i.e. after 
the publication of the first volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in December 1818], 
and the only time he used it to describe his philosophy was in a note from 1828 where he wrote 
that ‘my doctrine is pessimism’. (Manuscript Remains, vol. III, “Adversaria”, para. 66).” 




consequences of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.115 What Russell evidently meant by this 
was that Schopenhauer was the first philosopher to take the problem of evil as a serious 
philosophical concern, and instead of dispensing with the issue merely by way of 
sophisms and paltry excuses (Russell, 1946: 786) Schopenhauer offered a cogent 
explanation for the appearance of the ubiquity of the phenomenon of suffering.  
I observe that theistic doctrines have always struggled to explicate the existence of 
suffering in a world said to be created by a benevolent deity. For if the essence or prima 
causa is compassionate then the world ought to portray itself as something peacefully 
blissful, as everything which exists emanates therefrom and ought, therefore, to accord 
with the source from whence it arose; just as one may correctly assume that a torrid or 
frigid object emanated from a torrid or frigid source respectively. But, in striking 
contrast to the theistic conception of the world, we find the contrary, viz., a world full 
of evil and suffering. As a consequence, the theist must resort to fanciful chicanery if 
he is to preserve his juvenile dogmas, which stand at variance with reality. One such 
form of duplicity employed by the theists is that of the concept of free will:116 for the 
world cannot be essentially evil given that it emanated from a benevolent deity; hence 
the appearance of such along with suffering is, it is argued, an anomalous product of 
human agency. In this way the theistic account maintains that evil and suffering exist 
due to the “gift” of free will bestowed on man by God: an individual is said to possess 
the freedom to choose between acting rightly or wrongly; and evil appears as a 
consequence of the selection of the latter course. In this way is the deity absolved of all 
guilt and responsibility, thus is his benevolence preserved! Now, in spite of the obvious 
chicanery at work in the argument, this view may appear cogent to some extent; for 
murder, theft and other heinous acts of cruelty are certainly the products of human 
conduct. Therefore, assuming for the moment that people can intentionally act 
differently, it may appear that evil and suffering do in fact emanate from diabolical 
																																																								
115 “Historically, two things are important about Schopenhauer: his pessimism, and his doctrine 
that will is superior to knowledge” (Russell, 1946: 786). 
116 It is not my intention herein to concern myself with the various theodicies which have been 
propounded; however, it is interesting to note that most – if not all – theodicies share some 
form of the “free-will defence” (Hick, 1990: 40). In this sense, the various theodicies attempt 
to absolve the omnipotent benevolent deity of all responsibility by transferring the guilt onto 




human actions. But how, then, are we to account for the occurrences of natural disasters 
and diseases? The primitive theistic mindset is inclined to maintain that even these are 
ultimately due to human nature (cf., for instance, the story of Noah and the flood in the 
book of Genesis, wherein we are told that Jehovah induced a cataclysmic deluge in 
order to destroy wicked humankind).117 Nowadays, however, the scientific method has 
revealed the purely naturalistic, that is to say immanent, processes whereby such 
disasters occur: only the most intellectually primitive and juvenile among us would 
ascribe a natural disaster to human agency, i.e. to human immorality and wickedness. 
In striking contrast, the intellectually mature mind acknowledges that the universe is 
unconscious, Jenseits von Gut und Böse,118 nonchalant to the moral behaviour of 
humankind. In accordance with this mature view of the matter, we often witness tragedy 
befalling those considered morally upstanding and compassionate, whereas many a 
																																																								
117 “Then the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the Earth, and that every intent 
of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the Lord was sorry that He had made 
man on the Earth, and He was grieved in His heart. So the Lord said, ‘I will destroy man whom 
I have created from the face of the Earth, both man and beast, creeping thing and birds of the 
air, for I am sorry that I have made them’”. (Genesis 6.5-6.7). I may here be permitted to offer 
my naturalistic account of the Bible. For it must be borne in mind that the anecdotes found in 
both the Old and New Testaments are the product of a pre-scientific mindset. But in the Old 
Testament, in particular, nature is personified as Jehovah. In accordance with my naturalistic 
view, I conjecture that there must have been a deluge in the Mediterranean region in antiquity 
which destroyed much life (thus forming the basis of this myth); but due to the fact that pre-
scientific humans could not naturalistically explicate such phenomena they necessarily turned 
to an infantile understanding: God – the father – was incensed by certain human behaviours 
and He therefore punished humanity accordingly. Upon this naturalistic interpretation of the 
anecdotes in the Old Testament we can understand Jehovah’s seeming cruelty: for Jehovah is 
essentially akin to Mother Nature, which is often extremely destructive – and from our human 
perspective, “cruel”.  I cannot refrain, however, from stating that although this myth ascribes 
guilt to the wayward actions of humanity it unwittingly brings into question the characterisation 
of Jehovah as a benevolent entity; and thereby undermines the credibility of the contemporary 
Judaeo-Christian conception of God. For would the truly virtuous not show as much 
compassion to the wicked as to the good (Luke, 6: 27-30)? In a word: how could a truly 
benevolent God permit the cruel destruction of the creatures He is said to have created? 




villain lives a healthy, comfortable life to an extremely old age. In this and the struggle 
for existence nature incessantly declares her apathy to morality.119 We must 
acknowledge, therefore, that suffering and contentment are not entirely dependent upon 
human agency, that one cannot swiftly and easily dispense with the problem of evil by 
way of an appeal to the supposed liberum arbitrium120 of the human race. Another 
solution must be sought. Now it may occur to some, that perhaps the predicament of 
evil generated within theistic accounts is due to the benevolent nature ascribed to the 
essence or prima causa of the universe: what if, on the contrary, the world is not the 
product of a loving deity, but the consequence of a daemonic force (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 101), which brought creatures into existence in order to delight in their 
suffering? Indeed, such a view is capable of explicating the existence of evil with ease. 
It is along similar lines of thought, which I shall shortly elaborate upon, that 
Schopenhauer attempts to account for the appearance of evil in the world.121  For the 
solution to the problem of evil in the Schopenhauerian philosophy is to be found in the 
identification of the world in-itself, the Ding-an-sich, with the Will. In this sense I 
concur with Christopher Janaway (2008: 323) in maintaining that Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism is inextricably bound to his central metaphysics. In further concurrence 
therewith the psychoanalyst Edward Hitschmann (1956: 89) observes in his attempted 
analysis of the philosopher:  
“The most important argument which Schopenhauer employed again and again 
in his attempt to rationalise the ill-humour the world provoked in him is the 
[…] blind, irrational, aimless Will which can never be wholly satisfied and 
knows no resting point.” 
As a tangential, albeit corroborating, point to the aforementioned claim, I observe that 
although he does not explicitly deny the existence of the Judaeo-Christian deity in his 
																																																								
119 However, I must here acknowledge that it is erroneous to consider life immoral, in so far as 
this presupposes a conscious malevolent creator of the universe (something for which we in 
fact have no evidence); hence the universe must be considered amoral, i.e. apathetic to the joys 
and sorrows of the manifold creatures which happen to inhabit the third rock from a star called 
the Sun in the Milky Way Galaxy.  
120 “The free choice of the Will” (Cartwright, 2005: 61). 
121 Schopenhauer wrote in a notebook: “[…] it is far more truthful to say: the devil has created 




opus maximum,122 it ought to be noted that in attempting to explicate the ubiquity of 
evil Schopenhauer does not resort to a duplicitous theodicy; instead he jettisons the 
																																																								
122 Paul Edwards (2009: 175) notes that “Schopenhauer nowhere offers a formal defence of 
atheism […]”; however, that Schopenhauer was an atheist can hardly be denied. In his notebook 
entitled Spicilegia Schopenhauer (quoted in Cartwright, 2005: 65) wrote: “whoever loves the 
truth hates the gods in the singular as well as the plural”. It may appear odd, then, that within 
Schopenhauer’s principal work an extensive consideration of the three primary arguments for 
the existence of God are noticeably absent. However, this omission may be vindicated by the 
fact that in his doctoral dissertation Schopenhauer does mention and reject two of the three 
arguments, viz., the Ontological and the Cosmological. As to the Ontological Argument 
Schopenhauer (1889a: 12-13) refers to Aristotle’s distinction formulated in the Posterior 
Analytics which states that “[…] defining a thing and proving its existence are two different 
matters, separate to all eternity; since by the one we learn what it is that is meant, and by the 
other that such a thing exists”. Schopenhauer (1889a: 13) then proceeds to quote Aristotle’s 
dictum: “[e]xistence can never belong to the essence of a thing”, thereby undermining the 
central thesis of the modern form of the Ontological Argument which focuses on “the 
assumption that existence is a property or a predicate [of God]” (Hicks, 1990: 17-18). The fact 
that existence cannot be regarded as an essential attribute of the deity reveals that “this famous 
Ontological Proof is really a charming joke” (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 11). As to the 
Cosmological Argument we ought to distinguish between two aspects thereof, viz., the notions 
of a prima causa and a causa sui. The former must be considered an absurd contradiction 
(Schopenhauer, 1889a: 42), in so far as it presupposes an arbitrary break in the concatenation 
of causes. Yet, given that the principium fiendi is a priori, it must be both universal and 
necessary and admit of absolutely no exceptions (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 46); for why should 
one assume that the concatenation of causes abruptly comes to an end when the finite human 
mind tires of imagining the infinite chain of causes? Indeed, Schopenhauer (1969a: 495) states 
“[…] we cannot by any means imagine the possibility of an absolute beginning”. Now the 
notion of a causa sui which, if the attribute of eternal existence is not transferred to the deity, 
seeks to explicate the origins of God, for like every other object the principium fiendi ought to 
apply equally to the creator. Thus, some theologians argue that the Cosmological Argument 
implies that “God is the cause of himself”; but this claim is equally as bizarre and contradictory 
(Schopenhauer, 1889a: 42) as the notion of a prima causa, for, in the last analysis, it amounts 
to the illogical claim that God gave birth – to himself! So much then, for the Ontological and 
Cosmological Arguments. Lastly, Schopenhauer (1889a: 46) refers to the Teleological 




existence of God by replacing it with the primordial Will. In this way we can discern 
the fundamentally atheistic and pessimistic character of the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy; in fact, I may be permitted to go so far as to say that it is thoroughly 
incompatible with an optimistic theistic conception of the universe. For, as mentioned, 
Schopenhauer replaces the omnipotent benevolent deity with a self-deprecating 
striving, which is ultimately insatiable. Thus, it seems to me that Schopenhauer’s 
atheism is inextricably bound to his pessimism, for in absolutely no way does he 
attempt a reconciliation of the problem of evil with the supposed attributes of Jehovah. 
Instead, evil is acknowledged by Schopenhauer (1974b: 291) as a fundamental attribute 
of the world; for him the natura naturans123 is akin to the source of suffering; in this 
way the universe is thoroughly sullied with a pessimistic hue. 
However, before I commence an earnest exposition of the way in which the Will as 
Ding-an-sich generates discord and suffering within the world I wish first to address 
Bryan Magee’s (1997: 13) seemingly bizarre claim that “[Schopenhauer’s] pessimism 
is logically independent of his philosophy” and that “[n]on-pessimism is equally 
compatible with [it]” (ibid.), for in addressing this opposing view I believe we shall 
bolster our argument in favour of the inextricability of the metaphysical Will and 
																																																								
as “a great deal more plausible” than the Cosmological and Ontological Arguments. It is 
interesting to note, however, that he (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 46) does not offer a refutation of it 
in his doctoral thesis, but rather refers his readers to his treatise Über den Willen in der Natur, 
“a work”, we are told, “which though small in bulk, is rich and weighty in content”. In that 
particular treatise we discover what I have called, “the teleological argument for the extension 
of the Will” (cf. the chapter entitled Comparative Anatomy, 1889b: 252-280). According 
thereto, Schopenhauer (1889b: 261-262) utilises the Teleological Argument in his explanation 
for the way in which the Will manifests itself in the protective, defensive and life-sustaining 
organs and structures of every creature. Thus, it appears that Schopenhauer did not subject the 
so-called “Physico-theological Proof” to scrutiny due to its apparent plausibility – but here it 
must be borne in mind that Schopenhauer was writing in a pre-Darwinian era. Instead, 
Schopenhauer appropriated the argument in his explication of the way in which the 
metaphysical Will is said to manifest itself throughout organic nature. Nonetheless, this 
adaptation of the argument in no way seeks to defend the existence of a deity; instead it is 
actually utilised as a means to further Schopenhauer’s atheistic view of nature. 




pessimism. There are three primary objections I wish to raise in connection with 
Magee’s aforementioned proposition, and I shall subsequently elaborate upon them, 
viz., (i) Schopenhauer’s declaration that optimism is a pernicious way of thinking; (ii) 
if the Will does not necessarily manifest itself as something evil then the need for 
salvation (denial of the Will) is rendered superfluous; and (iii) the manifestation of the 
Will in the world of appearance accounts for the ubiquity of suffering.  
 
5.1. Optimism as a Pernicious Way of Thinking 
	
Let us commence the discussion by proceeding along the assumption that by “non-
pessimism” Magee portends the opposite thereto, viz., optimism. We must then 
earnestly enquire: is Schopenhauer’s philosophy, i.e. the view that the world is an 
expression or manifestation of a primordial Will, compatible with and conducive to 
optimism? In an extremely memorable passage in the first volume of Die Welt, 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 326) candidly states: 
“[…] I cannot here withhold the statement that optimism, where it is not merely 
the thoughtless talk of those who harbour nothing but words under their 
shallow foreheads, seems to me to be not merely an absurd, but also a really 
wicked, way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of 
mankind.” 
If this explicit statement in opposition to the optimistic view does not suffice to answer 
our initial question in the negative, viz., that Schopenhauer’s notion of the Will as Ding-
an-sich cannot possibly be considered compatible with optimism, I may be permitted 
to observe here that Schopenhauer expresses contempt for all Weltanschauungen he 
considers to be optimistic, and this attitude can be evinced most conspicuously in his 
evaluation of the major world religions. Accordingly, in the second volume of Die Welt 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 170) states: 
“I cannot, as is generally done, put the fundamental difference of all religions 
in the question whether they are monotheistic, polytheistic, pantheistic, or 
atheistic, but only in the question whether they are optimistic or pessimistic, in 
other words, whether they present the existence of this world as justified by 




which can be conceived only as the consequence of our guilt, and thus really 
ought not to be, in that they recognize that pain and death cannot lie in the 
eternal, original, and immutable order of things, that which in every respect 
ought to be.” 
This dichotomisation leads Schopenhauer to consider Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Catholicism as expressing the pessimistic spirit (Cartwright, 2005: 125), whereas he 
considers Greek paganism, Judaism, Protestantism and Islam as essentially optimistic 
in character (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 623). In Parerga und Paralipomena in particular, 
as Janaway (2008: 321) notes, “there is a demonizing of Jewish thought”.124 However, 
																																																								
124 Although Schopenhauer immensely dislikes the Jewish religion it is interesting to note that 
he had a number of Jewish friends, acolytes and admirers. For instance, in his youth 
Schopenhauer befriended Joseph Gans, a young Jewish student whom Schopenhauer supported 
financially (Safranski, 1991: 168). In his later years, Schopenhauer was, as Cartwright (2010: 
542) notes, devastated by the death of the Jewish lawyer Martin Emden, whom Schopenhauer 
(quoted in Cartwright, 2010: 542) referred to as his “best friend”. David Asher, “who was active 
in his faith and in Jewish social causes” (Cartwright, 2010: 542), was another friend and 
supporter of the philosopher, whom Schopenhauer unsuccessfully attempted on several 
occasions to persuade to translate his philosophical works into English (Cartwright, 2005: 9). 
Interestingly, Julius Frauenstädt, Schopenhauer’s “arch-evangelist” (Cartwright, 2010: 505), 
who did more than any other acolyte to spread the Schopenhauerian gospel, was in fact born 
Jewish, and he assisted Schopenhauer in having Parerga und Paralipomena published by 
Hayne of Berlin in 1851 (Cartwright, 2010: 506). This is sadly amusing in so far as Parerga is 
arguably (cf. Janaway, 2008: 321) Schopenhauer’s most anti-Semitic work; wherein he comes 
closest to a racial form of anti-Semitism (cf. for instance Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 264) remark 
that “[the Jews] are and remain a foreign oriental race […]”). Yet, in spite of Schopenhauer’s 
negative philosophical view of Judaism, he had great admiration for Spinoza (Cartwright, 2010: 
543-544); and we might expect him to have had an appreciation for the ancient Jewish sect of 
the Essenes (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 616), who were known to practice asceticism.  I would also 
like to note here that the first English biography on Schopenhauer, published in 1876 and 
entitled Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy, was written by the Jewess Helen 
Zimmern. Furthermore, both Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud – two of the greatest Jewish 
intellectuals of all time – expressed great admiration for Schopenhauer. Ernest Jones (quoted 
in Magee, 1997: 309) relates that Freud “openly regarded Schopenhauer as one of the half-




it is interesting to note that although Schopenhauer vehemently dislikes Judaism for its 
optimism and lack of an afterlife (Schopenhauer, 1974a: 125-126 and Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 301) he does not consider it the most reprehensible religion, for, as he 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 580) states: “[t]he myth of the Fall of man […] is the only thing 
in the Old Testament to which I can concede a metaphysical, although only allegorical, 
truth; indeed, it is this alone that reconciles me to the Old Testament”. For 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 605) Islam is “the most modern as well as the worst of all 
religions”, “[…] the saddest and poorest form of theism” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 162), 
and in “words some will find prophetic, others a cause for jihad” as Young (2005: 261) 
notes, Schopenhauer (ibid.) disparagingly refers to the Koran as a “wretched book”, 
which has inspired its acolytes “[…] to bloody wars and the most extensive conquests”; 
moreover, Schopenhauer claims that the Koran is a book in which he was unable to 
discover “one single idea of value” (ibid.). Thus, the most detestable religion, according 
to Schopenhauer (1889b: 377), is Islam; Judaism occupies the penultimate position. 
But, in essence, both are reprehensible for their naïve optimism.  
However, to return to the initial discussion, it is solely the myth of the Fall which, 
according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 620), connects the New Testament with the Old. 
For the pessimism of the former is utterly incompatible with the “optimistic history of 
creation” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 620) of the latter. Here, I may be permitted to offer 
the most concise and succinct expression of the distinction between optimistic and 
pessimistic religions. The former consider life a blessing from the creator, which ought 
thoroughly to be enjoyed and prolonged (even in instances in which a pleasant life is 
no longer tenable); whereas the latter consider life to be a punishment, from which a 
rapid salvation is to be hoped.125 Accordingly, pessimistic religions anticipate suffering 
as inevitable, for they teach that we are, without exception, sinners deserving of such 
punishment. In this way they are profoundly consoling, for when an evil befalls us we 
ought to consider it as just and bear it with composure and equanimity. Most 
																																																								
portrait of Schopenhauer on the wall in his Berlin study in the late 1920s (mentioned in Don 
Howard’s (1997: 87) article, A Peek Behind the Veil of Maya). 
125 It is interesting to note that the optimistic religions, in particular Judaism, do not possess 
complex soteriological doctrines. This is due, of course, to their optimistic attitude regarding 




Westerners, whose minds are regrettably corrupted by the “optimistic history of 
creation”, however, erroneously present the doctrine of metempsychosis, i.e. the 
transmigration of souls, as a consolation for the inevitability of death; whereas for an 
adherent of the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain126 faiths Samsara, i.e. rebirth, is an occurrence 
all wish to ultimately avert. But it is to be noted, that, according to the latter religions, 
in order for the cycle of birth, death and rebirth to be abolished the suffering 
experienced in one’s life cannot intentionally be annulled by way of suicide or 
euthanasia; for the avoidance of pain does not mitigate negative Karma from adhering 
to the soul, and thus is one perpetually rebound to existence.127 In order to purify the 
soul of all negative Karma one must endure suffering with equanimity; thereby 
ultimately escaping from the vicious cycle of Samsara. In my estimation, this attitude 
regarding the value of life is the most striking dissimilarity between the religions of the 
Orient to those religions of the Occident. The Abrahamic religions (with the possible 
exclusion of Catholicism) are naïvely optimistic, whereas the Indian religions are 
thoroughly pessimistic. For Schopenhauer the latter are commendable, for they contain 
profound insights into the nature of existence which, as we shall see, closely accord 
with his doctrine. 
It will be noticed that I have intentionally avoided using the all-encompassing term 
“Christianity” as a description for the religion of the New Testament, for 
Schopenhauer’s attitude thereto is, as Cartwright (2005: 26) notes, ambivalent. 
																																																								
126 Schopenhauer rarely makes mention of the Jain religion; this is due to the fact that he 
considers it to be essentially akin to Buddhism (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 608). It is interesting to 
note that many early Oriental scholars dismissed Jainism for the same reason (Gopalan, 1973:1-
2); however, it ought to be noted that, among other dissimilarities, Jainism adheres to a far more 
austere ascetic doctrine than does Buddhism (Wiley, 2004: 9-10). I mention this interesting fact 
because my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine (cf. the appendix) has been 
greatly influenced by the Jain teaching.  
127 In the words of the Upanishads (Mascaro, 1978: 140): “According as a man acts and walks 
in the path of life, so he becomes. He that does good becomes good; he that does evil becomes 
evil. By pure actions he becomes pure; by evil actions he becomes evil.” In this way immoral 
actions cause negative Karma to adhere to the soul; thus is one reborn into a life of suffering in 




Schopenhauer (1969b: 625) considers Protestantism, which is a revolt against 
Catholicism, to be a degenerate form of Christianity (Cartwright, 2005: 28), for:  
“[b]y eliminating asceticism and its central point, the meritorious nature of 
celibacy, Protestantism has already given up the innermost kernel of 
Christianity, and to this extent is to be regarded as a breaking away from it […] 
In the end, this results in a doctrine of a loving father who made the world, in 
order that things might go very pleasantly in it (and in this, of course, he was 
bound to fail), and who, if only we conform to his will in certain respects, will 
afterwards provide an even much pleasanter world (in which case it is only to 
be regretted that it has so fatal an entrance). This may be a good religion for 
comfortable, married, and civilized Protestant parsons, but it is not 
Christianity. Christianity is the doctrine of the deep guilt of the human race by 
reason of its very existence, and of the heart’s intense longing for salvation 
therefrom.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 625). 
In its pessimistic view of life and its doctrine of salvation, incipient Christianity, i.e. 
Catholicism, betrays its affinity with the philosophical precepts of the Hindus and 
Buddhists; and, according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 623) its pessimistic spirit, its 
soteriological doctrine, along with the concept of an avatar (in the form of Jesus as the 
“son of God”), betrays its really Indian – that is to say, Hindu – origins. It may be of 
interest to note here that Schopenhauer (1969b: 624) also considers Judaism to be a 
derivation of the Hindu religion – albeit, in an extremely circuitous way. As he 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 580, 623-624) explicates: 
“The Jewish religion resulted from this Zend religion [i.e. Zoroastrianism], as 
J. G. Rhode has thoroughly demonstrated in his book Die heilige Sage des 
Zendvolks; Jehovah came from Ormuzd, and Satan from Ahriman. The latter, 
however, plays only a very subordinate role in Judaism, in fact almost entirely 
disappears. In this way optimism gains the upper hand, and there is left only 
the myth of the Fall as a pessimistic element, which (as the fable of Meshian 
and Meshiane) is also taken from the Zend-Avesta, but nevertheless falls into 
oblivion until it, as well as Satan, is again taken up by Christianity. But Ormuzd 
himself is derived from Brahmanism, although from a lower region thereof; he 
is no other than Indra, that subordinate god of the firmament and the 




Thus it appears that Schopenhauer maintains that all the major world religions 
ultimately derive from Hinduism;128 those that have retained the pessimistic element of 
the former are, according to him (Cartwright, 2005: 125), vastly superior to those which 
have descended into crude, naïve optimism. Now if Schopenhauer’s claim that the Will 
as Ding-an-sich were equally as compatible with optimism as with pessimism, we 
would not expect to find Schopenhauer praising Hinduism, Buddhism and Catholicism 
for their pessimistic spirit, while simultaneously disdaining Greek paganism, Judaism, 
Protestantism and Islam for their essentially optimistic standpoints. 
In concluding my discussion I may be permitted to invoke one final observation in 
corroboration of the view that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is certainly not compatible 
with optimism, viz., one of Schopenhauer’s primary objections to pantheism 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 643 and Cartwright, 2005: 118). As the term denotes, pantheism 
maintains that God inheres in everything or, rather, that everything is akin to God. Now 
if God – as is traditionally done in the Judaeo-Christian tradition – is identified with 
benevolence, the claim that “everything is akin to God” is tantamount to the assertion 
that “everything is essentially good”129 – a proposition which strikes Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 643) as not only empirically bizarre, but in fact psychologically pernicious, in 
so far as it engenders a dangerous resentment towards life when disaster, as is only 
inevitable, occurs. If one would only earnestly open one’s eyes and consider this world 
he would see, quite plainly, that it is not a world of goodness, but one of immense 
sadness and tragedy. Given the ubiquity of suffering “it would be more correct to 
identify the world with the devil” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 101) than with a benevolent 
																																																								
128 By this I portend that if Judaism ultimately derives from Hinduism, then it follows that all 
the religions which subsequently emerged from it, i.e. the numerous denominations of 
Christianity, Islam and Baha’ism, etc. are merely (inferior) variations of Hinduism. In the East 
the matter concerning Hinduism as the original proto-religion is even less susceptible to debate 
in so far as the antiquity of the Hindu religion is indisputable and it is therefore reasonable to 
assume that the similarities between the Jain and Buddhist religions and Hindu thought are due 
to the fact that the former emanated from the latter (Gopalan, 1973: 10).  
129 Schopenhauer (cf. 1969b: 620, 623, et al.) is fond of invoking the Greek adage “παντα καλα 
λιαν” [“panta kala lian”] (“[And God saw] all [that He had made, and behold it] was very 




deity, and indeed this is precisely what the Schopenhauerian philosophy ultimately 
intends to do. Optimistic pantheism cannot adequately explicate the ubiquity of evil 
and suffering, thus “[…] the question of the origin of evil is the incurable disease ever 
breaking out in [the doctrine] anew” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 643); whereas the 
Schopenhauerian system is the sole philosophy wherein “the evils of the world [are] 
honestly admitted in all their magnitude; this is possible, because the answer to the 
question of their origin coincides with the answer to the question of the origin of the 
world” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 643). The metaphysical Will is thus undoubtedly and 
inextricably bound to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic Weltanschauung. 
Yet if this discussion does not sufficiently convince incredulous readers of the 
erroneousness of Magee’s assertion, I shall now invoke two further considerations in 
my attempt to prove that Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is inextricably bound to his 
pessimism. To this end I wish to consider Schopenhauer’s impetus for the ascetic life 
and his notions regarding suffering.  
 
5.2. The Evil Metaphysical Will as the Impetus for the Ascetic Life 
	
In a later section I earnestly discuss the difficulty in Schopenhauer’s attempted solution 
to the criticisms levelled at his claim that the Will is the Ding-an-sich; however, 
although I will not at present enter into an elaborate discussion thereon, it is necessary 
at this point in the exposition to illustrate the significance that Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 
196-197) revised view of his central claim has on his pessimistic outlook and the 
consequent need for salvation. For it will be recognized that if the essence of the world 
is not thoroughly evil the need for salvation therefrom is called into question. In short, 
I maintain that a multidimensional view of the Ding-an-sich, one in which the Will is 
said to occupy merely one facet thereof, erodes the claim that the world necessarily 
presents itself as violent and evil, and, as a consequence thereof, the need for salvation 




For our present purposes it is sufficient to note that Schopenhauer (1969b: 197) was 
coerced to qualify his view130 regarding the identification of the Will with the Ding-an-
sich primarily in light of the fact that one’s volitional strivings can be dated and their 
duration measured (Edwards, 2009: 170); here it must be recalled that if the Will is to 
be identified with the Ding-an-sich it must be atemporal, for time is said to be an a 
priori imposition of the mind. In acknowledgement of this difficulty, Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 196) states in the second volume of his principal work: 
“Meanwhile it is to be carefully noted, and I have always kept it in mind, that 
even the inward observation we have of our own will still does not by any 
means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself.” 
This seemingly inconspicuous, albeit extremely significant, qualification intimates that 
the Will is only one dimension of the Ding-an-sich; as a consequence thereof there may, 
perhaps, be many other inscrutable aspects thereto. Now although such an interpretation 
seems to draw Schopenhauer into a closer orbit with Kant – insofar as, like Kant, it 
would appear that Schopenhauer is arguing that the Ding-an-sich is ultimately 
impervious to human comprehension – it does tremendous violence to the former’s 
system; for if the Ding-an-sich is not exclusively identified with the Will then “there is 
no reason to expect that the world as [appearance] will present [itself as something 
violent]” (Wicks, 2008: 131), on the contrary, the inscrutable aspects of the Ding-an-
sich may be benign or benevolent, in which case the world and life would not 
																																																								
130 The fact that in the concluding sections of the first volume of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969a: 
409-411) argues that the dissolution of the Will in the ascetic does not lead to an absolute 
nothing but merely to a relative nothing, intimates that the view explicitly propounded in the 
second volume (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 196-197), i.e. a multidimensional view of the Ding-an-
sich, was already implicit in the first. However, I refer to the multidimensional view as a 
revision of the earlier position in order to distinguish it from the orthodox reading of 
Schopenhauer’s most famous claim, viz., that the Will is the Ding-an-sich. This view is 
corroborated by the fact that – save for the aforementioned discussion on absolute/relative 





necessarily manifest as a bellum omnium contra omnes;131 and if the world is not 
essentially savage then the need for salvation therefrom is undermined: 
“[…] the multidimensional interpretation undercuts the motivation to achieve 
tranquillity through the denial-of-the-Will, for we deny the Will precisely 
because our projection of the principle of sufficient reason generates 
intolerable suffering. A multidimensional conception of the thing-in-itself 
provides less reason for denying the Will, since it introduces potentially 
uncountable and inscrutable dimensions that minimize the Will’s metaphysical 
importance.” (Wicks, 2008: 132). 
Thus it becomes evident that Schopenhauer’s metaphysical claim, viz., that the Will is 
the Ding-an-sich, is inextricably bound to his notorious pessimism and, consequently, 
to his doctrine of salvation. Now if one were to claim that the Will within 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy does not necessarily lead to a pessimistic view of life but 
that it is equally compatible with optimism, then it becomes utterly impossible to 
explicate Schopenhauer’s reasons for concluding Die Welt with a soteriological 
doctrine. For one would not require salvation from a benign or gleeful existence. Just 
as we tacitly assume in all cases of intentional suicide that an individual driven to such 
an act must have been hopelessly unhappy, so here, too, may we assume that a 
philosophy which culminates in a soteriological doctrine must necessarily view the 
world in a profoundly pessimistic way. In fact, it is a curious coincidence, and one 
which I maintain corroborates the argument here propounded, that the religions 
identified by Schopenhauer (1969b: 170) as optimistic, in particular Judaism, do not in 
fact have elaborate soteriological doctrines; for upon an optimistic comprehension of 
the universe there is no need for salvation therefrom.132 It is only the so-called 
																																																								
131 “A war of all against all”. 
132 For the sake of meticulousness, I must observe here that Islam cannot be taken as a refutation 
of my assertion; for the Islamic doctrine of salvation – which is in the last analysis nothing 
more than entering a state of extravagant debauchery – is in fact incompatible with the 
optimistic view of existence espoused by the religion. Yet when one takes into consideration 
the fact that Islam is essentially a syncretistic religion par excellence, deriving its doctrines 
from a plethora of sources such as Judaism, Arab Paganism, Christianity, Manichaeism (Bell, 




“pessimistic religions”, viz., Hinduism, Buddhism and genuine Christianity, i.e. 
Catholicism, that advance complex soteriological doctrines in an attempt to assist 
votaries in escaping the nightmare of existence. 
It is evident, then, that, contrary to Magee’s assertion, Schopenhauer would not have 
wished for his philosophy to be construed in optimistic terms. However, the term “non-
pessimism” is, to my mind, intentionally vague; for it may not necessarily imply the 
opposite of pessimism. Hence, by that misleading term Magee may have had in mind 
the notion that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is independent of both optimism and 
pessimism, for as he (Magee, 1997: 13) states: “[…] it is an elementary point in logic 
that no truth claim can entail a value-judgment”; in other words, no objective claim can 
contain within itself “goodness” or “evilness”. This calls to mind the scientific method 
wherein absolute objectivity is a necessary precondition thereof. Therefore, we must 
acknowledge that from a scientific perspective, “optimism and pessimism are alike 
objectionable: optimism assumes, or attempts to prove, that the universe exists to please 
us, and pessimism that it exists to displease us. Scientifically, there is no evidence that 
it is concerned with us either one way or the other. The belief in either pessimism or 
optimism is a matter of temperament, not of reason […]” (Russell, 1946: 787).133 
Hence, it is often assumed that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is highly idiosyncratic and 
psychologically revealing in so far as it ascribes (i.e. in the parlance of psychoanalysis, 
that it projects) a negative psychological mood onto the objectively neutral world 
(Hitschmann, 1956: 46, 79).134 However, should we impute scientific principles and 
standards to a Lebensphilosophie? Here we must enquire as to whether Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy can be characterised as scientific in any sense of the word, as Magee (1997: 
13) tacitly appears to assume by his vague expression. First, we must acknowledge that 
like the scientific enterprise Schopenhauer’s system attempts to illuminate the 
mysteries of the universe and existence; however, it differs from the former in so far as 
																																																								
it. The Islamic doctrine of salvation may be considered a futile attempt to reconcile the 
optimism of Judaism with the pessimism of incipient Christianity. 
133 I assume, in what follows, that a happy life is worth living, whereas an unhappy life is not. 
134 As Edward Hitschmann (1956: 90) states: “Nowhere else can the strict subjectivity of a 
Weltanschauung be seen more clearly than in the optimistic or pessimistic attitude that the 
individual adopts towards the world. It becomes obvious that pessimism is not really a 




it offers a single solution to the problems thereto, i.e. the world is said to be in essence 
an expression of the unified metaphysical Will. Furthermore, in contrast to the modus 
operandi of the scientific method which strives (in vain) for absolute objectivity, 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy attempts to comprehend nature by way of the self 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 196). And, even more troubling, Schopenhauer’s magnum opus 
concludes with extremely religious jargon: for he propounds at length a soteriological 
doctrine, utilising such terms as “salvation”, “liberation”, “sin”, etc.; in this, I maintain, 
we discern most conspicuously Schopenhauer’s religiosity, in spite of his atheism. 
Significantly, these considerations intimate that Schopenhauer’s philosophy cannot be 
considered scientific in the strict sense of the word. Indeed, as Edward Hitschmann 
(1956: 55) states in his psychoanalytic study of the philosopher: “[Schopenhauer’s 
life’s work] was to be a philosophy not scientifically constructed but created through 
an intuitive view of the world, a work of art rather than a work of science”. I take these 
considerations as evidence that one ought not construe Schopenhauer’s philosophy as 
a scientific description of the universe, for – although Schopenhauer (1974b: 3) hoped 
that his metaphysics would complete and compliment the scientific method – his system 
is extremely subjectivistic, which stands in striking contrast to the scientific pursuit for 
absolute objectivity.  
Perhaps if Schopenhauer had been more scientifically, i.e. objectively, minded he 
would have arrived at a similar theory to that of Darwin’s notion of evolution by means 
of natural selection. However, I conjecture, that his religiosity was such that it coerced 
him to take a subjectivistic view of the world and existence, in contradistinction to an 
objective consideration of the way in which suffering propels creatures to adapt in their 
struggle for mere existence. This is an extremely significant point, for in a later section 
I attempt to argue that from the subjectivistic perspective it is extremely difficult – if 
not utterly impossible – to construe existence in optimistic terms, for the course of life 
necessarily entails the sufferings of sickness, old age and death. For the sake of 
persuasion, however, I shall anticipate in more concise form the argument to be 
encountered later.  
The scientific method is, by its very nature, objectivistic: hence, the scientist ought not 
compassionately engage with the sufferings of the living creatures he wishes to study 
and observe. For instance, unless he were utterly diabolical, i.e. unless he delighted in 




was a scientist in the true sense of the word, for he conducted experiments on helpless 
infant rhesus monkeys in spite of the great psychological trauma caused thereby to 
those creatures. From a scientific perspective I concur with Russell (1946: 787) in 
maintaining the matter as to whether existence is conducive to our happiness or 
unhappiness to be utterly impertinent, for in essence the scientific method seeks to 
augment knowledge and decrease ignorance – its purpose is not – although I admit that 
it is often used in this way by humanity – to increase happiness and mitigate suffering. 
The genuine scientist is, like nature, an amoral individual seeking solely to understand 
and augment his knowledge; he strives for this goal by fair means or foul: the end, for 
him, justifies the means whereby that goal is attained. Primarily for this reason the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge often entails the terrible suffering of creatures used 
for experimental purposes, whereby the scientist satiates his desire for knowledge. It is 
not that these individuals in pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s own sake are cruel, 
they merely assume an entirely objectivistic stance and consequently do not consider 
the subjective agony of their experimental subjects. However, from the subjective point 
of view, i.e. from the perspective of a living creature, the matter of suffering and the 
question as to whether or not our existence is worth the effort with which we necessarily 
keep it in motion is not an impertinent one. When the experimental scientist cages a 
helpless animal and performs a procedure whereby the animal is made to suffer he does 
not imagine what it must be like to be that creature: he merely pursues his intellectual 
goals without any regard to the subjectivistic stance, i.e. the personal sufferings, of the 
creature undergoing the heinous experiments. If, however, the scientist were to descend 
to the view of the suffering creature, if he were to imagine what it must be like to be 
the frightened animal, he would at once be overcome by compassionate sentiments and 
immediately cease his experiments; unless, of course, he were of a diabolical heart and 
impervious to, and, moreover, took delight in, the sufferings of others.135 Here one 
should note the close association between the pessimistic outlook and compassionate 
sentiments: in contrast to the optimistic perspective which regards every occurrence in 
a positive light and thus sees the good in all – even the diabolical – the acknowledgment 
of the sufferings of others necessarily invokes sentiments of empathy and a desire to 
alleviate the pain of the other in psychologically well-balanced, i.e. morally astute, 
																																																								
135 This delight in the sufferings and misfortunes of others is known in German as 




human beings. Thus it is that pessimism may be said to be not merely the most 
reasonable, but also a really virtuous, way of thinking, for in contrast to optimism it 
does not make “a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of mankind” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 326) and, we may add, sentient life in general. Hence a more 
veracious and just characterisation of Schopenhauer would be to describe him as “the 
philosopher of pessimism and compassion”,136 for the former necessarily implies the 
latter, as I believe I have sufficiently illustrated in the course of my discussion. 
In concluding this discussion I wish to confess that the argument, in which I have 
dichotomised between subjective and objective perspectives, is not in fact novel, but 
has its provenance in the third book of the second volume of Die Welt. Therein, 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 374) states in connection with aesthetic enjoyment that: 
“[e]verything is beautiful only so long as it does not concern us […] Life is never 
beautiful, but only the pictures of it, namely in the transfiguring mirror of art or poetry, 
particularly in youth, when we do not yet know it”. To live, i.e. subjectively, necessarily 
entails a thwarting of the Will, which, as shall become conspicuous in due course, 
entails suffering. Thus it is that from the subjective perspective “life is never beautiful”, 
for it excludes disinterested perception, i.e. will-lessness and hence pessimism reigns 
therein; whereas to assume volitional disinterestedness in an object precludes the 
possibility of suffering by eliminating the Will; it is primarily for this reason that 
pleasures (and frustrations) of the mind cannot be said to implicate the Will, for they 
are of an altogether different source. In my attempt to persuade incredulous readers of 
the veracity of pessimism I shall return to this matter. Let us now consider the way in 
which the metaphysical Will generates suffering within the phenomenal world. 
 
5.3. The Will as the Ultimate Source of Discord and Suffering 
	
Let us therefore turn to the third objection levelled against Magee’s assertion, viz., that 
the manifestation of the metaphysical Will in the world of appearance explicates the 
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ubiquity of suffering. As Hitschmann (1956: 89) notes: “[e]ven more important [for 
Schopenhauer’s pessimistic stance] than [the] metaphysical principle is the empirical 
impression of the contemplation of the world and of humanity […]”. In other words, 
the empirical manifestation of the Will, i.e. within the world of appearance, presents a 
harrowing spectacle of suffering which, I shall subsequently argue, is utterly 
incompatible with optimism. It is in this response to Magee that the pith of 
Schopenhauer’s pessimistic view is to be found; I therefore consider this section to be 
of the utmost significance. 
Previously we identified three primary inner characteristics of the Will, viz., that the 
Will in-itself is unified, eternal and unchanging. Now, however, we must consider the 
outer characteristics of the Will. By outer I portend merely the characteristics the Will 
exhibits within the world of appearance – the world in which the principle of sufficient 
reason reigns. In order to determine the outer characteristics of the Will we must turn 
to a consideration of the phenomenal objects in which the Will manifests itself. But 
here we must also be mindful of the fact that among objects in the world of appearances 
the Will manifests itself in varying degrees: for instance, the Will manifests itself more 
perfectly in a human than in an inanimate object, such as a stone. Now given that the 
Will manifests itself most perfectly in that of sentient creatures it will be most 
illuminating and beneficial to our purpose of determining the outer characteristics of 
the Will to turn to a consideration of animal life (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 354), and in 
particular that of the human.  
I imagine that most will have justifiably construed our characterisation of the inner 
characteristics of the Will as one of great repose; but the outer characteristics of that 
same entity produce a diametrically different picture. The reason for this is to be found 
in the fact of individuation – which Schopenhauer (1969a: 112) refers to as the 
principium individuationis.137 The individuating of the Will, i.e. its manifestation in 
time and space into multifarious forms, produces a harrowing spectacle in so far as it 
places the Will at variance with itself: 
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“Thus everywhere in nature we see contest, struggle, and the fluctuation of 
victory […] Every grade of the Will’s objectification fights for the matter, the 
space, and the time of another. Persistent matter must constantly change the 
form, since, under the guidance of causality, mechanical, physical, chemical, 
and organic phenomena, eagerly striving to appear, snatch the matter from one 
another, for each wishes to reveal its own Idea. This contest can be followed 
through the whole of nature; indeed only through it does nature exist: [for, as 
Empedocles says, ‘if strife did not rule things, then all would be a unity’]. Yet 
this strife itself is only the revelation of that variance with itself that is essential 
to the [Will]. This universal conflict is to be seen most clearly in the animal 
kingdom. Animals have the vegetable kingdom for their nourishment, and 
within the animal kingdom again every animal is the prey and food of some 
other. This means that the matter in which an animal’s Idea manifests itself 
must stand aside for the manifestation of another Idea, since every animal can 
maintain its own existence only by the incessant elimination of another’s. Thus 
the [Wille-zum-Leben] generally feasts on itself, and is in different forms its 
own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all the others, 
regards nature as manufactured for its own use.” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 146-
147). 
In the second volume of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969b: 354) offers a striking 
empirical corroboration of his theoretical formulation in the form of the following 
anecdote, which he expresses with unforgettable vividness: 
“Junghuhn138 relates that in Java he saw an immense field entirely covered with 
skeletons, and took it to be a battlefield. However, they were nothing but 
skeletons of large turtles five feet long, three feet broad, and of equal height. 
These turtles come this way from the sea, in order to lay their eggs, and are 
then seized by wild dogs (Canis rutilians); with their united strength, these 
dogs lay them on their backs, tear open their lower armour, the small scales of 
the belly, and devour them alive. But then a tiger often pounces on the dogs. 
Now all this misery is repeated thousands and thousands of times, year in year 
out. For this, then, are these turtles born.”  
But the explication of this grim picture – this bellum omnium contra omnes – is to be 
found in the nature of the Will itself as objectified object; for as individuated volitional 
																																																								




beings all are condemned to suffer the agony of existence, as each must necessarily find 
himself at variance with all others, “[…] everything a hunter and everything hunted 
[…]” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 354). But one need not venture into the brutal state of 
nature in order to discover the essential outer characteristics of this Will; for, by way 
of introspection, all of us experience the nature of the Will on a daily basis in our 
craving for nourishment and our lust for sexual gratification.  It is by way of these two 
seemingly mundane desires that one may arrive at an apprehension of Schopenhauer’s 
concept of suffering, which may be succinctly expressed in the following proposition: 
all suffering arises “from lack, from deficiency” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 196), “from 
dissatisfaction with one’s own state or condition” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 309). In short, 
suffering is experienced when one is cognizant139 of the fact that what is, is not in 
accordance with what one desires. In other words, suffering, on Schopenhauer’s 
account, is a product of an awareness of unfulfilled desire: one suffers when one is 
consciously aware of an unsatisfied wish, such as the pangs of hunger or the urge for 
sexual gratification.140  
It will be beneficial to the discussion, however, to mention that the appearance of a 
desire is not necessarily sufficient to produce a state of suffering (Janaway, 2008: 329). 
Consequently, we must here distinguish between the notions of desire and striving. For 
although I have defined suffering as a state of unfulfilled volition I am compelled to 
acknowledge the fact that the mere existence of a desire does not in-itself presuppose 
the state of suffering. I may desire the acquisition of a particular object or state of being 
without experiencing discomfort or unpleasantness as a consequence thereof; however, 
once I actively undertake to acquire that which I desire the possibility of thwarted 
attainment of the end to which I strive is the appearance of suffering. For, strictly 
speaking, it is only frustrated striving (for which one must obviously be conscious as a 
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Schopenhauer (1974b: 297) to be an essential component in the production of suffering. 
140 In my estimation Schopenhauer’s doctrine is even able to account for suffering produced by 
way of anxiety: one fears the potential loss of some object (such as one’s life or a loved one) 
and this possibility of loss – entertained in the mind as an actual loss – induces the sentiment of 
anxious suffering. The suffering of fear is slightly different, in so far as one is confronted with 
an actual dangerous object which threatens to immanently induce a loss, and consequently 




prerequisite) which produces a sentiment of pain and consequently suffering. For 
instance, an adolescent may contentedly fantasize about the possibility of having a 
passionate romantic relationship, but this amorous reverie is not experienced as 
unpleasant until the youth actually strives with frustration towards the intended goal. 
Thus it is that “[i]n early youth we sit before the impending course of our life like 
children at the theatre before the curtain is raised, who sit there in happy and excited 
expectation of the things that are to come” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 298), foolishly 
believing that the world lies before us as a stage with endless possibilities, wherein we 
imagine that we may accomplish every desire – no matter how difficult or outlandish it 
may in fact be. It is solely when we enter in upon this stage and assume the role of 
participants thereon that we experience the inevitable suffering of thwarted striving; it 
is then that the truth of the Schopenhauerian philosophy assumes its ascendency in 
consciousness. Thus, it ought to be borne in mind that throughout my discussion the 
term desire refers to an active striving towards the satiation of some or other volition.  
But let us return to the matter of apprehending the truth of the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy by way of two universal experiences, viz., that of hunger and lust. Prima 
facie, it may appear as though these two aforementioned fundamental desires can be 
swiftly annulled by way of an instant gratification – for instance, one could eat an 
unpalatable item or masturbate – but the human mind complicates the matter by 
desiring the ideal: a man wants neither a dry, stale piece of bread to smother his pangs 
of hunger, nor does he want his hand or his old haggard wife to satisfy his sexual 
cravings. On the contrary, he may wish to take a slender young woman with voluptuous 
breasts out for a meal of freshly cooked prawns, caviar and champagne; hoping that 
after which they may retire to her boudoir whereupon the man in question may satisfy 
his potent sexual urges. In this way, the satiation of desire is complicated, for it cannot 
constantly – if ever – be satisfied by mundane or trite means; and the inevitable 
consequence is suffering. 
But let us imagine, per impossible, that one’s every desire could easily be satiated upon 
its emergence. Given the above observations we would be vindicated in assuming that 
such an individual would live the most carefree, contented existence. But Schopenhauer 




“If […] it lacks objects of willing, because it is at once deprived of them again 
by too easy satisfaction, a fearful emptiness and boredom come over it; in other 
words, its being and its existence itself become an intolerable burden for it. 
Hence life swings like a pendulum to and fro between pain and boredom, and 
these two are in fact its ultimate constituents. This has been expressed very 
quaintly by saying that, after man had placed all pains and torments in hell, 
there was nothing left for heaven but boredom.”  
Given that the satiation of desires may lead to a condition of boredom it may appear as 
though boredom is a state of avolition. However, were this the case then the state of 
boredom would not be experienced as one of immense unpleasantness, but as one of 
extreme equanimity and contentment. Indeed, the state of boredom on this 
understanding, as Julian Young (2005: 212) notes, would be akin to that of the aesthetic 
state, i.e. a state in which the Will is temporarily suspended and one is momentarily 
released from its pressing demands. As a consequence, the condition of boredom cannot 
be construed as a state of avolition, but must be thought of as one of intense willing, in 
accordance with Schopenhauer’s theory. In other words, there must be an element of 
volition inherent to the state of boredom – it is not a state of will-lessness.141 However, 
boredom, unlike ordinary volitional states, is not a desire directed at a particular object; 
but is rather a general or undirected desire – it is, in short, a desire to possess volitions. 
As this may seem extremely confusing it will be helpful to follow Young (2005: 211) 
and distinguish between first-order and second-order volitions. The former are volitions 
“directed to objects other than the Will itself” (ibid.), whereas the latter refers to a desire 
for volitions, “a will to will” (ibid.). Boredom is thus a second-order volition in so far 
as it is, as I stated, a desire to possess volitions directed at particular objects. Thus, 
“[boredom] is suffering for exactly the same reason that willing is suffering, namely, it 
is a state in which there is a deep dissatisfaction of the Will” (Young, 2005:  212), i.e. 
an unsatisfied desire which strives in vain to acquire an object to which it can direct 
itself.  
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Now due to the fact that boredom is a particular form of desire, viz., one undirected, it 
in fact produces a far more agonizing condition. The bored individual is one whose 
Will has no particular object to which it can strive, whereas an ordinary (first-order) 
volition has means by which it may be able to satiate its desire: for instance, the lustful 
man can direct his actions towards the acquisition of his desired object (an attractive 
female) by going to a bar or a brothel; but the bored individual has no such means to 
quieten his Will, for he wills without a particular object to which the Will is directed. 
Thus, although both first-order and second-order volitional states produce a condition 
of suffering the latter is the more acutely experienced and is consequently the more 
agonizing in so far as the bored individual cannot direct his tempestuous Will towards 
a goal by which he may annul it.  
The pauper – who lives in a perpetual state of unfulfilled desire – looks upon the rich 
man with vitriolic envy, unaware that the latter is, in terms of suffering, none the better, 
but, by Schopenhauer’s account, in a far worse condition. The reason for this has been 
explicated by the abovementioned observations, viz., if we consider the rich man to be 
in such a position as to be instantaneously capable of satisfying his every desire the 
moment such a one appears, we must imagine him to be in a perpetual state of extreme 
boredom. Now because the pauper is ignorant of the fact that boredom is a far more 
tormenting form of suffering, he thus foolishly wishes for his every need to be satiated 
in order for him to be in a state of fulfilment as he erroneously perceives the rich man 
to be in.  But upon the abovementioned description of the nature of boredom, the poor, 
unsatisfied individual is in fact in a more favourable condition than the rich bored man: 
for so long as the former is not hindered from attaining his aims for too long, but is able 
to direct his desires towards the attainment thereof in a reasonable period, he is capable 
of keeping himself engaged, thereby curtailing the negative effects of both desire and 
boredom; whereas the latter suffers from an undirected Will, which, in extreme cases 
may even lead to suicide. 
But, in spite of Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 573 and 634) comments to the contrary,142 it 
would be inaccurate to conclude from our aforementioned discussion that a 
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contentment is absolutely unattainable, for the logical assumption of our musings is that 
satiation of a desire does indeed induce a contentment of sorts, however fleeting it may 
be. Thus, even with Schopenhauer’s pessimistic conception we can formulate a theory 
as to the attainment of happiness: if an individual were to balance his desires in such a 
way as to render them difficult of achievement so as to ward off boredom, but not too 
difficult as to render desire perpetually unsatisfied, we may justifiably assume that one 
can live a relatively contented life. But, it is necessary to note that according to 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 575; 1974b: 291) contentment cannot be positively experienced 
and hence it is often not apprehended as such until it has yielded to unpleasantness. Let 
us, therefore, now turn to a consideration thereof. 
 
5.4. The Negativity of Happiness Thesis 
	
According to Schopenhauer (1974b: 291-292), a primary reason for our inability to be 
conscious of contentment lies in the fact that satisfaction is negative, whereas suffering 
is the positive element. In my estimation these terms are misleading and 
Schopenhauer’s meaning regarding these concepts can be best comprehended if we 
utilise the terms “absence” and “presence” in lieu of “negative” and “positive”, 
respectively. Generally, people tend to associate the terms “positive” with goodness 
and “negative” with badness; and this may be justly described as a moral 
comprehension of the terms. Schopenhauer, however, does not intend this classification 
in a moral sense, but rather in, what I call, a mathematical sense. The latter expression 
may appear odd, but I have found it to be the most fruitful in rendering Schopenhauer’s 
meaning perspicuous, for by the phrase I portend that the term “positive” should be 
thought of in connection with the addition symbol (+) in mathematics, while the term 
“negative” should be associated with the subtraction symbol (-). To say, then, that 
suffering is “positive” portends that something is added to or present, whereas to say 
that happiness is “negative” simply means that something is subtracted from, removed 
or absent. Thus, Schopenhauer (1974b: 291) paradoxically characterises suffering as 
positive in so far as it makes its existence felt: it is the presence of a desire; whereas, 
in contrast, he describes contentment as negative in so far as it is the removal or absence 




“We feel pain, but not painlessness; care but not freedom from care; fear, but 
not safety and security. We feel the desire as we feel hunger and thirst; but as 
soon as it has been satisfied, it is like the mouthful of food which has been 
taken, and which ceases to exist for our feelings the moment it is swallowed. 
We painfully feel the loss of pleasures and enjoyments, as soon as they fail to 
appear; but when pains cease even after being present for a long time, their 
absence is not directly felt, but at most they are thought of intentionally by 
means of reflection. For only pain and want can be felt positively; and therefore 
they proclaim themselves; well-being, on the contrary is merely negative.” 
In other words, it is only loss – contemplated retrospectively – which teaches us about 
the true value of things; for owing to the nature of happiness as characterised by 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 291) one never becomes fully conscious of happiness, until it 
has been supplanted by the positively felt appearance of suffering. As such, “[…] we 
do not become conscious of the three greatest blessings of life […], namely health, 
youth and freedom, as long as we possess them, but only after we have lost them; for 
they too are negations. We notice that certain days of our life were happy only after 
they have made room for unhappy ones.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 575). The terminally 
ill man laments the loss of his previous health, the incarcerated prisoner agonizes over 
the loss of the freedom he once took for granted, and the old woman pines for her 
youthful vigour and appearance – but the healthy, free and young remain ignorant of 
their fortune so long as they possess them.143 I may add that it is only when we have 
lost someone we love that we realize how valuable they were to us; whereas we are 
often apt to take for granted the most valuable people in our lives while we still have 
them. This ultimately leads to the bleak conclusion that the apprehension of happiness 
is generally a retrospective (and, occasionally, a prospective) activity which occurs in 
periods of intense personal aguish: 
“[…] happiness lies always in the future, or else in the past, and the present 
may be compared to a small dark cloud driven by the wind over the sunny 
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plain; in front of and behind the cloud everything is bright, only it itself always 
casts a shadow.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 573). 
Although this “negativity of happiness” thesis is, in my estimation, an accurate 
description of most states of contentment, Schopenhauer (cited in Young, 2005: 215) 
acknowledges that there are some exceptions. In particular, Schopenhauer (ibid.) 
exempts the pleasures of scent and those of the intellect. Indeed, the delight to be 
experienced by a pleasant odour does not presuppose an antecedent unpleasant one; and 
neither do intellectual pleasures presuppose the antecedent presence of unpleasant 
thoughts in order to be fully enjoyed. Thus, we must allow that there are some positive 
forms of happiness. As Julian Young (2005: 215) states: 
“It seems […] that whereas the negativity of happiness thesis suggests that we 
experience just three states – the pain of willing, the pain of boredom and a 
neutral state which as such cannot compensate for the others – Schopenhauer 
actually acknowledges four: the previous three plus a [fourth] state composed, 
relatively insignificantly, of those “satisfactions” (as we may call them) which 
do establish a little positive credit, but mainly of the pleasures which do not 
presuppose any preceding state of willing.” 
Now it ought to be evident that the negativity of happiness thesis offers the most 
compelling argument for Schopenhauer’s notorious pessimism regarding existence; for 
the thesis declares that on the whole life vacillates like a pendulum between pain and 
boredom, interspersed with brief, fleeting, moments of a painless state we erroneously 
describe as “happiness”. In this sense we may “compare life to a circular path of red-
hot coals having a few cool places” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 380).  Now although one 
might concur with Schopenhauer on the positive nature of suffering, viz., “[…] that [it] 
makes itself felt” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 291-292), those inclined towards a more 
optimistic view might venture to argue that the pleasant moments, even if exceptional, 
compensate for the inevitable suffering of life, thereby rendering existence worthwhile. 
Thus, in the second volume of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969b: 576) attempts to 
confront and address this criticism by observing that:  
“[…] it is quite superfluous to dispute whether there is more good or evil in the 
world; for the mere existence of evil decides the matter, since evil can never 
be wiped off, and consequently can never be balanced, by the good that exists 




Mille piacer’ non vagliono un tormento144 
For that thousands had lived in happiness and joy would never do away with 
the anguish and death-agony of one individual; and just as little does my 
present well-being undo my previous sufferings. Therefore, were the evil in 
the world even a hundred times less than it is, its mere existence would still be 
sufficient to establish a truth that may be expressed in various ways, although 
always only somewhat indirectly, namely that we have not to be pleased but 
rather sorry about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would be 
preferable to its existence; that it is something which at bottom ought not to 
be, and so on.” 
Thus, in response to an optimistic characterisation of existence which attempts to argue 
that our joys and pleasures compensate for or counterbalance our sufferings, 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 576) declares that a single pain is sufficient to slander the world 
and one’s existence in toto. Such a view may truly be said to be the pinnacle of 
pessimism.  
But although this aforementioned argument may appear compelling to the frustrated 
and dejected I cannot desist from mentioning a possible criticism thereof. If it is true 
that no amount of happiness or goodness can eradicate a single torment – Mille piacer’ 
non vagliono un tormento – is it not equally as veracious to say that no amount of 
sorrow and evil can remove a single, fleeting moment of joy? For instance, the terrible 
torments of heartbreak can never abolish the happiness that once attended the 
interaction with the love-object. Thus, if one were psychologically robust they could, 
contrary to Schopenhauer’s position, affirm the moment of happiness by accepting the 
sorrow which is inextricably bound to it. For, from an alternative perspective, we may 
be permitted to say: all the sorrow in the world cannot render one moment of happiness 
superfluous. We find this contrary position most fully and beautifully expressed by 
Nietzsche (2003: 332), Schopenhauer’s self-professed antipode (Nietzsche, 1967b: 
155), in his seminal work Also Sprach Zarathustra: 
“Did you ever say Yes to one joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to all woe 
as well. All things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love; if 
ever you wanted one moment twice, if ever you said: ‘You please me, 
																																																								




happiness, instant, moment!’ then you wanted everything to return! You 
wanted everything anew, everything eternal, everything chained, entwined 
together, everything in love, O that is how you loved the world, you everlasting 
men, loved it eternally and for all time: and you say even to woe: ‘Go, but 
return!’ For all joy wants – eternity! 
[…] For all joy wants itself, therefore it also wants heart’s agony! O happiness! 
O pain! O break, heart! You Higher Men, learn this, learn that joy wants 
eternity, joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, deep, deep eternity!” 
I admit that in moments of intense psychical and physical pain it is extremely difficult 
to adopt this affirmative view and far easier to appeal to Schopenhauer’s defeatist 
stance; however, we must acknowledge that it is not impossible for one to embrace this 
joyous view, which accepts the inextricability of happiness and suffering. The 
acceptance of the notion that opposites illuminate each other necessarily entails the 
realisation that happiness can only be comprehended by way of its contrary, viz., 
suffering – just as the apex of a mountain assumes its stature in proportion to the depth 
of its valley. From this perspective happiness necessarily assumes and entails suffering. 
In the last analysis then, it seems that Schopenhauer’s argument is ultimately a matter 
of temperament for it does not take this contrary possibility into consideration.  
However, in criticizing Schopenhauer’s assertion by stating that one may equally avow 
one’s life by way of an affirmation of a single instance of happiness in an otherwise 
tormented existence, I do not portend to give the erroneous impression that the 
“negativity of happiness” thesis is erroneous and that life is essentially conducive to 
human happiness. On the contrary, I maintain that from a subjective standpoint – which 
I previously mentioned and will momentarily elaborate upon – “life is never beautiful” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 374), but rather akin to a harrowing nightmare.  Therefore, in 
an attempt to persuade my readers of the veracity of the pessimistic view, I will now 
turn to two external corroborations of the pessimistic standpoint. 
 
5.5. External Corroborations of the Pessimistic View of Life 
	
In spite of the cogent reasons presented in defence of the pessimistic view, I anticipate 




production of a profoundly troubled and tormented mind. Consequently, in an attempt 
to champion the pessimistic view of life, I wish to draw attention to two other 
Weltanschauungen which concur with Schopenhauer on the point of pessimism; in this 




The first external corroboration is to be found in the religious doctrines of Buddhism. 
It is generally well-known that the religion of the Buddha is essentially pessimistic 
about life; as, of course, can be evinced in the first Noble Truth (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
623); which I shall discuss in due course. Now, I anticipate that some might argue that 
the concurrence is in fact superficial in so far as it may be attributable to a direct 
influence, i.e. some might venture to argue that Schopenhauer’s philosophy was 
directly influenced by the pessimistic Buddhist teaching.145 However, it must be noted, 
																																																								
145 I anticipate, and likewise reject, any intimation that Schopenhauer’s pessimism emanated 
from Hindu scriptures, in particular, from the Upanishads. It is fairly well-known that 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 175-176) venerated these ancient Indian texts, which he (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 397) praisingly refers to as “the consolation” of his life and death. Indeed, as Moira 
Nicholls (2008: 176) notes, Schopenhauer was introduced to “Hindu thought around 1813-
1814”, by way of his acquaintance with Friedrich Majer, an orientalist scholar (Cartwright, 
2010: 266-269). This early acquaintance explicates the fact that we find many more references 
to Hinduism than to Buddhism in Schopenhauer’s manuscripts and published writings 
(Nicholls, 2008: 176-177) – in particular, the first edition of Die Welt (1818/1819), wherein 
Schopenhauer first fully presents his pessimistic philosophy. It may therefore appear probable, 
and consequently argued in opposition to my view, that Schopenhauer’s pessimism ultimately 
derived from Hindu sources (indeed, this would easily explicate the pessimism to be found in 
both the Schopenhauerian system and Buddhism). But although it is true that the notion of 
Samsara intimates that life is a punishment for past misdemeanours, one does not in fact get 
the impression of a pessimistic Weltanschauung from reading the Upanishads; on the contrary, 
to know that Brahman is identical with the entire universe – “[a]ll this universe is in truth 
Brahman” (Chandogya Upanishad, 1978: 114) –  is in fact to acquire a certain bliss and 
equanimity in the face of life’s adversities; thus is Brahman equated with joy: “[…] for from 




as Moira Nicholls (2008: 176) does in her article The Influences of Eastern Thought on 
Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Thing-in-Itself, that Schopenhauer’s early manuscripts 
contain very few references to Buddhism; Nicholls (2008: 176) states that she was only 
able to count two. Therefore, it seems improbable that Schopenhauer’s doctrine was 
directly influenced by the Buddhist teaching; rather it appears, as Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 169) himself professes,146 that he arrived at his pessimistic view of life 
independently thereof.  
In corroboration of my claim, I may be permitted to note here that the first volume 
(1818/1819) of Die Welt, like the early manuscripts, contains few references to 
Buddhism, approximately eight (Nicholls, 2008: 177) in total, “five of which are added 
in later editions (1844 and 1859) of that volume” (ibid.); whereas in the second volume, 
first published in 1844, “there are at least thirty references to Buddhism” (Nicholls, 
2008: 177). Indeed, it is only in the second volume of Die Welt (1844/1859) that the 
Four Noble Truths of Buddhism are explicitly mentioned by Schopenhauer (1969b: 
623). Thus, it cannot be cogently argued that Schopenhauer’s pessimism is derived 
																																																								
Upanishad, 1978: 111). One cannot imagine Schopenhauer stating such of the Will. The 
essence of the universe in Hindu thought cannot be considered as something fundamentally 
evil, as is the case with the Will in the Schopenhauerian philosophy. Indeed, I note here that in 
so far as Schopenhauer identifies an identical essence in all that exists, an essential teaching of 
the Upanishads can be discerned in his doctrine; however, Schopenhauer’s notion of the 
metaphysical Will and the pessimistic attitude attached thereto, is, by his (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: xvi) own admission, “by no means to be found in the Upanishads.” It therefore seems 
quite evident to me that Schopenhauer’s pessimism could not have been acquired by way of the 
Hindu teaching and texts, in spite of the fact that Schopenhauer identifies the religion as 
essentially pessimistic in spirit (Cartwright, 2005: 125). As a corroboratory observation I note 
that some scholars have criticised Schopenhauer for “stigmatizing Hinduism by claiming that 
it [is] pessimistic” (Cartwright,2005: 78). I can only reiterate that I did not at all get the 
impression that Hinduism is conducive to pessimism when I read a selection of the Upanishads 
(translated by Juan Muscaró, 1978); I therefore encourage all Schopenhauerian scholars to 
engage directly with these classical Indian texts in order to arrive at an independent opinion 
regarding this matter. 
146 “And this agreement [i.e. between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Buddhism] must be yet 
the more pleasing to me, inasmuch as in my philosophizing I have certainly not been under its 




from or that it was influenced by Buddhism. Therefore, we may consider the 
concurrence on this particular point between the two Weltanschauungen to be 
indicative of the ultimate truth of the pessimistic doctrine; indeed, this is the way in 
which Schopenhauer appears to have considered it: 
“If I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I 
should have to concede to Buddhism pre-eminence over the others. In any case, 
it must be a pleasure to me to see my doctrine in such close agreement with a 
religion that the majority of men on Earth hold as their own, for this numbers 
far more followers than any other.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 169). 
Now, although the number of people who profess belief in a system or notion certainly 
does not attest to the truth thereof, it is extremely interesting to note that the Buddhist 
view concurs with the Schopenhauerian in declaring life to be full of suffering. In 
particular I observe that the first two of the four Buddhist Noble Truths accord perfectly 
with the Schopenhauerian teaching. As Moira Nicholls (2008: 188) notes the first two 
Noble Truths state: 
(1) Life is permeated by suffering and dissatisfaction. 
(2) The origin of suffering lies in craving or lust. 
The first Noble Truth accords with Schopenhauer’s view that all life is essentially filled 
with suffering, while the second corresponds to Schopenhauer’s thesis that this 
suffering ultimately arises from the individuated Will, i.e., a state of unfulfilled volition. 
If Schopenhauer (1969b: 169) is indeed to be believed that his pessimistic view was not 
directly influenced by Buddhism, then it ought to strike us as an extremely curious 
coincidence that two systems, separated by so vast an expanse in both time and space, 
should accord so harmoniously in this particular regard. In my estimation, the 
concurrence between the two systems may be considered as tentative evidence of the 
veracity for the pessimistic view of life. 
 
5.5.2. Evolution by Means of Natural Selection 
	
Yet I anticipate that, in spite of the Buddhist concurrence, some irreligious individuals 




that both the Buddha and Schopenhauer were “religiously” motivated in declaring life 
to be a state of perpetual suffering, in so far as both may have been unwittingly 
influenced by the desire to present soteriological doctrines147 – hence I turn to a 
consideration of the second Weltanschauung which accords with Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism, viz., that of the Darwinian view of evolution by means of natural 
selection.148 Now although Schopenhauer rejects Darwin’s mechanism by means of 
which the mutation of species is now universally thought to occur,149 dismissing the 
theory as “shallow empiricism” (Cartwright, 2010: 466n1), he nonetheless accepts the 
notion that species can evolve (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 152).150 This mutual 
evolutionary view of organisms is one such similarity between the two colossal 
thinkers; but in the subsequent discussion I shall attempt to illustrate that, although his 
theory is not usually associated with pessimism, Darwin’s (2009b: 585-599) 
characterisation of life as a struggle for existence necessarily presupposes a pessimistic 
construal thereof.151  
However, before I turn to a discussion of the way in which I take Darwin’s theory to 
corroborate Schopenhauer’s pessimistic stance, I wish first to illustrate the fact that 
																																																								
147 This assertion is made in connection with Hick’s (1990: 3) observation that most religious 
systems possess doctrines of salvation or liberation. 
148 I note here that I am not the first to discern a similarity between the theories of Schopenhauer 
and Darwin. In 1870 David Asher, a friend and acolyte of Schopenhauer’s, wrote an article 
entitled Schopenhauer and Darwinism which was subsequently published in the Journal of 
Anthropology of 1871 (cf. pages 312-332). Therein Asher attempts to illustrate some of the 
most striking similarities between the two theories. I shall shortly discuss Asher’s notions in 
detail. 
149 This is primarily due to the fact that natural selection does not require the postulation of a 
striving, i.e. a Will. If Darwin had defined “natural selection” as nature’s desire to produce such 
and such organisms, Schopenhauer would undoubtedly have commended and endorsed the 
theory; cf. the latter section on Schopenhauer and evolution for a more detailed discussion of 
this issue. 
150 Schopenhauer’s evolutionism is known as generatio in utero heterogeneo (i.e. “generation 
in the womb of another”). 





others have, from the beginning, discerned numerous concurrences between the 
Schopenhauerian and Darwinian theories. As a place of departure, therefore, let us 
commence our discussion with a similarity made at a time when the implications of 
Darwin’s theory were still unfolding, viz., in the year 1871. In his article Schopenhauer 
and Darwinism David Asher (1871: 329) argues that “[w]hat Schopenhauer called ‘the 
metaphysics of sexual love’, he might, had he been acquainted with Darwin’s theory,152 
have designated [as ‘evolution by means of natural selection’]”. Now in order to 
comprehend Asher’s pronouncement one must first familiarize oneself with 
Schopenhauer’s theory of eugenics, which I previously discussed in connection with 
male homosexuality. I shall reiterate significant aspects of the theory for the sake of the 
present discussion. In the second volume of Die Welt (cf. chapter XLIV), Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 533) explicitly states that:  
“[…] all amorousness is rooted in the sexual impulse alone, is in fact absolutely 
only a more closely determined, specialised, and indeed, in the strictest sense, 
individualised sexual impulse, however, ethereally it may deport itself.”   
To two young lovers their passion for each other may signify a transcendent unification 
of their souls; however, Schopenhauer (1969b: 534) maintains that such erotic desire is 
merely an act of the Will attempting to compose the next generation; in short it is a 
meditatio compositionis generationis futurae, e qua iterum pendent innumerae 
generationes.153 Here, of course, we discern, once again, that the Will cannot be “blind” 
as Schopenhauer (1969a: 115) so emphatically insists. But, in spite of this complication, 
																																																								
152 It must be borne in mind that the first edition of the Origin of Species was published a year 
prior to Schopenhauer’s death in 1860. Therefore, the so-called “sage of Frankfurt” did not get 
an opportunity to read and study Darwin’s theory as presented by the great naturalist in his 
revolutionary work. However, as Cartwright (2010: 466n1) notes, “[a] few months before his 
death, [Schopenhauer] read a detailed account of [Darwin’s opus maximum]”. Nonetheless, we 
cannot assume that this “detailed account” contained perfectly accurate information regarding 
Darwin’s theory, for a secondary work necessarily, even if unwittingly, presents another 
individual’s interpretation thereof. Indeed, Schopenhauer (1974a: 31) argues that the reading 
of a secondary text, as opposed to a primary one, is akin to the desire “to have our food 
masticated by someone else”. 
153 “Meditation on the composition of the future generation on which in their turn innumerable 




the most significant point for our present purpose is the fact that the Will is said to be 
selecting favourable physiological characteristics for the coming generation. Here, of 
course, Schopenhauer (1969b: 539, 545) has in mind the prototypical Platonic Idea as 
the model for perfection, to which all love intrigues, and thus the production of progeny, 
tend.154 The appearance of the Platonic Ideas within Schopenhauer’s theory is a point 
of difficulty in Asher’s argument, but for the moment I shall postpone a discussion 
thereon and focus solely on the similarity between both systems. Accordingly, 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 545) argues that due to the imperfection of every extant creature, 
each seeks and selects a mate who can potentially cancel one’s own deficiencies, thus 
“everyone loves what he himself lacks” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 545); “in fact, he will 
even find beautiful those imperfections that are the opposite of his own. Hence, for 
example, short men look for tall women, persons with fair hair like those with dark, and 
so on” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 539). It is not my intention to determine the veracity of 
this view, for my part I wish only to observe that Schopenhauer’s eugenics aims, as I 
mentioned, at the production of prototypically perfect human types (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 549). Now, although Schopenhauer does not declare this perfect anthropoid type 
to be conducive to survival, it is possible to discern, as Asher (1871: 329) has done, the 
Darwinian concept of natural selection at work in this process of sexual attraction. In 
other words, the Will consciously selects certain characteristics in order to produce 
prototypically perfect human types, just as nature unwittingly selects attributes 
conducive to survival. 
Darwin evidently read Asher’s article, from which he acquired Schopenhauer’s 
passages on sexual selection which he (Darwin, 1909: 893) approvingly quotes in the 
third and definitive edition (1877)155 of his work The Descent of Man. This is interesting 
in so far as we must acknowledge two points of variance between the two colossal 
																																																								
154 “[E]veryone will decidedly prefer and ardently desire the most beautiful individuals; in other 
words, those in whom the character of the species is most purely and strongly marked” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 539). 
155 Unfortunately I have not been able to examine a copy of the edition of 1875; which I believe 
to be a reprint of the second edition of 1874. It may be, however, that I stand to be corrected in 




thinkers; I have already mentioned both, but I shall now elaborate upon them for the 
sake of thoroughness.  
Firstly, Schopenhauer (1969b: 539, 545) is committed to the notion of Platonic Ideas, 
which the Darwinian theory is not. Indeed, one can even discern the influence of the 
Platonic Ideas in Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 152) particular form of evolutionism, i.e. 
generatio in utero heterogeneo; for according thereto creatures cannot mutate gradually 
and imperceptibly, but appear fully-formed, i.e. according to a fixed “type”, once 
hatched from an egg or born from a uterus (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153). Thus, although 
the Platonic Ideas are not incompatible with evolutionism as such, they are utterly at 
variance with the Darwinian form thereof. To fully comprehend this fact one must bear 
in mind that intermediary species are noticeably absent in Schopenhauer’s 
evolutionism: generatio in utero heterogeneo is committed to the view that one 
particular species is able to produce another distinct type, hence Schopenhauer (1974b: 
153) argues that:  
“[…] there once emerged from the egg of a fish an ophidian, at another time 
from the egg of this a saurian; but at the same time there came from the egg of 
another fish a batrachian; however, from this there came a chelonian; from the 
egg of a third was born a cetacean and eventually a dolphin.” 
Thus, one may notice that according to Schopenhauer’s evolutionism one creature does 
not gradually and imperceptibly mutate into another, as is the case in the Darwinian 
theory (Darwin, 2009b: 689);156 rather a particular species appears fully-formed from 
another, distinct, species. We must note that according to the theory of generatio in 
utero heterogeneo nature makes great leaps from one creature to another.157 Now, I 
conjecture that one of the reasons – perhaps the primary reason – that this particular 
																																																								
156 “On the theory of natural selection, we can clearly understand why [Nature] should not [have 
taken a leap from structure to structure]; for natural selection can act only by taking advantage 
of slight successive variations; she can never take a leap, but must advance by the shortest and 
slowest steps”. (Darwin, 2009b: 689) 
157 Curiously, Schopenhauer (1969b: 296) intimates that, save for the transition from the 
inorganic to the organic, natura non facit saltus [i.e. “nature makes no leaps”]. However, we 
must acknowledge that his acceptance of the theory of generatio in utero heterogeneo violates 




evolutionism, i.e. generatio in utero heterogeneo, appeals to Schopenhauer’s 
sensibilities is due to the fact that it is perfectly compatible with the theory of Platonic 
Ideas. According to the Platonic theory every species has a corresponding prototypical 
and universal type, to which all actual creatures stand as mere imperfect ectypes; thus, 
if one species can arise from another then, it follows, that every new species must arrive 
fully-formed, corresponding to its particular universal type, i.e. its particular Platonic 
Idea. It must be borne in mind that the Platonic Ideas do “[n]ot themselves [enter] into 
time and space, the medium of the individuals, they remain fixed, subject to no change, 
always being, never having become” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 129). Therefore, these 
universal types, or species, are eternal and pre-determined; thus, an evolutionary theory 
based thereon must, of necessity, maintain that the appearance of one species from 
another cannot occur gradually and imperceptibly.  
But let us, for the sake of argument, imagine that one attempted to avow both a 
Darwinian form of evolutionism and the Platonic theory of Ideas, what would this 
amount to? If we recall that the Darwinian theory insists that the mutation of species 
occurs by way of imperceptible and slight variations (Darwin, 2009b: 689), then it 
would seem that the corresponding Platonic Ideas would appear identical for the most 
part. In other words, the slight mutations in similar organisms would not be discernible 
in a universal, i.e. general, form and one would be left with many identical Platonic 
Ideas corresponding to the numerous varieties. As a consequence thereof, one would 
violate the law of parsimony, i.e. Ockham’s principle, in so far as one would postulate 
the existence of many seemingly redundant entities. The Platonic Idea, being a general 
prototype, cannot account for slight variations, just as the universal concept of “dog” 
does not contain within itself a mechanism whereby one may be able to distinguish 
between the numerous breeds of dogs. Thus, the Platonic Ideas would necessarily 
present an extremely non-Darwinian view of evolution, in so far as solely definite, i.e. 
entirely distinguished types, would be capable of possessing corresponding Platonic 
Ideas. Expressed in more tangible terms, if one wished to avow the Platonic view one 
would have to postulate solely one hominoid/anthropoid Idea to account for the 
multifarious types thereof; thus, Australopithecus africanus, Australopithecus 
afarensis, Australopithecus garhi, Homo habilis, Homo erectus, Homo heidelbergensis 
and the manifold other intermediary hominoid types, many of which are unknown to 




Idea! The numerous variations in the hominoid type would have to be construed as 
inconsequential “flawed deviations of the ideal [type]” (Dawkins, 2010: 22), for 
although deviations may occur in the world of time and space, the Platonic Ideas are, 
as mentioned, eternally insusceptible to alteration (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 129). As a 
consequence of these considerations, it is evident that the Platonic Ideas are utterly 
incompatible with a Darwinian form of evolution. I cannot state with certainty that 
Schopenhauer was aware of this difficulty; however, I tentatively conjecture that this 
antagonism between the two doctrines would most probably have counted as another 
cogent reason for his rejection of the Darwinian theory.  
In discussing this interesting matter I do not wish to give the erroneous impression that 
Schopenhauer’s avowal of the Platonic Ideas was foolish, for it must be borne in mind 
that, although the Platonic theory strikes us as bizarre today, in a pre-evolutionary era 
the existence of multifarious creatures was a perplexing riddle; it was therefore 
understandable that intelligent individuals should attempt to explicate the existence of 
such by way of the readily-available Platonic view. Of course, Schopenhauer’s magnum 
opus, wherein he first postulates the existence of Platonic Ideas (cf. section 25 of 
volume one of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung; pages 127-130 of Payne’s 
translation), was composed prior to his acquaintance with the theory of generatio in 
utero heterogeneo, which, as he himself (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153-154) 
acknowledges, he first acquired in or after 1847 (which occurred after the publication 
of the second volume of Die Welt in 1844) by way of “the anonymous author [i.e. 
Robert Chambers] of [the 6th edition of] Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation”. 
Now if one earnestly takes into consideration the fact that Schopenhauer’s definitive 
principal work was composed and published (1844) prior to his acquaintance with 
evolutionary views (1847), then it is certainly not an exaggeration to say that 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is a pre-evolutionary one. However, in spite of his 
notorious stubbornness (cf. R. J. Hollingdale’s introduction to his translation of 
excerpts from Parerga und Paralipomena, wherein Hollingdale characterises 
Schopenhauer as possessing “an immovable mind”, pages 23-26), Schopenhauer was 
surprisingly accepting of evolutionary views, which he subsequently (supposedly in or 
after 1847) attempts to incorporate into his system. As we have seen, evolution by way 
of generatio in utero heterogeneo is perfectly compatible with the doctrine of Platonic 




without vitiating the latter. We can only conjecture that if Schopenhauer had lived long 
enough, he might have altogether abandoned the Platonic view in favour of Darwinian 
evolutionism. Schopenhauer, however, died in 1860 and he was therefore unable to 
study and experience first-hand the remarkable explanatory power of Darwin’s 
mechanism of natural selection, as I mentioned previously. Furthermore, we must 
acknowledge that, even though evolution by means of generatio in utero heterogeneo 
appears nowadays to be bizarrely erroneous, Schopenhauer had a remarkably 
prospective mind in so far as he accepts the notion that creatures can indeed transform; 
for it is reasonable to assume (given the vehemently negative reaction to Darwin’s 
theory in the nineteenth century) that most of Schopenhauer’s contemporaries were 
committed to an immutable view of organic nature.  
Secondly, and no less significant, is the fact, which I have attempted to illustrate on 
numerous occasions throughout my disquisition, viz., that the Will cannot be 
considered “blind”, in spite of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115, 1969b: 357, 497, 570, 579, 
642, et al.) repeated assertions to the contrary. I already attempted to reveal this fact by 
way of my discussion on male homosexuality; now, however, I shall succinctly 
corroborate it by way of Schopenhauer’s theory of sexual selection. I observe that if the 
manifested Will coerces an individual to select qualities in a partner which shall cancel 
both lovers’ imperfections (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 539) then it follows that the Will 
must consciously and knowingly act to affect that end. However, I anticipate a potential 
criticism of my interpretation, for it may be cogently argued that one is fully conscious 
of one’s object-choice in selecting a mate; indeed, we are all aware of what physical 
attributes we value in a potential partner; hence my assertion that such selection 
emanates from the Will may appear erroneous. But, in response, I note that although 
we may be fully conscious of what we are attracted to, it is not always evident why we 
should be attracted to those particular characteristics. For instance, a woman may be 
fully conscious of the fact that she is attracted to men with large noses, but upon asking 
her why she likes such she may be unable to offer any cogent explanation. The reason, 
according to Schopenhauer’s theory, viz., that she has a button-nose and so favours men 
with the opposite attribute in order to produce “normal-size-nosed” children, may not 
occur to her at all. Thus, it becomes evident that my criticism is valid, because although 
the phenomenal mind of the woman in question is oblivious to this fact, the Will must 




However, we must acknowledge that Schopenhauer’s theory is at variance with the 
Darwinian on this point; for the latter maintains that natural selection acts totally 
unconsciously: genetic mutations are a random and haphazard event which occur 
without any awareness and knowledge; indeed, I observe in this connection that most 
genetic mutations are inimical to a creature’s well-being. Thus, were these genetic 
anomalies a product of conscious deliberation – which according to Darwin’s theory 
we would not be able to attribute to the metaphysical realm – the pernicious ones would 
undoubtedly be prevented from occurring, for what conscious creative force would 
willingly select that a creature be born with a serious disability? On the contrary, the 
presence of congenital defects seems to indicate that nature operates unconsciously and 
amorally; hence, it would appear that the Will – given that it must be conscious – cannot 
be the mysterious force which underlies all natural phenomena. 
But here we discern a further significant dissimilarity between the two theories which 
I cannot withhold myself from mentioning; for whereas Schopenhauer’s theory of 
sexual selection ultimately aims at the prototypically perfect anthropoid type, Darwin’s 
theory of evolution by means of natural selection merely intimates that adaptive and 
beneficial qualities for existence shall be preserved and thus passed on to succeeding 
generations. According to the Darwinian view, evolutionism does not necessarily tend 
towards perfection; to be “more evolved” does not necessarily portend a more elevated 
position on Darwin’s (2009b: 628-638) “Great Tree of Life”. For instance, a positive 
attribute such as sight, may be lost if conditions require it; thus, although natural 
selection has favoured the loss of sight in the subterranean sand-dwelling mole, I highly 
doubt that anyone would consider the loss thereof to be an ascent in the evolutionary 
scale. Schopenhauer’s theory, however, is committed to the view that nature strives for 
progress and perfection. We have seen that in the human selection of a mate the Will, 
which is synonymous with nature, may be said to strive for the production of a 
prototypically perfect anthropoid type; but Schopenhauer (1974b: 143) even goes so 
far as to declare the human type to be “the last stage” of the manifestation of the Will, 




“[…] although there are no physical grounds for guaranteeing that another 
world- catastrophe will not occur,158 there is nevertheless against it a moral 
one, namely that such a catastrophe would now be to no purpose, since the 
inner essence of the world needs no higher objectification for the possibility of 
its salvation from the world.” 
Thus may the anthropoid type be said to be the most perfect and ultimate end of nature 
or the Will in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Hence it is a merit to the Darwinian theory 
of evolution that, unlike Schopenhauer’s theory of sexual selection and his theory of 
the manifestation of the Will in the phenomenal world, it does not intimate the 
interchangeability of the terms “evolution” and “progress”, i.e. Darwin’s evolutionism, 
unlike Schopenhauer’s, is not orthogenetic. 
However, let us return to the matter of concurrence between the two theories. As we 
have seen, Asher (1871: 329) attempted to indicate the convergence between 
Schopenhauer’s theory of sexual attraction and the Darwinian view of natural selection; 
however, one can discern less controversial and troublesome similarities between both 
systems. For instance, the Darwinian theory intimates that the brain, like all other bodily 
organs, is a product of the evolutionary process; thus the acquisition of a greater 
intellect must serve the purpose of self-preservation in the struggle for existence. I note 
here that this accords immaculately with Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 280) characterisation 
of the human brain; for Schopenhauer is arguably, as Magee (1997: 287) notes: 
																																																								
158 Schopenhauer (1974b: 143 & 152) maintains that the Earth has witnessed either three or 
four catastrophes in which the lower grades of the Will’s objectification were purged, thus 
permitting the appearance of the Will’s higher objectifications, the last of which is humankind. 
I must acknowledge here, that Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 152) explanation for the way in which 
a mutation occurs whereby one species produces another is extremely mystical; for he 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 152) states that “[a]fter the vital force [i.e. the Will] of this couple’s 
species had been checked in some way and had been augmented and enhanced in that couple 
to an abnormal degree, there now no longer emerged the likeness of the couple, but, by way of 
exception, a form directly akin to it, yet at a higher stage; and this occurred at a favourable 
hour, at the right position of the planets, and with a fortunate combination of all the 
atmospheric, tellurian, and astral influences. Thus the pair had on this occasion produced not a 




“[…] the first great philosopher to see the mind in biological terms, to see it 
first and foremost as a physical organ at work, a survival mechanism whose 
operations are to be understood only in terms of the functions for which it has 
been evolved; and to see in this light that man is not a rational animal, since 
mind is not a spectator but an instrument, constructed not for the detached 
observation of the world or the impersonal acquisition of knowledge but to 
light the field for action, and is therefore not sovereign but subordinate to the 
purposes of the Will.” 
Upon a Darwinian interpretation, the veracity of this view can easily be confirmed by 
way of a consideration of man’s innate physical weakness in comparison to that of 
animals of a comparable size. If man did not evolve a greater capacity for ratiocination 
he would undoubtedly have become extinct; for, I reiterate, the human-animal is, in 
comparison to animals of a similar stature, a physical weakling (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
280); hence, in the struggle for existence he and his progeny, without a greater capacity 
for intelligence, would certainly have become easy prey for other, more physically 
powerful, animals. Here I may be permitted to observe that the notion that this mental 
apparatus is not a transcendent or metaphysical entity, but rather a product of the 
physical world, intimates that, by its very nature, the mind is limited to a comprehension 
of the liveable (in our case, human) world in which we find ourselves; consequently, 
we ought not find it surprising that the deepest depths of this universe elude the grasp 
of human apprehension – for although humankind has acquired a vast quantity of 
genuine knowledge solely by way of the scientific method, there are still many 
mysteries which remain unknown; and, I conjecture, will perpetually remain so, owing 
to the finitude of the human brain: ignoramus et ignorabimus.159 But, to return to the 
principal matter, the most significant notion to be derived from this view is that the 
mind is, according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 279), an instrument in the struggle for 
survival (Young, 2005: 5), for natura nihil agit frustra et nihil facit supervacaneum;160 
therefore, the: 
“[…] extending and perfecting the brain, and thus increasing the powers of 
knowledge, is taken by nature, like all the rest, namely in consequence of the 
																																																								
159 “We do not know, and we shall not know”. 





increased needs, and hence in the service of the Will. What this Will aims at 
and attains in man is indeed essentially the same as, and not more than, what 
its goal is in the animal, nourishment […], propagation [and, we may add, 
protection from the brutality of nature].” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 279-280). 
For this last qualification is the point at which I find the greatest concurrence between 
Schopenhauer and Darwin,161 viz., in their characterisation of life as a bellum omnium 
contra omnes.162 Here, unlike in Asher’s (1871: 329-330) aforementioned concurrence, 
there are no problematical elements.163 In this particular sense, I conjecture that 
Schopenhauer is sometimes referred to as a precursor to Darwin (McGill, 1971: 21, 
286; Young, 2005: 86). For it will be recalled that according to Schopenhauer’s thesis, 
the objectified Will causes perpetual conflict between creatures, because in order to 
sustain itself as an appearance a creature must necessarily destroy the life of another 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 147); in this way one creature becomes the prey and 
nourishment of another, “[t]hus everywhere in nature we see contest, struggle, and the 
fluctuation of victory […]. Every grade of the Will’s objectification fights for the 
matter, the space, and the time of another” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 146-147). I maintain 
that this harrowing metaphysical, or philosophical, description of nature finds 
scientific, i.e. materialistic, corroboration in the Darwinian concept of the “struggle for 
existence”, and it may thus, in my estimation, be considered the metaphysical 
counterpart thereto.164  
																																																								
161 In a memorable passage Darwin (2009b: 590) states: “In looking at Nature, it is most 
necessary to keep the foregoing considerations always in mind – never to forget that every 
single organic being around us may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in numbers; 
that each lives by a struggle at some period of its life; that heavy destruction inevitably falls 
either on the young or old, during each generation or at recurrent intervals […] The face of 
Nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close 
together and driven inwards by incessant blows, sometimes one edge being struck, and then 
another with greater force”.  
162 “A war of all against all”. 
163 Such as the Platonic Ideas and the consciousness of the Will. 
164 In stating this I do not want to be misconstrued as portending that I hold Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical notion of the Will to be complementary to the various other forms of scientific 




Of course, in stating this I do not wish to give the erroneous impression of an absolute 
concurrence between both theories; on the contrary, I readily acknowledge that 
Schopenhauer rejects, among other things,165 the mechanism of natural selection due to 
the fact that it does not entail the notion of the metaphysical Will (Cartwright, 2010: 
466n1); however, in so far as creatures are said to struggle for existence with one 
another (Darwin, 2009b: 590) one may, I maintain, discern the Schopenhauerian notion 
of a Wille-zum-Leben inherent in every organism. Indeed, I further maintain that the 
Darwinian theory can be used to corroborate Schopenhauer’s notion, in so far as natural 
selection can explicate how the Will can be said to be “blind” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
115), i.e. unconscious. As we have seen, Schopenhauer’s teleological extension of the 
Will in nature precludes the possibility of the Will being described as “blind”; for if the 
Will is to produce adaptive physical parts conducive to survival, such as teeth, claws, 
horns, intellect, etc., then it must know prior to the appearance thereof which structures 
shall be of most benefit to the survival of a particular organism. Therefore, in spite of 
the significance accorded by Schopenhauer to the so-called “blindness” of the 
metaphysical Will, his theory is actually committed to the contrary view. Now it seems 
to me that the Darwinian theory is able to offer Schopenhauer a cogent solution to this 
difficulty, for it does not assume the existence of such a teleological force in nature; 
instead nature is said to unconsciously “select” profitable adaptations, thereby 
																																																								
assertion that science is founded upon the inexplicable, I do not consider his metaphysics as 
capable of adequately explicating those mysteries. Indeed, I have elsewhere (cf. section 4.8.4.) 
argued that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is incompatible with the scientific method. In my 
present discussion I have solely tried to illustrate that Schopenhauer’s metaphysical notion of 
the “Wille-zum-Leben” is neither at variance with nor antagonistic towards Darwin’s empirical 
theory of evolution by means of natural selection; and hence – given that I have attempted to 
show that Schopenhauer’s pessimism is inextricably bound to his metaphysics – the latter may 
be taken as offering an “external” corroboration of the former’s pessimistic characterisation of 
life. However, in stating this, I wish to make emphatically clear that I do not hold a metaphysical 
Will to be the driving force of the evolutionary process or the mechanism of natural selection. 
165 I have already discussed some of the dissimilarities between the systems; however I may be 
permitted here to mention that, unlike Darwin, Schopenhauer (1974b: 103) maintains that the 
production of new species is extremely difficult for nature, that the human is the ultimate telos 
of nature (1974b: 143-144) and that a distinct species can independently appear in two specific 




preserving them and dispensing with the less beneficial adaptations (Darwin, 2009b: 
586); in this way creatures are compelled to imperceptibly mutate. In this sense we must 
acknowledge that the mechanism of natural selection accords immaculately with 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115 and 1969b: 357, 497, 570, 579, 642) characterisation of 
the Will as “blind”, i.e. as acting without any knowledge.  
Now, in an attempt to illustrate the compatibility between the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy and the Darwinian scientific theory – in spite of Schopenhauer’s explicit 
rejection of the latter (Cartwright, 2010: 466n1) – it seems to me that it can be cogently 
argued that the driving force, i.e. the Will, haphazardly manifests itself into a plethora 
of different organisms; thereafter the mechanism of natural selection assumes its 
function and unconsciously preserves the organisms best suited to existence; while the 
less beneficially manifested products of the Will perish and become extinct.166 
Accordingly, those better adapted to survive the harsh conditions of existence will have 
a greater chance of preserving their genetic material and thus producing progeny. This 
aforementioned point illustrates that, to my mind at least, Schopenhauer’s famous 
metaphysical notion is certainly not incompatible with Darwin’s process by means of 
which evolution is said to occur, viz., natural selection; indeed, it seems to me that the 
two views mutually complement each other, as I shall shortly attempt to argue in another 
respect by way of a significant dichotomisation. I conjecture that had Schopenhauer 
realised this significant point, he would have come to acknowledge the benefits the 
Darwinian theory have for his own philosophy; for as I illustrated, the Darwinian 
mechanism of natural selection offers a cogent explication for the way in which the 
“blind” metaphysical Will can be said to drive the evolutionary process, whereas 
																																																								
166 It appears that Schopenhauer (1974b: 155-156) was reluctant to accept this prodigal view of 
the Will. However, it seems to me that it is the only view compatible with the assertion of the 
Will being a “blind” entity (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 115). The Will’s supposed frugality is 
necessarily dependent upon its awareness and knowledge of what it produces, for if it is to 
carefully preserve the general type, i.e. the species, then it must ensure the correct spatial and 
temporal placement of each of its productions; thus Schopenhauer (1974b: 156) states: “[nature 
knows] what she wants, wills it decidedly, and accordingly sets to work […].” In contrast to 
this view, the Darwinian theory necessarily assumes the unconsciousness of nature, for the 
protracted production of a particular species followed by its swift extinction is of no concern to 




Schopenhauer’s evolutionary theory of generatio in utero heterogeneo necessarily 
entails the existence of a conscious and knowledgeable Will which produces 
prefabricated organisms perfectly adapted to the environments in which they find 
themselves. Unfortunately, however, Schopenhauer did not discern this fact, instead he 
chose to fixate on the Darwinian theory’s non-metaphysical, i.e. materialistic 
(Cartwright, 2010: 466n1), nature which necessarily led to his rejection thereof.  
But not only does the Darwinian theory offer a non-conscious mechanism for the way 
in which an unconscious Will can be said to produce numerous well-adapted organisms, 
it also seems to me that, conversely, the Schopenhauerian notion of a “will-to-live” may 
be tacitly assumed to exist within every organism according to Darwin’s theory. Thus, 
just as the Darwinian theory seems to corroborate the Schopenhauerian notion of a 
“blind” Will producing multifarious organisms, so too does the Schopenhauerian theory 
substantiate the Darwinian by supplying it with a description for the mysterious innate 
force which propels creatures to continue with existence, in spite of the harshness and 
unpleasantness thereof. Of course, in stating this I do not portend that Darwin tacitly 
implies the notion of a metaphysical Will, for as we now know, given Schopenhauer’s 
criticism and rejection thereof, Darwin does not refer to the notion of a Wille-zum-
Leben as the primum mobile of the process of natural selection; however, when Darwin 
speaks of the “struggle for existence” it seems acceptable to me to construe the inward 
impetus whereby an organism seeks to maintain its existence and propagate its species 
as an innate “will-to-live”. For Darwin can only state that all creatures are furnished 
with a drive to survive and propagate their species, he cannot explicate why this is so 
or what this force actually is. Furthermore, if we earnestly take into consideration 
Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 3) assertion, that “[t]he ultimate basis on which all our 
knowledge and science rest is the inexplicable [and] [t]his inexplicable something 
devolves on metaphysics” then we shall conclude that the Darwinian theory, given that 
it is entirely empirical and thus limited to the phenomenal world, is necessarily 
incomplete and hence in need of a metaphysics as its foundation. The Schopenhauerian 
metaphysical theory is in fact the most appropriate selection given its biological 
inclination. In this sense the “Philosophy of the Will” may be taken as a complementary 
addendum to the Darwinian view of evolution by means of natural selection. In no way 
does the postulation of such an impetus, i.e. a Wille-zum-Leben, vitiate Darwin’s 




preservation of life amidst the most harrowing events and environments. This is one 
way in which the two theories can be regarded as mutually complementary; but I shall 
subsequently consider a dichotomisation I consider extremely significant in illustrating 
the mutual endorsement of both theories.   
The concurrence between the Schopenhauerian and Darwinian worldviews on the 
notion of life as a perpetual struggle between creatures for bare existence is striking. 
However, it is curious that although Darwin (2009b: 590, 592, etc.) also apprehends 
and discusses the harrowing spectacle of the struggle for survival his theory is hardly, 
if ever, characterised as pessimistic. What is to account for this oddity? I conjecture that 
the reason for this is due to the fact that as a scientist Darwin did not take into 
consideration the subjective agony experienced by the creatures he objectively 
observed. Darwin never explores what it means on a personal level to be a creature 
caught in the frightening struggle to exist; he is at all times content merely to explore, 
coldly and objectively, the way in which such suffering causes one creature to gradually 
mutate into another. Schopenhauer, in striking contrast, delves into the subjective 
sphere and is perpetually concerned with exploring and offering a solution to the 
suffering of a volitional creature. Now in the subsequent section I shall attempt to argue 
at length that from the inner, i.e. subjective, standpoint one may certainly apprehend 
the world in a Schopenhauerian-Buddhist sense, viz., in thoroughly pessimistic terms. 
I take the Darwinian theory of evolution by means of natural selection to be the 
objective correlative of the subjective Schopenhauerian view. In this way I maintain 
that the former offers a confirmation of the latter’s pessimistic view. 
As a correlate to the fact that the Darwinian theory is not, if ever, characterised as 
pessimistic, it is interesting to note that although Schopenhauer (1969a: 146-147) was 
aware of the struggle for existence between creatures and maintained a non-Darwinian 
view of evolution (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153), his colossal intellect did not entertain 
the possibility of a connection between the two, viz., the possibility of the struggle for 
existence driving the process of organic mutation. I conjecture that one of the primary 
reasons for this may be discovered in the different modi operandi employed by 
Schopenhauer and Darwin. It seems to me that the primary difference in the way in 
which both these geniuses considered the world hinges upon what I shall call the 




Yet I wish to explicitly acknowledge that the dichotomisation I have drawn between 
the subjective and the objective is not a novel concoction; Schopenhauer (1974b: 107) 
expressly mentions the distinction when he writes: 
“All the natural sciences labour under the inevitable disadvantage of 
comprehending nature exclusively from the objective side and of being 
indifferent to the subjective.” 
He (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 107) goes on to state that subjective contemplation 
“devolves on philosophy”. Therefore, it is appropriate that Darwin – the natural 
scientist – should pursue the objective path, while Schopenhauer – the metaphysical 
philosopher – should tread upon the subjective. Yet I wish to illustrate in the subsequent 
sections that the two perspectives are not incompatible and mutually antagonist towards 
each other; on the contrary, I seek to reveal their mutual compatibility and the way in 
which each complements the other, just as two well-suited lovers may be said to do the 
same. 
In short, I maintain that our moral evaluation of life primarily depends on our 
perspective thereto, i.e. if we consider life in a detached way as impartial spectators we 
are apt to view it in much the same way as we consider a work of art according to 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic thesis, for “knowledge is always painless” (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 297); whereas if we consider life from within, i.e. as willing characters 
embroiled in the struggle to survive, we are apt to regard it in an extremely different 
light, i.e. as something essentially painful and disagreeable, for “pain concerns the Will 
alone and consists in checking, hindering, or thwarting this […]” (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 297). This notion may be most easily comprehended by way of the aesthetic 
theory of disinterested contemplation of the most harrowing works of art – such as 
Goya’s Saturn Devouring his Son – wherein one either assumes an objective or a 
subjective stance. If, on the one hand, we consider Goya’s painting objectively, i.e. as 
mere spectators impervious to the sentiments of Saturn’s son, we may derive some 
aesthetic pleasure from the image, in spite of its gruesome theme; on the other hand, 
should we assume the subjective stance, empathise with Saturn’s son and imagine to 
ourselves how harrowing his final moments must have been we are thus rendered 
incapable of that aesthetic pleasure. The principal point here is that to experience life 




discomfort and suffering; hence it is that the exposure to such unfortunate events will 
inevitably lead, in my estimation, to a pessimistic view of existence; for, as 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 374) observes, from the subjective perspective “life is never 
beautiful”.  
Now it is obvious that in general the objective stance is considered superior to that of 
the subjective, for it promises to offer “cold, hard facts”, which supposedly approximate 
more closely to the truth. The reason for this belief ought to be self-evident, and it 
partially illuminates the matter under present consideration: human desires, fears and 
hopes tend to distort the truth in accordance thereto. In other words, where human 
desires and interests are concerned one is apt to deny certain uncomfortable facts which 
conflict with human wishes, while simultaneously emphasising those which comfort 
and console. It has, indeed, taken humanity millennia to emerge from its childish 
subjectivism, wherein the universe in toto was thought to have been created for the 
benefit and pleasure of human-beings.  As a consequence thereof, many scientifically-
minded individuals are apt to spurn subjectivism as infantile, distorting understanding 
and thus distancing knowledge from grasping the ultimate Truth. I can only add that in 
so far as subjectivism distorts reality it is indeed to be spurned. However, the conception 
of the subjective under present consideration does not intimate or concern subjective 
distortion in accordance with individual desires: the view I am attempting to present is 
rather one in which we seek to construe the universe from the individual or subjective 
stance. In other words, I am attempting to illustrate that the phenomena of sickness, old 
age and death perpetually and indisputably present themselves as unfavourable to living 
creatures.  
With these thoughts in mind let us now turn, in an attempt to prove the correlation 
between the two, to an earnest consideration of the Schopenhauerian and Darwinian 
systems in relation to the subjective/objective dichotomisation. It seems to me that a 
potential reason Schopenhauer was never able to associate the struggle for survival with 
the process of evolution was due to the fact that he was, in the main, concerned with 
articulating a subjective characterisation of the struggle for existence, whereas Darwin, 
in contrast, was concerned with the objective form thereof. By this I portend that 
Schopenhauer was concerned with the subjective nature of suffering for individual 
creatures; and this interest can be discerned in the way in which he sought a way to 




books of Die Welt indicate Schopenhauer’s penchant for religiosity and his devotion to 
the subjective modus operandi. We should not, however, be surprised by this fact, for 
by his own admission Schopenhauer (1969b: 5) maintains that the foundation of 
philosophical enquiry is the subjective: “consciousness alone is immediately given, 
hence the basis of philosophy is limited to the facts of consciousness”. In contrast, 
Darwin was not in the main concerned with the subjective nature and consequences of 
suffering for an individual creature, but, rather, he sought to observe the physical 
consequences wrought by the battle between creatures for survival. Darwin’s objective 
focus is, of course, to be expected, for “it is quite appropriate to the empirical standpoint 
of all the other sciences [excepting philosophy] to assume the objective world as 
positively and actually existing […]” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 5). Following 
Schopenhauer, we can regard the subjective standpoint as befitting of philosophical 
enquiry and the objective perspective as suitable to the physical sciences. Yet I maintain 
that we should not consider the opposing standpoints as fundamentally incompatible, 
but rather as mutually complementary. In this sense, the notion that the gradual 
evolution of life is driven by the struggle for existence may be considered an objective 
characterisation of the subjective Schopenhauerian doctrine of suffering; viewed 
externally we may observe the organic mutations generated thereby, whereas 
considered internally we inevitably discern the agony of life. In unison these two 
theories may be considered to offer the most exhaustive explanation of the world and 
life. Now it seems to me, that the question of the moral worth of life is pertinent solely 
in connection with the subjective standpoint: when one descends to the psychological 
view of a suffering creature the moral value of life becomes paramount. For the 
subjective standpoint views life and the world from the perspective of a living, suffering 
being. The questions pertaining to life’s worth and purpose, at least from the subjective 
standpoint, are not frivolous. However, for a scientist concerned with the way in which 
conflict between creatures for survival (experienced subjectively as suffering) leads to 
a gradual evolution of such organisms those aforementioned questions and concerns 
are indeed trivial, for the objective scientist is not concerned with the personal agony 
of the individual.  It seems to me that primarily for this reason, Bertrand Russell (1946: 
786-787) notes, in his History of Western Philosophy, that “[from] a scientific point of 
view, optimism and pessimism are alike objectionable”. In this Russell is undoubtedly 
correct, for science does not consider the universe in relation to human desires and 




impervious to the human condition, as it possibly can. For instance, when a scientist 
(cf. Darwin, 2009b: 587-588) explicates the tremendous amount of offspring most 
creatures produce in order to ensure that at least some will survive to maturity in order 
thereby to pass on their genetic material to the subsequent generation, he does not take 
into consideration the subjective situation, i.e. the suffering, of the creatures concerned. 
In other words, the scientific method insists that the investigator consider the nature of 
the universe and existence without emotion and sympathy: he wishes solely to know, to 
understand, not to feel, to empathise. Hence the question of whether the world is 
conducive to optimism or pessimism does not arise for the empirical scientist.  
It seems to me that this view of the scientific method finds corroboration in, and 
explicates, the cruel experiments often performed by scientists in an attempt to further 
human knowledge, for the objective desire for knowledge remains impervious to 
personal agony.  But from the subjective standpoint, which is essentially foreign to the 
scientific method, the situation immediately appears diabolical: an innocent pup, for 
instance, is born into the world merely in order for his life to be extinguished in an 
agonizingly painful way by some scientist wishing to know the frivolous effects a 
particular chemical has upon an animate body. From the objective standpoint one can 
consider the effects thereof interesting, but from the subjective perspective the situation 
is extremely disquieting. Although objectivity does indeed illuminate many mysteries 
of the universe, it inadvertently neglects an extremely significant aspect thereof, viz., 
the subjectivism of a conscious creature; and it is from the subjective standpoint that 
the moral worth of existence is certainly not a superfluous one, as Russell (1946:786-
787) appears to intimate. In other words, it is not in the least objectionable if a 
philosopher concerned with the art of living wishes to investigate the nature of the 
universe from the subjective perspective. Russell (1946: 787), however, subtly attempts 
to excoriate Schopenhauer’s bleak view of existence by arguing that “optimism 
assumes, or attempts to prove, that the universe exists to please us, and pessimism that 
it exists to displease us. Scientifically, there is no evidence that it is concerned with us 
either one way or the other”. This characterisation of the matter, however, appears to 
me to bungle the issue of life’s moral worth. In the first place, Russell’s description 
seems to intimate that a moral philosopher determines a priori the nature of the universe 
(i.e. in the case of Schopenhauer, that it is reprehensible) and subsequently attempts to 




world is not – in-itself – either beneficent or malevolent. However, this seems true only 
upon an entirely objective understanding: if one views life as an objective spectator 
then the phenomenon of suffering remains superfluous. The Darwinian struggle for 
existence can, for instance, be viewed in a detached manner: one merely attempts, 
without recourse to subjective experiences and moral judgments, to describe the way 
in which perpetual competition and strife between creatures leads to their gradual 
evolution. If, however, one were to descend to the subjective view an entirely different 
picture emerges: from a uniquely individual standpoint the universe may indeed portray 
itself as either beneficent or malevolent. This then, appears to intimate that the view 
ultimately depends on individual opinion; but this view, so it seems to me, discounts 
what it means to be a creature with desires in a harsh world. Let us not forget that the 
Darwinian theory of evolution by means of natural selection is considered the most 
plausible theoretical explanation for the plethora of organisms found on Earth. If a 
psychologist were to concur with the Schopenhauerian view that happiness ultimately 
depends on the satiation of a desire, then it would appear that life must either be filled 
with more suffering or happiness, depending on whether one’s desires are satisfied or 
not. Here, of course, suffering, i.e. unfulfilled or thwarted volition, must be equated 
with the bad, and happiness, i.e. the satiation of volitional strivings, with the good. 
Thus, in proportion as either suffering or happiness predominate in life it may be said 
to be either good or bad. The matter then, may appear to be entirely relative: one 
individual may consider his life, on the whole, to be filled with happiness, whereas 
another may be drawn to the conclusion that his life was one of sorrow and 
dissatisfaction. It may seem as though an objective determination of life’s worth is 
impossible to attain. But, if we ascend from our daily, mundane, lives and consider the 
matter sub specie aeternitatas we at once discern the truth of three of the so-called “four 
sights” apprehended by the Buddha, viz., the inevitability of old age, sickness and 
death. We may assume that these three inevitabilities are antithetical to the pursuit of 
happiness, for every creature is imbued with the Wille-zum-Leben which ultimately 
seeks youth, health and eternal life – not solely for itself, but also for those others on 
whom its happiness partially depends. If then, from this lofty standpoint, life is not – 
and can never be – in accordance with the ultimate wishes of animate creatures it must 
necessarily perpetually present itself as a tragedy, i.e. the sagacious individual must 
ultimately bear the cloak of pessimism. Indeed, I observe that such observations 




view here presented, as an oxymoron). These observations intimate that from the 
subjective perspective the question of whether life is ultimately conducive to the 
optimistic or the pessimistic temperament is not a superfluous matter. 
But let us return to Russell’s (1946: 786-787) criticism of Schopenhauer’s pessimism; 
which, as I mentioned, intimates that such a view was a foregone conclusion. In 
essence, it would appear that Russell is accusing Schopenhauer of spuriousness. For if 
a philosopher is authentic he, like the authentic scientist, will not attempt to describe 
the universe in accordance with preconceived notions and dogmas. In contrast, the 
religious individual may be taken as dishonest in so far as he attempts to describe the 
world in accordance with his preconceived dogmas about the universe. It is primarily 
for this reason that a great thinker should be irreligious, or at the very least sceptical of 
the religious dogmas inculcated in him as a youth, for if his aim is merely to corroborate 
unfounded notions, his investigations – be they of a philosophical or a scientific nature 
– will inevitably produce spurious results. The genuine great thinker – whether a 
philosopher or a scientist – approaches the world like an ignorant child: in theory he 
does not possess any preconceived notions of that which he undertakes to investigate, 
but enters in upon it as though he were a tabula rasa, allowing it to impress upon him 
its multifarious impressions: the results of his investigations are unbeknownst to him 
and he ought always to be prepared to revise his views in accordance with fresh data. 
In contradistinction thereto, the religious individual seeks always to corrupt the facts in 
order to make them harmonize with his preconceived ideas: if he believes the world to 
be the work of an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent creative force then every horror 
and disaster must be made congenial in order to accord with the way in which he 
believes the world ought to be.  Thus, Russell’s criticism of Schopenhauer’s bleak view 
of life appears to presuppose that Schopenhauer was dogmatically predisposed to 
pessimism. Psychologically, this may have been true; but I wish to observe that 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy arose from a consideration of the world: he did not first 
produce his philosophical system and subsequently attempt to find corroborations for 
it within the world, as religious optimists attempt to do. Furthermore, even if 
Schopenhauer were psychologically predisposed to a pessimistic temperament, he 
would undoubtedly have had to revise his views in accordance with irrefragable facts 




subjective sphere will offer ample corroboration for the pessimistic stance: old age (if 
we are fortunate enough to reach such a point), sickness and death await us all.   
I note further, in accordance with the view adumbrated in the aforementioned section, 
that Schopenhauer (1974b: 373-375) is decidedly opposed to vivisection, whereas 
Darwin, although opposed to wanton cruelty, argues that such experiments on living 
animals may be justified on the grounds that it may potentially further human 
knowledge and happiness.167 Unlike the scientific method, Schopenhauer considers the 
brutality of existence from the subjective standpoint, his philosophical system can, 
therefore, be taken as a dovetail to the scientific method, thereby completing (by 
offering a subjective characterisation alongside the objective) the description of the 
universe. This seems obvious in so far as science is concerned with the objective 
investigation of the world, i.e. a consideration of physical phenomena independent of 
their relation to human concerns. Thus, from the objective scientific perspective the 
question of the moral significance of the struggle for existence or the eventual death of 
the Sun is utterly superfluous; for the task of science is merely to hypothesise about and 
describe phenomena independently of the human relation thereto; however, in our 
modern scientific era, we have, to a large extent neglected the subjective sphere. In 
																																																								
167 In a letter originally published in The Times on the 18th of April 1881 and later in Nature 
and the British Medical Journal Darwin stated: “[…] I have all my life been a strong advocate 
for humanity to animals, and have done what I could in my writings to enforce this duty […] 
On the other hand, I know that physiology cannot possibly progress except by means of 
experiments on living animals, and I feel the deepest conviction that he who retards the progress 
of physiology commits a crime against mankind […] What improvements in medical practice 
may be directly attributed to physiological research is a question which can be properly 
discussed only by those physiologists and medical practitioners who have studied the history 
of their subjects; but as far as I can learn, the benefits are already great. However this may be, 
no one, unless he is grossly ignorant of what science has done for mankind, can entertain any 
doubt of the incalculable benefits which will hereafter be derived from physiology, not only by 
man, but by the lower animals. Look, for instance, at Pasteur’s results in modifying the germs 
of the most malignant diseases, from which, as it so happens, animals will in the first place 
receive more relief than man. Let it be remembered how many lives and what a fearful amount 
of suffering have been saved by knowledge gained of parasitic worms through the experiments 




order to develop compassion for our fellow creatures, we should at all times bear in 
mind the subjective stance and the suffering that invariably attends it. 
In concluding this discussion I may be permitted to state that the Darwinian theory of 
evolution by means of natural selection is just as pessimistic as Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy; but due to the fact that it pursues an objective mode of exploration, without 
concerning itself with the personal agony of creatures, it does not seem to warrant the 
characterisation. However, if it be considered the objective counterpart to the subjective 
Schopenhauerian view its inherent pessimism becomes evident. It is in this sense, 
therefore, that I consider the Darwinian theory as offering a corroboration to the 
pessimistic view of life. 
_____________________________________ 
It ought to be evident, then, that Schopenhauer’s pessimism is inextricably connected 
to his metaphysics. In other words, the world is precisely as it is, viz., evil, due to the 
fact that the essence of everything is an insatiable metaphysical Will. Yet, in the 
subsequent section we shall see that Schopenhauer also identifies the Will as, 
ordinarily, indestructible. Consequently, I have engaged in a protracted discussion on 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism in order to raise the question as to how consoling 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of athanasia actually is. For it seems as little comforting to be 
told that upon dying one will return to an evil essence as it would to be told that after 
death one would be committed to the furnace of hell. Hence, irrespective of the veracity 
or falsity of Schopenhauer’s doctrine, it appears that his consolation for the inevitability 
of death is in fact terribly disturbing. I shall return to this pertinent matter in the 
subsequent primary section, for the moment let us consider Schopenhauer’s evaluation 









5.6. Schopenhauer’s Evaluation of Life’s Worth 
	
“Gut ist der Schlaf, der Tod ist besser – freilich das beste wäre, nie geboren sein.”168 
- Heinrich Heine, Morphine 
One final difficulty pertaining to the pessimistic view which needs to be considered is 
Schopenhauer’s evaluation of existence, viz., that, in response to Hamlet’s (Act III, 
Scene I) famous question, it would be “better not to be”. We have seen that 
Schopenhauer characterises existence in extremely pessimistic terms and this 
necessarily leads him to the seemingly bleak conclusion that it would be better not to 
exist (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 325, Schopenhauer, 1969b: 576, 605 and Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 299). However, we must now earnestly enquire as to what precisely 
Schopenhauer portends thereby. Here we must distinguish between three aspects of the 
notion that non-existence would be preferable to existence, viz., (i) that it would have 
been better not to have been born, (ii) that it is unconscionable to beget children and 
(iii) that once born the next best thing is to return to the unconscious state as rapidly as 
possible. In the subsequent sections I shall consider in detail all three possibilities. 
 
5.6.1. It Would Have Been Better not to Have Been Born 
	
It is fairly well-known that Schopenhauer’s bleak view of existence leads him to a 
negative evaluation of life’s worth; thus, in the first volume of his magnum opus he 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 325) intimates the desirability of non-existence by remarking: 
“[…] the shortness of life, so often lamented, may perhaps be the best thing 
about it.” 
In the second volume of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969b: 576) offers more explicit 
statements on the preferability of non-existence: 
																																																								
168 “Sleep is good, death is better; but of course, the best thing would be never to have been 




“[…] that we have not to be pleased but rather sorry about the existence of the 
world; that its non-existence would be preferable to its existence; that it is 
something which at bottom ought not to be […]” 
And again, on page 605 of the second volume: 
“In fact, nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the 
knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist.” 
Furthermore, in the second volume of Parerga und Paralipomena Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 299) once again intimates the preferability of non-existence when he states: 
“If we picture to ourselves roughly as far as we can the sum total of misery, 
pain, and suffering of every kind on which the sun shines in its course, we shall 
admit that it would have been much better if it had been just as impossible for 
the sun to produce the phenomenon of life on Earth as on the Moon, and the 
surface of the Earth, like that of the Moon, had still been in a crystalline state. 
We can also regard our life as a uselessly disturbing episode in the blissful 
repose of nothingness.” 
Finally, Schopenhauer (1969b: 588) approvingly quotes Byron’s life-denying words: 
“Count o’er the joys thine hours have seen, 
Count o’er thy days from anguish free,  
And know, whatever thou hast been, 
‘Tis something better not to be.” 
Now if we take such utterances in the first sense, i.e. as to portend that it would have 
been better not to have been born in the first place, we are faced with a conspicuous 
dilemma: for only an extant creature – that is to say one which has been born – can 
entertain such thoughts and utter such words. Hence, were we to construe 
Schopenhauer’s negative evaluation of existence in the first sense, i.e. as a lamentation 
that one was born, it would, upon close philosophical consideration, appear to be utterly 
superfluous, a mere peevish rant. To lament the occurrence of something which has 
occurred and cannot be undone is in the last analysis futile and causes unnecessary 
psychological torment, for once we are extant we cannot alter the fact that we were 




in Epicurus’ words, “useless” (quoted in De Botton, 2000: 55). I therefore cannot 
imagine that Schopenhauer would propound a notion which would induce profound 
psychological torment; consequently, I maintain that we can confidently rule out this 
option as his intended meaning. 
 
5.6.2. It is Unconscionable to Beget Children 
	
A second possibility, closely related to the first, is to construe Schopenhauer as a 
proponent of anti-natalism, i.e., the view that it is morally wrong to beget children. 
Upon a superficial understanding of Schopenhauer’s philosophy this may appear 
acceptable, for in the second volume of Parerga und Paralipomena Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 300) rhetorically enquires: 
“Let us for a moment imagine that the act of procreation were not a necessity 
or accompanied by intense pleasure, but a matter of pure rational deliberation; 
could then the human race really continue to exist? Would not everyone rather 
feel so much sympathy for the coming generation that he would prefer to spare 
it the burden of existence, or at any rate would not like to assume in cold blood 
the responsibility of imposing on it such a burden?” 
Indeed, rational reflection on the nature of existence seems to declare that “[…] children 
may at times appear to be like innocent delinquents who are condemned not to death, 
it is true, but to life and have not yet grasped the purport of their sentence” 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 298-299). Thus, in these utterances one may justifiably construe 
Schopenhauer as arguing in favour of the anti-natalist position; but upon closer 
consideration of his philosophy it becomes evident that the imputation of an anti-
natalist attitude thereto is in fact erroneous. In short, the act of merely refraining from 
having children does not in-itself ensure the end of the world of appearance. This view 
will only appear bizarre to a mind thoroughly saturated with the doctrine of materialism, 
in which solely hollow phenomenal objects are accorded actuality. Here, therefore, we 
must recall Schopenhauer’s dichotomisation between the metaphysical Will on the one 
hand, which is said to be the ens realissimum169 (Schopenhauer, 1889: 376) and, on the 
																																																								




other, the world of appearances or the phenomenal world. For even though the human 
race would, in the course of time, become extinct due to sexual abstinence, the Will as 
Ding-an-sich would remain and re-manifest itself ad infinitum. Thus, the mere 
abstention of procreation is not, from a Schopenhauerian standpoint, sufficient in 
bringing the world of suffering to an end. As Schopenhauer (1969a: 400) states: “[the 
abolition of the Will] is not possible through physical force, such as the destruction of 
the seed or germ, the killing of the new-born child, […] suicide”, or, we might add, by 
way of abstention from procreation. Therefore, it would be erroneous to construe 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy as tacitly venerating sexually active lifestyles which do not 
lead to the production of children, such as protective vaginal sex, mutual masturbation, 
oral sex and intercourse per anum (cf. Schopenhauer, 1974b: 318). In the appendix I 
propound a view which illustrates how such sexual activity, even though it does not 
lead to the production of progeny, actually augments the metaphysical Will; thereby 
producing more suffering in the world of appearance. Paradoxically, then, 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 400; 1974b: 318) encourages the production of offspring in the 
hope that they will follow the ascetic lifestyle and thus ultimately abrogate the portion 
of Will which animates their bodies.  
In other words, from a Schopenhauerian perspective, all forms of sexual activity – 
especially those which do not lead to procreation – are to be avoided; consequently, 
Schopenhauer may be considered an anti-natalist solely in a very limited or a circuitous 
sense, i.e. not in so far as he actively discourages the production of children, but solely 
as a subsidiary consequence of the ascetic lifestyle which demands complete 
abstinence. As a consequence of these musings I may be permitted to remark that it is 
acceptable then, from a Schopenhauerian perspective, for one – such as Leo Tolstoy – 
to beget children and subsequently assume the life of a mendicant; for although in the 
act of procreation the metaphysical Will has, on my account, been caused to augment 
there is a twofold boon in such circumstances: on the one hand there is the abrogation 
of the Will which animates the saint’s body, i.e. at the moment of such a one’s death 
by way of voluntary starvation the Will residing therein is dissolved (cf. the appendix); 
on the other hand, the possibility of the mendicant’s children one day following in their 
parent’s footsteps intimates that the metaphysical Will, which was caused to augment 




new life, might eventually be annulled, thus reducing the amount of suffering in the 
world to the point at which it was prior to the individual’s birth.  
In conclusion, the above considerations illustrate that the anti-natalist position cannot 
be considered Schopenhauer’s intention when he (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 576, et al.) 
speaks of the preferability of non-existence.  
 
5.6.3. To Rapidly Return to the Unconscious State 
	
This leads, therefore, to the final possibility, viz., that one ought to strive for a speedy 
return to the state of unconsciousness. However, this final possibility may generate 
some confusion; for it may be construed as a prescription of suicide. Let us therefore 
turn to a consideration thereof. 
 
5.6.3.1. Schopenhauer’s Views on Suicide 
	
As Copleston (1947: 91) and Jacquette (2008: 302) note, Schopenhauer’s pessimism 
would appear to favour suicide as a possible solution to the problem of existence. 
However, it may come as a surprise to learn that Schopenhauer (1969a: 398-402) did 
not in fact condone (ordinary, i.e. non-ascetic) suicide, in so far as he does not consider 
it as offering a genuine liberation from the torments of life. Now although I discuss this 
difficult matter at length in the appendix I shall here succinctly adumbrate 
Schopenhauer’s view in an attempt to make the matter as perspicuous as possible. 
Although he does not consider it a crime, Schopenhauer (1974b: 309) maintains that 
suicide is a mistake in so far as it is “opposed to the attainment of the highest moral 
goal since it substitutes for the real salvation from this world of woe and misery one 
that is merely apparent”. What, we must justifiably enquire, does Schopenhauer portend 
by this notion? 
Schopenhauer’s view is, as with everything in his philosophy, founded upon his 
metaphysics: thus suicide is said to be a mistake (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 309) or “quite 
a futile and foolish act” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 399) in so far as it cannot really offer 




it, just as the rainbow remains unmoved, however rapidly the drops may change which 
sustain it for the moment” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 399). If death truly offered absolute 
annihilation, then “we would undoubtedly choose it in view of the state of the world. 
[But], ‘[a]y, there’s the rub’” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 308). In other words, the Will, 
which constitutes our essence, cannot be “destroyed by physical force” (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 400) and hence death by way of violent self-destruction or natural means does 
not offer the benefit of absolute annihilation, which would, of course, ensure our utter 
non-existence.  
We may note here, therefore, that any solution to the problem of existence must 
ultimately strive to abrogate the metaphysical Will; and such an act is said to occur in 
the case of the ascetic, who intentionally shuns life’s pleasures and incessantly seeks 
the disagreeable:  
“[…] [i]t is not merely the phenomenon, as in the case of others, that comes to 
an end with death, but the inner being itself that is abolished […] for him who 
ends thus, the world has at the same time ended.” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 382). 
But I must acknowledge that two glaring contradictions arise in Schopenhauer’s system 
at this point. The first is that Schopenhauer (1969a: 128-129) claims that the dissolution 
of the Will in one body would necessarily entail the dissolution of the Will in toto, for 
the atemporality and aspatiality of the metaphysical Will intimates that it is a unity; 
hence if the Will were to dissolve in the saint it ought to absolutely vanish in every 
other phenomenal manifestation. This is a dogmatical point which is utterly at variance 
with Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine. Thus if one were to accept it he would 
necessarily be compelled to reject the possibility of the abrogation of the Will in the 
ascetic saint. As a consequence, I reject this notion and in the appendix I argue that the 
dissolution of the metaphysical Will can only be brought about through an act of suicide 
by starvation, a matter I shall shortly elaborate upon. I mention this because it seems to 
me that the most cogent refutation of this dogmatical doctrine is that of experience: of 
course, there have been instances of ascetics dying by intentional starvation, in 
particular among the Jains (Wiley, 2004: 181-182), without the world dissolving 
therewith; consequently, it seems that Schopenhauer’s aforementioned pronouncement 




The second, and more significant, contradiction pertains to the fact that although the 
Will is said to be capable of dissolution in the ascetic at the moment of his death, the 
Will is also said to be indestructible (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 400). Thus how can that 
which is indestructible also be said to be capable of dissolution in certain (exceptional) 
circumstances? The solution thereto, it seems to me, is to be found in the ascetic 
practices, which tend to mitigate the vehemence of volitions. Paradoxically, the 
abstention of fulfilling potent desires seems to attenuate them; thus if we take this 
notion to the extreme and assume that one dies due to an ascetic practice, viz., by way 
of intentional starvation, it may be attributed to the total dissolution of the Will. Hence, 
I argue that in order to be entirely consistent, Schopenhauer ought to have concluded 
his opus maximum by arguing that the metaphysical Will dissolves solely in one who 
dies by asceticism. For if the Will exists in an attenuated state in the ascetic – as indeed 
it must, given the fact that the Will and the body are said to be identical (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 100) – it does not follow that it should miraculously, deus ex machina, dissolve 
at the moment of his death. I maintain that an ascetic practice ought to destroy the Will 
thereby inducing death as a necessary consequence thereof; as opposed to the traditional 
view which regards the Will as miraculously vanishing as a consequence of the death 
of the ascetic. The latter is illogical, for why should the Will only utterly dissolve in the 
case of the ascetics and not among laypeople? This is the main theme of the argument 
to be found in the appendix. 
As a consequence of this contradiction, and in order to render the matter intelligible, I 
must here anticipate my resolution thereof in the discussions to be found in the 
proceeding chief section and in the appendix, for, in order to fully comprehend 
Schopenhauer’s view, it is necessary to dichotomize between two types of death, viz., 
an ordinary, non-ascetic one and another occasioned by the most extreme form of 
asceticism, i.e. suicide by starvation.  An ordinary, i.e. non-ascetic, death cannot 
abrogate the metaphysical Will; which is, it will be recalled, the source of all strife and 
consequently suffering in the world. It is necessary to mention that most forms of 
suicide are non-ascetic in so far as they are not occasioned by a mortification of the 
Will; indeed, with the sole exception of suicide by starvation (cf. the appendix), all 
forms of suicide are characterised, according to Schopenhauer (1969a: 398), as 




Thus Schopenhauer (1969a: 398) paradoxically argues that an individual who commits 
suicide is not, as is commonly assumed, one who has lost his will-to-live; on the 
contrary, such an act of self-destruction has been motived, according to him 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 398), by the most vehement form of willing, for the suicide 
“[…] wills life, wills the unchecked existence and affirmation of the body; but the 
combination of circumstances does not allow of these, and the result for him is great 
suffering” (ibid). In a fit of frustration and rage the wilful individual is thus led to the 
act of suicide; but such a one is said by Schopenhauer to have possessed a burning 
desire to end his torment, not his life per se. This subtle, albeit significant, point can be 
best evinced in the fact that if the circumstances permitted a congenial atmosphere or 
outcome the suicidal individual would not have wished to end his life. The individual 
who commits suicide due to unrequited love, for instance, does so out of a frustration 
that he cannot obtain the desired sentiments from his love-object, not out of a disgust 
or horror at existence as such and in toto. If his beloved were to return his amorous 
sentiments his frustration and longing for destruction – which is psychologically 
defined by Freud (cited in Sadock and Sadock, 2007: 900) as anger directed towards 
the self – would dissipate. But here I wish to emphasise a seemingly tangential point, 
which is, in fact, of immense significance: the non-ascetic suicide is motived to self-
destruction by personal suffering, i.e. egoism (Young, 2005: 195), whereas, in contrast 
thereto, the ascetic saint, according to my interpretation, is prompted to suicide by 
altruistic incentives, i.e. the desire to mitigate the total amount of suffering in the world. 
The former wishes to annul his personal, individual suffering, whereas the latter 
exacerbates his discomfort in order to affect a transcendental change, thereby 
preventing the re-manifestation of the portion of his Will, and thus removing the 
possibility of suffering in other, as yet unborn, creatures. Although it is a mere truism, 
it is for this reason that ordinary suicide is an affirmation of the Wille-zum-Leben, 
whereas the ascetic form of suicide is a denial thereof. All this is discussed at length in 
the appendix; however, the point to be emphasised is that in cases in which a wilful 
individual commits suicide the Will, upon an orthodox reading of the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy, remains intact (in contradistinction to my interpretation, in which the 
metaphysical Will is so said to augment) and can therefore re-manifest itself into the 
world of appearances as a new creature to suffer and ultimately die. This process of 
Samsara will recur perpetually until eventually – if, indeed, ever – the Will finds itself 




the case of ordinary, i.e. non-ascetic, suicide the act merely brings an individual 
existence to an end, but it does not affect the Will as Ding-an-sich.  
Of course, this argument against suicide, viz., that it is a futile undertaking in so far as 
it does not destroy the Will as Ding-an-sich, may appear inadequate, for a potential 
suicide is concerned solely with his suffering; it is highly unlikely that Schopenhauer’s 
argument would dissuade one from committing such an act. For a tormented individual 
contemplating suicide is, as Julian Young (2005: 195) notes somewhat disparagingly 
“exceptionally self-obsessed”. The non-ascetic suicide wishes solely to bring his 
suffering to an end, the sufferings of yet unborn creatures which shall arise by way of 
palingenesis from the re-manifestation of his portion of the metaphysical Will are, to 
him, superfluous and unlikely to prevent him from taking his own life.  However, we 
should guard against reading Schopenhauer as presenting a prohibition on the act of 
suicide; but as merely explicating the ultimate futility of such an undertaking 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 309). But in order to comprehend this one must bear in mind 
the metaphysical Will and assume a higher, i.e. universalistic, moral stance; in other 
words, one must take upon oneself the sufferings of the entire world and wish to end 
the tragedy of existence in toto. For if one apprehends that the ubiquitous Will is the 
ultimate source or cause of Leiden,170 one may realise that suffering is not idiosyncratic 
or limited to the “unfortunate few”; on the contrary, existence as such is thoroughly 
permeated by sorrow. It is hoped that this realisation will ultimately lead to compassion 
for our fellow sufferers, which will, in turn, lead to the ascetic lifestyle, as the sole 
genuine solution to the problem of existence. Here then we arrive at an understanding 
of the initial mysterious utterance, i.e. the absolute destruction of one’s portion of the 
metaphysical Will by way of an ascetic lifestyle is the only acceptable way in which to 
construe the claim that “non-existence is preferable to existence”.  
In concluding this discussion I may be permitted to make one final significant 
observation, which I take to be a corroboration of my maverick interpretation of 
Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine. I cannot accept as legitimate those 
interpretations171 which attempt to argue for the acquisition of personal benefit for the 
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171 Cf. for instance, Robert Wicks’ (2008:  128 & 132-133) and Julian Young’s (2005: 195- 




saint by adhering to the ascetic lifestyle; for I observe that if the saint merely strives at 
a nullification of the Will solely within himself in order to attain personal satisfaction, 
then he might just as well spend his existence contemplating works of art or commit 
(ordinary, i.e. non-ascetic) suicide. For if the ascetic lifestyle is construed as a path to 
liberation from personal suffering it does not differ at all from aesthetic contemplation 
or ordinary suicide, at bottom it is in fact identical therewith. Moreover, the ascetic 
practices actually exacerbate personal suffering; hence it would appear odd that one 
should augment one’s personal agony in order to mitigate it.  Thus, although I 
acknowledge that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s ascetic doctrine is extremely 
unorthodox and audacious it appears to me to be the only truly acceptable one, in spite 
of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 128-129) assertions to the contrary and the numerous 
predicaments (discussed at length in the appendix) it inevitably generates.  
 
5.6.3.2. Schopenhauer’s Soteriological Doctrine 
	
Thus it is evident that the rapid return to the state of unconsciousness cannot be 
construed as an encouragement to suicide; or, at least, to an ordinary, i.e. non-ascetic, 
form thereof. Instead we ought to construe Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 576; 605) 
statements as an intimation to follow the ascetic lifestyle thereby abrogating the portion 
of the Will which animates the body. Now I will not enter here into a prolix discussion 
on this complicated matter, which I was compelled to touch upon while discussing 
Schopenhauer’s views on suicide, and furthermore can be found in the appendix of this 
dissertation; instead I refer readers thereto once a sufficient understanding of 
Schopenhauer’s views in this section have been grasped. For our present purposes I 
wish to mention the only acceptable means by which one should perish according to 
my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine. 
It is interesting to note that in his doctrine of salvation one can best discern the 
religiosity of Schopenhauer and that of his system, in spite of his undeniable atheism 
(Edwards, 2009: 173). For although it is difficult to define the concept of religion (Hick, 
1990: 2) one feature that most religious systems have in common is, as John H. Hick 
(1990: 3) notes, “a concern with what is variously called salvation or liberation”. Hence 




considered a religion – with the Will as God and Schopenhauer as its arch-prophet or 
messiah. Consequently, in the Schopenhauerian soteriological doctrine we discover a 
way in which one may escape from the nightmare of existence; but therein I maintain 
that we also find the sense in which Schopenhauer (1969b: 605) states that “it would 
be better for us not to exist”. In other words, it would be better for us not to exist 
absolutely, i.e. as Will, and not merely relatively, i.e. as phenomenal appearance; and 
this end can be achieved solely by way of the ascetic life.   
It ought to be evident by now from the discussion on suicide, that Schopenhauer 
conceived of two types of death: one relative and the other absolute.172 The former 
																																																								
172 It is necessary to mention that this pronouncement is based upon a particular view of the 
assertion that the Will is akin to the Ding-an-sich. According to the orthodox view the Will is 
identical with the Ding-an-sich; while the maverick interpretation contends that the Will is 
merely one facet of the essence in-itself. If the Ding-an-sich is entirely Will then the abrogation 
of the latter would entail the destruction of the former, thus producing an “absolute 
nothingness”; whereas if the Will is merely one facet of the world as it is in-itself then the 
destruction thereof would produce only a “relative nothingness”. To my mind the first volume 
(which is essentially the first edition) of Die Welt supports the “absolute nothingness” 
hypothesis – I say this in spite of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 409-410) explicit rejection of the 
notion of “absolute nothingness” in the concluding section, viz. 71, of the fourth book thereof. 
It is interesting to note that this section was already present in the first edition (1818/1819), 
intimating that Schopenhauer had always maintained that, besides the Will, there are other 
inscrutable dimensions to the Ding-an-sich. However, in the first volume of Die Welt it seems 
to me that the absolute identification of the Will with the Ding-an-sich is paramount, for besides 
the aforementioned section wherein Schopenhauer rejects the notion of absolute nothingness, 
there is no other insinuation of the multidimensional view; indeed, in spite of a controversy 
surrounding it (cf. John E. Atwell’s Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The 
Metaphysics of Will, chapter one) I consider the identification to be der einzige Gedanke (“the 
single thought”) mentioned by Schopenhauer (1969a: xii) in the preface to the first edition. In 
the second volume (which is essentially the second edition), by contrast, Schopenhauer (1969b: 
196) explicitly supports the “relative nothingness” hypothesis by claiming “[…] that even the 
inward observation we have of our own Will still does not by any means furnish an exhaustive 
and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself”. In spite of the fact that I do not think the Will 
is the Ding-an-sich as intended by Kant I have argued that a multidimensional view thereof 




refers to an individual who perishes by non-ascetic means; in such a case the 
disappearance is illusory, for the Will which once animated the individual’s body is 
reabsorbed into the metaphysical Will and, through the process of palingenesis, it is re-
manifested into the world of appearances. Thus, for the individual who dies by non-
ascetic means, his is a relative disappearance, it is solely the phenomenal individuality 
which is utterly destroyed, whereas the essential being is unscathed thereby. On the 
other hand, Schopenhauer (1969a: 400) intimates that the death of the ascetic saint leads 
to absolute destruction, i.e. both the Will as Ding-an-sich and its manifestation, the 
appearance, are abrogated at the moment of the ascetic’s death. But such an event seems 
impossible, for as Copleston (1947: 91) notes:  
“Individual consciousness is indeed destroyed [in death], but man’s inner 
nature, identical with Will, persists and can never be destroyed.” 
In the appendix of this dissertation I address this conspicuous paradox by invoking the 
distinction between non-ascetic and ascetic forms of death. In short, I illustrate that the 
Ding-an-sich is not impervious to alteration, but can in fact contract and augment. It 
follows, therefore, that the only way in which an individual can utterly abrogate the 
Will in oneself is by way of the ascetic lifestyle, but in particular by way of an 
intentional starvation unto death. I argue that the metaphysical Will is caused to contract 
by the ascetic practice of starvation which inevitably induces death as a consequence. 
However, I readily acknowledge that my solution thereto has led, among other 
difficulties, to an inadmissible conclusion concerning the application of the causal law. 
For the notion that the Will can, even under exceptional circumstances, dissolve, 
necessary leads to the maverick application of the law of causality to the realm of the 
Ding-an-sich. I admit that this is problematic for a philosophy which adopts the ideality 
of the causal law; however, there is, to my mind, no escaping this difficulty. In the 
appendix I attempt to offer a solution from a radical idealist perspective; however, in a 
later section (cf. 7.8.) I attempt to argue, contrary to the transcendental idealist view, 
																																																								
engage with the latter’s thought; for the Will is said to be the ultimate cause of all phenomena, 
including suffering, in the world. If, however, the Ding-an-sich is not entirely Will then there 
is no reason to suppose that the world will necessarily present itself as something evil; it follows 
that the significance of Schopenhauer’s aesthetic and ascetic theories would become 




that the law of causality, like that of time and space, does actually possess a mind-
independentness of sorts; hence, if my analysis is veracious, the world as it is in-itself 
cannot be impervious to its influence. However, if my thesis, viz., that ascetic practices 
can cause the metaphysical Will to contract, is accepted, then we must affirm the 
alternative possibility, viz., that under certain circumstances the Will as Ding-an-sich, 
can also be caused to expand. My interpretation, contrary to that of Schopenhauer’s 
static understanding, thus leads to a dynamic view of the Ding-an-sich, one in which it 
is perpetually augmenting and contracting in accordance with the actions performed in 
the phenomenal world.173 I anticipate and encourage constructive criticism of my view; 
however, let us return to the primary matter at hand.  
The distinction between two types of death leads to a significant conclusion. If it is best 
to rapidly return to the state of unconsciousness then one ought not merely strive for a 
relative annihilation, i.e. one in which one’s subjectivity is destroyed but not the Ding-
an-sich, as for instance in the case of the ordinary suicide; but rather one should 
endeavour for absolute annihilation, i.e. a state in which one’s essence is, along with 
one’s subjectivity, dissolved. In this way the portion of the Will which once animated 
the body cannot re-manifest itself into the phenomenal world and thus continue the 
tragedy of existence. Schopenhauer’s solution to the problem of life is, therefore, the 
ascetic lifestyle, whereby one is ultimately able to abrogate the Will within oneself. 
Therefore, the only cogent sense in which Schopenhauer’s view, viz., “that non-
existence is preferable to existence”, can be interpreted is that one ought to strive to 
return as rapidly as possible to the unconscious state by following the ascetic lifestyle 
and, according to my interpretation, perishing by way of intentional starvation. In that 
way one can truly be said to “not exist” in so far as one’s inner essence has been 
destroyed and therefore cannot re-manifest itself in the phenomenal world. 
																																																								
173 I may be permitted to compare this to humankind’s primitive and modern understanding of 
the cosmos. Prior to Edwin Hubble’s discovery that the galaxies are moving away from the 
Milky Way (Hawking, 2016: 46) it was erroneously maintained that the universe was static and 
eternal; however, nowadays it is known that the universe is in a constant state of expansion and 
is, therefore, in a constant state of transformation (Hawking, 2016: 46). Thus that which once, 




5.7. Is a Life of Suffering Really not Worth Living? 
	
We must now enquire whether Schopenhauer’s negative evaluation of life, i.e. the claim 
that it is not worth living, is vindicated. For although life may certainly be filled with 
immense suffering it does not follow that life is not worth living (cf. Young, 2005: 206).  
There are those who, in spite of their sorrows – or perhaps because of them – continue 
to live meaningfully. Are we to earnestly maintain that solely a life of contentment and 
pleasure is worth living? Perhaps we ought first to enquire as to the nature of 
contentment: Schopenhauer’s “negativity of happiness” thesis offers a compelling 
explanation of the nature thereto, one which Nietzsche surreptitiously endorses and 
advances as his own. In Der Antichrist, for instance, Nietzsche (2003b: 127) states: 
“What is happiness? – The feeling […] that a resistance is overcome.” 
A resistance is evidently an obstacle to the satisfaction of a desire and thus Nietzsche 
appears to be arguing that happiness is the fulfilment of the striving towards an 
unsatisfied longing. Thus, upon a close consideration of the matter, it becomes evident 
that happiness cannot exist independently of unhappiness, as paradoxical as that may 
appear. In order for one to fully experience the exuberance of happiness one must first 
have been in a state of tormenting agony and dissatisfaction. Indeed, one cannot expect 
life to be solely happy, for such would render the concept meaningless. It is only by 
way of the contrary that happiness is comprehended and appreciated since “opposites 
illuminate each other” (Cartwright, 2005: 98). An existence of perpetual contentment 
would not be acknowledged as such, and instead “[…] people would die of boredom or 
hang themselves; or they would fight, throttle, and murder one another and so cause 
themselves more suffering than is now laid upon them by nature” (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 293). This notion was first introduced in the section on Schopenhauer’s 
“negativity of happiness” thesis but it is most eloquently expressed, as mentioned, by 
Nietzsche (2003: 332) in the fourth part of Also Sprach Zarathustra wherein suffering 
is shown to be inextricably bound to happiness: 
“For all joy wants itself, therefore it also wants heart’s agony!” 
However, it must be acknowledged that a serious difficulty arises in cases in which an 
individual cannot surmount suffering, such as the mental and physical aguish associated 




case, where the possibility of happiness seems genuinely to be incapable of ever 
returning – in so far as the obstacle cannot be surmounted, i.e. the terminal disease 
which will induce tremendous suffering cannot be cured – it seems to me that the 
negativity of happiness thesis cannot offer much consolation and that such a life is, in 
the last analysis, not worth living. For although the surmounting of an obstacle produces 
happiness the progression of a terminal illness will only exacerbate suffering without 
ever offering the possible return of jubilation. In short, a terminal illness will ensure 
that one’s life progresses in a descent, wherein it may genuinely be said: “[i]t is bad 
today and every day it will get worse, until the worst of all happens” (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 299). If we discount metaphysical theories – both the Schopenhauerian doctrine 
of the Will and the Indian theory of Karma – in such cases, wherein intense mental and 
physical suffering is experienced without the possibility of it ever being annulled, it is 
to my mind perfectly acceptable then to wish to rapidly return to the place from whence 
one arose by way of humane euthanasia. An individual who does not possess a 
metaphysical doctrine and yet emphatically insists on extending suffering is either 
diabolical or naively hopeful. Indeed, it is solely the pernicious influence of optimism 
devoid of metaphysics which criminalises euthanasia and prevents a suffering creature 
from attaining salvation from the torments of a harrowing terminal illness. In this sense 
Sigmund Freud’s life and death are to be taken as a prototype: for he lived, in spite of 
physical torment due to his illness, until such a time as he acknowledged the suffering 
to outweigh the pleasures of his existence; it was then that he requested his doctor assist 
him in departing this vallis lacrimarum174 sooner than was immanently inevitable.  
I readily admit to difficult cases in regard to my thesis, for depressed individuals, in 
particular, believe that their condition is utterly hopeless; hence it may be argued that I 
tacitly abet the suicide of such individuals. This is certainly not so, for we must 
acknowledge that the lives of many severely depressed individuals are not as hopeless 
as they imagine; indeed, this belief in the utter futility and hopelessness of their lives 
is, in many instances, erroneous and is nothing but a distortion of their reality caused 
by their tormenting condition. I maintain that it is only when the possibility of happiness 
is genuinely and entirely at an end that one should entertain the possibility of humane 
euthanasia.  
																																																								




6. The Schopenhauerian Doctrine of Athanasia  
 
Although it is not my intention to propound psychological analyses in an attempt to 
avow or discredit aspects of Schopenhauer’s thought as others have unjustly attempted 
to do,175 I wish to make the psychological observation that Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical concern with death and athanasia certainly emanate from an extremely 
personal concern; for it appears that Schopenhauer was haunted by the inevitability of 
his death. In corroboration of this view I note that in biographies of the great 
philosopher it is often related that he had many anxieties surrounding his health and 
general well-being; for instance, it is often stated that: 
“[Schopenhauer] slept with loaded pistols by his bedside, and would not allow 
a barber to shave his neck. To avoid the possibility of drinking infected water 
he carried a leather water-flask; he would also lock away the stem and bowl of 
his tobacco pipe after he used it. He settled in Frankfurt (where he was to spend 
most of his later life) because of the high reputation of its doctors. And one 
could go on and on.” (Berman, 1995: xviii). 
It ought to come as no surprise then that the thanatophobic Schopenhauer is, as Simon 
Critchley (2008: 200) notes, “perhaps the modern philosopher who said most about 
death”. Indeed, throughout Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 274-286; 1969b: 463-509; 1974b: 
267-282) works one can find references to his own mortality or to death in general;176 
																																																								
175 As Cartwright (2005: 190) notes, some commentators have attempted to portray 
Schopenhauer’s relationship with his mother as an explanation for, and a consequent rejection 
of, his misogyny.  Although such an explanation may have merit from a psychological 
perspective, it in no way refutes Schopenhauer’s characterisation of women (although, of 
course, I am not thereby intimating that I accept his views thereon). The attempt to discredit a 
philosopher’s theories by appealing to psychological explanations and diagnoses is in fact a 
subtle form of the argumentum ad hominem fallacy and therefore it has absolutely no place in 
a philosophical exposition. 
176 For instance, in the preface to the second edition (1847) of his doctoral thesis Schopenhauer 
(1889a: ix) states: “For I am aware that the time cannot be far off when all correction will be 
impossible; but with that time the period of my real influence will commence […]”, intimating 
that the thought of death was not far from his mind even at the relatively young age of 59. In 




and Singh (2010: 119) goes so far as to state that “no other subject is as important and 
as omnipresent in Schopenhauer’s system as death”. Indeed, following the influence of 
Socrates, Schopenhauer (1969b: 463) explicitly acknowledges death to be “the real 
inspiring genius […] of philosophy”, making it clear that the fear of death is the impetus 
for all genuine philosophizing, including his own system. As such, it ought to come as 
no surprise that the lengthiest supplementary essay in the second volume of Die Welt is 
devoted to the topics of death and athanasia.177 
 
6.1. The Anxiety of Death as a Uniquely Rational Phenomenon 
 
As a point of departure it will be convenient to begin this significant discussion, which 
is the primary theme of my exposition, with the observation that the knowledge of the 
inevitability of death is uniquely human (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463) – no other animal 
is as troubled by the prospect of death as is the homo sapiens. The reason for this is to 
be found in a form of the principle of sufficient reason which is idiosyncratic to the 
human race, viz., the principium cognoscendi, which has the concept (abstract idea) as 
its object (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 114). The modus operandi whereby the principle of 
sufficient reason of knowing is activated is the faculty of reason; and this faculty, 
Schopenhauer claims (1969b: 59 and 1889a: 114), is unique to the human species, ergo 
																																																								
references to death, cf. for instance section 54 in particular, pages 274-286. Furthermore, the 
lengthiest essay in the second volume of Die Welt is devoted to the themes of death and 
immortality (Cartwright, 2005: 36); and in the second volume of Parerga und Paralipomena 
one will also find an additional essay on the topic of athanasia, cf. section X, pages 267-282. It 
is evident that Schopenhauer was, as Singh (2010: 119) expresses it, a thanatologist and I 
conjecture that this was due to Schopenhauer’s extreme thanatophobia. 
177 Chapter XLI, “On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility of our Inner Nature”, pages 
463-509. Schopenhauer (1974b: 267-282) added a supplementary discussion to these themes 
in the second volume of Parerga und Paralipomena. These two essays contain many beautiful 
consolatory remarks about death and the possibility of immortality which I encourage 




is its object, the concept.178 This view of the matter inevitably leads Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 278) to the conclusion that solely the human-animal possesses the abstract 
concepts of “past” and “future”. It follows, then, that  
“[…] the consciousness of [non-rational] animals is a mere succession of 
present events, none of which, however, exists as future before its appearance, 
or as past after its disappearance, this being the distinctive characteristic of the 
human consciousness. Therefore the [non-rational animals] have infinitely less 
to suffer than have we, since they know no other sufferings than those directly 
brought about by the present. But the present is without extension; the future 
and the past, on the other hand, which contain most of the causes of our 
sufferings, are widely extended. To their actual content the merely possible is 
added, whereby an unlimited field is opened up to desire and fear. The [non-
rational animals], on the other hand, are undisturbed by these; they peacefully 
and serenely enjoy every present moment, even if it is only bearable […] 
Further, the sufferings that belong solely to the present can be merely 
physical.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 60-61). 
As the above excerpt intimates, Schopenhauer (1974b: 296) maintains that the life of 
the human being is laden – by way of the abstract concepts of past and future – with 
																																																								
178 This notion must, however, be qualified by the observation that such abstract knowledge is 
noticeably absent in the extremely young and the severely mentally disabled, both of whom, it 
may be justly argued, do not possess the faculty of reason. Nowadays, it is also believed that 
there are certain non-human animal species which possess ratiocination (Jones, 1991: 134). I 
mention this because it is not entirely correct to equate rationality with humanity, but this is 
precisely the way in which Schopenhauer (1889a: 114) considers the matter. As a consequence 
of the aforementioned facts however, it is certain that there are humans, i.e. the extremely young 
and the severely mentally impaired, who do not have an abstract apprehension of the 
inevitability death; whereas there are probably certain non-human animals which possess such 
an understanding. Therefore, in the subsequent discussion one should bear in mind that, despite 
the characterisation not being entirely accurate, humanness is associated with reason, whereas 
non-human animals are considered entirely non-rational, in accordance with Schopenhauer’s 
(1889a: 114) view of the matter. Where possible, and in order to rectify this error, I have 
attempted to avoid characterising the distinction as that between humans on the one hand and 
non-human animals on the other; but rather as that of a distinction between “rational creatures” 




more suffering than is the life of the non-rational animal, which lives solely in the 
present moment and is thus afflicted solely by physical torments. I maintain that a 
consideration of our own lives can reveal the veracity of Schopenhauer’s 
pronouncements. All know, by way of direct experience, of the way in which the past 
and future can cause havoc on the composure of one’s mind; the memory of past 
iniquities can haunt the human conscience, as can the uncertainty of the future. The 
rational-human, unlike the non-rational animal, thus worries about events long past and 
unalterable, on the one hand, and those which are not as yet actualised and may in fact 
never materialise, on the other. The abstract concept of the past makes regret – which 
is a uniquely human, i.e. rational, phenomenon – possible: one may conjure up scenes 
in one’s mind and retrospectively wish that he had acted differently in the past by 
having done something or having omitted to do something else. Everyone knows from 
experience how agonizing a serious regret may be, and it is in this way that the faculty 
of reason – by way of contemplating the past – can augment suffering in a rational 
creature. As the phenomenon of regret is inextricably connected with the abstract 
concept of the past, we must assume that if a creature does not possess the abstract 
concept of “past” it cannot suffer from the torment of regret. Consequently, the torment 
of regret is restricted to all rational creatures.  
In just the same way, if we now turn our attention from a retrospective to a prospective 
consideration, a creature devoid of the abstract concept of “future” will not be capable 
of suffering the pangs of anxiety: for the anxious state depends on the possibility of the 
occurrence of misfortune not immediately present, but existing in the unknown future 
of possibilities. For instance, an extremely wealthy man may be said to be anxious over 
the possibility of becoming a destitute pauper; he thus worries (suffers) about a 
potentiality, i.e. over something unreal and imaginary. Yet without the abstract concept 
of “future” his anxiety, like the phenomenon of regret without the abstract concept of 
“past”, would be devoid of foundation and hence non-existent.  
Hence, in connection with the view here adumbrated regarding the phenomena of regret 
and anxiety, I may be permitted to quote Nietzsche’s (2003: 69) poetic words:  
“If I wanted to shake this tree with my hands I should be unable to do it. But 
the wind, which we cannot see, torments it and bends it where it wishes. It is 




Hence, regret and anxiety – arising as they do from an abstract apprehension of past 
and future, respectively – are mere illusory figments of the imagination, i.e. the two 
“invisible hands” par excellence, which produce a suffering unique to rational 
creatures. In contrast thereto, the entire existence of a non-rational creature is restricted 
to the present moment which, by way of removing the past and future, mitigates the 
amount of suffering experienced thereby. It is primarily for this reason that 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 296) declares the non-rational animal to be “the embodiment of 
the present” and he (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 296) considers this attribute to be the quality 
we most enjoy in connection with our domestic pets.179  
Now, although it is true that the conception of past and future can augment one’s 
suffering by way of regret and anxiety as I have discussed, it is necessary – in order 
merely to be honest and just – to emphasise that reason is not solely a tormentor but 
also a great liberator. In other words, reason is, to use a hackneyed expression, a 
“double-edged sword” (Jones, 1991: 135): it can both augment and attenuate our 
suffering. In the case of non-rational creatures it is true, as Schopenhauer (1969b: 60-
61) states, that their suffering is limited to the present moment; for those that lack a 
retrospective and prospective apprehension can have neither regrets nor anxieties, 
respectively. But, we should be extremely cautious in concluding that as a consequence 
of the absence thereof the non-rational animal is more fortunate than its rational 
counterpart. For although the faculty of reason can augment suffering by way of regret 
and anxiety, it can also liberate one from the torments of the present moment. What is 
meant by this is that reason allows a creature who possesses it to escape the torments 
of the present moment by contemplating the past and the future: amidst the most awful 
catastrophes the rational animal is able to escape his present suffering by conjuring up 
jovial thoughts of his past or hopeful events in his future. In contrast thereto, the non-
rational creature has no such consolation at his disposal, he is entirely subject to the 
torments of the present moment and consequently cannot evade his fear.  When, for 
																																																								
179 Interestingly, this ignorance concerning time, which is unique to non-rational animals, grants 
them a certain non-metaphysical immortality, for, following Wittgenstein (1922: 88), “if by 
eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally 




instance, an individual takes his beloved dog180 to the vet he may feel greatly saddened 
by the animal’s trepidation, which cannot be annulled by recourse to reason. In other 
words, one cannot attenuate a non-rational creature’s fear – which is, by 
Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 60-61) definition, always immediate – by appealing to past 
experiences181 or to future occurrences.182 
Now although it is evident that the faculty of reason can liberate one from suffering in 
the present moment, it must be borne in mind that contemplation of the past and future 
can, and more often does, severely torment. In the case of the human the apprehension 
of death extends to anxiety thereof, thereby augmenting the human capacity for 
suffering. Here it will be beneficial to the discussion to distinguish between the 
psychological concepts of fear and anxiety. Fear refers to sentiments of trepidation 
produced by the immediate presence of danger, whereas anxiety refers to trepidation 
for which no object is currently or immediately present. This distinction allows us to 
state that the non-human, non-rational animal is capable solely of fear (which, 
according to our definition, betokens the immediacy of some danger), whereas the 
rational-human is capable of both fear and anxiety. Consequently, I note that there is a 
subtle difference between fearing death and being anxious about it. The rational 
creature, unfortunately, possesses both these torments.  
The anxiety of death is thus a uniquely rational phenomenon – compounded of both 
reason and Will183  – and refers to the abstract conceptualisation of the inevitability of 
death. When, for instance, an individual experiences uncomfortable sentiments upon 
the contemplation of death which is not as yet immanent we may correctly say that he 
suffers from anxiety over the inevitability of death. I maintain that it is this anxious 
psychological state which encourages philosophical contemplation on the phenomenon 
of death. Technically speaking, then, it is the anxiety of death, and not the fear thereof, 
which induces a philosophical consideration of the matter (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463). 
For in the case of one being confronted immediately with the prospect of death, the 
																																																								
180 Assuming, of course, that dogs do indeed lack the faculty of reason. 
181 For instance, by saying to them: “this uncomfortable experience has never been as bad in 
the past as you imagine it will be, therefore you really have nothing to fear now”. 
182 For instance, by reminding them: “in a little while you will be back at home and safe”. 




contemplation thereof would be absolutely impossible; indeed, it would be superfluous, 
for it would not preserve one’s life. In life-threating situations one directs all one’s 
energy to survival, the philosophical contemplation of death – which cannot preserve 
one’s life – becomes redundant.184  
Now with these notions firmly in mind we can proceed to a description of the way in 
which the abstract concept assists in the anxiety of death. For it is by way of the past 
(based on inductive reasoning) that the inevitability of death somewhere in the 
unknown future comes to beset the human mind more profoundly than any other and 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 463) thus refers to it as “the real inspiring genius […] of 
philosophy”. For the human knows with the certainty of a seer that death will, sooner 
or later, come to him and to those he loves. This knowledge produces a profound 
anxiety and melancholy in the rational human which – like the phenomenon of regret – 
is noticeably absent in non-rational creatures. For the non-rational animal is entirely 
absorbed in the present moment and is consequently free from the torment of anxiety 
concerning the inevitability of death; indeed, as Schopenhauer (1974b: 296) notes, “it 
is just this complete absorption in the present moment, peculiar to [non-rational, non-
human] animals, which contributes so much to the pleasure we derive from our 
domestic pets.” Once the certainty of the inevitability of death dawns upon a rational 
mind it cannot but augment the suffering that an individual experiences; and thus 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 60-61) is vindicated in his view that the apprehension of abstract 
concepts contributes to humankind’s greater capacity for suffering. 
But, we must observe that despite the fact that reason – by way of induction – alerts us 
to the inevitability of death, the abovementioned discussion does not sufficiently 
explicate the ubiquity of the fear of death; which, it may be argued, is present as an 
apprehension of immediate danger even in the non-human animal (Schopenhauer, 
1969b:465). In other words, if we concur with Schopenhauer that most non-human 
animals are devoid of ratiocination then it would appear an inexplicable anomaly that 
they too should fear death if that disquietude were founded solely upon rational 
																																																								
184 In this connection I observe that Schopenhauer’s consolatory philosophical doctrine on 





reflection.  Indeed, the fact that even non-rational creatures fear death intimates that 
such trepidation cannot solely be the result of ratiocination. For although humans are 
aware of the fact that they will inevitably die, that knowledge in itself does not elucidate 
the phenomenon we are presently considering, viz., why one should in fact fear the 
inevitable. In fact, Schopenhauer (1969b: 465-466) argues that from a rational 
perspective death cannot be feared: for rationally considered it would appear, according 
to Schopenhauer (1974b: 268) “better not to be”.185 As such, far from causing a fear of 
annihilation, rational reflection can actually teach one that death is something to be 
desired.  
 
6.2. The Wille-zum-Leben as the Ultimate Source of the Fear of Death 
 
There is, therefore, evidently something more to the matter than mere reason. In other 
words, the mere contemplation of the inevitability of death is in itself insufficient in 
explicating the fear thereof. To that end we may justifiably speak of the fear of death 
as a compounded problem. To discover the second necessary – indeed, the essential – 
element in the production of the fear of death, which the non-rational creature possess 
in equal proportion with the rational, we must turn to the Schopenhauerian doctrine of 
the Will as Ding-an-sich. On the one hand, there is, as was just illustrated, the abstract 
concept of death, which alerts the rational creature to the inevitability of the cessation 
of life sometime in the unknown future; while, on the other, Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 
100) notion of the Will grounding appearances intimates that a vehement desire for life 
exists within every creature. Here, therefore, it must be recalled that Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 510) maintains the Will to be essentially directed towards the continuance of 
life, not solely in the individual, but in general, i.e. in the multifarious extant species 
found throughout the world; he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 275) thus declares that “was der 
Wille will immer das Leben ist” – “[…] what the Will wills is always life”; hence “it is 
																																																								
185 “Indeed, as a mature consideration of the matter leads to the result that complete non-
existence would be preferable to an existence such as ours, the thought of a cessation of our 
existence, or a time when we shall no longer exist, cannot reasonably disturb us any more than 
can the idea that we might never have come into existence” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 268). I refer 




immaterial and a mere pleonasm if, instead of saying “the Will”, we say the ‘[Wille-
zum-Leben]’” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 275). Consequently, it is by way of the concept 
of the Will that Schopenhauer explicates both the ubiquity and the irrationality of the 
fear of death. For at bottom, all creatures contain within themselves an irrational urge 
to continue life, no matter how difficult and sorrowful it may be. Thus Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 465) states:  
“The fear of death is, in fact, independent of all knowledge, for the animal has 
it, although it does not know death.186 Everything that is born already brings 
this fear into the world. Such fear of death, however, is a priori only the reverse 
side of the [Wille-zum-Leben], which indeed we all are. Therefore in every 
animal the fear of its own destruction, like the care for its maintenance, is 
inborn.” 
Thus it becomes perspicuous that the fear of death, according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 
465), originates primarily from the Will. Now as the Will is said to be “blind” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 466), i.e. without knowledge and consciousness, it follows that 
the fear of death is essentially irrational (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 465). In other words, 
the fear of death is nothing but the blind desire for life, i.e. “the reverse side of the 
[Wille-zum-Leben]” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 465), which exists in all organic creatures. 
As such, it follows that if the metaphysical Will were rational the predicament of death 
would not be a disturbance, for reason teaches that it is better not to be than to exist: 
“[…] The boundless attachment to life […] cannot have sprung from 
knowledge or reflection. To these, on the contrary, it appears foolish, for the 
objective value of life is very uncertain, and it remains at least doubtful whether 
existence is to be preferred to non-existence; in fact, if experience and 
reflection have their say, non-existence must certainly win. If we knocked on 
the graves and asked the dead whether they would like to rise again, they would 
shake their heads […] Knowledge […] far from being the origin of that 
attachment to life, even opposes it, since it discloses life’s worthlessness, and 
in this way combats the fear of death.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b:465-466). 
																																																								
186 In other words, the non-human animal does not possess an abstract conception of death and 




As mentioned, these remarks lead to the conclusion that the fear of death ultimately 
emanates from the Wille-zum-Leben, which constitutes the innermost kernel of all 
creatures (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 465). As a consequence thereof Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 465) is able to speak of non-rational animals as also possessing a fear of death, 
but we must observe that this trepidation is different to that of the anxiety concerning 
death which is found in humans (and other rational creatures). In other words, we must 
bear in mind the distinction we previously made between the fear of death on the one 
hand and the anxiety of death on the other: the abstract concept is associated with the 
latter, whereas the irrational Will is inextricably bound to the former. Consequently, if 
it makes any sense to speak meaningfully of an apprehension of death in non-rational 
creatures then it must be restricted to the immediate moment and relate to the fear, as 
opposed to the anxiety, of death. The non-rational animal has a presentiment of death, 
according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 463), solely when its life is threatened; for given 
that they are non-rational they cannot abstractly contemplate the concept of death and 
thus the inevitability thereof is of no concern to them. As a consequence thereof the 
non-human animal lives as though its life is endless (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463); and 
in a sense they are “immortal” (cf. Wittgenstein, 1922: 88).  
However, I must observe a glaring contradiction inherent in Schopenhauer’s theory. In 
the last section I argued, by way of Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 329) argument for 
extending the Will throughout animate nature and his (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 560-567) 
theory of male homosexuality, that the Will as Ding-an-sich cannot, contrary to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115 and 1969b: 466) repeated assertions to the contrary, be 
“without knowledge and blind”; in contradistinction thereto I describe the Will as a 
conscious creative force and a designer of phenomena. Hence it is a peculiarity of his 
system that the conscious Will, which, as we shall shortly see, is said to be 
indestructible (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 269), should fear annihilation.   
Let us for the sake of argument, and in order to render the matter as perspicuous as 
possible, imagine that the Will were in fact blind. If this were so, then Schopenhauer 
could cogently argue that, deceived by the phenomenal mind, the Will, which is 
perpetually directed towards life (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 275), vehemently struggles 
against impending and certain annihilation. However, the fear would, as I intimated, in 
fact be illusory in so far as only one’s phenomenal appearance is susceptible to 




(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 269) and consequently immortal. Here, therefore, the Will’s 
blindness becomes paramount and one can finally apprehend my reasons for according 
it so much attention in the second section of the first part of my exposition. I reiterate 
that in the course of my discussion I argued that the Will cannot in fact be conceived 
of as “blind” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 115), but that it must be conscious and cognisant 
of the creatures it brings into existence.  
Now if the Will as Ding-an-sich is, as I argued, conscious, then it ought to know that it 
is indestructible (cf. Schopenhauer 1974b: 270); hence the destruction of the 
phenomenal form ought to be impertinent to it, i.e. the metaphysical Will ought to 
remain nonchalant in the face of impending death. In short, the contradiction I am 
attempting to render perspicuous is this: if the Will is indestructible (1974b: 269), but 
conscious, and not as Schopenhauer (1969b: 465-466) emphatically insists “irrational 
and blind”, then why should it fear death, when annihilation is merely the destruction 
of the phenomenal appearance and not the Will as Ding-an-sich (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 
270)? It seems to me, therefore, that the identification of the metaphysical Will as a 
rational and conscious entity generates profound complications for Schopenhauer’s 
notions about the fear of death.  
However, in spite of this difficulty, Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 463-466) theory as to the 
origins of the trepidation concerning death is rather straightforward to comprehend: the 
fear of annihilation, although ultimately illusory (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 270), is 
produced by way of both the metaphysical Will and the adventitious (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 466) human mind; i.e. working in unison the Will and the mind induce a fear of 
destruction. The “irrational and blind” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 465) Will incessantly 
strives to continue and perpetuate life (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 275), while the 
phenomenally orientated animal brain deceives the metaphysical Will into believing 
that the annihilation of its phenomenal manifestation is tantamount to its own 
destruction. But, I reiterate that this argument is necessarily dependent upon the 
supposed irrationality and blindness of the metaphysical Will (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
465), a view I previously refuted and rejected. However, this is not my ultimate 
grievance with Schopenhauer’s theory of death and athanasia. In the second part of my 
exposition I shall present numerous criticisms which attempt to refute Schopenhauer’s 
radical idealism and his claim that the Will is the Ding-an-sich; thereby ultimately 




6.3. Some Preliminary Consolations for the Inevitability of Death 
 
It is evident then, that, for Schopenhauer (1969b: 465-466), the fear of death is not a 
product of rational reflection; but ratiocination does augment one’s agony in so far as 
it produces an anxiety about the prospect of death, even in instances where it is not 
threateningly immanent. Yet this is solely one side of the “double-edged sword” (Jones, 
1991: 135) that is reason; and previously I alluded to reason’s ability to liberate one 
from the torments of the present moment. In this way ratiocination can mitigate some 
of the anxiety surrounding the inevitability of death, and thus Schopenhauer (1969b: 
463) argues that 
“[…] just as everywhere in nature a remedy, or at any rate a compensation, is 
given for every evil, so the same reflection that introduced the knowledge of 
death also assists us in obtaining metaphysical points of view. Such views 
console us concerning death, and the [non- rational] animal is neither in need 
of nor capable of them.” 
Thus, just as reason is the source of the anxiety concerning the inevitability of death 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463), it is also the origin of consolatory thoughts pertaining 
thereto. Of course, it is safe to assume that Schopenhauer took his metaphysical theory 
to offer the greatest consolation, and in a moment I shall elaborate upon it at length. 
However, for the present moment I want to focus on some of the other consolatory 
thoughts which emanate from reason concerning the inevitability of death propounded 
by Schopenhauer (1969b: 463-468) in the course of his discussion in chapter XLI in 
the second volume of Die Welt.  
The first consolation is founded upon the observation that were the anxiety of death 
merely a product of rational contemplation it seems that we should “think with equal 
horror of the time [prior to birth] when as yet we did not exist” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
466). Schopenhauer (1969b: 466) correctly points out that because the contemplation 
of non-existence prior to birth does not fill our hearts with trepidation it cannot be non-
existence we fear in fearing death; for the non-existence prior to one’s birth is in all 
respects akin to the non-existence after one’s death. In this connection it will be 




viz., that consciousness is a necessary ingredient in the production of suffering.187  Now 
due to the fact that one cannot recall the period before one’s birth (owing, of course, to 
the absence of consciousness) it is evident that non-existence cannot be experienced as 
a state of suffering and consequently as an evil.  Thus, rational reflection teaches us that 
non-existence is absolutely nothing to be feared, for without consciousness non-
existence is impervious to all forms of suffering. At bottom, our nonchalance at the 
notion of our non-existence prior to birth should console us as to our inevitable non-
existence after death, for both are, as I mentioned, essentially one and the same. Hence, 
“[…] I can then console myself for the infinite time after my death when I shall 
not exist, with the infinite time when I did not as yet exist, as a quite customary 
and really comfortable state. For the infinity a parte post without me cannot 
be any more fearful than the infinity a parte ante without me, since the two are 
not distinguished by anything except by the intervention of an ephemeral life-
dream […] [To] mourn for the time when we shall no longer exist is just as 
absurd as it would be to mourn for the time when we did not as yet exist; for it 
is all the same whether the time our existence does not fill is related to that 
which it does fill as future or as past.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 467). 
The next consolation pertains to the rapidity with which consciousness is lost just prior 
to death. Schopenhauer (1969b: 468) correctly notes that “[…] for the subject, death 
itself consists merely in the moment when consciousness vanishes, since the activity of 
the brain ceases. The extension of the stoppage to all the other parts of the organism 
which follows this is really already an event after death. Therefore, in a subjective 
respect, death concerns only consciousness”. In other words, for an individual in the 
process of dying the only event of concern is the moment one loses consciousness, for 
it alone illuminates the world and renders it experienceable. Rational reflection 
consequently teaches us that from a subjective perspective death is really an 
instantaneous event in so far as it entails the loss of consciousness which occurs as 
rapidly as the speed of light. Here we must observe that in order for one to experience 
an event consciousness is a prerequisite thereof, i.e. without awareness one cannot be 
said to experience anything. Hence, death cannot be considered an evil, “for every evil, 
																																																								
187 I wish to note that all Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 466-470) cogent consolations afforded by 
reason concerning the inevitability of death arise, as I see it, from an earnest consideration of 




like every good, presupposes existence, indeed even consciousness” (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 467).   
I reiterate that at the moment of death the transition into a state of unconsciousness 
occurs so rapidly that it cannot even be said to be experienceable as an event in life, let 
alone one of immense suffering. Any individual who has experienced the rapidity with 
which consciousness is lost upon falling asleep, fainting (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273) 
or being administered a general anaesthetic can attest to this consoling fact; as 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 468) states:   
“Now from going to sleep everyone can, to some extent, judge what the 
vanishing of consciousness may be; and whoever has had a real fainting fit 
knows it even better. The transition here is not so gradual, nor is it brought 
about by dreams; but first of all, while we are still fully conscious, the power 
of sight disappears, and then immediately supervenes the deepest 
unconsciousness.” 
Indeed, if we consider Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 468) notion that “death itself consists 
merely in the moment when consciousness vanishes” to be veracious, then we must 
acknowledge that the moment of death coincides with the loss of consciousness and is 
consequently not something experienceable, i.e. following Epicurus (quoted in 
Schopenhauer, 1969b: 468), we can justifiably declare that “death does not concern us; 
[for] when we are, death is not, and when death is, we are not”. Similarly, in connection 
with the aforementioned discussion, I may be permitted to invoke Wittgenstein’s (1922: 
88) famous words: 
“Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through.” 
I reiterate that if we consider consciousness to be a prerequisite for the possibility of 
experiencing anything, we can, I think, comprehend Wittgenstein’s meaning: the fact 
that consciousness is lost in the act of dying – a phenomenon which from the subjective 
standpoint occurs instantaneously – portends that death itself cannot be experienced. It 
is therefore, upon close consideration, erroneous to maintain that all will experience the 
phenomenon of death; for although it is certain that all animate creatures will perish, 




In this way reason intimates that we should not fear death as an evil; on the contrary, 
death “often appears even as a good thing, as something desired, as a friend” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 496). In order to comprehend how death, which is often 
considered the summum malum, is in fact a benevolent friend, we need only turn our 
attention to Schopenhauer’s (1969b:469) pessimistic musings on the nature of life and 
the state of most individuals just prior to their death: 
“All who have encountered insuperable obstacles to their existence or to their 
efforts, who suffer from incurable disease or from inconsolable grief, have the 
return into the womb of nature as the last resource that is open to them as a 
matter of course. Like everything else, they emerged from this womb for a 
short time, enticed by the hope of more favourable conditions of existence than 
those that have fallen to their lot, and from this the same path always remains 
open to them.” 
The error of considering death as an evil often occurs as a result of a confounding of 
the state just prior to death with the instantaneous act of death itself (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 283). By this I mean, quite simply, that most individuals experience serious 
illness and tremendous suffering just prior to their passing. Now many unwittingly 
associate grave illnesses with the act of death itself, thereby confounding the 
phenomena and causing death itself to assume the form of an evil adversary. Yet, to 
reiterate an earlier observation, the rationally sagacious individual must bear in mind 
that the destruction of consciousness in death renders it impervious to experience – 
whether of a pleasant or unpleasant nature – hence, by releasing a tormented individual 
from the manifold psychological and physical agonies of existence, death may thus be 
considered a remedy for the sickness of life, i.e. as a kind friend who leads us out of 
our agonizing condition. Is it not in this sense that Socrates’ last words were said by 
Plato (2007C: 92) to be:  
“Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt?”188 
Of course, the state of non-existence cannot be considered a positively experienceable 
good, but neither can it, upon rational reflection, be considered an evil. As 
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consciousness is extinguished in death, the phenomenon thereof is, as Epicurus (quoted 
in Schopenhauer, 1969b: 468) has it, essentially nothing to us – neither a good, nor a 
bad. But from the standpoint of ratiocination, the considerations here presented in this 
way transform the summum malum into the summum bonum, liberating one from the 
suffering of life.189 Let us now turn to an earnest consideration of Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical consolation for the inevitability of death, which he (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 463) considers to be the most tranquilising. 
 
6.4. Schopenhauer’s Theory of Immortality 
 
Although the aforementioned reflections can and do console one regarding the 
inevitability of death, Schopenhauer (1969b: 463) maintains that only a metaphysical 
doctrine which teaches a continued existence of sorts after the demise of one’s physical 
form can truly console one plagued by the certainty of death. However, Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 464) maintains that Western individuals tend to oscillate between two equally 
erroneous views: on the one hand, there exists the bizarre doctrine that one shall 
continue to exist after death with all one’s physical attributes, i.e. “with skin and hair” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 464); whereas, on the other hand, there is the materialistic view 
that death is an absolute annihilation which inevitably leads to the “bestial” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 464) conclusion expressed in the dictum “edite, bibite, post 
mortem nulla voluptas”.190 Both these views are anathema to Schopenhauer’s 
sensibilities and he consequently attempts to propound an alternative metaphysical 
view. 
Now Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia ultimately depends, as Cartwright (2005: 39) 
notes, on the “metaphysics of the Will”. But in addition thereto it is also greatly 
indebted to “Kant’s greatest merit” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 417), viz., the 
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merely illusory; for as will become conspicuous Schopenhauer (1974b: 278) maintains that the 
Will is impervious to destruction by ordinary death and hence it is able to re-manifest itself, 
thereby continuing the tragedy of existence. 




dichotomisation between the Will as Ding-an-sich on the one hand, and the world of 
appearances, on the other. Ultimately, Schopenhauer (1974b: 269-270) wishes to argue 
that the phenomenon of death belongs solely to the phenomenal world, and not to the 
Will as Ding-an-sich. 
Let us commence this discussion by observing the situation from the former standpoint, 
i.e. the world of appearance subjected to the four forms of the principle of sufficient 
reason. From this perspective we behold a temporal and spatial world in perpetual flux 
and transformation: here the principium fiendi191 and the principium essendi192 rule and 
thus ensure that the forms are individuated and constantly change; in other words, as a 
particular phenomenon “everyone is transitory” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 282). Thus, one 
witnesses the birth of an individual, followed by an ephemeral, and often tragic, life, 
which subsequently sinks into the desolation of oblivion. As Schopenhauer (1969a: 
275) states:  
“Birth and death belong equally to life, and hold the balance as mutual 
conditions of each other, or, if the expression be preferred, as poles of the 
whole phenomenon of life.” 
From this perspective we may be led to the view that an individual arises at birth ex 
nihilo193 and returns thereto upon dying (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 275). Indeed, this is the 
view most championed by our modern materialistic world. But if one were to subject 
the notion to a rigorous scrutiny one shall discern its ultimate inaccuracy. For the notion 
that something may arise out of nothing is, in the last analysis, utterly inconceivable to 
the human mind. For this reason the ancients rightly declared: Ex nihilo nihil fit, et in 
nihilum nihil potest reverti (quoted in Schopenhauer, 1969b: 487).194 The notion of 
something arising out of nothing is to philosophy what the now debunked concept of 
abiogenesis (spontaneous generation) was to biology. I may, therefore, be permitted to 
use the expression of “spontaneous creation” as an expression of the notion of 
something arising out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo). Now, even though biology has 
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192 “The principle of sufficient reason of being”, i.e. time and space. 
193 “Out of nothing”. 





been purged of the concept, we still find, at the present day, a unique form of this bizarre 
doctrine being propounded in cosmology. I am thinking in particular of the difficulty 
faced by modern cosmologists in attempting to explicate what came before the so-called 
“big bang”. Due to the fact that our scientific laws may not be applicable to whatever 
brought the big bang into existence (Hawking, 2016: 55)195 it seems convenient, from 
the scientific standpoint, to argue that the creation of our universe was an act of 
spontaneous creation, i.e. creatio ex nihilo. Yet this seems to me to be an utterly 
meaningless response, for, as mentioned, the creation of something out of nothing is 
inconceivable to a rational mind. In my opinion such an explanation stands in lieu of 
the more honest admission of ignorance, i.e. a cosmologist ought rather to admit that 
the origins of the big bang are insoluble by the scientific method and they ought to take 
Wittgenstein’s (1922: 90) closing statement in the Tractatus sensu proprio:196 
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” 
But let us, for the sake of argument, entertain the doctrine of the universe arising ex 
nihilo. One need only attempt to imagine the situation in order for its absurdity to be 
brought to the fore: from an empty void or vacuum – not itself located within time or 
space, therefore, technically speaking, not really anything – elementary particles 
suddenly burst forth, i.e. by an act of spontaneous creation, thereby forming the 
universe. Absolutely everything we experience from – nothing! It is an affront to every 
logical mind to hear that the universe spontaneously created itself out of empty 
nothingness; even more so than the notion of a worm or a fly spontaneously generating 
itself in putrefying flesh or waste.197 I think that such theories corroborate my view of 
the ignorance with which we humans must necessarily live our lives: we find ourselves 
on a lonely planet inhabited by certain forms of life, floating aimlessly in the vast 
expanse of space, and yet surrounded by what appears to be a lifeless ocean in all 
directions: in truth, we know not how we, our planet, our Moon, our Sun, our solar 
																																																								
195 “As far as we are concerned, events before the big bang can have no consequences, so they 
should not form part of a scientific model of the universe. We should therefore cut them out of 
the model and say that time had a beginning at the big bang” (Hawking, 2016: 55). 
196 “Literally”. 
197 For not even in the case of biological spontaneous generation are creatures said to appear 




system, our galaxy or even our universe itself came to be. At best we can formulate 
conjectures which appear to accord with our observations and which we subsequently 
term “theories”; but we can never be entirely certain of anything: ignoramus et 
ignorabimus.198 However, for a theory to be plausible it must, at the very least, be 
comprehensible and yet, as mentioned, I simply cannot fathom the creation of 
something – indeed, absolutely everything – out of nothing.  
It may be argued in response, of course, that the finite human mind is incapable of 
comprehending the universe in its entirely: perhaps, then, elementary particles can 
spontaneously create, in spite of humankind’s inability to fathom such an occurrence. 
But, even if this seemingly absurd fact does indeed accord with reality, the scientific 
method demands that such an event be proved by way of experimentation; for until then 
it remains mere conjecture. I therefore propose that until scientists can unequivocally 
show by way of experimentation such elementary particles spontaneously creating 
themselves from a true vacuum, we cast such theories aside and approach all creatio ex 
nihilo theories cum grano salis.199 I have discussed this matter at length in order to 
convince and illustrate to readers the untenability of attempting to argue that something 
can arise out of nothing. 
Now, to Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 270-271) mind, the notion that a creature’s existence 
commences with birth is an absurdity; for it tacitly assumes that existence can arise ex 
nihilo. However, I take the aforementioned discussion to have illustrated the absurdity 
– and consequently, the untenability – of such a view. Hence I maintain that, along with 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 487), I can confidently assert the dictum: ex nihilo nihil fit, et in 
																																																								
198 “We do not know and we shall not know”. 
199 But philosophy affords us a further indictment of the aforementioned view in the form of 
the cosmological argument for God’s existence. According thereto, God is the prima causa of 
the universe; therefore, nothing could have created God and so, therefore, God must be the 
cause of himself (causa sui). But the absurdity of the notion of something causing (i.e. creating) 
itself may be succinctly illustrated by conjuring up in the mind the image of a man giving birth 
– to himself! Therefore, one will not find a haven for the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in the 




nihilum nihil potest reverti.200 The impossibility of something arising out of nothing is 
extremely significant to the development of Schopenhauer’s argument for immortality, 
for it intimates that a creature must have existed in some sense prior to its birth; thus 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 487) states: “everyone can think of himself as immortal only in 
so far as he thinks of himself as unborn”.  
This necessarily leads to the question as to what could possibly have existed prior to 
one’s conception. The solution, as with everything in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, is to 
be found in the notion of the metaphysical Will (Cartwright, 2005: 39). However, it is 
important to bear in mind that radical idealism is equally as essential to Schopenhauer’s 
theory of immortality; for as will become evident in due course Schopenhauer (1974b: 
270) wishes to argue that the phenomenon of death belongs uniquely to the phenomenal 
world and not to the world as it is in-itself.  It will be recalled that in the second section 
of the first part of my exposition I argued that the metaphysical Will possesses three 
attributes, or rather the lack thereof, in contradistinction to objects found in the 
phenomenal world. I indicated that due to the fact that time, space (the principium 
individuationis, which emanates from the principium essendi) and causality (which 
emanates from the principium fiendi) are essentially mind-dependent they pertain solely 
to the phenomenal world, i.e. the experienceable world of appearances. As a 
consequence thereof, the world as it is in-itself, i.e. independent of all cognition must 
be aspatial, atemporal and acausal. We can express this positively by saying that the 
Will as Ding-an-sich is a unity, eternal and unchanging. For the sake of Schopenhauer’s 
theory of immortality, the two most significant attributes of the Ding-an-sich are its 
atemporality and its acausality.  Although I already discussed these three concepts in 
the course of my discussion on Schopenhauer’s attempted identification of the Will 










6.4.1. The Will as Eternal 
 
Given that time emanates from the mind it cannot be a feature of the Will as it is in-
itself (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 120); thus is the Will as Ding-an-sich said by 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 176) to be eternal. But it is important to note that here eternity 
is not to be construed as an endless duration, which inadvertently presupposes the 
notion of time, but, rather, as a timelessness. Consequently, the Will as Ding-an-sich is 
eternal only in so far as it is not located within time, for the attempted application of 
temporal concepts thereto is utterly meaningless. In this sense the Will has no beginning 
and no end (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 278); rather, it is that which perpetually exists 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 279). Thus Schopenhauer (1974b: 276) states: 
“[…] however much the plays and masks may change on the world’s stage, the 
actors in all of them nevertheless remain the same. We sit together, talk, and 
excite one another; eyes gleam and voices grow louder. Thousands of years 
ago, others sat in just the same way; it was the same and they were the same. 
It will be just the same thousands of years hence. The contrivance that prevents 
us from becoming aware of this is time.” 
Now the atemporality of the Will has a peculiar counterpart in the phenomenal world, 
viz., it perpetually manifests itself in the present moment (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 279). 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 279) therefore refers to this perpetual present as “the nunc 
stans”, which he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 279) acquires by way of scholastic philosophy. 
Not being subject to time, the Will remains impervious to its pernicious influence and 
consequently the abstract “concepts of past and future” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 1974) 
do not apply to it; “hence the present is the essential form of the phenomenon of the 
Will, and is inseparable from that form”. Consequently, if it were possible for one to 
assume the standpoint of the metaphysical Will he would behold an extended present 
moment wherein superfluous and superficial appearances perpetually transform; akin 
to the actor who “stand firm and is, therefore, always the same” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 






6.4.2. The Will as Unalterable 
 
Besides being atemporal, it will be recalled that the Will as Ding-an-sich is also said 
by Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) to be impervious to the pernicious influence of the 
principium fiendi, i.e. the law of causation. This portends that the metaphysical Will is 
not subject to alteration, i.e., it is unchanging. If, in contrast thereto, we compare the 
situation of phenomenal objects we find that they are in a constant state of 
transformation: the individual, for instance, is in a perpetual process of aging which we 
can discern in the three primary phases of human life, viz., youth, adulthood and old 
age. But the metaphysical Will does not, like its phenomenal manifestations, grow old 
and decrepit for, as mentioned, it is impervious to the influence of causality. Thus, the 
Will which will manifest itself in an object a thousand years from now is identical to 
the Will which manifested itself in an object a thousand years ago (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 276). In this way there exists an identification between every extant and 
deceased creature; for the Will which exists in all is indefatigable and unalterable; thus 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 482) states: 
“I know quite well that anyone would regard me as mad if I seriously assured 
him that the cat, playing just now in the yard, is still the same one that did the 
same jumps and tricks there three hundred years ago; but I also know that it is 
much more absurd to believe that the cat of today is through and through and 
fundamentally an entirely different one from the cat of three hundred years 
ago.”201 
Although I do not wish to anticipate one of my most significant criticisms of 
Schopenhauer’s theory, due to the complexity of the matter I wish here to observe a 
serious complication generated by the supposed acausality of the metaphysical Will for 
Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine. In my discussion on Schopenhauer’s notorious 
pessimism, I observed that the solution to the problem of life for Schopenhauer (1969a: 
412) is the dissolution of the metaphysical Will in oneself; only in this sense is one’s 
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doubt this was due in part to his theory of the indestructibility of the metaphysical Will and its 




existence truly at an end. Indeed, because the metaphysical Will is insusceptible to a 
positive transformation by way of non-ascetic suicide, it is rejected by Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 398) as a genuine solution to the predicament of life, for non-ascetic suicide 
affects solely the phenomenal appearance and not the Will as Ding-an-sich 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 399). Now in order for the metaphysical Will to be susceptible 
to ascetic practices it simply cannot be impervious to the influence of causation; on the 
contrary, I argue that the phenomenally-bound ascetic practices must be capable of a 
direct causal interaction with the Will as Ding-an-sich. Therefore, it seems to me that 
an argument against Schopenhauer’s claim for the acausality (and thus, the 
unalterability) of the metaphysical Will is to be found in his soteriological doctrine; in 
connection therewith, I refer the reader to the appendix. 
 
6.4.3. The Will as a Unity 
 
It will also be recalled that given that the metaphysical Will is not subject to the 
principium individuationis (in particular, space) it is not to be conceived of as a plurality 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 113). This is significant in so far as it intimates that immortality 
is not, in contradistinction to religious and many other philosophical (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 495) notions thereof, a personal matter. In other words, because the unified Will 
constitutes the essence of every extant creature, the immortal aspect of all is essentially 
identical and not individual;202 whereas “all philosophers [before Schopenhauer] have 
made the mistake of placing that which is metaphysical, indestructible, and eternal in 
man in the intellect” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 495), which is, by its very nature, separate 
and distinct to every individual.   
In his beautiful discussion on athanasia in the second volume of Parerga und 
Paralipomena Schopenhauer (1974b: 281) maintains that what is uniquely individual 
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that the abrogation of the Will in one organism will necessary lead to the dissolution of the Will 
in toto (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 129). In the appendix I address and attempt to resolve this 




is in fact an illusion, for it belongs to the phenomenal appearance of the manifested 
metaphysical Will. As such, the dissolution of one’s individuality at the moment of 
death is not in fact to be feared, for it is something adventitious and does not constitute 
one’s innermost essence. Although this notion is extremely alluring, I must, however, 
observe a serious inconsistency inherent to this view generated by Schopenhauer’s 
(2005: 82) invocation of the so-called “intelligible character”, which he acquired by 
way of Kant. 
Let us commence this discussion by observing that for Schopenhauer (2005: 51) the 
human character is fixed and unalterable – “it remains the same throughout the whole 
of life”. Schopenhauer (2005: 52) claims that:  
“A confirmation of this truth can be gathered from everyday experience. But 
one encounters it in the most striking manner when after twenty or thirty years 
one meets an acquaintance again and soon catches him doing the same silly 
things as formerly.” 
Indeed, many individuals unwittingly assume the veracity of this notion when, for 
instance, upon “[f]inding a man dishonest once, he never trusts him again”, whereas, 
on the contrary, “he readily relies on the one who has proved himself honest in the past” 
(Schopenhauer, 2005: 52). Furthermore, Schopenhauer (2005: 52) observes that when 
an individual behaves contrary to the way in which one expects him to behave one 
“never says: ‘His character has changed’, but ‘I was mistaken about him’”; intimating, 
of course, that the human character is static and unalterable. Now although these 
pronouncements may accord with the way in which most human beings construe the 
matter of personality, i.e., as something unalterable, it in no way proves the veracity 
thereof. In contradistinction thereto I may be permitted to observe here that in my 
estimation the human character can and does undergo various alterations throughout 
the course of one’s life. In order to illustrate the matter most convincingly, I note that 
damage to the brain by way of disease, intoxication or injury can result in serious 
personality changes.203 I think that any reticent individual who has ever ingested 
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(cited in Wilkinson, 2017) claims that he initially identified as a heterosexual man, but that 
after sustaining a serious stroke (which, of course, must be assumed to have physiologically 




alcohol can attest to the way in which the substance causes one to become less inhibited 
and thus act contrary to one’s usual character. The significance of this observation 
intimates that one’s personality is entirely dependent upon the brain; consequently, if 
that organ undergoes a certain permanent physiological alteration, it is to be expected 
that the personality will likewise be transformed accordingly in some significant 
respect. But I note that in the course of his discussion on the inalterability of the human 
character Schopenhauer (2005: 51-54) does not discuss this significant fact and he 
(Schopenhauer, 2005: 51) consequently insists upon the constancy of the human 
character. 
However, such a view is at variance with the fact that Schopenhauer (1889a: 169-170) 
is also a determinist – correctly maintaining that all objects, including humans, are 
subject to the causal law. As Schopenhauer (2005: 46) states:  
“For man, like all objects of experience, is a phenomenon in time and space, 
and since the law of causality holds for all such a priori and consequently 
without exception, he too must be subject to it.” 
As such, it would seem that the human character, like everything else in the phenomenal 
world, ought to be subject to the principium fiendi and thus alterable. However, the 
desire to construe the human character as unalterable leads Schopenhauer (2005: 82), 
as mentioned, to the acceptance of the Kantian dichotomisation between the intelligible 
and the empirical characters. The intelligible character is essentially the “noumenal 
form” of the character, not bound by the principle of sufficient reason, i.e. the 
principium individuationis and causality (Schopenhauer, 2005: 82); whereas the 
empirical character is, as its name suggests, the character known through experience 
(Schopenhauer, 2005: 49), i.e. the phenomenal manifestation of the so-called 
intelligible character.204 Now, that the genuine character, i.e., the intelligible character, 
is impervious to the principle of sufficient reason intimates that it is static and 
unalterable throughout the course of one’s life (Schopenhauer, 2005: 51). 
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However, it is important to realise that the postulation of an unalterable human 
character generates profound complications within Schopenhauer’s system. For if the 
intelligible character is not bound to the principle of sufficient reason then it must 
necessarily belong to the world as it is in-itself. However, it will be recalled that the 
Ding-an-sich is said to be a unity and therefore the possibility of multitudinous 
characters existing within that realm is precluded. Schopenhauer (1969a: 224) therefore 
sagaciously avoids the contradiction of identifying the intelligible character with the 
Will as Ding-an-sich by arguing that every human character corresponds to a unique 
Platonic Idea.205 Although this appears to resolve the difficulty – locating the 
intelligible character somewhere in between that of the world as it is in-itself and its 
manifestation, i.e. the phenomenal world – the postulation of the Platonic Ideas 
generates, as is known, profound complications for Schopenhauer’s system. As I 
argued, the Platonic Ideas actually constitute a third force, for they are neither fully 
akin to the Will as Ding-an-sich and nor are they entirely identical with phenomenal 
objects. In the last analysis, however, they are a superfluous and unnecessary element 
within Schopenhauer’s system and I therefore maintain that it is best to jettison them 
altogether.206; 207 
																																																								
205 “[…] each person exhibits to a certain extent [a Platonic] Idea that is wholly characteristic 
of him” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 224). 
206 It is to be noted that the Platonic Ideas also play a role in Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 483-485) 
theory of immortality. It will be recalled that I previously identified the Platonic Idea as a 
prototype or blueprint for all phenomenal manifestations; thus Schopenhauer (1969b: 483) 
maintains that by following the particular Idea of each species the Will is able to manifest 
instantiations of particular creatures ad infinitum. The view is evidently non-Darwinian in so 
far as it maintains the immutability of particular species by assigning an eternal prototypical 
Idea to every extant and extinct species. Furthermore, the Platonic Idea, unlike its particular 
instantiation, is immortal in so far as it is said to be impervious to the influence of time and 
causality (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 483). However, due to the fact that I take the Platonic Ideas 
to be a superfluous postulation within Schopenhauer’s system I do not believe that a 
consideration of them is able to offer much consolation for the inevitability of death.  
207 Moreover, I must acknowledge that if one were to obstinately and absurdly retain the concept 
of a unique Platonic Idea corresponding to every individual human existence (Schopenhauer, 




Now if one were to reject the Platonic Ideas it follows that there would no longer exist 
an abode for the intelligible character for, as mentioned, it cannot be equated with the 
Will as Ding-an-sich which is said by Schopenhauer (1969a: 113) to be a unity. One 
would then be compelled to reject the notion of the intelligible character altogether and 
retain solely that of the empirical character. But then one would necessarily have to 
accept that given that the empirical character is entirely located within the phenomenal 
realm it is entirely subject to the laws which govern it; as such one would be coerced 
to accept the view that, contrary to Schopenhauer’s (2005: 51) assertion, the human 
character, like all phenomenal entities, is subject to the principium fiendi and 
consequently alterable.  
I observe that although this view is at variance with Schopenhauer’s (2005: 51) 
understanding it actually accords perfectly with his (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 281) 
teaching that the individual character is an illusion, i.e. individuality, which all fear 
losing at the moment of death, is in fact not that which is essential. This is significant, 
because according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 495) what distinguishes him from all 
previous philosophical systems is his identification of the essence of man to be located 
in the impersonal Will, as opposed to the rational and individual soul. But if, as we have 
seen, one adheres to Schopenhauer’s (2005: 51) view of the constancy of the individual 
character then one is coerced to postulate a transcendent form thereof, i.e. an 
indestructible Platonic Idea corresponding to the individual human character 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 224), even if it is unconscious,208 thereby, perhaps unwittingly, 
																																																								
“intelligible character” (Schopenhauer, 2005: 51), then one has unwittingly placed old wine in 
new bottles; for the concept of an indestructible, uniquely individual character is already found 
in many religious and spiritualist traditions; it is all one then whether we refer to this notion as 
the “soul” or the “intelligible character” or a “unique Platonic Idea”. Yet the fact that for 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 273) consciousness, wherein the human character is inextricably bound, 
is akin to the physical brain necessarily rules out the possibility of it surviving the demise of 
the physical form; as such we are compelled to consider the concept of the intelligible character 
an untenable and unnecessary fiction within his system, a foreign notion culled from the 
Kantian philosophy and recklessly grafted onto the Schopenhauerian.  
208 Schopenhauer (1974b: 273-274) correctly observes that consciousness is dependent on the 
brain, which is ultimately a phenomenal object. Thus, “in death consciousness assuredly 




drawing Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality into a closer association with Judaeo-
Christian and Platonic (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 277) beliefs; intimating that there is in 
fact a postulated immortal individual character within Schopenhauer’s theory. 
On the contrary, my interpretation – by jettisoning the notion of the intelligible 
character – purifies Schopenhauer’s theory of all erroneous Platonic and Judaeo-
Christian influences. What remains upon my view is the empirical character which, like 
all phenomenal objects is bound to the principle of sufficient reason and is consequently 
subject to alteration and ultimately destruction in death. Thus, on my view, nothing 
personal or individual survives the demise of one’s physical form and this, I observe, 
accords immaculately with Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 278) characterisation of the matter. 
 
6.5. The Doctrine of Palingenesis 
 
The above considerations necessarily lead to the conclusion that the metaphysical Will 
is the indestructible element in all creatures; for unlike phenomenal manifestations 
thereof, the Will is neither subjected to the principium individuationis nor to the 
principium fiendi (the law of causality). Thus Schopenhauer (1974b: 270) states: 
“How can we imagine, on seeing the death of a human being, that here a thing-
in-itself becomes nothing? On the contrary, that only a phenomenon comes to 
an end in time, this form of all phenomena, without the thing-in-itself being 
thereby affected, is the immediate intuitive knowledge of everyone.”  
It is evident, then, that the metaphysical Will exists prior to one’s conception and that 
it shall persist after one’s phenomenal demise. But if we pursue the matter to its logical 
conclusion then we shall come to realise that Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality is 
actually a form of the Eastern religious concept of the so-called “transmigration of 
souls”. However, in the case of Schopenhauer’s philosophy what transmigrates is not, 
as in the Eastern religions, a conscious, individual soul but an “irrational and blind” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 466) metaphysical entity. This generates one particularly 
																																																								
by Schopenhauer (1969a: 224) to act as a prototype of the unique human individuality must be 




significant distinction between the theory of transmigration in Eastern thought and 
within Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. 
Following Schopenhauer (1974b: 276-277), it will be convenient to distinguish 
between two forms of the concept of the “transmigration of souls”. Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 276) observes that metempsychosis refers to “the transition of the entire so-
called soul into another body”; whereas palingenesis intimates the continuation of a 
non-conscious substance, which, upon “assuming the shape of a new being, receives a 
new intellect” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 276). Now the intellect and consciousness are, 
for Schopenhauer (1969b: 205 & 466), entirely adventitious; consequently, they do not 
constitute the essence of a creature. Expressed somewhat differently, we may correctly 
say that the intellect and consciousness are, for Schopenhauer (1974b: 273-274), 
entirely a product of the phenomenal world. Thus Schopenhauer (1974b: 273) states:  
“For in death consciousness assuredly perishes, but certainly not that which 
had till then produced it. Thus consciousness rests primarily on the intellect, 
but this on a physiological process. For it is obviously the function of the brain 
and, therefore, conditioned by the co-operation of the nervous and vascular 
systems, more specifically by the brain that is nourished, animated and 
constantly agitated by the heart. It is through the ingenious and mysterious 
structure of the brain which anatomy describes but physiology does not 
understand, that the phenomenon of the objective world and the whole 
mechanism of our thoughts are brought about. An individual consciousness 
and thus a consciousness in general is not conceivable in an immaterial or 
incorporeal being, since the condition of every consciousness, knowledge, is 
necessarily a brain-function really because the intellect manifests itself 
objectively as brain.” 
Thus, when an individual dies his intellect and consciousness – given that they are 
entirely dependent on the brain (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273), which is a phenomenal 
entity – dissolve at the moment of death;209 but the metaphysical Will – given that it is 
said to be atemporal (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 119-120 & 1969b: 496) and acausal 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100) – is indestructible and consequently it does not dissolve at 
																																																								
209 It follows, therefore, that birth is the assuming of a particular consciousness, whereas death 




the moment of one’s death.210 Schopenhauer (1969b: 502) takes his theory of the 
indestructible, albeit unconscious, Will to be akin to the notion of palingenesis, 
referring to it as “more correct than metempsychosis for describing this [i.e. his] 
doctrine” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 502). Schopenhauer (1974b: 276) acknowledges 
metempsychosis to be the exoteric form of the transmigration of the souls, whereas 
palingenesis he (ibid.) considers as the esoteric form thereof. Thus, given that it is more 
comprehensible to the masses, it is understandable that metempsychosis is often 
accorded more attention by religion. However, metempsychosis must be considered 
erroneous in so far as it maintains the rebirth of a conscious and intellectual soul, 
whereas, according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 466), that which endures and survives the 
demise of the physical form in order to re-manifest itself in the phenomenal world is 
the unconscious metaphysical Will. 
It is ultimately from this process of life, death and re-birth in saecula saeculorum211 
that we find ourselves in existence at this present moment; for our essence, which we 
currently possess for but a brief moment in time, is indefatigable and indestructible; as 
such, it animated countless lives prior to our birth and it will – if we do not follow the 
path of asceticism and abrogate the portion of the Will which we currently possess 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 508) – re-manifest itself into countless other lives after our 
demise. Accordingly, we are deluded by the principle of sufficient reason into thinking 
that at every generation the world contains within it fundamentally new existences. In 
essence, the creatures which inhabit the world today are the manifestations of a Will 
which existed in countless previous generations, and which will, in turn, constitute the 
essence of countless future generations. In this sense, we may be compared to actors 
donning new costumes and personas, whereas, in essence, i.e. behind the façade, we 
are the same imperturbable and indefatigable beings. Birth is akin to putting on a new 
costume, death to casting it off. Hence, the costume, i.e. the individual existence, I don 
today will eventually be exchanged for another, as it has been innumerable times 
before.212 
																																																								
210 At least not at the moment of a non-ascetic death; cf. the appendix. 
211 “Unto the age of ages”, expressing the notion of eternity. 
212 Until, at last, the Will manifests itself in an individual who says “from the bottom of his 




Here, therefore, it is significant to note that Schopenhauer’s theory of palingenesis does 
not commit him to the absurdity of maintaining that one’s existence commences at birth 
and that it will end at death, or that after arising ex nihilo one will continue to exist 
“with skin and hair” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 464) for all eternity. In this regard, 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 488) actually considers Christianity to be the pinnacle of 
inconsistency and absurdity, for the Christian doctrine teaches that one is created ex 
nihilo and then is committed to either heaven or hell for all eternity, i.e. the teaching 
generates an asymmetry between the states prior to birth and after death. Such a 
doctrine defiles the truth, as Schopenhauer (1969b: 174 & 1974b: 273) sees it, for two 
reasons: firstly, it assumes the absurdity of a creatio ex nihilo and secondly, it maintains 
the continued existence of one’s conscious individuality after death.213 In 
contradistinction thereto, the incipient Jewish doctrine – although erroneous in so far 
as it, like Christianity maintains that one’s existence commences at birth (or, more 
accurately, conception) and ends at death – Schopenhauer (1969b: 488) considers to be 
consistent in so far as it maintains that a nothingness stands on either side of existence, 
i.e. prior to birth and after one’s death.214 The Eastern religions – “Brahmanism and 
Buddhism” – however, espouse a consistent and a veracious doctrine in so far as they 
maintain that one will exist after death just as much as one existed prior to one’s birth 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 488). Moreover, this profound insight accords immaculately 




1969b: 479). Cf. the appendix in which I discuss at great length the abrogation of the Will in 
the resigned ascetic.  
213 It is interesting to note that modern science offers a similar inconsistent view of the universe: 
it was created ex nihilo, underwent a process of rapid inflation, and it now appears that it will 
continue to inflate ad infinitum (Hawking, 2016: 224). Thus, the universe, like the Christian 
view of immortality, arose from nothing and has an eternal existence. 
214 Schopenhauer (1974b: 357n1) bizarrely intimates that the absence of a doctrine of 
immortality in incipient Judaism may partly explicate why “the Jews were at all times and by 




6.6. The Extension of Immortality to Non-Human Animals 
 
In my estimation one of the greatest aspects of the Schopenhauerian theory is the fact 
that it extends immortality to non-human animals. In the second section of the first part 
of my exposition I presented three arguments as refuting solipsism, viz., the analogical, 
the practical egoist and the teleological arguments. These were meant to prove that all 
animate creatures are in fact phenomenal manifestations of the indefatigable and 
indestructible metaphysical Will. As such, the Schopenhauerian theory of athanasia 
applies equally to non-human animals as it does to the human-animal. Thus 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 482) states: 
“We shall have false notions about the indestructibility of our true nature 
through death, so long as we do not make up our minds to study it first of all 
in the animals, and claim for ourselves alone a class apart from them under the 
boastful name of immortality. But it is this presumption alone and the 
narrowness of view from which it proceeds, on account of which most people 
struggle so obstinately against recognizing the obvious truth that, essentially 
and in the main, we are the same as animals; in fact that such people recoil at 
every hint of our relationship with these. Yet it is this denial of the truth which, 
more than anything else, bars to them the way to real knowledge of the 
indestructibility of our true nature.” 
Firstly, then, one needs to comprehend, as mentioned, that due to the fact that the 
metaphysical Will is the underlying reality of all phenomenal objects it is as 
indestructible in non-human creatures as it is in human organisms. Thus Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 476) states:  
“If I kill an animal, be it a dog, a bird, a frog, or even only an insect, it is really 
inconceivable that this being, or rather the primary and original force by virtue 
of which such a marvellous phenomenon displayed itself only a moment before 
in its full energy and love of life, could through my wicked or thoughtless act 
have become nothing. Again, on the other hand, the millions of animals of 
every kind which come into existence at every moment in endless variety, full 
of force and drive, can never have been absolutely nothing before the act of 





It is therefore evident that non-human animals possess the indestructible Will in equal 
proportion to human-animals. Therefore, they are every bit as immortal as are their 
human counterparts. Now if we attend closely to this notion we shall inevitably come 
to the realisation – congenial to some and horrifying to others – that the metaphysical 
Will which animates one’s phenomenal form at present might re-manifest itself in non-
human organisms in countless other phenomenal lives; or that, conversely, the Will 
which presently animates one’s body might have existed in the previous life or lives as, 
for instance, a seemingly insignificant insect! Thus, in this life one happens to be a 
human being, but perhaps in the next life one will be a dog, an ant, an elephant or even 
a plant of some sort; just as one may have been any of these creatures in previous lives. 
To quote the poetic words on the transmigration of souls from the Katha Upanishad 
(translated by Juan Mascaró, 1978: 64): 
“The soul may go to the womb of a mother and thus obtain a new body. It even 
may go into trees or plants […].” 
But here I must acknowledge a significant distinction between the concept of the 
transmigration of one’s essential being in the Eastern religious sense and according to 
the Schopenhauerian view thereof. The Eastern religions maintain that moral behaviour 
ensures that one’s soul (jiva) will ascend the moral hierarchy and thus be reborn into a 
more fortunate existence (cf. Mascaró, 1978: 57-58); thus, a righteous individual in this 
life will be reborn as a more fortunate creature in the next life, until he finally attains 
the human form and achieves Moksha from the perpetual cycle of Samsara.215 In 
																																																								
215 As liberation from the cycle of Samsara requires abstract knowledge (which, arguably only 
humans possess, cf. Schopenhauer, 1889a: 114) it would appear that a righteous creature would 
have to be reborn into a human form just prior to attaining Moksha; but if, in contrast, a human 
were to behave wickedly he would have to be reborn into a tormented existence. This, however, 
need not be a non-human animal existence, for some non-human animals are capable of living 
peaceful lives; whereas many humans live with a tremendous amount of suffering. It is 
therefore possible that a wicked individual could be reborn into such a troubled human 
existence in his next life. I mention this because one should avoid adopting an ascensional 
evolutionary view in connection with the transmigration of souls, i.e. one should avoid 
erroneously maintaining that once the human form has been attained one cannot descend or 
regress to a non-human stage. However, as mentioned, the human form is a necessary 




contradistinction thereto, the evil individual will be reborn into a less fortunate form in 
order to purify the soul of the negative Karma it has accumulated in its previous life or 
lives. In contrast to this Indian view of the transmigration of souls, there is no cogent 
reason for postulating a moral hierarchy within the Schopenhauerian system. Thus, it 
is possible that, for instance, the metaphysical Will which manifested itself in Adolf 
Hitler’s being could have re-manifested itself in the being of an entirely contented 
individual: one who is destined to live a long, prosperous and pleasant life.  In other 
words, the Schopenhauerian theory of the transmigration of the metaphysical Will does 
not postulate a moral connection between one’s numerous lives, as does the Indian 
doctrine.216 According to Schopenhauer’s theory, it is therefore possible for the Will of 
a genuinely benevolent human being to be re-manifested into an utterly tormented 
existence in the next life, just as it is possible for the Will of a malicious individual to 
be re-manifested into a thoroughly congenial existence. This may appear to be a rather 
bleak and depressing view, for it intimates that no matter how we behave in this life, 
we cannot positively influence the next. However, this is true only in a limited sense, 
for the sagacious individual is one who apprehends the essential metaphysical unity of 
all extant creatures: he thus comes to see himself in everything which lives – which is 
beautifully expressed by the Indian expression, “tat tvam asi”217 (Mascaró, 1978: 64, 
117-118), which Schopenhauer (1969a: 220, 355) is fond of quoting – and he 
consequently treats all living creatures with a care and respect which the egoist 
ordinarily reserves solely for himself. Now my maverick interpretation of 
Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine maintains that the thwarting of one’s desires 
(which is akin to behaving morally) causes a reduction in the potency of one’s 
phenomenal volitions which corresponds to a contraction in the metaphysical Will. 
																																																								
216 However, I wish to observe that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine 
(cf. the appendix herein) intimates that egoistical and malicious actions within the phenomenal 
world cause a corresponding augmentation in the metaphysical Will; thereby increasing the 
amount of suffering in the world. In this sense my interpretation indicates that there is in fact a 
moral connection between one’s phenomenal actions and the metaphysical essence; but it is not 
one in which one’s particular essence will be made to suffer in proceeding lives for the evil 
deeds perpetrated within one’s present life. 




Thus, in a sense, moral behaviour does indeed have metaphysical implications, but this 
is not a personal or individual boon as such, but one undertaken for the greater-good.  
But to return to the primary matter: I consider Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 476) inclusion 
of non-human animals into his theory of immortality to be extremely sagacious, for it 
is ludicrous to consider humankind as superior thereto merely due to the former’s 
greater capacity for ratiocination. At bottom, the human brain is, as Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 273-274) correctly observes, “[a] cerebral animal consciousness, one that is 
somewhat more highly developed, animal in so far as we have it essentially in common 
with the whole animal kingdom, although in us it reaches its summit”. What reason 
then does a philosopher or a religionist have, besides callow prejudice (i.e. speciesism), 
for excluding a non-human animal from the possibility of immortality? I can find 
absolutely none, of course.  
In connection with the immortality of non-human animals, one should note 
Schopenhauer’s (2005: 112 & 1969b: 476) negative assessment of Descartes’ view that 
non-human animals do not possess “intelligent souls” (Bracken, 2002: 112-113) and 
are consequently not immortal, like their human counterparts. In fact, Schopenhauer 
(2005: 112) explicitly invokes the practical egoist argument, discussed at length in a 
previous section, as proof of the fact “that the truly essential and fundamental part in 
man and beast is identically the same thing” (Schopenhauer, 2005: 113). Hence, it 
follows that for Schopenhauer (1969b: 476) the non-human animal is every bit as 
immortal as its human-animal counterpart; consequently, when a dog, for instance, dies 
her218 essence endures and thus re-manifests itself as another creature in the 
phenomenal world. 
As a consequence of this inclusion of non-human animals into his theory of 
immortality, one would expect Schopenhauer to argue in favour of a vegetarian lifestyle 
at the very least, for the essence in the creatures one consumes may have been the same 
essence which animated one’s deceased relatives.219 Surprisingly, however, he 
																																																								
218 I intentionally refrain from using the word “it”, which unwittingly implies that a non-human 
animal is a mere inanimate object (Schopenhauer, 2005: 112). 
219 Although, given that the indestructible metaphysical Will can also manifest itself into a “tree 
or a plant” (Mascaró, 1978: 64), it is possible that one could inadvertently consume the essence 




(Schopenhauer, 2005: 116) does not do this, instead Schopenhauer (1974b: 159) claims 
that humans, in particular white Northern Europeans, require animal flesh in order to 
survive the harsh, cold, Northern climate. Thus Schopenhauer (2005: 116-117) states 
that: 
“[…] compassion for sentient beings is not to carry us to the length of 
abstaining from flesh, like the Brahmans. This is because, by a natural law, 
capacity for pain keeps pace with the intelligence; consequently men, by going 
without animal food, especially in the North, would suffer more than beasts do 
through a quick death, which is always unforeseen; although the latter ought 
to be made still easier by means of chloroform. Indeed, without meat 
nourishment mankind would be quite unable to withstand the rigours of the 
Northern climate.”  
This argument in defence of the consumption of animal flesh propounded by 
Schopenhauer seems to me to be erroneous for it invokes a phenomenal, and therefore 
illusory, distinction between that of “man and beast”, viz., that of the greater capacity 
for suffering generated by the rational intellect (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273). But in 
order to cogently refute Schopenhauer’s argument we must first recall two significant 
facts, viz., (i) that the fuga mortis220 emanates from the Wille-zum-Leben 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 465), which ultimately constitutes the essence of all living 
organisms (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 245), and (ii) that the intellect is said by 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 466) to be adventitious. Thus, the simplest response to 
Schopenhauer is that regardless as to the intellectual capabilities of each creature and 
the idiosyncratic capacity for suffering attached thereto, all creatures are a 
manifestation of the metaphysical Will and thus all must fear death equally and ought, 
as a consequence thereof, to be treated with compassion. “Tat tvam asi” – “this living 
thing art thou” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 220). 
But, for the sake of argument, I believe it is possible to refute Schopenhauer’s assertion 
from a phenomenal consideration of the matter. For although humankind’s possession 
																																																								
one should shun food altogether; this is interesting for it accords with the way in which I argue 
that the metaphysical Will can be entirely abrogated, viz., by way of a voluntary starvation unto 
death (cf. the appendix). 




of ratiocination makes possible the knowledge of past and future (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 60-61), and in this way the phenomena of regret and anxiety arise respectively 
which augment human suffering; it is not at all clear how the abstention from the 
consumption of animal flesh can augment such anthropoid agony in the modern era as 
Schopenhauer (2005: 116) intimates. In relation to prehistoric times Schopenhauer’s 
argument is certainly applicable: for in the cold Northerly climate many vegetables and 
fruit cannot grow, certainly not during the frigid winter months; hence the consumption 
of animal flesh was essential to one’s survival. But the suffering associated with the 
deprivation of nourishment does not seem to me to be characteristically human, and 
thus dependent on past and future knowledge; on the contrary, the agony associated 
with starvation is an entirely present-moment concern – the sole form of suffering 
accessible to non-human animals, by Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 296) own admission. 
However, it is possible that the rational-human animal can develop an anxiety 
concerning the possibility of starvation, in which case the suffering associated therewith 
would extend beyond the present moment. However, in the modern world – wherein 
one can easily store, preserve and acquire non-animal food products – it seems to me 
that Schopenhauer’s (2005: 116) argument is impertinent. Thus, the consumption of 
animal flesh in the modern, civilized world seems to me to be unconscionable.   
As a further refutation of Schopenhauer’s claim I observe that if non-human animals 
do not possess ratiocination they are, as Schopenhauer (1969b: 60-61) states, bound to 
the present moment and hence they cannot escape their immediate suffering. Although 
it may be true that most non-human animals do not possess the notion of the 
inevitability of death – which ultimately depends on inductive reasoning – it is evident, 
as Schopenhauer (1969b: 463) also acknowledges, that they do have a presentiment of 
death when it is dangerously immanent. Thus, it is simply false that non-human animals 
ignorantly walk to their deaths, i.e. without suffering any trepidation. I reiterate, that in 
our modern, civilized world – wherein non-animal nourishment can be easily acquired, 
preserved and stored – one simply cannot vindicate the subjection of an innocent 
creature to such unnecessary agony. It is only within the primitive state of nature that 
Schopenhauer’s (2005: 116-117) abovementioned argument can be cogently defended. 
This, however, is not the only criticism I wish to level at Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
let us therefore turn to a more detailed consideration thereof; in particular in connection 




6.7. Some Difficulties Pertaining to Schopenhauer’s Theory of Athanasia 
 
In the subsequent, i.e. second, part of my exposition I shall attempt to refute 
Schopenhauer’s claim that the metaphysical Will is immortal by indicating that 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) radical idealism is erroneous and that the Will, contrary to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100, 126, 176, et al.) assertions, is not impervious to the 
principium individuationis and the principium fiendi. However, before I close this 
significant section I wish to observe a few difficulties pertaining specifically to 
Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality. 
 
6.7.1. A Multidimensional Ding-an-sich 
 
In the second edition of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969b: 197) explicitly acknowledges 
that the Will is both located within time and that it presupposes the correlativity thesis 
– for in order for it to be known as such, it must be an object for a subject; hence it 
would appear that the equation of the Ding-an-sich with the Will is erroneous. As a 
consequence of that admission, Schopenhauer (1969b: 196) qualifies his original 
insight by claiming that: 
“[…] even the inward observation we have of our own Will still does not by 
any means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself 
[…] Accordingly, the act of Will is indeed only the nearest and clearest 
phenomenon of the thing-in-itself […].” 
This necessarily intimates that the Ding-an-sich possesses other inscrutable 
dimensions, i.e. besides the Will; hence one may justifiably speak of a multidimensional 
Ding-an-sich. Such a view has implications for Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality, 
for even if – as I shall attempt to argue in the subsequent section – the Will is indeed 
temporal, spatial and subject to the causal law, then it follows that the Will is not 
immortal; but that in-itself does not preclude, upon a multidimensional interpretation, 
the possibility of something unknown and mysterious surviving the demise of one’s 
physical form. For if one were to take Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100, 126, 176, et al.) 
claims for the a priority of time, space and causality seriously then it follows that the 




ought to be impervious to alteration and, hence, to destruction. However, this notion, 
like Kant’s characterisation of the way the world is in-itself (Scruton, 2001: 55-56), can 
only be conceived of in a negative sense, i.e. “to designate the limit of our knowledge” 
and not positively, i.e. to designate and characterise the nature of immortality. 
Consequently, one can solely entertain immortality, upon a multidimensional view of 
the Ding-an-sich, as a possibility. It is important to note, therefore, that my criticism 
and ultimate rejection of the metaphysical Will does not entirely rule out the possibility 
of athanasia. However, owing to the transcendent nature of the matter I have not, and 
shall not, attempt to identify what could possibly survive the demise of one’s physical 
form; for, as Schopenhauer (1969b: 198) correctly observes, 
“[…] the thing-in-itself […] may have, entirely outside all possible 
phenomenon, determinations, qualities, and modes of existence which for us 
are absolutely unknowable and incomprehensible […].” 
 
6.7.2. The Will as the Origin of Fuga Mortis 
 
A second, and more serious, difficulty arises with Schopenhauer’s doctrine regarding 
the origins of the fear of death. It was discussed at length that although reason alerts 
one to the inevitability of death, the fear of death really resides, not in the intellect, but 
in the Will itself (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 498). This, however, is an odd occurrence, for 
how can that which is indestructible and immortal (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 278) be said 
to fear death, whereas that which is subject to decay and destruction be said to be 
impervious to the fear relating thereto (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 498)?221 Here it is 
necessary to recall Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 273) insistence on the intellect’s 
phenomenality. As such, “in death consciousness [and consequently, the intellect] 
assuredly perishes” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273), whereas the metaphysical Will is said 
by Schopenhauer (1969b: 498) to be impervious to such destruction. However, I 
																																																								
221 Indeed, Schopenhauer (1969b: 498) goes so far as to state that “[…] if man were a merely 
knowing being, death would necessarily be not only a matter of indifference, but even welcome 
to him”. Yet it seems odd that the truly destructible should remain nonchalant in the face of 




reiterate that this characterisation of the matter appears extremely odd to me: surely the 
fuga mortis should emanate from that which is, by its very nature, destructible, viz., the 
intellect, and not the indestructible metaphysical Will? 
It seems that Schopenhauer (1969b: 498) was fully aware of this difficulty; thus, in the 
second edition of Die Welt he (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 498) addresses this predicament 
by arguing that the Will is deceived by the intellect into thinking that its existence will 
end along with the demise of the body: 
“Nevertheless, the Will in us fears death, and this is because knowledge 
presents to this Will its true nature merely in the individual phenomenon. From 
this there arises for the Will the illusion that it perishes with this phenomenon, 
just as when the mirror is smashed my image in it seems to be destroyed at the 
same time. Therefore this fills the Will with horror, because it is contrary to its 
original nature, which is a blind craving for existence.” 
In this way Schopenhauer (1969b: 498) attempts to resolve the conspicuous 
contradiction in arguing that the fear of death emanates from that which is, by its very 
nature, indestructible. However, does the argument not, yet again, presuppose the 
consciousness of the metaphysical Will, in contradistinction to Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 
115, 1969b: 466, et al.) repeated characterisation of the Will as “blind”? For in order 
for the Will to be deceived it would have to be capable of knowledge and awareness. It 
is evident, then, that Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 498) claim that the fuga mortis emanates 
from the metaphysical Will generates a contradiction within his theory; however, his 
attempted solution of the problem inadvertently intimates the Will’s consciousness and 
capacity for knowledge. 
 
6.7.3. The Evil Metaphysical Will 
 
Finally, one may justifiably question how consoling the Schopenhauerian doctrine of 
athanasia is if the metaphysical Will is essentially daemonic (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
349). It will be recalled that in the section on Schopenhauer’s notorious pessimism I 
argued that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 146-147) characterisation of the phenomenal 




theory (Janaway, 2008: 335). In other words, suffering exists due to the essential nature 
of the metaphysical Will; consequently, Schopenhauer’s doctrine which maintains that 
upon dying one returns to the Will as Ding-an-sich intimates that one will ultimately 
return to the source of ultimate evil. Expressed thus, it seems that the doctrine cannot 
truly be considered consoling, but rather, harrowing (Young, 2005: 201-202).  
However, in response to the abovementioned criticism I must observe that the Will only 
presents a harrowing spectacle in its individuated form, i.e. suffering appears solely 
when the Will manifests itself in the realm of appearances, it does not inhere in the 
metaphysical realm. For it is solely the Will at variance with itself (which intimates the 
principium individuationis) which reveals the Will’s truly daemonic nature. Without 
the a priori forms of time and space the Will simply cannot produce the suffering 
spectacle so characteristic of the phenomenal world. Consequently, the reabsorption 
into the one metaphysical Will precludes the possibility of evil and suffering in so far 
as the principium individuationis does not exist therein. It is primarily for that reason 
that within the metaphysical realm the notions of strife and suffering lose all meaning.  
Furthermore, it will be recalled that consciousness is a necessary element in the 
production of suffering. But the intellect is said by Schopenhauer (1969b: 466 & 1974b: 
273) to be an entirely adventitious phenomenal entity, and thus, even if the principium 
individuationis did subsist in the metaphysical realm, the conflict generated by the Will 
at variance with itself would not be experienceable; consequently, it would ultimately 
be a superfluous matter.  
As such, it is solely the phenomenally manifested and individuated Will, illuminated 
by consciousness which is dependent on the phenomenal brain (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 
273), which produces the spectacle of suffering. I therefore conclude that, although the 
metaphysical Will is the ultimate source of suffering (Janaway, 2008: 335), it is only 
extant in the phenomenal world as such and consequently, although death is a return to 
the metaphysical Will (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 270), it is not, as Young (2005: 202) 
intimates, to be feared or despised in so far as the phenomenon of suffering does not 
exist within that metaphysical realm. Let us now turn in earnest to a detailed criticism 





Part II: Criticisms Pertaining to Schopenhauer’s Theory  
 
In this second part of the dissertation I intend to illustrate the untenability of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of athanasia by illustrating that the world must have a mind-
independent existence to a certain extent and that the metaphysical Will is not 
indestructible in so far as it is subject to both the principium individuationis and the 
principium fiendi. To this end it is necessary to subject the two pillars upon which the 
edifice of Schopenhauer’s system rests, viz., his radical idealism and the identification 
of the Will with the Ding-an-sich, to a painstaking scrutiny. Now as the identification 
of the Will with the Ding-an-sich presupposes radical idealism, I shall commence this 





7. The World as Appearance: Part Two 
 
To that end, I shall first critically examine Schopenhauer’s five primary arguments I 
identified in the first section in favour of the radical idealist thesis; but I endeavour to 
go even farther in my insistence upon the absurdity of radical idealism by way of a 
consideration of three difficulties pertaining specifically thereto. These difficulties are 
so compelling that, even without a critical examination of Schopenhauer’s specific 
arguments for radical idealism, I take them to be cogent reasons for the rejection 
thereof. In short, they are: 
(i) The difficulty of the status of the mind within Schopenhauer’s philosophy, i.e. 
whether the mind is a physical or a metaphysical entity. 
(ii) The incompatibility of radical idealism with evolutionary theory; and  
(iii) The incongruence between subjective and objective forms of time, space and 
causality. 
However, let us commence this discussion with a critical examination of 
Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 3-18) five primary arguments for radical idealism. It will be 
recalled that they are: 
(i) The argument from immediacy 
(ii) The argument from inconceivability 
(iii) The argument from certainty 
(iv) The argument from simplicity, and 
(v) The argument from the subject-object antithesis 
I shall now, in accordance with my presentation of these arguments in the earlier section 
of my exposition, critique each one individually. 
 
7.1. The Argument from Immediacy 
 
It will be recalled that the argument from immediacy maintains that “everything of 
which [one] has certain, sure, and hence immediate knowledge, lies within his 




certainty […]” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 4). Now although it is true that one possesses 
immediate knowledge solely of the contents in one’s mind, it simply does not follow 
therefrom that objects do not exist independently thereof; for, I observe that objects 
often present themselves in ways contrary to one’s desires, thus intimating that they 
must necessarily have a mind-independent existence. For if objects truly emanated 
entirely from the mind and not some external source, then it seems to me that they 
should perpetually present themselves as congenial thereto. For the mind, it will be 
recalled, is said by Schopenhauer (1974b: 274) to be a product of the metaphysical Will. 
Consequently, the Will ought to present to itself agreeable scenes, and thus 
consciousness should be occupied solely with pleasant entities. On the contrary, 
however, one is often faced with extremely disagreeable, indeed harrowing, images, 
which intimates to me that the contents of one’s consciousness must in fact have an 
external, i.e., mind-independent, source. Thus, the argument from immediacy, although 
in part veracious, does not truly prove that objects are entirely mind-dependent. 
 
7.2. The Argument from Inconceivability  
 
A tangible illustration of the so-called “argument from inconceivability” is that of 
attempting to picture one’s funeral to oneself. For in the act of imagining the world 
devoid of oneself – i.e. the world without one’s consciousness – one’s act of imagining 
necessarily presupposes such a consciousness. In the same way, the argument of 
inconceivability maintains that it is impossible to imagine the world devoid of 
consciousness; for in the very act of imagining one has inadvertently presupposed that 
which one was attempting to exclude (Young, 2005: 26); as Schopenhauer (1969b: 5) 
states: 
“[…] if […] we attempt to imagine an objective world without a knowing 
subject, then we become aware that what we are imagining at that moment is 
in truth the opposite of what we intended, namely nothing but just the process 
in the intellect of a knowing being who perceives an objective world, that is to 
say, precisely that which we had sought to exclude.” 
However, the argument is, as Julian Young (2005: 27) notes, “little more than a 




expressed: my idiosyncratic image of the world cannot exist without me, i.e. without 
my consciousness, but it does not follow that the objective world cannot exist 
independently of my consciousness. Thus, the distinction between an idiosyncratic 
(subjective) world on the one hand and an objective world on the other, ultimately 
reveals the argument to be fallacious. 
 
7.3. The Argument from Certainty 
 
That one ought to accept radical idealism in order to surmount Hume’s scepticism does 
not seem to me to be an extremely compelling argument, which is precisely what the 
argument from certainty attempts to do (Janaway, 2002: 30). For although the 
postulation of time, space and causality as a priori features of the mind does indeed 
stamp them with a degree of certitude, it is questionable whether they really do emanate 
from the mind and are not objective features of the world as it is in-itself.  
In connection with a possible refutation of this argument, however, I wish to reiterate a 
previous discussion. I have already argued that sensation, although defined by 
Schopenhauer (1889a: 60) as “[…] a process within the organism  and […] limited, as 
such, to the region within the skin; […] cannot therefore contain anything which lies 
beyond that region, or, in other words, anything that is outside it”, must in fact originate 
from an external source; for if all sensations were products of the brain it would be 
impossible to distinguish real sensations from hallucinatory ones. I therefore argued 
that in order to distinguish between hallucinatory sensations and real sensations it is 
necessary to posit the Ding-an-sich as causing the latter, while the former are 
hallucinations in so far as they originate entirely within the subject’s brain and do not 
correspond to any externally real object. This necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
there must exist a mind-independent form of causality; for, I reiterate, the Ding-an-sich 
must cause real sensations “within the organism” (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 60). Thus, 
although radical idealism does remove scepticism regarding the causal law, that is not 




appears that causality does in fact have a mind-independent existence. Thus, the 
argument from certainty is, unfortunately for Schopenhauer, unconvincing.222 
 
7.4. The Argument from Simplicity 
 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 9) claims that the materialist posits a redundant second objective 
world, “which, although completely separated from the first [i.e. subjective, mind-
dependent world], resembles it to a nicety”. Thus, the fact that the “absolutely objective 
world outside the head” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 9) is essentially akin to “the second 
world already known subjectively” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 10), which is, according to 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 4), the more immediate and therefore antecedent, it follows that 
the derivative objective world is a redundancy. 
In response to this argument, I wish to observe that it inadvertently presupposes the 
derivative nature of the objective world from the subjective (as opposed to the contrary, 
which I consider veracious). However, in order for the mind to contain real sensations 
– as opposed to hallucinatory ones – it is necessary to assume that the former correspond 
to external, i.e., mind-independent, objects. In this way the subjective world is a 
derivative of the objective, and not vice versa as the argument surreptitiously intimates. 
It is evident that Schopenhauer (1969b: 9) attempts to intentionally invert the process 
in order to prove the veracity of radical idealism, for he (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 4) 
wishes to avow the primacy of the subjective over the objective. Yet, it seems to me 
that one can only distinguish reality from illusion if the subjective world is a derivative 
of the objective and not if the objective world is a derivative of the subjective. For if 
the subjective world is permitted precedence over the objective, then ultimately all 
phenomena must be regarded as an illusion, i.e. everything we experience is essentially 
an hallucination. This undoubtedly accords with Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 16-18) view 
																																																								
222 Shortly, I shall attempt to corroborate this argument by observing that one never actually 
knows a priori the precise cause of a particular phenomenon; which, it seems to me, we ought 
to be able to do if causality were truly brought to experience by way of the mind. The same is 





of “life [as] a long dream”, however, it renders the distinction between real and 
hallucinatory sensations superfluous in so far as both, in the last analysis, depend on 
the mind. 
 
7.5. The Argument from the Subject-Object Antithesis 
 
The argument Schopenhauer (1969b: 15) most relies on, according to Janaway (2002: 
31), is that of the subject-object antithesis. In short, the argument maintains that an 
object, i.e. an appearance, cannot exist without the subject, i.e. a consciousness, and 
vice versa. Thus Schopenhauer (1969b: 15-16) states: 
“[…] the intellect and matter are correlatives, in other words, the one exists 
only for the other; both stand and fall together; the one is only the other’s 
reflex. They are really one and the same thing, considered from two opposite 
points of view […].” 
In this way Schopenhauer (1969a: 3) attempts to argue that “[t]he world is my 
[appearance]”, for no object can exist independently of a perceiving subject; thus both 
are said to “stand and fall together” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 15). But upon closer 
consideration “[t]he whole appeal to the principle is, in short”, as Young (2005: 28) 
correctly acknowledges, “a disaster”. The reason for this is that the very point at issue 
is whether phenomenal objects are anything more than mere constructions of 
consciousness; thus one wants a genuine proof of the doctrine of radical idealism and 
not some irrefragable principle which presupposes it (Young, 2005: 28). For there 
certainly cannot be perception of an object without a subject, i.e. consciousness; but we 
want to know to what extent an object can be said to exist independently of the mind – 
and the fact, which I have reiterated ad nauseam, viz., that we have sensations which 
we can distinguish from hallucinatory ones, intimates that the world does in fact have 
a mind-independent existence. 
____________________________________________________ 
Although the abovementioned criticisms of Schopenhauer’s five primary arguments for 
radical idealism ought to be quite convincing of the untenability thereof, I shall in the 




utterly decimate Schopenhauer’s claim for the absolute dependency of the existence of 
the world on the mind. 
 
7.6. The Status of the Mind: A Phenomenal or Metaphysical Entity? 
 
The first of the three serious issues for the radical idealist claim within the 
Schopenhauerian system concerns the status of the mind. As I have indicated, the mind 
– by way of the a priori forms of time, space and causality – is said by Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 417-418) to construct the existence of the external world. In this sense, the 
world is said to be mind-dependent, i.e. an appearance (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 3). 
However, on numerous occasions Schopenhauer (1969a: 421, et al.) explicitly equates 
the mind with the brain;223 inadvertently intimating that the source of appearances is 
itself an appearance.  
In Parerga und Paralipomena in particular Schopenhauer (1974b: 273) inadvertently 
presents the difficulty when he states:  
“It is through the ingenious and mysterious structure of the brain which 
anatomy describes but physiology does not understand, that the phenomenon 
of the objective world and the whole mechanism of our thoughts are brought 
about.”  
Thus, as the abovementioned excerpt indicates, the brain is the location of the synthetic 
a priori principles, viz., time, space and causality, which make experience possible 
																																																								
223 I wish to observe that Kant’s (1950: 65) sagacious postulation of a transcendental 
apperception is not subject to the same difficulties as is the Schopenhauerian (1974b: 273) 
identification of the mind with the physical brain. For the transcendental apperception must, as 
its appellation intimates, be non-phenomenal (Scruton, 2001: 44), i.e. it must “precede” (Kant, 
A107) the phenomenal objects which it ultimately constructs. Thus, the source of the a priori 
mechanisms necessarily precedes experience, i.e. is not itself a phenomenal entity, and thus 
there is no contradiction in the Kantian notion that self-consciousness is an essential element 
in the production of the phenomenal world. One may therefore justly feel that Schopenhauer 
ought to have retained Kant’s transcendental apperception as a necessary pre-condition of his 




(Copleston, 1947: 48). But the real difficulty lies in the fact that the brain is said by 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 273) to be an organ within the human body; as such it must be 
an appearance. As a consequence thereof a grave difficulty arises as to the status of the 
mind within Schopenhauer’s system and how, in short, it can be both the provenience 
of appearances and yet be itself an appearance. In short, Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 273) 
assertion that the mind is akin to the physical brain and is yet responsible for the 
construction of the phenomenal world by placing raw sensations into causal, spatial and 
temporal relations (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 5-6), necessarily leads to the bizarre 
conclusion that the mind must, on Schopenhauer’s account, be considered a causa 
sui,224 for the brain is the ultimate source of all phenomenal entities and thus it must be 
the cause of itself.  
In order to fully comprehend my criticism one need only realise that radical idealism is 
necessarily committed to the notion of the mind’s priority; for if the world is merely an 
appearance therein, then the mind must necessarily be granted primacy. However, by 
identifying the mind with the brain Schopenhauer (1974b: 273) has unwittingly 
demoted the mind to a secondary position within his system. This pronouncement finds 
textual corroboration in Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 201, et al.) emphatic and repeated 
assertion upon the intellect’s auxiliary status; going so far as to explicitly declare it to 
be “an adventitious principle” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 466); the metaphysical Will 
alone is said to be “the primary and substantial thing” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 205). 
However, I conjecture, in response to my criticism, that the difficulty can easily be 
resolved if the Will can be construed as conscious and intelligent: for in this way the 
source of appearances may be said to be the transcendent consciousness, which is not 
itself an appearance, and thus the serious difficulty is averted. However, 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115, et al.) characterisation of the metaphysical Will as “blind” 
precludes the possibility of it being the source of appearances.   
I retort, however, that in an earlier section I discussed at length the fact that the 
metaphysical Will cannot be “blind” in so far as it purposefully manifests itself in 
certain ways, in particular in organic phenomena (Young, 2005: 83). Thus, one may 
justifiably assume that the difficulty for the radical idealist stance generated by 
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Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 273) equation of the mind with the physical brain is resolved 
by way of the Will’s teleological nature, which reveals its ultimate consciousness. In 
this way one could potentially argue that the phenomenal world is produced, not by the 
individuated consciousness which is ultimately a phenomenal entity, but by the 
consciousness of the metaphysical Will. Thus, the world would be said to be, not “my” 
appearance (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 3), but the metaphysical Will’s appearance. 
Although I discern a way in which to salvage Schopenhauer’s radical idealism within 
this maverick view, it necessarily entails an extremely controversial postulation, viz., a 
transcendent mind or consciousness. However, if we, like Schopenhauer (1969b: 214), 
consider consciousness to be a mere function of the brain, just as digestion is a mere 
function of the stomach, then we simply cannot maintain the possibility of 
consciousness existing independently thereof any more than we can digestion without 
a stomach. We can consequently avow, along with Schopenhauer (1974b: 273), that: 
“An individual consciousness and thus a consciousness in general is not 
conceivable in an immaterial or incorporeal being, since the condition of every 
consciousness, knowledge, is necessarily a brain-function really because the 
intellect manifests itself objectively as brain.” 
It ought to be evident then that Schopenhauer’s radical idealism is founded upon an 
extremely insecure foundation in so far as the phenomenal world is said to be a product 
of the individuated consciousness, which ultimately depends on one’s brain 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273), which is, in the last analysis, a physical entity 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 273). Thus, contradictorily the phenomenal world is a product 
of a phenomenal object, i.e. the brain. However, even if the world cannot in toto be a 
work of the brain it is still, I maintain, partly dependent thereon. Thus, although I reject 
radical idealism I accept the veracity of partial idealism; I shall return to this point in 
due course. 
 
7.7. The Incompatibility of Schopenhauerian Radical Idealism with Evolutionism 
 
The second difficulty pertaining to the issue of the mind in Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
may be succinctly described as an empirical refutation of the radical idealist position. 




and extremely imperfect remains entombed in its soil, we find what is perhaps the 
greatest refutation of radical idealism, viz., the remains of organisms devoid of brains. 
But this fact is utterly inexplicable on Schopenhauer’s radical idealist interpretation: 
for if all objects are mind-dependent how could the Earth and all its objects have existed 
prior to consciousness?  
Here I wish to observe that the position of the radical Idealist is incompatible, even 
antithetical, to an evolutionary view of life. This is all the more striking insofar as 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 151-155) was himself an evolutionist, albeit one of a particular 
type.225 As the matter may be of some interest to readers I shall present a succinct 
discussion of Schopenhauer’s evolutionary views in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Schopenhauer died one year after the publication of Darwin’s masterpiece On the 
Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle of Life in 1859, and although he was consequently unable to study 
the work itself he was able to “read a detailed account” of Darwin’s theory a few months 
prior to his death in September 1860 (Cartwright, 2010: 466n1).226 One would be 
forgiven to think that Schopenhauer – the philosopher of pessimism who presented the 
unrelenting struggle of life so eloquently and memorably in numerous passages of his 
works (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 146-147, 1969b: 354, et al.) – would have praised the 
author of the Origin of the Species for his candid honesty with which he (Darwin, 
2009b: 585-599) described the brutality of life in the state of nature.227 But, 
																																																								
225 Cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy’s Schopenhauer as an Evolutionist (1911). 
226 I have opted to compare Schopenhauer’s evolutionary views with those of Darwin’s, as 
opposed to Lamarck’s, due to the former’s historical significance; for it was Darwin’s theory 
in particular, as Okasha (2016: 8) notes, which sounded the death knell for the biblical 
creationist theory, which was thitherto the widely accepted view; and, further, Darwin’s theory 
is still extremely influential in current science (cf. Dawkins, 2010: 18), despite the fact that 
there is an ongoing debate among a small group of scientists as to whether natural selection is 
the real, or only, mechanism by which creatures imperceptibly mutate into others (Dawkins, 
2010: 17, 18).  
227 It is for his emphasis on the struggle for survival that Schopenhauer is sometimes considered 
a precursor to Darwin (Young, 2005: 86); but, as I shall indicate by way of footnotes throughout 
my discussion, there are numerous points on which the great thinkers are at variance with each 




surprisingly, Schopenhauer (quoted in Cartwright, 2010: 466-467n1) wrote to his friend 
and acolyte, Julius Frauenstädt, that “Darwin’s thoughts [are] “shallow empiricism” 
and simply a variation of Lamarck’s,228 and they [are] “in no way related to my theory”. 
These remarks may appear perplexing to those who equate evolutionism with the name 
of Darwin and maintain, further, that Darwinism is the sole form thereof. Indeed, 
contrary to popular belief, Darwin was not the “inventor” of the theory of evolution, 
but the discoverer of the mechanism by which evolution is said to occur, viz., the theory 
of natural selection (Clements, 2009: 6).229 Thus, it is significant to understand that it 
is the mechanism of natural selection that Schopenhauer rejects – that is “in no way 
related to [his] theory” (Cartwright, 2010: 467n1) – and not the theory of evolution as 
such. As Arthur O. Lovejoy (1911: 207) notes in his article Schopenhauer as an 
Evolutionist, in his later writings Schopenhauer “unmistakably announced – what 
																																																								
Schopenhauer’s pessimism I attempted to utilize the Darwinian theory as an “external” 
corroboration thereof.  
228 It is interesting to note that, prior to adopting and incorporating evolutionary views into his 
system, Schopenhauer (1889b: 262-265) mentions and criticises Lamarck’s evolutionary theory 
as “an error of genius” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 264). His (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 262, 264) 
primary criticism is that Lamarck does not consider the metaphysical Will as existing “prior to 
the animal itself” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 264) as a creative force within nature, thereby 
fashioning creatures according to the environments in which they live. It is important to note 
that had Lamarck postulated a metaphysical Will as the mysterious force whereby evolutionism 
is said to occur, Schopenhauer would undoubtedly have found it perfectly congenial. However, 
it appears that Schopenhauer (1889b: 262-265) did not accept evolutionary views when he 
wrote Über den Willen in der Natur (in the mid-1830s); it seems he adopted and subsequently 
incorporated a particular form thereof only in or after 1847 (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153-154). 
Indeed, I observe that Schopenhauer’s particular form of evolutionism, viz., generatio in utero 
heterogeneo (generation in the womb of another), is conspicuously absent in Über den Willen 
in der Natur, thus corroborating my aforementioned claim. As shall become evident in the 
course of the discussion, Schopenhauer rejects Darwinian evolution for precisely the same 
reason that he criticizes Lamarckian evolutionism, viz., it does not postulate a metaphysical 
Will as the mysterious force driving the evolutionary process. 
229 Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829), previously mentioned, was in fact the first 




remained his final view – that the philosophy of nature to which his metaphysics of the 
Will properly led was of a frankly and completely evolutionistic type”.  
It is interesting to note then, as Lovejoy does (1911: 213n1), that Schopenhauer is often 
erroneously portrayed in the secondary literature as “essentially anti-evolutionistic” and 
often his evolutionism is entirely neglected and omitted from discussions on his 
philosophy. Indeed, even in his article entitled Schopenhauer and Darwinism, David 
Asher (1871: 312-332) – an acolyte and close friend of the philosopher, whom 
“Schopenhauer tried several times, without success, to induce […] to translate his 
philosophical writings into English” (Cartwright, 2005: 9) – fails to make mention of 
Schopenhauer’s particular form of evolutionism and the incompatibility of the 
Schopenhauerian system with that of Darwinism in particular and evolutionism in 
general. As a consequence most of the observations presented here are novel; however, 
I must acknowledge that although I have been primarily guided in my current 
discussion by Schopenhauer’s notions in his works Über den Willen in der Natur and 
Parerga und Paralipomena, I am also greatly indebted to Lovejoy’s aforementioned 
article (1911) and Young’s work on Schopenhauer (2005). 
It will be remembered that Schopenhauer (1889b: 216) considered his metaphysics of 
the Will to be an essential component in acquiring a complete understanding of the 
universe. Thus, so far as Schopenhauer is concerned, any evolutionistic explanation 
must take into consideration the metaphysical Will and factor it into its explanation of 
the way in which organisms are said to evolve. Now, if we turn our attention to 
Darwin’s (2009b: 600-640) mechanism of natural selection – despite a certain outer 
similarity to Schopenhauer’s philosophy (cf. Asher, 1871: 321-332) – we find that it is 
entirely devoid of metaphysics – indeed, it does not require any metaphysical 
foundation in order to render it practicable or comprehensible.  
In order to fully comprehend this, we must first enquire: what, in the first place, is 
natural selection? In his revolutionary magnum opus Darwin (2009b: 601) defines the 
mechanism succinctly as “[the preservation] of favourable variations and the rejection 




he knew not what230 – an organism possesses a characteristic which is conducive to its 
survival then this favourable attribute will invariably be passed on to the creature’s 
descendants by means of inheritance. If, on the contrary, a characteristic is not 
conducive – perhaps even antithetical – to the creature’s survival then it will obviously 
not be communicated to future descendants, as the organism will undoubtedly perish in 
the struggle for life, for “nature cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they 
may be useful to any being” (Darwin, 2009b: 602). By this means, then, creatures 
gradually and imperceptibly mutate from one generation to the next: 
“It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, 
throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which 
is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly 
working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of 
each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life. 
We see nothing of these slow changes in progress, until the hand of time has 
marked the long lapses of ages, and then so imperfect is our view into long past 
geological ages, that we only see that the forms of life are now different from 
what they formerly were” (Darwin, 2009b: 603). 
In this view of evolution there is no mention or postulation of a metaphysical Will 
working, subterraneanly as it were, to affect the imperceptible changes in organisms. 
With his mechanism of natural selection Darwin had discovered a purely materialistic 
explanation of the way in which the process of evolution occurs (cf. Young, 2005: 87). 
Indeed, nowadays this is considered one of its greatest merits; but for Schopenhauer 
this was anathema to his Weltanschauung: for as Lovejoy (1911: 221) notes 
“[Darwin’s] doctrine assigns to the organism itself, and to its inner potencies, an 
essentially passive role, development is, as it were, extorted from living things by 
external circumstances, and is not a tendency expressive of all that is most characteristic 
in the nature of organisms as such”, whereas Schopenhauer (1889b: 216) maintains that 
he had discovered in the Will the skeleton key to unlock every mystery in the universe 
– that science, therefore, necessarily requires his metaphysics to complete its 
conception of the world (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 218-219). But Darwin’s mechanism of 
																																																								
230 Today, however, we know that this is due to genetics, and in particular mutations within the 




natural selection did not, so I assume, appear to Schopenhauer to require the assistance 
of a metaphysical Will in order to render the notion valid or comprehensible. This, in 
my estimation, is what led Schopenhauer to reject Darwin: it was thus, as I said, solely 
a rejection of Darwin’s mechanism by which evolution is said to occur, i.e. natural 
selection, and not evolution as such. We may therefore anticipate that Schopenhauer’s 
evolutionism will undoubtedly take into consideration the metaphysical Will and 
accord it a central place.  
Indeed, that is the case, for Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 151-155) evolutionism is founded 
upon his teleological view of nature.231 We must now reflect upon this concept at some 
length, for it is exceedingly significant to comprehending Schopenhauer’s evolutionary 
views. For Schopenhauer, as Julian Young (2005: 71) notes, “organic nature is […] 
universally purposive”; this “purposiveness” can be seen, so Schopenhauer (1889b: 
265-269) thinks, in the structure of each individual animal which is so well-suited to its 
particular mode of life. In other words, Schopenhauer (1889b: 266) views all organisms 
as the product of final causes (causa finalis) at work within nature. But causality, like 
time, can only be conceived to flow in one direction – regressive causation, as Young 
(2005: 86) notes, is impossible – indeed inconceivable. The concept of a causa finalis 
is to be thought of in terms of goals: an organ or the anatomical structure of a creature 
is brought into existence precisely in order to fulfil a certain purpose, “as if knowledge 
of that mode of life and its outward conditions had preceded the structure, and as if 
therefore each animal had chosen its equipment before it assumed a body; just as a 
sportsman before starting chooses his whole equipment, gun, powder, shot, pouch, 
hunting-knife and dress, according to the game he intends chasing. The latter does not 
take aim at the wild boar because he happens to have a rifle: he took the rifle with him 
and not a fowling piece, because he intended to hunt wild boar; and the ox does not butt 
because it happens to have horns: it has horns because it intends to butt” (Schopenhauer, 
1889b: 261). Now given that regressive causation cannot be conceived and thus utilised 
in the explanation of the purposiveness which we see everywhere in nature another 
																																																								
231 It will be recalled that in 4.10. I discussed Schopenhauer’s teleological theory in connection 
with surmounting the difficulty of solipsism in the Schopenhauerian philosophy. In particular, 
the teleological argument may be taken as evidence of the metaphysical Will’s existence in 




explanation must necessarily be proposed. Thus what, we may now ask, is directing the 
development of the structure and organs of an animal’s body? In a word it is the Will 
(Schopenhauer, 1889b: 266) – the Will which “gives all things, whatever they may be, 
the power to exist and to act” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 217). Thus it is the Will directing, 
subterraneanly, the course and development of the organism’s physical structure 
(Schopenhauer, 1889b: 266). “Most certainly”, as Schopenhauer (1889b: 265) remarks, 
“the shape and organisation of each animal species had been determined by its own 
Will according to the circumstances in which it wished to live; not however as a thing 
physical in time, but on the contrary as a thing metaphysical outside time”. Expressed 
somewhat differently we may say that the Will has a desire to actualize itself in some 
shape or form and it therefore does this by producing certain organs and anatomical 
structures: 
“[…] Every organ must be looked upon as the expression of a universal 
manifestation of the Will, i.e. of one made once for all, of a fixed longing, of 
an act of volition proceeding, not from the individual, but from the species. 
Every animal form is a longing of the [Wille-zum-Leben] which is roused in 
circumstances, for instance, the Will is seized with a longing to live on trees, 
to hang on their branches, to devour their leaves, without contention with other 
animals and without ever touching the ground: this longing presents itself 
throughout endless time in the form (or Platonic Idea) of the sloth. It can hardly 
walk at all, being only adapted for climbing; helpless on the ground, it is agile 
on trees and looks itself life a moss-clad bough in order to escape its pursuers.” 
(Schopenhauer, 1889b: 245-255). 
The Will in-itself is consequently the driving or creative force (Young, 2005: 83) – the 
primum mobile232 – within nature: by its power it is able to bring into existence any 
creature it desires. But this notion of a teleological Will within nature is prone to a 
serious objection, one I have already touched upon and discussed. This may be 
expressed in the form of a question: does such a notion of the Will being a creative 
force not presuppose that it possesses knowledge? Schopenhauer (1969a: 115, 1969b: 
349, et al.) emphatically insists that the Will is “blind”, i.e. that it is utterly devoid of 
knowledge and consciousness. But how then can the Will be said to work towards the 
creation of some distinct type of creature within nature? In other words, how does the 
																																																								




Will know that in order to sustain itself the ant-eater does not require teeth, but rather 
“long claws on its fore-feet, in order to break into the nests of the white ant, but also 
[…] a prolonged cylindrical muzzle, in order to penetrate into them, with a small mouth 
and a long, threadlike tongue, covered with a glutinous slime, which it inserts into the 
white ants’ nests and then withdraws covered with the insects that adhere to it” 
(Schopenhauer, 1889b: 260)? It seems to me that the postulation of the metaphysical 
Will not being illuminated by knowledge is inadmissible upon Schopenhauer’s 
teleological understanding of nature. Indeed, I am confident in my assertion in so far as 
it is shared by another, extremely astute, Schopenhauerian commentator: for reasons I 
have just mentioned Julian Young (2005: 83) notes that it is “fairly clearly a mistake” 
to characterize the Will as “blind”.233   
Owing to its creative nature the Will can bring spontaneously into existence a fully 
formed organism; but Schopenhauer (1974b: 103-104) maintains that such spontaneity 
of generation – or generatio aeqivoca as he was fond of referring to the phenomenon – 
although a common occurrence among the lower organisms such as epizoa and 
parasites, cannot – for some mysterious reason – occur in the so-called “higher” 
organisms. In other words, Schopenhauer (1974b: 152) maintains that multicellular 
organisms, such as fish, amphibians, reptiles and mammals et al., cannot spontaneously 
appear from inorganic matter, i.e. “from some coagulating, sun-incubated marine ooze, 
slime or decaying organic substance” in the same way as unicellular organisms can, but 
had, rather, to be born either from an egg or a uterus. However, despite this qualification 
the Will is, according to Schopenhauer (1974b: 152), still able to spontaneously 
produce a creature in utero or from an egg. As a consequence thereof he (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 152) propounded a particular theory of evolutionism which he cumbersomely 
refers to as generatio in utero heterogeneo.234 Now according to this curious doctrine 
an entirely new species can be born from parents of a totally different species,235 and 
																																																								
233 Previously I illustrated the Will’s consciousness and intelligence by way of Schopenhauer’s 
theory of male homosexuality. These considerations persuasively illustrate that, contrary to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 115, et al.) repeated assertions, the metaphysical Will cannot be 
“blind”. 
234 “Generation in the womb of another”. 
235 On this point Schopenhauer is clearly at variance with Darwin for the former’s notion that 




this process occurs, according to Schopenhauer (1974b: 153) in a non-linear direction, 
“but in several that rise side by side” (ibid.), as Schopenhauer (1974b: 153) explicates: 
“Thus, for example, there once emerged from the egg of a fish an ophidian, at 
another time from the egg of this a saurian; but at the same time there came 
from the egg of another fish a batrachian; however, from this there then came 
a chelonian; from the egg of a third was born a cetacean and eventually a 
dolphin. Later on, a cetacean again produced a phoca and ultimately a phoca 
once gave birth to a walrus. Possibly the duck-bill came from the egg of the 
duck, and some other larger mammal from that of an ostrich. In general, these 
events must have taken place simultaneously in many countries that were 
independent of one another, yet they occurred everywhere in stages which 
were at once definite and clear and each of which is furnished a fixed and 
permanent species.236 They did not, however, take place in gradual and 
obliterated transitional stages, and so not on the analogy of a tone howling from 
the lowest to the highest octave, but on that of a scale rising with definite 
intervals and pauses.” 
Curiously, Schopenhauer (1974b: 152) maintains that the creative potential of the Will 
can only be called forth by way of exceptional phenomenal influences: 
“After the vital force of this couple’s species had been checked in some way 
and had been augmented and enhanced in that couple to an abnormal degree, 
there now no longer emerged the likeness of the couple, but, by way of 
exception, a form directly akin to it, yet at a higher stage; and this occurred at 
a favourable hour, at the right position of the planets, and with a fortunate 
combination of all atmospheric, tellurian, and astral influences. Thus the pair 
had on this occasion produced not an individual, but a species.” 
																																																								
nature makes extremely vast jumps, i.e. mutation, on Schopenhauer’s account, does not unfold 
gradually, but rapidly. Whereas Darwin (2009b: 689) had argued that natura non facit saltus, 
and hence the mutation of organisms unfolds by way of a gradual and imperceptible process. 
236 As previously discussed, this view accords perfectly with Schopenhauer’s acceptance of the 
Platonic Ideas, i.e. each species has a corresponding Platonic Idea to which it stands as 




The metaphysical Will is thus said to produce the multitudinous forms of organisms 
found throughout the world. But, it is to be noted that the way in which the metaphysical 
Will interacts with phenomenal objects (such as “the right position of the planets”) 
thereby producing a new species, unwittingly intimates a causal connection between 
the Ding-an-sich and its manifestation, a matter I have previously discussed and which 
has tremendous implications for Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality, given that the 
metaphysical Will is said to be utterly impervious to the causal law. Thus, we discern 
the Will’s causal susceptibility to phenomenal objects in connection with the theory of 
generatio in utero heterogeneo. This is significant in so far as in the appendix I argue 
that the metaphysical Will can be causally influenced by phenomenal ascetic practices; 
thereby indicating that the Will is not, as Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) states, impervious 
to the causal principle. I shall return to this matter in due course. 
Some twenty-years prior to Darwin’s publication of The Descent of Man and Selection 
in Relation to Sex (1871)237 Schopenhauer (1974b: 156-159) applied his evolutionary 
theory to that of man and hypothesized as to the development of the multifarious human 
races. He (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 312) maintains that there are three distinct human 
types or races, viz., the Caucasian, the Mongolian and the Ethiopian. All three of these 
races according to Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 156) theory, are not, as is the conclusion of 
the Darwinian theory, directly related but are the offspring of different types of apes.238 
Thus Schopenhauer (1974b: 153) writes: 
																																																								
237 Interestingly, in chapter XX of the third and final edition of this work (first published in 
1877) Darwin (1909: 893) quoted Schopenhauer on love. It is highly doubtful, however, that 
Darwin ever read any of Schopenhauer’s works, for the reference to the quotation cites Asher’s 
(1871: 323) article Schopenhauer and Darwinism as its source. The actual provenience of 
Schopenhauer’s words are to be found in chapter XLIV – The Metaphysics of Sexual Love – of 
the second volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. 
238 In contradistinction to Darwin’s (2009b: 808-810) theory of “centres of creation”, i.e. the 
view that each species appeared in one area alone and subsequently migrated to other locations 
at various times and evolved accordingly, Schopenhauer (1974b: 155) maintains that descent 
from a common ancestor is “an absurd assumption” and that therefore “in similar circumstances 
but in different localities, nature repeats the same process and is much too careful to allow the 
existence of a species, especially of the higher kinds, to be quite precarious, by staking it on a 




“We will not disguise the fact that we should accordingly have to imagine the 
first human beings as having come in Asia from the pongo (the parent of the 
orang-utan) and in Africa from the chimpanzee, though not as apes, but directly 
as human beings.” 
What this essentially amounts to is the claim that these different races of man were 
produced generatio in utero heterogeneo in different locations, i.e. a chimpanzee in 
Africa gave birth to the first Ethiopian type, while the first Caucasian and Mongolian 
humans were the offspring of pongos.239; 240 Thus Schopenhauer, in contrast to Darwin, 
was a polygenesist, i.e. he believed that the different human races are of different 
origins. Now it is interesting to note that in his classification of the human races 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 157) maintains that “colour is not the essential thing”; and he 
(Schopenhauer: 1974b: 157) maintains – correctly as far as genetic studies have 
revealed – that all humans irrespective of race were originally “black or dark brown” 
in colour. This is due to the fact that  
																																																								
to achieve. Rather does she know what she wants, wills it decidedly, and accordingly sets to 
work; but the occasion is never exclusive and unique” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 155-156).  
239 I should like to draw attention to the fact that on the point of creatures evolving from extant 
species, Schopenhauer is, once again, at variance with Darwin’s teaching. For according to 
Darwin (2009b: 784-785), the organisms which evolve from a parent-form will, owing to their 
adaptations, be better suited to survival, and as a consequence thereof they shall in the course 
of time supplant their parent-forms. This did not seem to occur to Schopenhauer, and hence he 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153) assumed that parent-forms could coexist with their mutated 
offspring-forms – for instance, a chimpanzee can coexist with an Ethiopian human in Africa. 
240 In connection with this theory, I should like to note here that when there was an exhibition 
of exotic animals in Frankfort Schopenhauer (cited in Thomas and Thomas, 1946: 237) 
reportedly went “[e]very afternoon […] to the fair and stared impressively at an [orang-utan] 
who stared back at him, unimpressed, from his cage. Schopenhauer was fascinated by ‘the 
probable ancestor of our race’. He urged his friends not to miss the opportunity of seeing this 
[orang-utan]. ‘Mon ami’, he said to him on one of his visits, ‘I regret exceedingly that I have 
not been able to make your acquaintance at an earlier date…Yes, yes, the frontal bone of your 
head is decidedly better formed than that of most humans…I am thrilled at the manner in which 
you stare through the bars. You have the strange and melancholy mien of a prophet gazing into 




“[…] man’s origin could have occurred only within the tropics because in the 
other zones the new-born human infant would have perished in the first winter. 
For although he had been nursed not without maternal care, he had yet grown 
up without any instruction and had inherited no knowledge from any ancestors. 
Therefore the infant of nature had first to recline on her warm bosom before 
she ventured to send it out into the rough and harsh world. Now in the torrid 
zones man is black, or at any rate dark brown. This, then, is the true, natural, 
and characteristic colour of the human species, regardless of race, and there 
has never been a naturally white race. In fact, to talk of such and childishly to 
divide people into white, yellow, and black, as is still done in all books, is 
evidence of great prejudice and a lack of thought.” 
Now it ought to be noted that, in spite of the abovementioned view, Schopenhauer does 
not reject the concept of racial classification, for as we have seen he (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 312) acknowledges that the human race is divided into three distinct human 
types, viz., the Caucasian, the Mongolian and the Ethiopian. In other words, it is utterly 
erroneous to construe Schopenhauer’s theory on the originally dark complexion of all 
humankind as intimating that all human beings were initially of, or descended from, the 
Ethiopian type.  However, Schopenhauer (1969b: 547) rejects, as can be gleaned from 
the abovementioned excerpt, the characterisation of these three distinct human types 
according to the pigmentation of their skins; this is due to the fact that all three human 
types, irrespective of race, were originally “black, or at any rate dark brown” 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 157), and hence: 
“[…] a white [or we might add, yellow or red] colour in the skin is not natural 
to man […] consequently, a white [or yellow or red] human being has never 
sprung originally from the womb of nature, and therefore there is no white [or 
yellow or red] race, however much this is talked about, but every white [or 
yellow or red] human being is bleached.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 547). 
It is for this reason that Schopenhauer (1974b: 157) speaks of the division of the human 
races according to colour as being “childish” and as “evidence of great prejudice and a 
lack of thought”. Now I think that Schopenhauer’s argument can be corroborated by 
the following observation: there are cases of albinism in Ethiopian people, as there are 
of melanism in Caucasoid and Mongoloid people; but no one would venture to assert 




pigmentation is an Ethiopian. Hence, it would appear that Schopenhauer’s thesis is 
indeed correct, for the pigmentation of one’s skin cannot determine one’s racial 
affiliation. If, on the other hand, the colour of one’s skin could determine one’s racial 
affiliation one would be coerced to regard Ethiopian albinos as Caucasoid, and hyper-
pigmented Caucasoids and Mongoloids as Ethiopians. Such is flagrantly erroneous. But 
it is owing to the fact that all races were, I reiterate, originally of a “black, or at any rate 
dark brown” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 157) complexion that we should jettison the 
classification of the races according to the colour of their skin; for technically speaking 
the human race in toto must, according to Schopenhauer’s theory, be regarded as black 
or dark brown. Hence, the characterisation of races according to the terms “white”, 
“black” and “yellow” is indeed foolish and redundant. Nonetheless, the fact that 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 312) avows the existence of three distinct human races intimates 
that there must exist biologically appropriate characteristics to determine one’s racial 
origins; but Schopenhauer does not, to my knowledge, offer explicit pronouncements 
on this matter. 
For the sake of interest I should like to continue for a while longer my discussion on 
Schopenhauer’s views on this compelling topic. It appears to me that Schopenhauer 
maintained that the various European races arose on the Indian sub-continent by way 
of his evolutionary theory of generatio in utero heterogeneo.241 In other words, an 
Asiatic ape, most probably a pongo according to Schopenhauer (1974b: 153), gave birth 
to a dark-skinned Caucasoid which, in the course of time and for reasons I shall shortly 
elaborate upon, became extremely pale. Hence, Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 547) theory 
																																																								
241 In corroboration of this view I note that Schopenhauer (1974b: 404) considered the Greeks, 
whom he greatly admired (Russell, 1946: 782), as the first Asiatic tribes “to reach Europe”. 
This intimates, of course, that the European population as a whole was originally from Asia, 
and because the Indians are essentially Caucasian people with extremely dark complexions – 
especially in the southern region of the Indian sub-continent – they must be considered the 
prototypes of the people who would eventually become “white Europeans”. Thus, one must 
imagine that, according to Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 153) theory, a pongo in India gave birth to 
the first Caucasian human, which had a “dark brown or black” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 157) 
complexion and would therefore have been considered an Indian by today’s standards; these 
anthropoids gradually migrated Westwards until finally, in the frigid conditions of Northern 




leads to the conclusion that the forefathers of the European people were in fact the dark-
skinned Hindus (i.e. Indians).  
Given this theory of European origins, it is amusing that some, as Bryan Magee (1997: 
437) notes, view Schopenhauer as a precursor to Nazi ideology. This view has been 
corroborated, perhaps unwittingly, in some recent works242 in claiming that 
Schopenhauer was the philosopher Hitler most admired. However, Schopenhauer’s 
(1969b: 547) theory of the originally dark-skin nature of all humans seems to be 
conspicuously at variance with Nazi ideology. Furthermore, far from sharing the Nazi 
admiration of blonde-haired, blue-eyed people Schopenhauer (1969b: 547) refers to 
such features as “an abnormality, analogous to white mice, or at least to white horses”; 
therefore, in choosing a mate for the propagation of the species “[…] nature strives to 
return to dark hair and brown eyes as the archetype […]” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 547). 
Such is conspicuously at variance with Nazi aesthetics and eugenics which sought 
																																																								
242 Cf. for instance, Yvonne Sherratt’s Hitler’s Philosophers (2013: 23-24) and Timothy W. 
Ryback’s Hitler’s Private Library: The Books that Shaped his Life (2010: 104-105). I cannot 
desist from stating that I find the latter work highly dubious in so far as it appears to make 
unsubstantiated claims. For instance, Ryback (2010: 105) states unequivocally that “[…] there 
is no reason to doubt that Hitler owned copies of Schopenhauer’s works […]”, but that in the 
course of his investigations he was only able to discover “a single Schopenhauer volume among 
Hitler’s remnant books, [viz.,] a 1931 reprint of Schopenhauer’s translation of Hand Oracle 
and the Art of Worldly Wisdom, by the seventeenth-century Jesuit Balthasar Gracian”. This 
work – which is, as Ryback (2010: 105) correctly notes, a translation into German from the 
original Spanish undertaken by Schopenhauer – can hardly be considered a part of 
Schopenhauer’s oeuvre. Therefore, even if Hitler did read Schopenhauer’s translation (for 
which there is, in fact, no proof; for merely owning a book does not portend the reading thereof) 
it could hardly be said that Hitler had thereby acquired a sufficient knowledge of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy by reading it. Ryback (2010: 105) also dubiously claims that “[the] 
most solid piece of evidence to the centrality of Schopenhauer in Hitler’s life is the bust of the 
wild-haired philosopher that Hitler displayed on a table in his Berghof study”. However, in 
spite of this bold assertion, Ryback does not include an image of this “most solid piece of 
evidence” – instead he includes the famous picture of Hitler gazing at a bust of Nietzsche at the 
Nietzsche Archives in Weimar – and, I may add, I have been unable to find any further evidence 
(pictorial or written) to corroborate Ryback’s claim. I am therefore sceptical that Hitler ever 




ultimately to produce an Aryan race of blonde-haired, blue-eyed people. Taking these 
facts into consideration, not to mention anything of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 372) moral 
philosophy, I think it is highly doubtful that Hitler ever read Schopenhauer profoundly, 
if indeed it all.243 Now, we would expect one who greatly admired the thoughts of 
another to attempt a refutation thereof when the former believes the latter to be in the 
wrong – all the more so on extremely significant matters; but I have been unable to 
discover a single piece of evidence that Hitler ever attempted to refute Schopenhauer’s 
racial views, which are conspicuously at variance with Nazi ideology. These facts 
intimate to me that, if anything, Hitler was a pseudo-Schopenhauerian scholar. 
Yet, in spite of the fact that Schopenhauer was certainly not a precursor to the Nazis, 
we cannot avoid the fact that he did espouse racist views regarding the intellectual and 
cultural superiority of lighter-skinned individuals. Hence Schopenhauer (1974b: 158-
159) proceeds in his discussion on humanity by noting that “the highest civilisation and 
culture, apart from the ancient Hindus and Egyptians, are found exclusively among the 
white races” and he (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 159) attempts to explicate this fact by 
noting that the Caucasian and Mongolian races “had to develop all their intellectual 
powers and invent and perfect all the arts in their struggle with need, want, and misery, 
which in their many forms were brought about by the climate”. Thus Schopenhauer 
maintains that the colder climate in Northern Europe and Asia necessitated an 
augmentation in intelligence which has led to the higher civilisation and culture among 
the so-called “white” human race, while the Ethiopian race Schopenhauer (1889b: 271-
272n2) considers to be the most intellectually inferior as is evinced by the fact that they 
“have become the special victims of the slave-trade […] though this by no means 
justifies the fact” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 271-272n2).244 
																																																								
243 Recently I discovered a 1905 copy of Schopenhauer’s Die Welt (edited by Eduard 
Grisebach), purported to belong to Hitler. The book was supposedly given to August Kubizek 
by Hitler when he moved out of the apartment the two shared in Vienna. I note further, that 
although the book contains a fair amount of underlining, there is no way to determine whether 
these were done by Hitler or by someone else. I mention this solely for interest’s sake, as Hitler 
may in fact have read Schopenhauer’s opus maximum. 
244 Although Schopenhauer (1889b: 271-272n2) clearly held racist views regarding what he 




This intellectual distinction between the races notwithstanding, Schopenhauer (1974b: 
143-144) maintains that the human form – irrespective of race – is the ultimate telos of 
nature.245 Such a notion may appear odd to the materialistic mindset, but once one 
understands that the notion is founded upon the teleological view of the Will, it follows 
that a hierarchy of forms is possible – indeed, even essential. The human accordingly 
stands at the very apex of the Will’s hierarchical objectification. But why should the 
Will not manifest itself in an organism higher than that of man? The answer, according 
to Schopenhauer (1974b: 143-144) is, in short, because there is no need for it: 
“[…] in my opinion the stage where mankind is reached must be the last 
because here there has already occurred to man the possibility of denying the 
Will and thus of turning back from all the ways of the world, whereby the 
divina commedia then comes to an end.” 
It must be said that this is an extremely strange pronouncement as it seems to generate 
the accusation of a contradiction within Schopenhauer’s thought. In describing the 
phenomenal characteristics of the Will Schopenhauer (1969a: 275) claimed that the 
term was a “mere pleonasm” for Wille-zum-Leben, as the Will incessantly wills life – 
was der Wille will immer das Leben ist (Cartwright, 2005: 187). But if that is the case, 
then what possible motivation can the Will possess to ultimately manifest itself in a 
creature which could potentially bring about its utter destruction?246 Indeed, this notion 
seems to intimate that the Will – far from willing life – actually harbours a motivation 
directed towards self-destruction, i.e. the Will, on this account, seems to be suicidal.247 
Furthermore, the denial of the Will does not seem to me to emanate therefrom but from 
																																																								
slavery, referring to the slave-owners in the southern United States as “a disgrace to the whole 
of humanity”. 
245 In this respect Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 143-144) view is, as Young (2005: 86) notes, at 
variance with Darwin’s theory, for it leads to the conclusion that “Schopenhauer did not 
anticipate the continual evolution of the [human] species”. 
246 I refer the reader to the appendix in which a detailed discussion of the abrogation of the Will 
can be found. 
247 I cannot help thinking here of Freud’s (1950: 49-50) notion of the so-called “death-instinct” 
(Thanatos). Although it is important to note that the death-instinct, according to Freud (1950: 
49-50), seeks to return to the inanimate whereas the Schopenhauerian abrogation of the Will 




the liberated intellect.248 Thus, although Schopenhauer utilized this contradictory 
notion in his attempt to explicate the Will’s gradual evolution from rudimentary 
organisms to its ultimate goal, viz., man, this is inadmissible within his system and 
should consequently not be done. There are other, indeed far more serious, 
contradictions and difficulties which Schopenhauer’s evolutionism generates within his 
philosophy. Let us therefore now turn to the most serious, which is the primary topic 
of this particular section in my exposition. 
It must be borne in mind that Schopenhauer probably acquired his theory of evolution 
in the late eighteen-forties (Lovejoy, 1911: 211), for he (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 154) 
explicitly states that his evolutionism “was first put forward by the anonymous author 
of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (6th ed. 1847)”. As a consequence, 
Schopenhauer’s evolutionism was a late addition to his system and we should therefore 
not be surprised that it generates problems therein. I shall now attempt to illustrate the 
primary difficulty which arises within Schopenhauer’s philosophy when he propounds 
his theory of generatio in utero heterogeneo. One must bear in mind that originally the 
Platonic Ideas – although themselves the source of a peculiar difficulty in 
Schopenhauer’s system – were initially (in 1818) utilised by him (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 127-130) to explicate the existence of multifarious creatures found throughout 
the world – both extant and extinct;249 but once he had read the Vestiges Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 156-157) attempted to re-cast his views on the origin of different species by, 
as we now know, postulating the theory of “generation in the uterus of another”. In 
short, the problem with an evolutionary view of nature for Schopenhauer is that it 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that consciousness did not always exist, but that it 
evolved, and that, therefore, there was a time when the universe was utterly devoid of 
consciousness. For the radical idealist it is contradictory to speak of alteration within 
the phenomenal world without a consciousness, for the principium individuationis and 
the principium fiendi are said to be brought to experience by way of the mind. 
In fact we can discover references to this problem within Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 
140n1, 142) last major work, for there is one (lengthy) passage in particular in the essay 
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On Philosophy and Natural Science in which Schopenhauer describes the gradual 
ascent of the Will’s objectification in the world of appearance. Therein he 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 142-143) intimates – as is only inevitable upon an evolutionist 
view – that there was a period in which the universe was devoid of consciousness and 
yet objects – appearances – must have existed in order for the transformations to occur 
which would eventually lead to the appearance of conscious life. Schopenhauer (1974b: 
142) confusingly speaks of the objectification of the Wille-zum-Leben being “restricted 
to its lowest stages, to the forces of inorganic nature” – a violent chapter in the world’s 
history in which solely inorganic elements and inanimate objects existed – and 
thereafter of a period in which the world was populated solely by “the mute and still 
life” of vegetative matter. Now I enquire in all earnestness: can such a view of the 
gradual evolution of conscious beings from inanimate and non-conscious chemicals 
and matter truly be defended upon a radical idealist view, in which the world is said to 
be dependent in its entirety upon the mind of a conscious creature? I think the answer 
is self-evident.  
Interestingly, Lovejoy (1911: 212) quotes the aforementioned passage by 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 142-144) at length in his interesting article, but he neither 
pursues the topic nor discusses this difficulty as to whether the evolutionistic theory 
and radical idealism are compatible in detail. Lovejoy (1911: 199-200) seems to think 
that Schopenhauer’s evolutionism is perfectly compatible with the rest of his system 
because although the Will in-itself is said to be unchanging250 the process of evolution 
applies solely to the world of appearances and does not interfere with the Ding-an-sich. 
On this point Lovejoy is not entirely incorrect, for it is quite true that the notion of 
organisms mutating into different species is not an issue within the province of 
phenomenal appearances; the difficulty arises when we pursue this thought to its logical 
conclusion, i.e. when we imagine a period utterly devoid of consciousness. Thus it 
seems to me that in his article Lovejoy appears to forget that Schopenhauer is also a 
radical transcendental idealist and therefore the consequences of the theory of evolution 
generate a unique problem for him – as indeed they do for any individual who maintains 
both an evolutionist and a radical idealist theory simultaneously. 
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The predicament here is an obvious one. Upon a radical idealist view, one in which no 
object may exist without a subject (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 15-16), i.e. without 
consciousness, how can the “dumb and silent life of a purely plant world” 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 142) or, for that matter, a totally non-conscious, inanimate 
world, be said to “exist” as such? Without the recourse to a deity or some other 
ubiquitous consciousness the very notion is nonsensical upon a radical idealist view of 
the world, for without consciousness there simply cannot be any extant, i.e. 
phenomenal, objects – the world devoid of consciousness cannot exist as appearance, 
but solely as the Will in-itself.251 But it is evident that the process of evolution applies 
solely to the objects in the world, i.e. to the world as appearance, and without the 
presence of that world it is meaningless to speak of evolution. In essence this amounts 
to the fact that upon a radical idealist view one cannot speak of life arising from 
inanimate matter and subsequently developing gradually by way of non-conscious 
organisms over the course of millions of years towards the so-called “higher organisms” 
which possess brains and consciousness. The radical idealist can only state that 
consciousness, for some mysterious reason, presents to itself the particular phenomena 
that it does. Of course, these organisms can be conceived of as evolving only in an 
extremely limited sense, viz., only in so far as such transformation was accompanied 
by consciousness, prior thereto no such alteration can be meaningfully conceived. Thus, 
from a radical idealist position, one can only avow evolution as occurring 
simultaneously with the existence of consciousness, but it is meaningless to speak of a 
non-conscious inorganic world existing prior to the appearance of consciousness, as 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 142-143) does. 
Given the seriousness of the matter, Schopenhauer (1974b: 140n1) was indeed aware 
of the tension generated by evolutionism (and the Kantian-Laplacian cosmogony) and 
his radical idealist position, for he states (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 140):  
“[…] On the one hand, it must be admitted that all those physical, 
cosmogonical, chemical, and geological events existed even before the 
appearance of a consciousness and so outside this since, as conditions, they 
were necessarily bound to precede such an appearance by a long interval of 
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time. Yet, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that, as those events first 
appear in and through the forms of consciousness, they are absolutely nothing 
outside it and are not even conceivable.” 
It ought to be evident that Schopenhauer’s difficulty in reconciling evolutionism with 
radical idealism is generated in part by his (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273) insistence on 
the mind being identical with the brain; thereby rendering consciousness dependent on 
a material, i.e. phenomenal, entity. If Schopenhauer, on the contrary, had been 
sagacious enough to argue for the transcendent nature of the mind he could easily have 
avoided this extremely serious difficulty by claiming that consciousness is independent 
of and antecedent to the world of phenomena. But the identification of the mind, 
wherein consciousness is said to reside (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273), with the brain 
precludes any such possibility. In short, it is Schopenhauer’s radical idealism which 
identifies consciousness as dependent upon the phenomenal brain which renders an 
evolutionary view of nature untenable. 
I maintain that had Schopenhauer possessed a less rigid mindset he would, in light of 
his (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 153-154) evolutionistic researches in the eighteen-forties, 
have adapted his radical idealist position which he (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 3) 
propounded in 1818 to that of partial idealism, i.e., the view that the world of 
experience is mind-dependent only to a certain extent; but his notorious stubbornness 
prevented him from so doing. Schopenhauer wished to persist in his radical idealist 
claim which, as we know, maintains that without a conscious subject to perceive there 
can be no perceived object (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 15-16), and yet he (Schopenhauer, 
1974b: 140-141; 151-155) also wished to avow his theory of generatio in utero 
heterogeneo form of evolution and the Kantian-Laplacian cosmogony which 
presuppose a materialistic universe existing independently of consciousness. In my 
estimation I think that the two views cannot be reconciled with each other, and yet 
Schopenhauer was compelled to find some explanation in which both positions can be 
avowed simultaneously. To that end he (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 140n1) attempts to 
resolve this difficulty, unsuccessfully in my estimation, by arguing that “[t]he 
geological events which preceded all life on Earth” are “merely hypothetical”, 
intimating that “if a consciousness had existed in those primeval times, then such events 
would have appeared in it”. This attempted solution to the problem as to how life could 




principium individuationis and the principium fiendi to the world as it is in-itself. For 
if the Will’s phenomenal manifestations existed in a “hypothetical” state prior to the 
appearance of consciousness that could have actualised or materialised “if a brain had 
existed at that time” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 141n1), then one has unwittingly intimated 
that the metaphysical Will itself is susceptible to both transformation and individuation. 
For, even without conscious observation, the metaphysical Will must evidently undergo 
a process of transformation in order to reach the point of animal consciousness 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 143) whereby the Will is able to behold itself. It is 
conspicuously evident, then, that Schopenhauerian radical idealism is incompatible 
with evolutionism, for the former requires consciousness as a prerequisite for all 
possible occurrences, whereas the latter maintains that consciousness is inessential, i.e. 
an adventitious phenomenon which in no way grounds or makes experiences possible. 
One must therefore choose either the one position or the other, but we cannot avow 
both simultaneously as Schopenhauer (1969a: 3, 1974b: 152-153) wishes to do. To do 
so is to avow antithetical theories which cannot be reconciled with each other. 
Thus I confidently conclude that Schopenhauerian evolutionism is necessarily 
committed to a form of materialism. For according to an evolutionary account it is by 
a process of mutations that the attributes of conscious organisms have been attained. In 
this way, the brain – given that it is a bodily organ (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273-274) – 
must have evolved from an extremely rudimentary (non-conscious) organ. Thus, on 
Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 140) account, there must have existed an era in which the 
world – and perhaps even the universe – was devoid of consciousness. For the radical 
idealist such a concept is inadmissible, but then we should allow empirical evidence to 
decide the matter: for, as I mentioned, the position of the radical idealist is utterly unable 
to explicate the existence of fossilised creatures devoid of brains in the earliest strata 
found on Earth.252  
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To persist in the Schopenhauerian view of radical idealism in the face of these 
irrefragable facts one would have to appeal to a transcendent mind (either in the form 
of a soul or a deity) in the way in which George Berkeley (2004a: 108-109) had done. 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that Berkeley (2004a: 109) – the radical idealist par 
excellence – was a religious man, for the position requires, as I have indicated, the 
postulation of a transcendent mind, i.e. a soul or an omniscient deity. However, such a 
position is, to my mind, repugnant, and it is not my intention to propound flawed views, 
which, moreover, are untenable on Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 273-274) principles. 
 
7.8. Time, Space and Causality as Mind-Independent 
 
I turn now to a further criticism of Schopenhauer’s radical idealist position, which has 
already been touched upon, albeit in a different respect. In the first section on idealism, 
in which I was discussing the similarities and dissimilarities between the three different 
varieties of idealism, viz., Berkeleyan, Kantian and Schopenhauerian, I argued that the 
only cogent explanation for the existence of multifarious objects in the world of 
appearances – which are often harrowing or dangerous to the subject in whom such 
appearances are said ultimately to derive – is the postulation that there is something 
inherently unique to each object, i.e. that every individual object must contain in-itself 
– as a Ding-an-sich – some particular property or properties which render them as they 
are. I argued that the radical idealist’s thesis, viz., that the world, with its innumerable 
objects, is nothing more than a mind-dependent appearance (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 3), 
is ultimately untenable; for it cannot explicate the existence of the manifold objects 
found throughout the universe. Both the Berkeleyan and Schopenhauerian varieties of 
idealism cannot explicate the appearance of disagreeable and, indeed, often dangerous, 
objects which are said to emanate from the consciousness of a benevolent deity or the 
human mind, respectively. I took this criticism to be a harsh repudiation of radical 
idealism; and I argued, therefore, that the only way in which such a difficulty can be 
surmounted is by way of an appeal to the inherent properties of the object in-itself. In 
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other words, every object must contain within itself certain properties which render it 
as it is and not otherwise. I tentatively offer this interpretation as being in accordance 
with Kant’s (1950: 36) intended teaching in which he declares his philosophy to be “the 
very contrary” of radical idealism, and I maintain that it inevitably leads to the doctrine 
of partial idealism (cf. Young, 2005: 54), i.e. the view that one’s idiosyncratic 
understanding of the world is partially mind-dependent.   
In the aforementioned section I was compelled to argue that there may be two types of 
causality, viz., a subjective and an objective form thereof. The postulation of the latter 
form of causality was used merely as a theoretical device, in order to explicate how the 
object in-itself is able to cause sensations in a perceptive being. Now, it seems to me 
that if it can be shown that the so-called a priori mechanisms of the mind possess a 
mind-independent existence, then the veracity of the radical idealist position is 
enfeebled. If such a possibility is demonstrated, it follows therefrom that 
Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 271-272) doctrine of athanasia is untenable, in so far as it is 
founded upon the radical idealist doctrine. However, in attempting to demonstrate the 
mind-independency of time, space and causality I must insist that Kant’s (1950: 37) 
critical philosophy should not be neglected: for as human beings we are limited by the 
finitude of our minds and we cannot be certain of anything which transcends our 
experience. There are things for which we are, and must forever remain, ignorant: 
ignoramus et ignorabimus.253 Consequently, in the subsequent section I do not wish to 
be taken as offering definitive proof of the independent nature of time, space and 
causality; I merely wish to propose the possibility that these essential forms of 
experience may be mind-independent. To that end, I turn to a criticism of the 
Schopenhauerian notion that time, space and causality emanate from the human mind.  
According to the principium fiendi, which is the first class of objects for the subject 
which Schopenhauer (1889a: 47) discusses in his doctoral dissertation, the mind 
imposes the law of causality onto the sensory material received thereby. Causality is 
thus “an a priori and necessary truth” (Cartwright, 2005: 140) and it has no existence 
beyond the mind, which is to say that it applies solely to appearances and not to the 
Ding-an-sich. It is primarily for this reason, i.e. that causality is a priori, that 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 436) excoriates Kant and rejects the claim that the Ding-an-sich 
																																																								




causes sensations. Causality, on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 436) account, thus exists 
solely in so far as a perceiving mind is present. Now I believe that a young, inquisitive 
mind may be greatly impressed upon first learning of the a priority of causality, for it 
appears, prima facie, to resolve Hume’s (2007: 60) scepticism relating thereto. For if 
causality is an a priori form of the mind then it is not, as Hume (2007: 60) maintains, 
impossible for a scientist to speak meaningfully of causal relations. But if one 
investigates the matter more profoundly difficulties begin to appear; just as one notices 
cracks in the paint of an oil painting only upon close inspection, which from a distance 
were utterly unnoticeable. For it seems to me that if causality were indeed a priori then 
we should be able to determine the causal connection between objects and events a 
priori. Yet, when we consider even the simplest of phenomena we realise how 
profoundly ignorant we are: we cannot accurately determine a priori the vera causa of 
most occurrences. But this seemingly trivial observation intimates to me that causality 
is, in fact, mind-independent.  
As intimated, the provenience of the notion of the a priority of the causal law is to be 
discovered in Kant’s (1950: 17-19) attempt to address the scepticism of Hume. Now, a 
matter upon which I must be emphatically perspicuous and have yet to earnestly discuss 
is the precise meaning thereof. For when one declares that the mind imposes causality 
upon the sensations does one portend that a particular instantiation of the causal law is 
brought to experience by way of the mind, or is a more general meaning of the concept 
intended? If the latter is the intended meaning then the mind only knows a priori in a 
general sense that every effect must have an antecedent cause, it does not in fact impose 
a particular instantiation of the causal law onto phenomena and hence it cannot 
immediately know – if indeed it can at all – the vera causa of phenomena. It will be 
remembered that Hume (2007: 41-42) claimed that all causal connections amount, in 
the final analysis, to nothing more than an arbitrary connection among objects. Of 
course, it is preferable and consequently enticing to interpret Kant’s (1950: 17-19) 
response to Hume as a theory in which the mind applies a particular instantiation of the 
causal law onto the sensory data received; for it seems to me that Hume’s scepticism is 
resolved solely by way of this interpretation, i.e. if the mind is construed to impose a 
particular instantiation of the causal law onto phenomena. 
However, it is not difficult to refute this dubious analysis, for many individuals tend to 




often find an array of competing causal explanations for an unknown phenomenon. Let 
us take as a simple, yet compelling, illustration of the point I am attempting to propound 
here the movement of the Sun in the firmament. The most reasonable explanation for 
this occurrence is that of the geocentric view (Stuart, 2018: 18-19), i.e. that the Earth is 
stationary and the Sun revolves around it, for this is the way in which it appears when 
one considers the phenomenon from the Earth. However, in attempting to explicate this 
same occurrence, the Aztecs posited that if Huitzilopochtli254 were not offered the heart 
and blood of a human the Sun would remain immobile; hence the movement of the Sun 
was thought by that ancient culture to be powered by metaphysical forces. Then, of 
course, there is the heliocentric theory (Stuart, 2018: 22-23), which maintains that the 
Earth and other planets revolve around the Sun. Given that we have here three 
conflictual causal explanations for the same phenomenon, it would appear that Kant’s 
theory of the a priority of causality is erroneous if we adopt the view that the mind 
imposes a particular instantiation of causality onto the received sensory data, for we 
must assume that the innate mechanisms of the mind are approximately homogenous 
among thinking beings given the general concurrence on the way in which we perceive 
the world, and hence one would expect everyone to offer the identical causal 
explanation for every universally perceived effect. It cannot be then that Kant – a genius 
as he certainly was – propounded such a fragile theory. The logical answer is that Kant 
meant by his theory that the mind imposes the law of causality only in a general manner, 
as opposed to it imposing a particular instantiation of the causal law; this general law 
may be succinctly expressed as “for every effect there must of necessity exist an 
antecedent cause”, which is necessarily mind-dependent. In this way, we are able to 
explicate the numerous divergent causal explanations which abound in the world for 
every possible phenomenon. 
But this understanding, like a curative medicine which invariably has a side-effect, 
generates a serious problem. For it would appear that Kant does not in fact resolve 
Hume’s scepticism in so far as the issue of arbitrarily associating objects according to 
a general law of causality does not in fact prove their actual causal connection. By this 
I mean that even though the mind may know that every effect presupposes a cause, it 
still cannot correctly identify the particular cause thereof and hence Hume’s (2007: 60) 
																																																								




predicament remains, for how can one be certain of the veracity of one’s idiosyncratic 
causal explanations? It is one thing to say that the human mind knows a priori and in 
general that a cause must precede an effect, but it is quite another to say that a particular 
cause is directly responsible for the appearance of a particular effect. It seems to me 
that Hume’s (2007: 60) scepticism pertains to the latter, and if one cannot convincingly 
prove the causal relationship between two objects then scepticism concerning their 
causal connection must remain. This observation is, in addition to the fact that objects 
often present themselves as disagreeable and even dangerous, yet another cogent reason 
for rejecting the a priority of the causal law. However, I do not wish to give the 
erroneous impression that Kant is entirely incorrect and that his theory is devoid of 
value. On the contrary, the notion that the mind contains within itself a general 
understanding of certain significant features of experience leads to a profound view 
with tremendous explanatory power; for it intimates that one’s understanding of the 
world does, to a certain extent – albeit not entirely – depend on the human mind. 
The discrepancy between the numerous causal explanations propounded by individuals 
intimates that the idiosyncratic world of the individual is to a certain extent mind-
dependent. Thus, from the perspective of the Aztec he is correct in his causal 
explanation of the movement of the Sun in the firmament, just as is the unscientific 
layman in his assumption that the Sun revolves around the Earth. This is the doctrine 
of partial idealism (cf. Young, 2005: 54), by which is meant that the world one knows 
is partially constructed by the mind. Thus, each individual possesses an idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the world peculiar to himself, which stands in contradistinction to the 
actual empirical world; although the former may at times concur with the latter it does 
not necessarily do so. Indeed, following Kant (1950: 37), we must avow that it is 
impossible for us to know with any certitude whether or not our idiosyncratic 
interpretations accord with reality as it is in-itself. For our finite minds are incapable of 
comprehending reality to its very depths; to reiterate the maxim I quoted earlier on 
numerous occasions: ignoramus et ignorabimus.255 I take the notion of idiosyncratic 
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causality to be an extremely significant one for it explicates the disparities in causal 
explanations among different people. There is much truth in the claim that the mind 
imposes a general causal assumption onto phenomena in so far as individuals do 
attempt to surmise causal explanations for the phenomena they witness, but it is 
evidently erroneous to claim that causality itself emanates from the mind. In connection 
therewith, I wish to observe that the human mind tends to postulate causal explanations 
even in instances in which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
vera causa of a particular phenomenon. For instance, a medical doctor may attribute 
the development of an illness to one cause, but upon further examination he may 
conclude that a different cause is responsible for the aetiology of the disorder; one need 
only think of the numerous misdiagnoses constantly made by even the most eminent 
medical practitioners as proof of this observation. Therefore, although it may not be 
consoling to an ailing patient, it may be said that a medical doctor can at best always 
and only offer an idiosyncratic explanation for the development of a disease. 
Sometimes, as one inevitably hopes, the doctor’s diagnosis accords closely with the 
unknown reality, and the patient is able to partially or fully recover; but if the doctor’s 
idiosyncratic diagnosis is inaccurate the patient will inevitably worsen.  
Now it might enter into the minds of some creative readers, that a possible response to 
the observation of manifold causal explanations is due to a faulty application of the law 
of causality. However, it is inadmissible to argue that this is the source of the error in 
the causal explanation for by this one implicates thinking, which is foreign to the 
principium fiendi. Indeed, the principle of sufficient reason of becoming is concerned 
solely with the Understanding (Hamlyn, 2009: 16); and in his appendix to the first 
volume of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969a: 439) explicitly states that thinking is 
concerned with reason [Vernunft] and concepts, and is therefore the province of the 
principle of sufficient reason of knowledge (principium cognoscendi). The numerous 
idiosyncratic causal explanations are therefore not a consequence of a faulty application 
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idiosyncrasies. In spite of this obvious limitation, the scientific method is the most objective 
discipline possessed by humankind and it ought therefore to be valued as its most sacred 
possession. He who lambastes science is as ignorant as he who venerates it as an omniscient 




of the principium fiendi. In concluding, I note, therefore, that the existence of numerous 
causal explanations for one and the same phenomenon refutes the claim for the a 
priority of the causal law, for if causality truly emanated from the mind we should all 
possess identical causal explanations. So much then for the mind-independentness of 
the causal law. 
Likewise, I take issue with Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 283) claim that time emanates from 
the mind. In order to refute this claim my intention is to illustrate that there are in fact 
two aspects of time: an internal and an external. The internal sense of time is entirely 
mind-dependent, whereas the external form of time is wholly mind-independent. In my 
view Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 283) assertion of the ideality of time implicitly 
confounds the external, mind-independent, sense of time with that of the internal, mind-
dependent, form thereof. Hence, if it can be shown that the internal sense of time does 
not correspond to the external, it seems to me that an objective, i.e. mind-independent, 
form of time will thereby be proven to exist. 
In contradistinction to Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 283) view, therefore, I note that if time 
were truly mind-dependent then it seems to me that we should be able to accurately 
gauge the passing thereof and that moreover, an idiosyncratic dilation or contraction in 
one’s idiosyncratic sense of time ought to correspond to the objective, i.e. mind-
independent, form thereof. However, I maintain that the mind is incapable of correctly 
determining the precise lapsing of time, and this may be empirically demonstrated and 
proved in the following way: one should time what they imagine to be the passing of 
five minutes on a watch, without actually looking at the instrument. I have found that 
without constant practice I am incapable of accurately determining the passing of the 
specified time and this I take as proof of the fact that time cannot be mind-dependent; 
for if time truly emanated from the mind one would not be incapable of accurately 
gauging it. 
Moreover, and more significantly, I observe that the contraction and dilation of one’s 
idiosyncratic sense of time does not affect the passing of objective time. Research has 
shown that illness, such as fever (Goudsmit and Claiborne, 1970: 15) and narcotics can 




“[i]n general, stimulants like caffeine and amphetamine, which speed up 
metabolism, make time seem longer; depressants like barbiturates or opiates 
make it seem shorter.” 
Now if time truly emanated from the mind, as Schopenhauer (1974b: 283) claims, then 
it seems to me that any dilation or contraction in one’s perception of time ought to 
correspond to the mind-independent form thereof. In other words, Thomas De Quincey, 
for instance, ought to have found himself suddenly existing in the future after he had 
ingested opium for he (quoted in Goudsmit and Claiborne, 1970: 15) claimed that under 
its influence “he seemed to live as much as one hundred years in a single night”. Yet, 
after the influence of the narcotic had worn off, De Quincey undoubtedly found himself 
to be no farther in the future than an individual who had not ingested the substance. It 
therefore appears that we exist within an objective framework of time and that time 
does not originate from the perceiving mind; as such we can declare in contradistinction 
to Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 283) teaching that: 
“[t]ime is something purely objective and real, existing quite independently of 
me. I am thrown into it only accidently, have got possession of a small portion 
of it, and have thus arrived at a transient reality just as thousands of others 
before me who are now no more, and I too shall very soon be nothing. Time, 
on the other hand, is that which is real; it then goes on without me.” 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 272). 
Finally, space, too, cannot be mind-dependent, for if it were then one should not be 
susceptible to geometrical deception. Geometrical relations are essentially relative, in 
so far as we judge the size and shape of an object relative to another. This relation 
should not be conceived, however, as mind-dependent, i.e. as emanating from the 
perceiver’s mind: for the relation between two or more objects must necessarily be 
objective, i.e. based on the association between external entities. To take an illustration 
of the point I am wishing to make let one imagine that an average-sized man were to 
be placed inside a play-house, his entire body would fill the space; but the mind does 
not initially perceive this relation as it truly is: one imagines that the house is of the 
usual proportions and that the man is excessively large, i.e. “a giant”; it is solely when 
a third object, say a tree, is placed next to the house and the man that the mind adjusts 
its perception and realises that the house, and not the man, is disproportional, i.e. the 




house nor the man which has undergone a transformation, it is solely the mind which 
has adjusted its view thereof. Now I maintain that if space truly emanated from the 
mind then one would not err in the manner previously described: one would know 
immediately, i.e. a priori, that the house was of an irregular size and not the man. 
I take these considerations as offering compelling evidence that causality, time and 
space do not emanate from the mind, but that they must necessarily possess a mind-
independent existence. However, it is significant to note that every individual does in 
fact carry around within his head a subjective sense of time, space and causality. In this 
sense, the mind does in fact partially construct an idiosyncratic reality for every 
individual (cf. Young, 2005: 54); but this idiosyncratic construction often does not 
accord with reality, which exists entirely independently of one’s mind. Now if one 
admits that there is a mind-independent form of time, space and causality then 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) argument for radical idealism collapses: the experienceable 
world is not dependent on the mind for its ultimate existence. Thus is the first pillar 





8. The World as Will: Part Two 
 
I turn now to the second critical part of my exposition, wherein I shall attempt to 
illustrate the untenability of Schopenhauer’s second primary thesis in favour of 
athanasia, viz., the identification of the Will with the Ding-an-sich. To this end I shall 
consider four primary criticisms of the thesis: (i) the problem of rendering the Will a 
concept, (ii) the problem of “intellectual intuition”, (iii) that the Will is located within 
time and space, and (iv) that the Will is subject to change (i.e. the law of causality). 
 
8.1. The Will as a Concept 
 
The first issue I wish to consider is concerned with conceptual knowledge, as discussed 
by Schopenhauer (1889a: 114) in his doctoral thesis. It will be recalled that concepts 
are abstract representations of perceptions (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 115). Now it must 
be observed that when Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) confers the term “Will” upon that 
which he discovers by way of introspection, he has unwittingly transformed it into a 
concept; for all knowledge is essentially dependent upon the division of subject and 
object (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 15-16). In other words, knowledge of the world as it is 
in-itself requires that it becomes an object of perception for a subject. I note that the 
knowledge of the Will cannot be impervious to this principle of “no object without a 
subject”. But if the knowledge of the Will renders it an object, then it must be subject 
to the principle of sufficient reason in its fourfold form. For the present moment I shall 
limit the discussion to the Will as object considered under the form of the principium 
cognoscendi. Now when it is placed under this particular form of the principle of 
sufficient reason, the Will, as Copleston (1947: 65) notes, becomes: 
“[…] an abstract term and a concept: it must be either mere phantasy or based 
on an idea of perception, in neither of which cases can it be an adequate 
expression of the noumenon.” 
It will be recalled that the way in which the mind formulates a concept is by way of 
abstraction: one experiences manifold similar objects and subsequently unifies these 




shown that this is precisely the way in which the mind comes to identify “the Will”; for 
when one attends to his inner state one discovers a myriad of volitions: lustful cravings 
for numerous individuals, the desire for different kinds of nourishment, wealth in order 
to acquire many possessions, and so on. The mind abstracts what is common to all 
these, disregards what is inessential, and confers the term “Will” thereon. In this way it 
is evident that the term “Will” is a concept and as such it must be, as Copleston (1947: 
65) correctly intimates, an appearance. Thus the concept of the Will cannot be utilised 
in connection with the world as it is in-itself, for being a concept it is a double 
appearance – twice removed from the Ding-an-sich – and hence it cannot pertain to the 
world as it is in-itself. To this end White (2008: 79) correctly states: 
“[…] If all concepts and all words are derived from [appearances], if all that is 
material in our knowledge comes from perception of the corporeal world and 
has its origin in sensation, and if reason cannot take us beyond [appearances], 
then we cannot reason to the Will, nor can we meaningfully talk or think about 
it. Still less can we acquire conceptual knowledge of it.” 
If the Will is indeed a concept then it follows that it must be a representation of (inner) 
perceptions, i.e. appearances. In other words, according to the dichotomisation between 
phenomena on the one hand and the world as it is in-itself on the other, the Will belongs 
to that of the former. Thus it appears that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) introspective 
method has not disclosed the nature of the elusive Ding-an-sich. But before we hastily 
conclude this section, I wish to discuss in more detail the reasons for stating that the 
Will is essentially a concept. 
I must observe that the synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind apply equally to 
inner, as they do to outer, perceptions. Now when Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) attempts 
to discover the Ding-an-sich he proceeds to his goal along the erroneous assumption 
that the synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind pertain solely to the external world 
– that the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason does not, indeed, cannot, 
pertain to inner experiences and states. Of course, the error made by Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 100) is in thinking that introspection reveals the Ding-an-sich, whereas, in 
reality, it merely discloses another phenomenal realm.  
If we attempt to adumbrate Schopenhauer’s reasoning, we can say that there is solely 




publicly experienceable (i.e. other individuals are able to perceive it) and it is 
phenomenal, like all other objects, whereas the other side can only be experienced by 
one individual, i.e. the subject himself, which Schopenhauer (1969b: 7) erroneously 
takes to be indicative of the Ding-an-sich. One’s own body is indeed a unique object 
for precisely this reason; but it does not follow that because only I can experience my 
inner states directly they are equivalent to the Ding-an-sich and therefore impervious 
to the principle of sufficient reason. That, of course, does not follow. As a consequence, 
we must acknowledge that subjective (inner) states are indeed phenomenal in nature 
and are consequently susceptible to the influence of the synthetic a priori mechanisms 
of the mind in equal measure to externally experienceable objects. Once that is 
conceded the possibility of positively identifying the Ding-an-sich by way of 
introspection becomes a lost cause. Indeed, in the foregoing paragraphs it was 
conclusively demonstrated that the Will is subject to the principium cognoscendi, and 
in the subsequent discussions of this section it will be shown that the Will is not only 
susceptible thereto, but, more seriously, it is also subject to the principium essendi (in 
particular time) and the principium fiendi. Now by demonstrating that the Will is 
essentially an abstraction, i.e. a concept, we have proven that it is not impervious to the 
principle of sufficient reason, and that, consequently it is utterly incapable of being 
regarded as a characterisation of the way the world is in-itself.  
I anticipate that there may be some who remain unconvinced by my discussion and for 
these incredulous individuals I offer a further corroboration of my thesis. It seems to 
me that we can authenticate the argument that the Will is a concept by recalling the fact 
that because the concept is an abstraction from perception (Schopenhauer, 1889a: 114), 
i.e. it discards what is inessential, it is something vague and intangible. Hence, if the 
Will is indeed a concept it must be possible to demonstrate that it is an extremely vague 
and intangible notion. It is the equivocalness of concepts which leads Schopenhauer 
(1889a: 116) to excoriate philosophical systems which base their fundamental tenets 
upon these diaphanous foundations. Thus Schopenhauer (1889a: 116) states of those 
who utilise concepts in this manner: 
“Of what avail […] can philosophical systems be, which are only spun out of 
conceptions of [the highest and most general] sort and have for their substance 
mere flimsy husks of thoughts like these? They must of necessity be 




If the Will is essentially an abstraction – a concept – it raises the justifiable question as 
to whether Schopenhauer cannot be accused of the same offence. In other words, cannot 
the concept of the Will be said to be essentially “empty, poor, and therefore also 
dreadfully tiresome”? If it can be cogently illustrated that the Will is extremely vague 
and uncertain it may well be taken as a further corroboration of the criticism that the 
term is a mere concept and consequently does not disclose the nature of the world as it 
is in-itself. 
However, it will be remembered that in the introductory section I explained that 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 111) thought his concept of the Will to possess great explanatory 
power; it was claimed that the Will is: 
“[…] no mere ens rationis, no hypostasis […], nor is it a term of vague 
uncertain meaning.” (Schopenhauer, 1889b: 376). 
In essence Schopenhauer (1889b: 376) claims that owing to the Will’s immediateness 
it is something “which is better known than anything”, hence it appears not to be 
something vague and intangible as is characteristic of concepts. However, when one 
attempts to explicate what precisely is meant by the term “Will” one inevitably finds 
oneself thrown into tremendous difficulty; for the Will is not easily explicable. Hence, 
Odell (2001: 54) anticipates that those unacquainted with the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy “may feel some uncertainty concerning exactly what Schopenhauer meant 
to refer to with the word ‘Will’”. Such uncertainty seems to conflict with 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 111-112, 1889b: 376) view that the Will is known better than 
anything; for surely if the Will “is better known than anything” it should not generate 
any uncertainty and confusion? It was due to the inscrutability of the term that I argued 
in the introductory section that the term “Will” is – like the phenomenon of love – 
incapable of communication. In that particular section I presented the Will’s 
incommunicability as not necessarily an impediment to the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy, but here I must confess that it appears to be a serious problem; for it seems 
to intimate that “the Will” is indeed an extremely abstract concept – generating 
uncertainty and being difficult to define and communicate. 
It seems to me that there is a possible response to this criticism, for in defence of 
Schopenhauer one may respond that in order to speak meaningfully of that which 




Philosophy is in essence an abstract discipline, consequently its modus operandi is by 
way of concepts. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a philosopher expounding a 
complicated system without utilising fundamental terminology (concepts). Thus, one 
may respond to the aforementioned criticism by pointing out that the Will is merely an 
explicative device which only approximates to the entity one discovers introspectively 
(cf. Schopenhauer, 1969b: 197-198). Upon this understanding the Will is 
acknowledged to be a concept, but it does not fully describe that which it is meant to 
symbolise. Thus, this response to our criticism dichotomises between incommunicable 
knowledge of the world as it is in-itself on the one hand, and communicable knowledge 
thereof which requires that it be conceptualised, on the other.  
However, it is by way of this discussion that we discern a potential difficulty with the 
attempt to positively identify – or we might say, possess incommunicable knowledge 
of – the world as it is in-itself, which I take to be a corroboration of the Kantian doctrine 
and in particular the notion of not being able to positively characterise the world as it 
is in-itself (Kant, 1950: 37). Due to the fact that both outer and inner experiences are 
subject to the synthetic a priori mechanisms of the mind it seems impossible to know 
anything independently thereof. In other words, all knowledge as such is conditioned 
by these mechanisms of the mind – in the parlance of the Schopenhauerian philosophy: 
all knowledge is condition by the principle of sufficient reason – hence we must enquire 
if there is even any meaning in the notion of “knowledge independent of the principle 
of sufficient reason”, for all knowledge presupposes the principle and is therefore 
dependent upon it. Thus the notion of “knowledge independent of the principle of 
sufficient reason” appears to be a contradictio in terminis. As Schopenhauer (1969b: 
198) states: 
“[…] being-known of itself contradicts being-in-itself, and everything that is 
known is as such only phenomenon.” 
It follows that all knowledge claims are necessarily dependent upon the principle of 
sufficient reason, and hence the communicability of knowledge requires the 
employment of concepts as their primum mobile.  
We have still to observe that even if, per impossible, one were able to know the world 
in-itself he would not be able to express this knowledge by way of words (concepts), 




(in particular the principium cognoscendi). Therefore, even if it were possible for 
Schopenhauer to possess knowledge independent of the principle of sufficient reason – 
something impossible on his own terms – he would still not be able to communicate it 
by way of a philosophical discourse. The response to our criticism that the Will is in 
fact a concept and therefore incapable of elucidating the nature of the Ding-an-sich is 
consequently insufficient; whereas the criticism that the Will is in fact a concept and 
consequently cannot be taken as a characterisation of the Ding-an-sich remains 
pertinent.  
In summation, it is hoped that this discussion has made perspicuous that the Will is a 
concept and therefore subject to the principle of sufficient reason of knowing. As such 
it cannot be taken as a descriptive or explanatory term for the world as it is in-itself (the 
Ding-an-sich), which is ultimately impervious to the influence of that principle and 
therefore unknowable (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 198). I now turn to a consideration of an 
equally inimical and closely related criticism of the Schopenhauerian notion of the Will 
being identified with the Ding-an-sich, viz. that knowledge of the Will is a product of 
intellectual intuition.  
 
8.2. Knowledge of the Will as a Product of Intellectual Intuition 
 
In the introductory section of my dissertation I attempted to defend Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 100) claim that the Will is the Ding-an-sich by likening it to the sensation of 
being in love. This was due to the fact that, as with amorous sentiments, I maintained 
that the Will is capable of being known, but that the knowledge thereof is 
incommunicable. In other words, I maintained that an individual can attain knowledge 
of the world as it is in-itself, but that once acquired this knowledge cannot be passed 
on to others. It occurred to me that knowledge of the metaphysical Will would 
necessarily transcend the principle of sufficient reason and consequently such 
knowledge (which at the time I erroneously believed to be possible) would not be 
communicable for this very reason. I confess that initially the argument seemed 
meritorious to me; but upon further contemplation I am compelled to present the 




Given that the Will is identified with the Ding-an-sich by Schopenhauer (1969a: 100, 
et al.) it follows that it must be regarded as a supra-sensible object; hence it must 
necessarily be impervious to the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason and 
cannot become a mundane object of sense-perception. But how, then, can such an entity 
– if indeed such a one does in fact exist – ever become an object for knowledge? It 
seems to me that knowledge of the world as it is in-itself can be acquired solely by way 
of “intellectual intuition”. Now for the sake of comprehensibility, we may succinctly 
define the concept of intellectual intuition as the immediate, direct and complete 
knowledge of that which transcends experience, i.e. immediate and direct knowledge 
of ultimate reality (Cartwright, 2005: 89) – knowledge of the world as it is in-itself. In 
other words, intellectual intuition may be considered a “sixth-sense” (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 521) whereby one has immediate access to a mind-independent world, i.e. 
knowledge of the Ding-an-sich or the way the world is in-itself.  
Initially I failed to realise that Schopenhauer’s (1889b: 376) claim that the Will “is 
better known than anything, and moreover in quite a different way from all the rest” is 
tantamount to the utterances of other philosophers and religionists who claim 
knowledge of the supra-sensible world by way of a direct mystical insight therein. This 
is all the more surprising in so far as Schopenhauer (1969b: 186, et al.) explicitly 
excoriates his contemporaries on numerous occasions for having recourse to this 
dubious form of knowledge: 
“All knowledge so gained [by way of intellectual intuition, i.e., a kind of 
ecstasy or clairvoyance] must be rejected as subjective, individual, and 
consequently problematical. Even if it actually existed, it would not be 
communicable, for only the normal knowledge of the brain is communicable; 
if it is abstract knowledge, through concepts and words; if it is knowledge of 
mere perception, through works of art.” 
“[The philosopher] should therefore beware of falling into the way of the 
mystics, and, for instance, by assertion of intellectual intuition, or pretended 
immediate apprehensions of the faculty of reason, of trying to give in bright 
colours a positive knowledge of what is for ever inaccessible to all knowledge, 
or at most can be expressed only by a negation.” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 611). 
Now, is not Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) claim that by way of introspection one 




(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 186, 611, et al.) so vehemently disdains and deprecates? For 
introspective knowledge is equally as susceptible to the principle of sufficient reason 
as is knowledge of the external world, as I indicated and discussed in the previous 
section. Yet Schopenhauer never admits this seemingly obvious fact; instead he 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: xxi) appears to mitigate his anxieties surrounding this difficulty 
by way of a reaction formation. For in the preface to the second edition of his magnum 
opus Schopenhauer (1969a: xxi) boldly declares: 
“I am always to be found at the standpoint of reflection, in other words, of 
rational deliberation and honest information, never at that of inspiration, called 
intellectual intuition or even absolute thought; its correct names would be 
humbug and charlatanism.”256  
Yet there is a justifiable reason for Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 289) denial and 
apprehensiveness regarding this matter: for the possibility of intellectual intuition 
presents itself as a serious difficulty with Schopenhauer’s philosophy in toto; for the 
thesis that the Will is akin to the Ding-an-sich forms the foundation of his entire system; 
consequently, if Schopenhauer has based his philosophy upon the precarious 
foundations of an unproven “sixth sense” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 521) it will 
undoubtedly bring into question his many other theories and observations based 
thereon. Kant’s teaching had indicated that between raw sensations and intelligible 
perceptions there stands the mind (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 417), which acts as a powerful 
distorter of the former. The presence of the mind, therefore, precludes the possibility of 
knowing what the world may be like independently thereof and in-itself; it is primarily 
for this reason that Schopenhauer (1969a: xxi, 1969b: 186, 289, 611, et al.)  correctly 
excoriates those philosophers who appeal to intellectual intuition.   
Now although Schopenhauer (1969b: 289) emphatically claims that he has “always 
stood on the ground of reflection, consequently of honesty and hence without the vain 
pretension of intellectual intuition or absolute thought that characterises the period of 
																																																								
256 Schopenhauer (1969b: 289) reiterates this view in the supplements to the second book of the 
second volume of Die Welt, when he states: “[…] I have always stood on the ground of 
reflection, consequently of honesty, and hence without the vain pretension of intellectual 





pseudo-philosophy between Kant and [himself]”; it may, in fact, be cogently argued 
that he is equally as guilty of the offence of a magical or mystical insight into the nature 
of reality as were those he so despised and excoriated. To fully comprehend this 
criticism we must observe that when Schopenhauer (1969a: 100) states that it is by way 
of introspection that one discovers the Ding-an-sich he unwittingly intimates that a 
supra-sensuous knowledge – i.e., a “sixth-sense”, illumining the dark depths of ultimate 
reality – is possible. However, it is not at all self-evident that introspective knowledge 
should be impervious to the influence of the principle of sufficient reason. Indeed, as I 
mentioned in the previous criticism, introspective knowledge is equally as susceptible 
to the influence of the principle of sufficient reason as is external knowledge; hence the 
Will must be temporally257 and spatially258 situated and likewise must it be subject to 
the law of causality.259 For this reason I maintain that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 99-100) 
introspective method is a surreptitious form of intellectual intuition whereby he 
attempts to discover the nature of ultimate reality.  
Closely related to the aforementioned discussion is Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 410) claim 
that mysticism is able to supply an incommunicable transcendental “knowledge”260 of 
the world as it is in-itself:  
“If, however, it should be absolutely insisted on that somehow a positive 
knowledge is to be acquired of what philosophy can express only negatively 
as denial of the Will, nothing would be left but to refer to that state which is 
experienced by all who have attained to complete denial of the Will, and which 
																																																								
257 Our volitional strivings “can be dated and their duration can be measured” (Edwards, 2009: 
170). Cf. also Schopenhauer, 1969b: 197. 
258 The Will is akin to the bodily organs it manifests itself in (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 108); hence 
it must be extended in space. 
259 As discussed at great length in the appendix, the only way in which Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 
508) claim that the Will of the ascetic saint is abrogated at the moment of his death is by way 
of postulating the possibility of a transcendental change, whereby ascetic practices can causally 
affect the Will as Ding-an-sich. 
260 Strictly speaking, “such a state cannot really be called knowledge”, as Schopenhauer (1969a: 




is denoted by the names ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so 
on.” 
I observe that this notion is extremely peculiar in so far as it intimates that one can 
acquire “knowledge” of something which in principle transcends the preconditions for 
all knowledge; thus, such comprehension is said to be “accessible only to one’s own 
experience that cannot be further communicated” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 410). Now it 
will be recalled that in the introductory section of the dissertation I propounded the 
view of introspective knowledge of the Ding-an-sich to be knowable, albeit 
incommunicable; intimating that one can acquire knowledge of the world as it is in-
itself but such knowledge must forever remain idiosyncratically esoteric. Further 
thereto, I argued, in this second, critical part of my exposition, that the description of 
this introspective entity as “the Will” rendered it a concept; consequently, the true Ding-
an-sich – although in principle knowable in a unique way by means of introspection, 
according to Schopenhauer (1969b: 195) – is utterly incommunicable. Here, however, 
philosophical honesty and the pursuit for Truth coerce me to offer a rejection of my 
initial argument. For the detailed consideration of Schopenhauer’s system leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that no such supra-sensible knowledge is even possible in the first 
place, let alone communicable.  In the section on the criticism of the Will as a concept 
I argued that it is meaningless to speak of knowledge devoid of the principle of 
sufficient reason: knowledge necessarily presupposes the correlativity thesis 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 15-16), i.e., the dictum which declares “no object without a 
subject”; for in order to know something there must be a subject (i.e. a knower) and an 
object (i.e. the known). In other words, all knowledge claims presuppose the 
correlativity thesis and hence it is meaningless to speak of a knowledge which 
transcends it. In short, the fact that the Will is a known entity precludes the possibility 
of it being an accurate description of the world as it is in-itself; for the latter must 
necessarily transcend the possibility of being known. 
 
8.3. The Will as Subject to the Principium Individuationis  
 
As we have seen, one of Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 270) primary contentions for 




exist only for the faculty of sensibility and are thus brought to experience thereby. Now 
the supposed atemporality of the Will, in particular, allows Schopenhauer (1969b: 325) 
to characterise it as something immortal; for as it does not partake of the form of time 
it is said by Schopenhauer (1969b: 325) to be eternal.261 If, therefore, it can be 
demonstrated that the Will is in fact not impervious to the influence of temporality we 
shall earnestly undermine Schopenhauer’s doctrine of athanasia. To that end I now turn 
to a consideration of the Will as a temporally situated entity. 
Due to the fact that time is brought to experience by way of the sensibility, 
Schopenhauer (1974b: 283) maintains that time is totally mind-dependent: i.e., if there 
were no sentient beings in existence there would not be time. This thesis is 
problematical in itself in so far as it undermines the scientific understanding of the 
world: if, as I discussed in an earlier section, we are to think that time is mind-dependent 
then it seems impossible that the world could have existed prior to the appearance of 
sentient forms. For this reason I argued that Schopenhauer’s radical idealism – which 
is committed to both atheism (Edwards, 2009: 173) and to the view that consciousness 
is dependent on the phenomenal brain (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273-274) – is 
antagonistic towards the scientific understanding which maintains that consciousness 
evolved from a state of unconsciousness. For our present purposes, however, the 
question with which we are primarily concerned is not whether it is possible to make 
sense of a non-conscious world gradually evolving into a sentient one without the form 
of time – and hence whether one can simultaneously maintain a radical idealist position 
and scientifically empirical Weltanschauung without contradiction – rather, we are 
concerned with whether the Will itself is temporally situated or not.  
Now let us consider this matter by way of Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 195) modus 
operandi for identifying the Will as Ding-an-sich: through introspection I judge myself 
to be fundamentally constituted by manifold insatiable cravings, which by way of 
abstraction, leads me to the knowledge of the general concept of “Will”. The general 
concept of Will, being an abstraction, is a mere thought in the mind of a rational being, 
but the internal perceptions by way of which one abstracts the general concept are 
individual occurrences – temporally (and, incidentally, spatially) situated. Indeed, 
																																																								
261 I remind readers that here, however, eternity is not to be construed, as is ordinarily done, as 




Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 106) claim that the Will is atemporal has been greatly 
contested since its inception.262 The criticism is best expressed by Paul Edwards (2009: 
170), who argues that volitional strivings are not outside time – “they can be dated and 
their duration can be measured”. Upon a close consideration of the matter one can 
immediately discern the veracity of Edwards’ (2009: 170) observation: each desire one 
experiences can be ascribed a particular time and its duration can indeed be measured. 
For instance, at certain times in the morning, afternoon and evening one experiences 
the pangs of hunger prompting one to seek nourishment. One could, if one so desired, 
determine the precise time at which these pangs of hunger appeared and ceased (thus 
determining their duration). Consequently, it is evidently erroneous for Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 106) to characterise the Will as atemporal. 
But I must acknowledge that the observation that the Will is temporally situated appears 
to be extremely damaging, not only to Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia, but to his 
philosophical system in toto. For, as mentioned, the Ding-an-sich must necessarily be 
impervious to temporality and if the Will is located within time it obviously cannot be 
said to be an accurate description of the way the world is in-itself. One might think that 
this noxious observation would have prompted Schopenhauer to entirely abandon his 
thesis of the Will being the Ding-an-sich; however, Schopenhauer (1969b: 197) – being 
notoriously stubborn – refused to entirely relinquish his claim.263 Thus, in the second 
edition of his magnum opus, Schopenhauer (196b9b: 197) explicitly offers a 
qualification to his most renowned notion, by propounding what we might call the “veil 
hypothesis”. According to this modified thesis, the Will is said to be located behind the 
“veil of time”, which Schopenhauer (1969b: 197-198) takes great pains to demonstrate 
																																																								
262 For instance, in December of 1820 – only two years after the publication of the first volume 
of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung – a scathing review of the magnum opus appeared by F. 
E. Beneke in the Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (Cartwright, 2010: 388). Therein, one 
of the reasons Beneke castigated Schopenhauer’s identification of the Will as the Ding-an-sich 
is due to the fact that we experience successive acts of Will, which are necessarily located 
“within the a priori form of time” (Cartwright, 2010: 388). 
263 It is only fair to Schopenhauer to note that his entire life’s work was founded upon the thesis 
of the Will being the Ding-an-sich; hence I think one can comprehend Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 





does not entirely vitiate or obscure his claim that the Will is (the closest apprehension 
one can attain of) the Ding-an-sich. Thus, in the first essay of the second book in the 
second volume of his principal work, entitled On the Possibility of Knowing the Thing-
in-Itself, Schopenhauer (1969b: 196- 198) states: 
“Meanwhile it is to be carefully noted, and I have always kept it in mind, that 
even the inward observation we have of our own Will still does not by any 
means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself. 
[…] But the inner knowledge is free from two forms belonging to outer 
knowledge,264 the form of space and the form of causality which brings about 
all sense-perception. On the other hand, there still remains the form of time, as 
well as that of being known and knowing in general. Accordingly, in this inner 
knowledge the thing-in-itself has indeed to a great extent cast off its veils, but 
still does not appear quite naked. In consequence of the form of time which 
still adheres to it, everyone knows his Will only in successive individual acts, 
not as a whole, in and by itself […] Yet the apprehension in which we know 
the stirrings and acts of our own Will is far more immediate than is any other. 
It is the point where the thing-in-itself enters the phenomenon most 
immediately, and is most clearly examined by the knowing subject; therefore 
the event thus immediately known is simply and solely calculated to become 
the interpreter of every other. For in the case of every emergence of an act of 
Will from the obscure depths of our inner being into the knowing 
consciousness, there occurs a direct transition into the phenomenon of the 
thing-in-itself that lies outside time. Accordingly the act of Will is indeed only 
the nearest and clearest phenomenon of the thing-in-itself; yet it follows from 
this that, if all the other phenomena could be known by us just as immediately 
and intimately, we should be obliged to regard them precisely as that which 
the Will is in us. Therefore in this sense I teach that the inner nature of 
everything is Will, and I call the Will the thing-in-itself. In this way, Kant’s 
doctrine of the inability to know the thing-in-itself is modified to the extent 
that the thing-in-itself is merely not absolutely and completely knowable; that 
nevertheless by far the most immediate of its phenomena, distinguished toto 
genere from all the rest by this immediateness, is its representative for us. 
Accordingly we have to refer the whole world of phenomena to that one in 
which the thing-in-itself is manifested under the lightest of veils, and still 
																																																								




remains phenomenon only in so far as my intellect, the only thing capable of 
knowledge, still always remains distinguished from me as the one who wills, 
and does not cast off the knowledge-form of time, even with inner perception.” 
Now the “veil hypothesis” intimates what we might call a “multidimensional view” 
(Wicks, 2008: 131) of the Ding-an-sich. According thereto the Will is solely one 
dimension of the world as it is in-itself; and, by implication, the Ding-an-sich must 
possess other inscrutable dimensions. It is interesting to note in connection with this 
foregoing observation that Schopenhauer (1969b: 196) states that he has “always kept 
it in mind, that even the inward observation we have of our own Will still does not by 
any means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself”; for in 
the first edition of Die Welt Schopenhauer does not explicitly refer to either the “veil 
hypothesis” or to the Will as being merely one facet of the Ding-an-sich. In spite of the 
glaring absence of such an important discussion, I have arrived at the conclusion that 
Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 196) utterance is indeed sincere, and I wish to illustrate his 
genuineness by way of a circuitous consideration. In the final section of the first volume 
of Die Welt Schopenhauer (1969a: 409) observes that the ascetic saint’s death “appears 
to us as a transition into empty nothingness”. He (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 409) notes 
that: 
“[…] the concept of nothing is essentially relative, and always refers to a 
definite something that it negates.” 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 409) proceeds with his discussion by dichotomizing between 
two forms of nothingness, viz., nihil privativum and nihil negativum; the former refers 
to a relative nothing, while the latter refers to an absolute nothing. From this distinction 
Schopenhauer states (1969a: 409) that a  
“[…] nihil negativum (an absolute nothing) is not even conceivable, but 
everything of this kind, considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed 
under a wider concept, is always only a nihil privativum (a relative nothing). 
Every nothing is thought of as such only in relation to something else; it 
presupposes this relation, and thus that other thing also. […] Thus every nihil 
negativum or absolute nothing, if subordinated to a higher concept, will appear 
as a mere nihil privativum, or relative nothing, which can always change signs 
with what it negates, so that that would then be thought of as negation, but it 




Now it seems to me that if it can be illustrated that Schopenhauer had already 
propounded in the first edition (1818/1819) of Die Welt that the ascetic saint’s death is 
not an utter destruction (a nihil negativum) but is rather to be thought of as nihil 
privativum (a relative nothing), a multidimensional view of the Ding-an-sich had 
implicitly been intimated thereby. For if the saint’s death is not a passing into absolute 
nothing then there must be something which still exists after the destruction of his 
portion of the metaphysical Will. But this something is ineffable to our finite human 
minds and hence it appears to us as nothing, i.e. relative to our position (a nihil 
privativum). The matter is extremely complex, hence we must attend closely to 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 411-412) words in order to decipher his meaning.  He 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 410, 411-412) says that from our perspective, i.e. from life 
which is nothing but the outward manifestation of Will, the ascetic saint’s death – which 
is the utter dissolution of that Will – appears to us to be a passing into absolute nothing; 
but this is deceptive in so far as the Ding-an-sich must therefore be thought to possess 
other dimensions besides that of the Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 410). If the world in-
itself is not Will in toto then it follows that the dissolution of the saint’s portion of Will 
is not a vanishing into absolute nothing (although, relative to our existence, it does 
indeed appear this way).  Thus, Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 409) insistence on the 
inconceivability of nihil negativum (absolute nothing) seems to intimate a 
multidimensional view of the Ding-an-sich. As such it does indeed appear as though 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 196) had always borne in mind the difficulty of the Will being 
located within time and hence it “still does not by any means furnish an exhaustive and 
adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 197). It is by way of 
this consideration that I have come to the conclusion that Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 196) 
utterance in the second volume of his principal work265 is indeed sincere. 
However, just as all curative medicines have unfortunate side-effects, so too does 
Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 197-198) solution of the problem pertaining to the Will’s 
temporality engender adverse difficulties. For, although the postulation of a 
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multidimensional Ding-an-sich with inscrutable aspects might seem more plausible266 
and in unison with the Kantian philosophy,267 it nonetheless must be noted that it 
generates profound complications for the Schopenhauerian Weltanschauung. In the 
first place, it corrodes Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 300) arguments that the world is 
necessarily an evil place, filled with a profusion of suffering; and, in the second, and 
by implication, it brings into question the need for salvation. In an earlier section we 
noted that suffering for Schopenhauer (1969b: 634) emanates from unfulfilled 
volitions: if I desire something which I cannot acquire the result is an inner state of 
torment. Now if the inner being is not entirely identical with the Will then it does not 
follow that life must necessarily present itself as a tragedy, one in which we are all in a 
state of perpetual suffering. Perhaps in some individuals other inscrutable aspects of 
the Ding-an-sich manifest themselves in greater proportions to the Will and thus 
produce a different type of experience – one with noticeably less suffering. Hence, in 
such a case we would not expect suffering to play a prominent role in the life of such 
individuals. As Robert Wicks (2008: 131) notes: 
“[This multidimensional interpretation of the Ding-an-sich] demolishes 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. This, crucially, is if the thing-in-itself has 
innumerable dimensions, only one of which is “Will”, then Schopenhauer 
cannot claim that the thing-in-itself is either only, or mainly, a mindless and 
amoral Will. If the thing-in-itself is not essentially Will, however, then there is 
no reason to expect that the world as [appearance] will present a violent 
appearance […] Individuals selfishly and aggressively oppose each other 
owing to the metaphysical fact that their inner nature is blind Will, not because 
the nature of reality merely appears to us to be in itself Will, or because Will 
is only one of possibly an infinite number of the thing-in-itself’s other 
dimensions […].” 
Closely related to the aforementioned difficulty is the need for salvation if the world is 
not essentially a manifestation of the Will. For Schopenhauer (1969a: 392) ascetic 
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it appears that Schopenhauer is arguing that the world as it is in-itself is ultimately inaccessible 




practices are intended to attenuate the potency of volitions (i.e. ascetic practices seek 
to destroy the individual manifestation of Will) in order to liberate the world from a 
miniscule amount of suffering;268 but if the world as it is in-itself is not entirely identical 
with the Will it undermines the need to attain salvation in this way, as Wicks (2008: 
132) notes: 
“[…] The multidimensional interpretation undercuts the motivation to achieve 
tranquillity through the denial-of-the-Will, for we deny the Will precisely 
because our projection of the principle of sufficient reason generates 
intolerable suffering. A multidimensional conception of the thing-in-itself 
provides less reason for denying the Will, since it introduces potentially 
uncountable and inscrutable dimensions that minimize the Will’s metaphysical 
importance.” 
I may be permitted to add a third difficulty generated by the multidimensional view of 
the Ding-an-sich. It concerns Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 3) understanding of the relation 
between science and philosophy. It will be recalled that according to Schopenhauer 
(1889b: 219) scientists utilise many inexplicable terms such as “energy”, “force”, “dark 
matter”, “singularity”, “dark energy” and so on, which are qualitates occulta – “occult 
qualities, necessary but scientifically inexplicable elements of scientific explanations 
of the world” (Cartwright, 2005: 52). The Will – unlike the vacuous terms “energy”, 
“force”, “dark matter”, etc. – is said by Schopenhauer (1889b: 376; 1969a: 110-112) to 
be truly known (albeit in a unique way); consequently, if such phenomena and all other 
inscrutable natural forces were to be comprehended as a form of volition then, it 
follows, they would not be as mysterious as they now appear. The Schopenhauerian 
philosophy, and in particular the identification of the Will with the Ding-an-sich, would 
become the root from which all the branches of science emanate.269 Now, if I were to 
play the advocatus diaboli270 I might remark that a multidimensional view of the Ding-
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269 As Schopenhauer (1889b: 246) states in his work Über den Willen in der Natur: “Whenever 
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an-sich leads to the conclusion that although the inner nature of the world manifests 
itself in me as the Will I cannot arbitrarily assume that that same aspect of the Ding-an-
sich manifests itself in other animate or inanimate objects. As a result thereof, I would 
be obliged to accept the inscrutability of certain phenomena such as dark matter, energy 
and so on; which is, of course, contrary to Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 3) ultimate 
intention. 
Now although we have seen that the multidimensional interpretation of the Ding-an-
sich was initially postulated by Schopenhauer (1969b: 196-198) as a solution to the 
difficulty of the Will’s temporality, the three aforementioned considerations pertaining 
specifically to the multidimensionality of the Ding-an-sich caution us against hastily 
adopting it; for as we have seen, the multidimensional view inadvertently decimates the 
foundations upon which the Schopenhauerian philosophy is constructed. That may 
seem congenial to our present purposes, for I am intentionally trying to illustrate that 
the Will cannot be taken as a sufficient explanation of the Ding-an-sich; thereby 
illustrating the untenability of Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality. However, I must 
observe that if we were to adopt this multidimensional view it would become far more 
difficult – if not impossible – to disprove a slightly modified theory of athanasia, for it 
may be that although the Will is located within time, and hence cannot be identified 
with the world as it is in-itself, the other aspects of the Ding-an-sich may be impervious 
to the form of time and thus these inscrutable dimensions may indeed continue to exist 
post mortem. I observe that even if one were to adopt the multidimensional view it 
would not vitiate the view here propounded, for my exposition does not rule out the 
possibility of something surviving the destruction of the physical form; but it does offer 
compelling reasons for exempting the possibility of the conscious/cognitive/rational 
apparatus or the Will as possible candidates for immortality. It is not my intention to 
convince my readers one way or another; my sole intention in this section has been to 
illustrate that the Will is not impervious to time and hence it cannot be equated with the 
Ding-an-sich. 
It should also be noted that Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 197) argument, in an attempt to 
salvage the equation of the Will with the Ding-an-sich, that time is “the thinnest of 
veils” is unconvincing. Here we must observe that Schopenhauer portends that time 
does not have an extremely obscuring effect on disclosing the nature of the Ding-an-




too are we to consider time. However, we may enquire as to how Schopenhauer knows 
that time is a “thinner” veil than that of either space or causality. Furthermore, it does 
not follow that solely one veil, viz., that of time, is better than the threefold veil of time, 
space and causality, as Young (2005: 94) notes:  
“[…] it cannot in general be argued that the fewer the filters (‘veils’) through 
which one views something the closer one comes to experiencing it as it is in 
itself.” 
For all we know the form of time may have an extremely obscuring effect upon the 
nature of the Ding-an-sich, thus rendering it entirely different from the way it really is 
in-itself. Indeed, as one aspect of the principle of individuation we ought to suspect 
time to be a great obscurantist. Moreover, in the course of his discussion Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 196-197) does not offer a cogent defence for his claim that time is “the thinnest 
of veils”, he appears to merely assert the notion in an attempt to preserve his claim that 
the Will is the Ding-an-sich, or at least “the nearest and clearest phenomenon of the 
thing-in-itself” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 197). As a consequence, the argument must be 
rejected as inadequate.  
We have still to contend with one final issue pertaining to the multidimensionality of 
the Ding-an-sich, viz., the possibility of knowing it by way of mysticism. Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 410) maintains that mystic visionaries are capable of apprehending the 
ordinarily inscrutable aspects of the Ding-an-sich, although this knowledge remains 
incommunicable to others. It will be recalled that an attempt to communicate 
knowledge requires the use of words, which are inextricably bound to concepts. Hence 
the communication of knowledge necessarily subjects it to the principium cognoscendi 
(Schopenhauer, 1889a: 114). But we must enquire, as I did in the section on the Will 
considered as a concept, whether it makes any sense to speak of knowledge about the 
inscrutable aspects of the Ding-an-sich in the first place. The difficulty here can be 
elucidated by way of disclosing the logical fallacy inherent to the notion; in essence the 
following proposition is being postulated by Schopenhauer (1969a: 410): “one may 
possess knowledge of that which transcends knowledge”. The claim is evidently self-
refuting, for it makes no sense for one to speak of the acquisition of knowledge 
impervious to the principle of sufficient reason, when in fact the very concept of 




observe that all knowledge claims are subject to the correlativity thesis (Schopenhauer, 
1969b: 15-16): to know something is essentially to render it an object for a subject. I 
illustrated that even knowledge of the Will is not impervious to this fundamental 
principle, for one comes to know the Will by way of particular volitional states which 
are, in essence, objects for a perceiving subject. Thus, I argue that absolutely any 
knowledge claim implicates the correlativity thesis, even mystical knowledge 
presupposes a known object and a perceiving knower. The oddity here is that although 
mystics claim to possess such “knowledge” (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 410) they cannot 
point to an object which grounds their claim. Schopenhauer (1969a: 410) attempts to 
evade this difficulty by claiming that “such a state cannot really be called knowledge”; 
but if this is so then the mystics must possess mere unfounded fantasies, which do not 
accord with ultimate reality. This certainly does not accord with Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 410) intended argument. 
However, we cannot accept the claim that mystical knowledge is impervious to the 
correlativity thesis and the principle of sufficient reason, for mysticism (and religion in 
general) are equally as bound to the forms of human knowledge as are science and 
philosophy. In other words, human knowledge is limited by the correlativity thesis and 
the principle of sufficient reason and because all forms of knowledge are dependent 
thereon none can transcend it. If, as I have argued, science has a limit to the knowledge 
it can impart, that does not necessarily leave a void to be filled by another – arguably 
inferior – form of knowledge acquisition, such as mysticism. We have seen that because 
all knowledge is ultimately derived from perception of the world any knowledge claim 
must ultimately correspond to some external (perceptible) object. Now the ecstatic 
visions of mystics and prophets must ultimately emanate from some external source, 
and if they do not correspond to publicly perceptible objects we must assume them to 
have originated from inner (psychological) perceptions, i.e. they are nothing more than 
hallucinatory phenomena. That a prophet is said to have conversed with some 
supernatural being does not really disclose some profound insights concerning the 
world as it is in-itself, it only reveals the absurd chaos of that individual’s own inner 
psychological state. In my opinion, such individuals do not deserve the adulation of 
acolytes but the medical assistance of psychiatrists. So much then for the oxymoronic 




Finally, I wish to turn to a proof of the Will’s spatiality. Although Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 197) claims that the Will is impervious to the form of space a consideration of 
the matter proves his assertion to be false. For the Will is said by Schopenhauer (1969a: 
102-103, 106; 108) to be akin to the body: 
“[…] the parts of the body must correspond completely to the chief demands 
and desires by which the Will manifests itself; they must be the visible 
expression of these desires.271 Teeth, gullet, and intestinal canal are objectified 
hunger; the genitals are objectified sexual impulse; grasping hands and nimble 
feet correspond to the more indirect strivings of the Will which they represent.” 
In other words, the spatially extended body is identical to the Will as Ding-an-sich: 
every striving of the Will finds expression in a particular part of one’s body 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 102-103). But if this is so, we must enquire if it makes any sense 
to speak of a non-corporeal volition: can, for instance, hunger exist without the stomach 
or sexual passion without the genitals? I doubt that such a thought is even truly 
conceivable. Indeed, are not these aforementioned desires as dependent upon bodily 
organs as consciousness is upon the brain? It will be recalled that Schopenhauer (1974b: 
273) maintains that the destruction of the brain necessarily terminates consciousness; 
hence the latter cannot endure without the existence of the former. In like manner, it 
appears that hunger and sexual passion cannot persist without their necessary bodily 
organs. Indeed, I doubt that the notion of hunger devoid of a stomach or lust without 
copulatory organs makes any sense. Thus, the Will is intricately bound to the body and 
cannot really be thought to exist without it. For otherwise, we must absurdly conceive 
of the Will as Ding-an-sich as a plethora of numerous non-corporeal strivings which 
can only be actualised and thus comprehended by way of bodily organs! Rather, the 
Will must be conceived of as something which can only exist as a corporeal object, i.e. 
in connection with bodily organs. Now due to the fact that one’s body is spatially 
extended it follows that the Will must likewise be subject to spatial properties. In other 
words, sexual passion and hunger are located in specific bodily organs which occupy a 
particular place - indeed, given that the entire body considered in toto is an 
objectification of the Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 108), it must of necessity occupy a 
particular place in space – ergo the Will is spatially located. I could, if I so desired, give 
																																																								




the exact spatial coordinates of the embodied Will, just as, in the case of time, I could 
measure the duration of a volition and date it (Edwards, 2009: 170). 
We can conclude this significant section by observing that because the Will is both 
spatially and temporally situated it cannot be the Ding-an-sich; for the latter must 
necessarily be impervious to the influence of both time and space (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 417-418). Thus far, I have illustrated that the Will is subject to two forms of the 
principle of sufficient reason, viz., the principium cognoscendi and the principium 
essendi; I now turn to a consideration of the Will subject to the principium fiendi. 
 
8.4. The Will as Subject to the Principium Fiendi 
 
In his qualification of his identification of the Will with the Ding-an-sich Schopenhauer 
(1969b: 197) boldly declares that: 
“[…] the inner knowledge [by way of which the Will as Ding-an-sich is to be 
discovered] is free from two forms belonging to outer knowledge, the form of 
space and the form of causality which brings about all sense-perception.” 
However, I now wish to indicate that contrary to Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 197) 
assertion, the Will is in fact subject to the causal principle. However, the argument by 
which I am able to illustrate this entails my detailed discussion on Schopenhauer’s 
soteriological doctrine; I therefore recommend that this section be read as an 
introduction to the appendix, wherein I illustrate that the metaphysical Will must be 
susceptible to transformation in order for Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine to 
make any sense. 
In the section on the pessimistic Weltanschauung I argued that the only meaningful way 
in which Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 605) assertion that it “would be better for us not to 
exist” can be construed is as a call to live the austere life of an ascetic. For the 
metaphysical Will is ordinarily indestructible and at the moment of an ordinary (i.e. 
non-ascetic) death the portion of the Will which once animated the organism will, by 
way of palingenesis (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 276), re-manifest itself in the phenomenal 
world, thereby continuing the tragedy of life. The only way in which the Will can be 




Firstly, in connection with the abovementioned observation, it is significant to note that 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 272) considers his philosophy to be immanent as opposed to 
transcendent. Immanence refers to that which “keeps within the bounds of the 
possibility of experience”, whereas transcendence refers to that which “going beyond 
all possibility of experience, endeavours to determine the nature of things as they are 
in themselves” (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 279). As Cartwright (2005: 87) notes: 
“Schopenhauer argued that his philosophy is immanent in the Kantian sense, 
that is, it makes no claims about anything beyond the possibility of experience; 
it provides an explanation and interpretation of what is given in the experiences 
of the external world and in self-consciousness.” 
As such, it is erroneous to construe the Schopenhauerian soteriological doctrine as 
intimating that asceticism solely affects one’s phenomenal volitions and not the 
metaphysical Will, as Robert Wicks (2008: 127-133) appears to do; for we then run the 
risk of rendering Schopenhauer’s philosophy transcendent by unwittingly implying that 
the Will as Ding-an-sich is divorced from the phenomenal world and consequently the 
former must necessarily exist above or beyond the latter. In contradistinction thereto, 
the immanence of the metaphysical Will necessarily portends that it is in fact 
susceptible to ascetic practices. This essentially portends that the metaphysical Will is 
subject to alteration, i.e. to the principium fiendi. 
However, the way in which the principium fiendi interacts with the Ding-an-sich is 
slightly more complex. I discuss this matter in greater deal in the appendix, but for the 
sake of thoroughness I shall succinctly reiterate it here: it seems to me that the ascetic 
practices must be thought of as affecting an alteration in one’s phenomenal volitions – 
which is experienced by the subject as an attenuation in the potency of a desire – and 
this must necessarily correspond to the metaphysical Will, i.e. a contraction therein is 
affected, for the former is a mere manifestation of the latter in time and space, and 
consequently an alteration in the one sphere will undoubtedly affect a change in the 
other. However, I must observe that in the appendix I am concerned that this maverick 
interpretation is liable to the criticism that it erroneously applies the causal law, which 
is supposed to be an a priori feature of the mind (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 436), to the 
mind-independent world of the Ding-an-sich. This criticism is entirely valid, but it 




fact be mind-independent, in which case my interpretation would remain valid. Indeed, 
I have illustrated on numerous occasions throughout my exposition that an objective 
form of causality seems likely to exist because (i) without it one cannot easily explicate 
the existence of the experienceable objects found throughout the universe, i.e. objects 
appear to contain something within themselves which cause them to appear the way 
they do and (ii) the fact that one cannot easily determine the vera causa of phenomena 
portends that causality does not in fact emanate from the mind, but rather exists 
independently thereof. 
Thus, in no way does the fact that causality applies to the world as it is in-itself vitiate 
my interpretation. Rather, I consider my view to be the correct explanation of 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 382) soteriological doctrine, for it accords immaculately with 
his system in toto. But the most significant aspect of the present discussion is the fact 
that the metaphysical Will can be caused to contract by ascetic practices; for the fact 
that the Ding-an-sich can change intimates that it is in fact susceptible to the causal 
principle. Now this is of tremendous pertinence in so far as it will be recalled that one 
of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 275) arguments for immortality is that the Will is 
unchanging and thus, unlike phenomenal objects, it is said to be impervious to creation 
and destruction (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 275). My maverick interpretation of 
Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine (cf. the appendix) jettisons this dogmatic notion 
and thus the metaphysical Will cannot, on my interpretation, be considered immutable 







In spite of a certain consolatory appeal, I maintain that I have persuasively illustrated 
the untenability of Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality. This was accomplished by 
way of a detailed critical examination of the two primary pillars upon which the theory 
is based, viz., Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) radical idealism and his (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 100, et al.) identification of the Ding-an-sich with the Will. In order to arrive at 
a definite conclusion regarding the veracity of these two notions it was necessary to 
consider the Schopenhauerian philosophy in toto because, as I emphasized in the 
introductory section, Schopenhauer is “an emphatically systematic thinker” (Higgins, 
2003: 330), in which each part of his thought is held to be intricately interrelated to the 
others (Schopenhauer, 1969a: xii). As a consequence thereof, I structured my 
exposition along Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 1, 93 and 269) presentation of the topics in 
his opus maximum, commencing with a discussion on his radical, “physiological” 
(McGill, 1971: 144), idealism, which takes its rise from notions first proposed, 
according to Schopenhauer (1969a: 3), by Descartes, but fully enunciated by George 
Berkeley. I then turned to a consideration of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) attempted 
identification of the way the world is in-itself, i.e. to positively characterise the Ding-
an-sich – an undertaking utterly inadmissible on Kantian terms – which naturally led 
into discussions on suffering, Schopenhauer’s notorious pessimism, suicide and 
ultimately death and immortality, the last of which constitutes the principal theme of 
my exposition.  
I illustrated that for Schopenhauer (1969b: 501) an individual is immortal only in so far 
as one is metaphysically Will, which is said to be both atemporal and acausal; this, in 
fact, is the essence of Schopenhauer’s argument in favour of athanasia. I consequently 
subjected the theory to a thorough scrutiny in the second primary section of the 
disquisition and I believe myself to have unequivocally illustrated, by way of numerous 
cogent arguments, that the Will is in fact located in both time and space and is further 
susceptible to the influence of the causal law; as such I conclude that the Will cannot 
be indestructible and it therefore cannot be considered as the immortal entity within a 
creature. Furthermore, and as a supplement to the aforementioned argument, I have 
attempted to illustrate that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) particular form of radical 




atemporal and acausal – thereby decimating the second pillar upon which his theory of 
athanasia is based. In particular, I have argued that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 3) radical 
idealism is unsound in so far as he (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273) regards consciousness 
as dependent upon the physical brain272 but likewise attempts to propound an 
evolutionary theory (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 152-154). It seems to me that the sagacious 
course, as I discussed in detail herein, is to reject and jettison radical idealism in favour 
of an evolutionary theory, but both positions cannot be avowed simultaneously on 
Schopenhauer’s terms.  
Having arrived at these conclusions it is evident that, in spite of its beauty and 
consolatory power, it is impossible to defend and avow the Schopenhauerian theory of 
athanasia upon an orthodox interpretation of the Ding-an-sich. Here it must be recalled 
that I refer to the orthodox interpretation as the view which unequivocally equates the 
Will with the Ding-an-sich (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100); whereas the maverick view 
is that which considers the Will to be only one facet – indeed, the only form “we know 
most immediately” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 198) – of the way the world may be in-itself 
(Schopenhauer, 1969b: 196-198). As a consequence thereof, in rejecting 
Schopenhauer’s theory and in concurring with him (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 273) 
regarding the status of the mind, i.e. that it is akin to the physical, mortal brain, I do not 
wish to give the impression that I utterly reject the concept of athanasia within his 
philosophical system. On the contrary, I wish to observe, once again, that in no way 
does my critical exposition rule out the possibility of something surviving the demise 
of the physical form within the Schopenhauerian philosophy (i.e. upon a maverick 
interpretation of the Ding-an-sich). For it will be remembered that Schopenhauer’s 
(1969b: 196-198) qualification of his central thesis, viz., that the Will is the Ding-an-
sich, intimates that there are inscrutable aspects to the way the world is in-itself. As 
such, when an individual perishes it is possible that something ineffable persists (cf. 
Schopenhauer, 1969b: 494), but I believe that my critical exposition precludes the 
possibility of that something being the so-called metaphysical Will, as Schopenhauer 
																																																								





(1974b: 270, et al.) attempts to argue.273 However, one should not consider the inability 
to resolve the question of whether or not something survives the demise of the physical 
form as indicative of the ineptitude of the discipline or the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy, for as Bertrand Russell (1999: 8) remarks: 
“Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many questions as we could wish, has at 
least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, 
and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the 
commonest things of daily life.” 
Therefore, even though the mystery of athanasia has not – and indeed may never – be 
solved, philosophy can, by way of its method, question death, which thereby generates 
profound consolations regarding the inevitability thereof. This is undoubtedly true of 
the Schopenhauerian philosophy. In that sense, it accords with the Socratic view (cited 
by Schopenhauer, 1969b: 463), viz., that, as Michel de Montaigne (1946a: 103) 
expresses it, “to think as a philosopher is to learn to die”. 
  
																																																								
273 Furthermore, if one concurs with Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 273) claim that consciousness is 
entirely dependent on the physical brain, then it ought to be evident that whatever survives the 




Appendix to the Will as Subject to the Principium Fiendi 
 
In this appendix, which is an emendation of my Master’s dissertation274 which I 
completed at the University of the Witwatersrand, I seek to illustrate the alterability of 
the Will as Ding-an-sich by way of a novel interpretation of Schopenhauer’s 
soteriological doctrine. Due to the fact that the appendix constitutes an autonomous 
consideration on a distinct aspect of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, I wished neither to 
vitiate my thesis nor this particular self-contained discussion by attempting to 
incorporate it into the main body of my work; hence I have included it as an addendum. 
But its appropriate position is in fact in the second, critical part of the dissertation 
wherein I attempt to refute Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) claim for the identification of 
the Will with the Ding-an-sich by indicating that it is susceptible to the principium 
fiendi. 275 
I may be permitted to take this opportunity to outline the central argument to be found 
in the following appendix and to offer a more detailed account of its relation to my 
work as a whole. Although it may, upon an initial reading, appear convoluted and 
technical, the argument is in fact rather simple. In short, I take the abrogation of the 
Will to be central to Schopenhauer’s ascetic doctrine. However, this aspirational goal 
is not as easily achieved as it may at first appear and I discuss at length the many 
problems and attempted solutions pertaining thereto. Schopenhauer’s (1969b: 382) 
claim that the inner essence of the ascetic saint dissolves at the moment of death is 
peculiar in so far as every appearance presupposes the Will; consequently, “as long as 
the ascetic is alive, the inner nature is in him, however weak it may be, and at death it 
should, it seems, be ‘re-absorbed’ into the one metaphysical Will” (Copleston, 
1947:178). To this end I argue that Schopenhauer ought to have concluded his magnum 
opus by avowing suicide by starvation as the only genuine path to salvation; for in this 
way I argue that the ascetic practices occasion death by abrogating the portion of Will 
which once animated the ascetic saint’s body, thereby reducing the amount of suffering 
																																																								
274 “On the Abrogation of the Schopenhauerian Ascetic Saint’s Essential Being by the Practice 
of Sallekhana”, completed in 2011. 




in the world by preventing a portion of the Will as Ding-an-sich from re-manifesting 
itself in the world of appearances by way of palingenesis (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 276).  
I vindicate the incorporation of this section in its current form for two primary reasons. 
The first of which is rather trivial, but I maintain that it shall (partly) indicate the way 
in which I arrived at an interest in Schopenhauer’s concepts of death and immortality. 
Secondly, and more significantly, my exploration of Schopenhauer’s soteriological 
doctrine can be read and studied independently of the primary topic of the dissertation; 
but my discussion herein leads to the pertinent conclusion that the Will as Ding-an-
sich, contrary to what Schopenhauer (1969b: 470-473) claims, is not insusceptible to 
alteration. This is significant in so far as one of the primary arguments for immortality 
in Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 275) philosophy is the notion that the Will in-itself is 
impervious to the principium fiendi and consequently to alteration; hence the Will, 
according to Schopenhauer’s thesis, can neither be created nor destroyed. I reiterate, 
however, that due to the intricacy of the argument it seemed to me that I could not 
incorporate this discussion into the primary body of my thesis without vitiating it and 
the argument here propounded, and I therefore resolve to present it in its current form. 
Although I have attempted to avoid unnecessary repetition, the fact that this work is 
self-contained has made it necessary to repeat, albeit in far less detail, some of the 
notions already encountered and discussed in the main body of the dissertation, I beg 




Despite the ingeniousness of his system, the so-called “philosopher of pessimism” 
(Cartwright, 2005: 124) has long been accused of inconsistency.276 My primary 
intention herein is to discuss and emend just one of these inconsistencies in particular, 
																																																								
276 See, for example, Bertrand Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy (1946) pages 785 and 
787; Frederick Copleston’s Arthur Schopenhauer: Philosopher of Pessimism (1947) page 190; 
David Cartwright’s Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy (2005) page xxx, and 
Patrick Gardiner’s article on Schopenhauer in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume VII 




viz., the claim which Schopenhauer (1969a: 382) propounds in the fourth book of the 
first volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung concerning the death of the ascetic 
saint. Therein Schopenhauer (1969a: 382) states that when such a one dies “it is not 
merely the phenomenon, as in the case of others, that comes to an end with death, but 
the inner being itself […] is abolished […] for him who ends thus, the world has at the 
same time ended”.277  
This claim is problematical in itself, for as Frederick Copleston (1947: 178) notes, it is 
extremely difficult to understand how such an event can occur given the fact that, as 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 382) himself admits, “in the ascetic the inner nature exists only 
in a very weak degree”; consequently, “as long as the ascetic is alive, the inner nature 
is in him, however weak it may be, and at death it should, it seems, be ‘re-absorbed’ 
into the one metaphysical Will”.                                                                                 
But the notion of the inner essence dissolving at the moment of the ascetic’s death is 
rendered utterly inconsistent by an explicit pronouncement made by Schopenhauer 
(1974b: 312) in his last major work published in 1851, viz., that the so-called “denial 
of the [Wille-zum-Leben] does not in any way assert the annihilation of a substance”. 
Now if the ascetic practices do not affect a transcendental change, by which I mean 
cause some alteration in the metaphysical Will, then the notion that the inner nature of 
the saint is abrogated at the moment of his death is, to be frank, utterly impossible. This, 
then, is the inconsistency which shall concern me herein. 
However, before I commence my discussion in earnest I wish to indicate that I do not 
intend to oppose Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 382) claim that the Will of the saint dissolves 
at the moment of his death, for this concept will be utilised in my explanation as to how 
asceticism paradoxically reduces suffering in the world.278 But how that dissolution of 
																																																								
277 It is necessary to mention that I intend no sexism by referring to the saint as a male. My 
motive for doing so is simply aesthetic, as Schopenhauer did so in his writings and I wish to 
keep with his style herein. Indeed, as Julian Young (2005:189) correctly notes: “many of 
Schopenhauer’s examples of sainthood are women”. 
278 Indeed, I wish to note that any interpretation which follows Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 312) 
pronouncement that ascetic practices do not lead to the “annihilation of a substance” is liable 
to serious criticism. In particular, such interpretations appear to reduce Schopenhauer’s 




the Will occurs is, in my estimation, not at all conspicuous; accordingly, if I am to retain 
that notion, I must illustrate as persuasively as possible how that termination occurs – 
for as it stands the doctrine is evidently incomplete and in desperate need of a 
correction. Fortunately, I have found that I need not stray too far afield in search of a 
solution, for one, as I see it, is already contained within the Schopenhauerian 
philosophy itself: it is, namely, the distinction between an ordinary death and one 
occasioned by the most extreme form of asceticism, viz., suicide by starvation 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 400-401). I shall expound upon these themes in due course. 
I may be permitted to state that I am confident that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s 
soteriological doctrine shall be of great interest and benefit to Schopenhauerian 
scholars. It is not an outlandish interpretation in so far as it utilises concepts originally 
propounded by Schopenhauer (1969a: 400-401) himself: indeed, its novelty resides 
solely in the way in which I have repositioned and presented certain Schopenhauerian 
concepts. Consequently, my interpretation is merely a reformulation of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy and it differs from it solely in structure and not in content. Indeed, I console 
myself by noting that progress in intellectual matters is often achieved through 
dissention, for as Schopenhauer (2010a: 112) explains: 
“Even when [a great work] stems from [one of the greatest intellects of all 
time], a newly created theory can hardly, without a miracle, already be so 
perfect at its very genesis that nothing is left for the successors to add, or to 
correct […] ‘Never to err and always to hit the mark is the business of the gods: 
it is not granted to mortals to escape their fate’. 
[Consequently], it is incumbent on us to acknowledge what has been 
accomplished, to accept it gratefully and with a clear mind, and then to develop 
it to the best of our ability to the greatest possible perfection.” 
It is in this spirit that I commit my thoughts on this particular topic to paper. 
  
																																																								
suffering. My interpretation, on the contrary, argues that the ascetic exacerbates his suffering 
in order to prevent it in others; consequently it must be considered an extreme form of altruism. 






I shall assume that readers have already read the section on Schopenhauer’s pessimism 
and are consequently aware of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 146-147) claim that the Will as 
Ding-an-sich is the provenience of suffering. However, I wish to make an observation 
concerning this latter notion which, to my surprise and disappointment, is often absent 
in the secondary English literature on the Schopenhauerian philosophy.  
To Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 146-147, et al.) lamentable characterisation of the world as 
a place of incessant suffering I must add one other fact which, in my estimation, makes 
this view almost unbearable. Not only will one suffer in this life, but also in innumerable 
others, for according to Schopenhauer (1974b: 276) the provenience of suffering will 
be re-manifested through the process of palingenesis.279 This thought, if it were to be 
considered veracious, would, it seems to me, induce even a confirmed optimist to 
become an ascetic. For imagine being born again and again, only in order to suffer again 
and again ad nauseam – “would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and 
curse” (Nietzsche, 1974: 273) such a thought? I doubt that many individuals wise to the 
bitter taste of tears in one life would be able to endure such a notion. This is an 
exceedingly significant point as it relates to Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 372) concept of 
the enlightened consciousness which surmounts the illusion of individuality:280 thus, 
the pain and torment of those as yet unborn creatures must be considered as significant 
																																																								
279 It will be recalled that Schopenhauer (1974: 276) defines palingenesis as “[…] the 
disintegration and new formation of the individual, since Will alone persists and, assuming the 
shape of a new being, receives a new intellect.” The notion is to be distinguished from 
metempsychosis which is “the transition of the entire so-called soul into another body” 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 276). Cf. the section on death herein, wherein I first present and discuss 
these significant notions. 
280 The most succinct explication of the enlightened consciousness I am here referring to is 
given by Schopenhauer (1969a: 372) thus: “[t]he principium individuationis, the form of the 
phenomenon, no longer holds him so firmly in its grasp, but the suffering he sees in others 




as one’s own. In due course I shall explicate how in the case of the saint this sentiment 
of compassion reaches its zenith. 
Nonetheless, in his magnum opus Schopenhauer (1969a: 392) suggests that it is the 
personal experience of active suffering and ennui which illuminate the human mind to 
the utter futility of all existence, culminating, Schopenhauer (1969a: 392) hopes, in the 
ascetic lifestyle. This austere style of living is, as Robert Wicks (2008: 127) observes, 
“often associated with monks and monasteries, [it] focuses on self-sacrifice, stillness, 
renunciation, self-knowledge, self-purification, self-imposed poverty, and deep 
meditation”.  
Now, it is the ascetic solution to the problem of suffering which most have found to be 
the most disagreeable aspect of the Schopenhauerian philosophy. For instance, the 
famous psychologist C. G. Jung (1989: 69) remarks that “Schopenhauer’s sombre 
picture of the world had [his] undivided approval, but not [the philosopher’s] solution 
of the problem”. Indeed, the notion that the exacerbation of suffering shall somehow 
cause a reduction thereof seems to be contradictory. 
There may be numerous reasons for individuals rejecting Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 385-
386) solution to the problem of suffering, but it seems to me that the controversial 
identification of the Will with the Kantian Ding-an-sich (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100) 
has caused many intellectuals, perhaps unwittingly, to reject the ascetic aspect of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy.281 But in so doing a great injustice has been committed 
because the metaphysical concept of the Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 100), the ubiquity 
of suffering (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 310), Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 380, 396) notorious 
pessimism, and salvation (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 379) are all inextricably bound. Thus, 
																																																								
281 For instance, C. G. Jung (1989: 70) states that after he had read Kant’s Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft he believed that he had “discovered the fundamental flaw […] in Schopenhauer’s 
system. [Schopenhauer] had committed the deadly sin of hypostatizing a metaphysical 
assertion, and of endowing a mere noumenon, a Ding-an-sich, with special qualities”. I 
conjecture that Jung (1989: 69) rejects Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 391-392) ascetic solution to the 
predicament of suffering because, by the time he entertained that section, he had already 
rejected the notion of the Will as the Ding-an-sich. In contrast, I maintain that Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 391-392) ascetic solution to the problem of suffering is inseparably connected to his 




I consider myself vindicated in stating that the Schopenhauerian notion of salvation 
through asceticism will invariably seem peculiar to one who rejects ab ovo the 
metaphysical framework upon which it is based. But therein lies the error: one should 
not discount aspects of a systematic philosophy prior to considering it in its entirety, 
“for we cannot take away a pillar without endangering the rest of the structure” 
(Schopenhauer, 1974b: 369).282  
However, that is not to suggest that the Schopenhauerian (1969a: 391-392) concept of 
salvation through asceticism is comprehended with ease if one uncritically accepts 
every word the great philosopher utters, for one may still find the last part of his opus 
maximum perplexing – for, I reiterate, how can an exacerbation of suffering cause a 
reduction thereof? It is my opinion that the baffling notion of asceticism is best 
comprehended by way of Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 398-402) views on suicide; 




What, in the first place, did Schopenhauer actually think of the phenomenon of suicide? 
As Dale Jacquette (2008: 302) and Frederick Copleston (1947: 91) note, it would 
appear, given his bleak view of existence (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 380, 396), that 
Schopenhauer has positioned himself for an enthusiastic defence of self-destruction.  
Life, according to Schopenhauer (1974b: 292-293, et al.), is an unrelenting struggle 
which ultimately concludes in personal annihilation; thus why, we may justifiably ask, 
should one not hasten the inevitable? Let us, therefore, commence this topic by 
observing that if consciousness is a requirement in the production of suffering, i.e. one 
needs to be cognizant of some or other deprivation, and if this consciousness is 
																																																								
282 I remind readers that, as Kathleen M. Higgins (2003: 330) notes in her article on 
Schopenhauer in Volume VI of the Routledge History of Philosophy, entitled The Age of 
German Idealism: “[…] Schopenhauer is an emphatically systematic thinker. In claiming that 
his philosophy is an ‘organic’ whole, composed of elements that stand or fall together, 




expunged in death – as Schopenhauer (1974b: 273-274) himself states – then why not 
commit suicide? Surely death presents itself as the final escape from the torments and 
miseries of life? 
However, for Schopenhauer (1974b: 309), ordinary suicide is a mistake283 because “[it] 
is opposed to the attainment of the highest moral goal since it substitutes for the real 
salvation from this world of woe and misery one that is merely apparent”. Now in order 
to fully comprehend Schopenhauer’s meaning here it is necessary to acquaint oneself 
with his moral philosophy which has much in common with the non-Mohammedan 
Indian religions. It is also necessary to mention (as was previously alluded to) that 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 379) is not concerned with individual misery, and, by 
implication, individual deliverance. Were it the case that Schopenhauer had written 
about individual, i.e. personal, suffering and salvation then it seems obvious to me that 
he would have encouraged ordinary suicide because, as I mentioned, the consciousness 
which assists in producing suffering by alerting a sentient creature to an unfulfilled 
desire is expunged in death.  
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 378-379) ideal human being is the ascetic saint who penetrates 
so profoundly into the inner essence of the world that  
“[…] he no longer makes the egoistical distinction between himself and the 
person of others, but takes as much interest in the sufferings of other 
individuals as in his own, and thus is not only benevolent and charitable in the 
highest degree, but even ready to sacrifice his own individuality whenever 
several others can be saved thereby, then it follows automatically that such a 
man, recognising in all beings his own true and innermost self, must also regard 
the endless sufferings of all that lives as his own, and thus take upon himself 
the pain of the whole world.” 
It may thus be said of such an individual that, “like Buddha, [he] cannot be completely 
happy so long as any living thing is suffering” (Russell, 1946: 799). This is due to the 
fact that the ascetic saint apprehends the metaphysical unity of all creatures; as a result 
of which he experiences every misfortune as though it were his own (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 379) – indeed he even realises that the Will in him shall re-manifest itself 
																																																								




through palingenesis after his death, thus continuing the senseless tragedy known as 
life. In contrast, an individual entangled in the “veil of Maya”, i.e. “the principium 
individuationis, and […] the remaining forms of the principle of sufficient reason” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 352) is ignorant because: 
“[i]n this form of his limited knowledge he sees not the inner nature of things, 
which is one, but its phenomena as separated, detached, innumerable, very 
different, and indeed opposed.” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 352). 
This is the illusion, the so-called “veil of Maya” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 378) which 
only the mendicant, truly and in actuality, surmounts. Now if we consider the 
compassionate ascetic saint – one who troubles himself over the innumerable tragedies 
which abound everywhere in the world (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 379) – to be the ideal of 
this pessimistic Weltanschauung, then it follows that the ultimate intention of the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy must be to reduce universal suffering. It is only if we 
remain ignorant of this fact that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 398) proscription of ordinary 
suicide may appear peculiar to us. Now with this notion firmly in mind let us turn to 
the matter of suicide in earnest. 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 398) claims that ordinary suicide is altogether different from 
asceticism and he makes the odd remark that far from being a denial of the Wille-zum-
Leben, ordinary suicide is actually “a strong affirmation” of the Will (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 398). The ordinary suicide, according to Schopenhauer (1969a: 399), does not 
deny the essence of life (i.e. the Will) but only the circumstances under which he 
presently finds himself, i.e. the ordinary suicide rejects the suffering of life but not the 
Wille-zum-Leben itself, which is, as we know, the provenience of suffering. As 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 398) states: 
“[Ordinary] suicide, the arbitrary doing away with the individual phenomenon, 
differs most widely from the denial of the [Wille-zum-Leben], which is the only 
act of its freedom to appear in the phenomenon, and hence, as Asmus calls it, 
the transcendental change […] Far from being denial of the Will, [ordinary] 
suicide is a phenomenon of the Will’s strong affirmation. For denial has its 
essential nature in the fact that the pleasures of life, not its sorrows, are 
shunned. The suicide wills life, and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions 
on which it has come to him. Therefore he gives up by no means the [Wille-




wills life, wills the unchecked existence and affirmation of the body; but the 
combination of circumstances does not allow of these, and the result for him is 
great suffering.” 
Therefore, because ordinary suicide is an assertion, as opposed to a denial, of the Will 
it is ignorant, as Frederick Copleston (1947: 91) notes, of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics: 
“Individual consciousness is indeed destroyed [in the act of ordinary suicide], 
i.e. phenomenal existence, but man’s inner nature, identical with Will, persists 
and can never be destroyed.” 
Consequently, ordinary suicide is an inept undertaking in so far as it can never 
extinguish that which is the real provenience of suffering, viz., the Will. Furthermore, 
it must be reiterated that this Will can re-manifest itself after the demise of the 
phenomenal form through the process of palingenesis (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 276), 
thus continuing the tragi-comedy known as life. 
But what, if anything, can affect the noumenal Will? Frederick Copleston (1947: 177) 
argues that Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 382) claim that ascetic practices can abrogate the 
Will of a mendicant is not “logically justified”. I take Copleston to mean that 
Schopenhauer does not cogently explicate how such an event can occur by way of 
ascetic practices – Schopenhauer (1969a: 382) simply presents it as a miraculous fact 
– a “deus ex machina” in Copleston’s (1947:178) words. Indeed, it is odd that the Will 
should somehow entirely dissolve at the moment of a saint’s death, even though 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 382) maintains that a glimmer of that entity exists within the 
most austere ascetics. However, I shall not reject this problematical concept 
propounded by Schopenhauer (1969a: 382) as it is an essential aspect of his philosophy: 
without it the concept of salvation as presented in book four of volume one of Die Welt 
is vacuous. For if the saint’s Will persists after death then he is in precisely the same 
position as the lustful plebeian: what, then, would be the point of exacerbating one’s 
suffering?  
As a consequence of these observations I shall attempt to follow Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 390) notions by arguing in the subsequent sections that the only way of 
perennially liberating oneself – and consequently other sentient creatures – from the 
servitude of the Will is through the ascetic ideal –i.e. living the austere existence of an 




interpretation of the way in which such a process, viz., the dissolution of the 




What is meant by the term asceticism is the “deliberate breaking of the Will by refusing 
the agreeable and looking for the disagreeable, the voluntarily chosen way of life of 
penance and self-chastisement, for the constant mortification of the Will” 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 392).284 “According to this body of opinion”, as Michael Fox 
(1980, 163) correctly notes, “to surmount suffering, one should abandon the struggle 
for happiness and the eradication of misery, and paradoxically, embrace suffering […] 
By doing so, and by continually and deliberately exposing oneself to pain, humiliation 
and deprivation, one can achieve liberation from the endless cycle of desires”. 
Consequently, the ascetic saint exacerbates his misery as much as he possibly can, not 
solely by denying his body of its desires but, beyond that, by inflicting torture upon 
himself as a flagellant (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 382) in order to extirpate his Will, 
thereby reducing the amount of suffering in the world. 
At this point one may justifiably wonder how the exacerbation of personal agony can 
diminish universal suffering. I shall address this concern in the subsequent section, but 
before I offer the interpretation of asceticism I consider to be the most credible, I wish 
to consider three alternative explanations. 
Throughout his discussion on asceticism Schopenhauer (1969a: 390, et al.) alludes to 
the possibility of the manifested Will being absolutely abrogated in an animate being 
by the ascetic practices he prescribes. For instance, of the individual who has resolved 
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Schopenhauer (1969a: 275) makes it quite clear that the Wille-zum-Leben wills life perpetually: 
“was der Wille will immer das Leben ist” (“what the Will wills is always life”) (Cartwright, 
2005: 187). The ascetic lifestyle is rather a battle between the liberated consciousness against 




to deny himself pleasures and intentionally seek out the disagreeable, Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 390) states: 
“Such a man who, after many bitter struggles with his own nature, has at last 
completely conquered, is then left only as pure knowing being, as undimmed 
mirror of the world. Nothing can distress or alarm him any more; nothing can 
any longer move him; for he has cut all the thousand threads of willing which 
hold us bound to the world, and which as craving, fear, envy, and anger drag 
us here and there in constant pain.” 
Sentences such as this seem to suggest that the austere practices of the ascetic saint 
cause him to live a more harmonious existence than the lustful plebeian by abrogating 
the Will in an absolute sense while he lives and breathes.285 But Schopenhauer (1969a: 
382) admits that the saintly state is not actually one of will-lessness but a “constant 
struggle” (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 391) because: 
“He who has reached [the point of asceticism] still always feels, as a living 
body, as concrete phenomenon of Will, the natural tendency to every kind of 
willing; but he deliberately suppresses it, since he compels himself to refrain 
from doing all that he would like to do, and on the other hand to do all that he 
would not like to do, even if this has no further purpose than that of serving to 
mortify the Will.” 
Thus it is clear that a glimmer of the Will remains even in the body of the ascetic saint 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 382), and he must therefore constantly deny and frustrate his 
desires in order to persist with the ascetic lifestyle (cf. Young, 2005: 190). 
Consequently, we can confidently rule out this first possibility, viz., that the ascetic 
practices induce a state of will-lessness while alive, as being the impetus for 
Schopenhauer’s prescription of asceticism.  
A second explanation for Schopenhauer’s avowal of the ascetic lifestyle may be 
inferred from his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 332) characterisation of “the Will’s inner 
conflict with itself”. As Copleston (1947: 161) explicates: 
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“The simplest assertion of the [Wille-zum-Leben] is the assertion of one’s own 
body, which, in its inner nature, is the Will: it is objectified Will. But [the] 
assertion of one’s own body very easily extends to the denial of the same Will 
expressed in another’s body, either by destroying this latter or by compelling 
it to serve one’s own Will, instead of allowing it to serve the other’s Will, 
which is its natural function.” 
Thus some may not unjustifiably maintain that the impetus for the ascetic lifestyle in 
the Schopenhauerian philosophy is to prevent the saint from affirming his own Will 
and thereby inadvertently denying the Will in other creatures. To this I can only respond 
that, although asceticism reduces competition and conflict between creatures, I 
emphatically reject that it is the sine qua non of the Schopenhauerian doctrine which, 
it must be remembered, is an idealistic philosophy (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 3). Thus, I 
conclude with confidence that Schopenhauer could not have intended such a 
materialistic consequence – however beneficial the (unforeseen) consequences thereof 
might be. Moreover, if the intention of the ascetic lifestyle were merely to remove the 
inevitable competition between creatures Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 382) prescription of 
intentionally seeking out the disagreeable would be rendered absurd, for the active 
exacerbation of suffering would not be explicable upon such a crude materialistic 
interpretation of the great philosopher’s doctrine. 
A third possibility is the notion that the ascetic practices are prescribed by 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 389-390) because they produce, paradoxically, a profound sense 
of jubilation for the saint.286 It would be justifiable to assume that the ascetic saint 
would be somewhat of a morose and melancholic character given that he is perennially 
in a state of deprivation; but, oddly enough, Schopenhauer (1969a: 390) claims that the 
contrary is true of such individuals: 
“[…] The man in whom the denial of the [Wille-zum-Leben] has dawned, 
however poor, cheerless, and full of privation his state may be when looked at 
from outside, is full of inner cheerfulness and true heavenly peace.” 
																																																								
286This understanding, which may also be referred to as the “beatific mystification 





It should be noted that the provenience of the contentment derived from ascetic 
practices is not the Will, but rather the intellect; thus such pleasure does not warrant 
negation, i.e. asceticism demands only the negation of pleasures derived from the Will 
and not “pleasures of the mind”, as it were (cf. Schopenhauer, 1969a: 391-392). Yet 
this intellectual contentment notwithstanding, the ascetic saint is by no means an 
egoistic hedonist: he does not seek to gain a state of personal jubilation through 
masochistic practices or otherwise – for as I mentioned, the ultimate telos of the saint 
is to reduce the amount of suffering which abounds everywhere in the world 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 379). I reiterate that if the Schopenhauerian saint were 
concerned solely with his own salvation then this interpretation might seem adequate; 
but the consciousness of the saint is painfully altruistic: 
“He recognises immediately, and without reasons or arguments, that the in-
itself of his own phenomenon is also that of others, namely that [Wille-zum-
Leben] which constitutes the inner nature of everything, and lives in all; in fact, 
he recognises that this extends even to the animals and to the whole of nature; 
he will therefore not cause suffering even to an animal.” (Schopenhauer, 
1969a: 372). 
Now if the saint were concerned solely with his own well-being then this third option 
would present itself as a possible interpretation of Schopenhauer’s prescription of 
asceticism; but due to the fact that it reeks of egoism I am obliged to reject it as a 
feasible interpretation. Indeed, it cannot be left unmentioned that if the pleasure derived 
from ascetic practices were a suitable solution to the predicament of suffering within 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy then one would be compelled to affirm the acceptability, 
nay, the necessity, of ordinary suicide: for in both instances personal suffering is 
expunged; but, as one ought to know by now, the Schopenhauerian (1969a: 379) 








It seems to me that the only meaningful way in which the Schopenhauerian notion of 
asceticism can be interpreted is thus: a mortification of the phenomenal Will produces 
a “transcendental alteration”, i.e. it affects the Will as Ding-an-sich in a desirable way. 
But before I commence an elaborate discussion on this fourth possibility, I believe it is 
necessary to discuss a potential cause for concern inherent to this interpretation, which 
might, I conjecture, prevent otherwise reasonable individuals from accepting the 
veracity thereof. 
Some Schopenhauerian scholars such as Bryan Magee287 and S. Jack Odell288 have 
ventured to incorrectly equate the Will with the concept of a force or energy. For one 
to truly comprehend why such terms should not be utilised in lieu of the term Will it is 
necessary to mention Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 3) understanding of the relation between 
science and philosophy.289 
In Schopenhauer’s (1974b: 3) view science requires metaphysics in order to complete 
its investigations (cf. Young, 2005: 56). 290 For instance, some physicists contend that 
																																																								
287 “The term ‘force’, rejected by [Schopenhauer], would have been vastly preferable [to the 
world ‘Will’]. ‘Energy’ would have been better still” (Magee. 1997: 144). 
288 “[…] The reader may feel some uncertainty concerning exactly what Schopenhauer meant 
to refer to with the word ‘Will’. I have considered all of the following: desire, drive, impulse, 
striving, and Magee’s view that it us what physicists refer to as force or energy” (Odell, 2001: 
54).  
289 I felt that I could not omit this section, which I already presented in the main body of my 
dissertation, without vitiating the presentation of my argument in this particular section (which, 
it must be remembered, is an independent consideration of Schopenhauer’s soteriological 
doctrine). I have therefore retained it and I beg my readers to excuse the repetition.  
290 This, in fact, is precisely one of the reasons Schopenhauer wrote Über den Willen in der 
Natur, as Professor David E. Cartwright (2005: 184) explains: “The somewhat clumsy subtitle 
of On the Will in Nature, ‘A discussion of the Corroborations from the Empirical Sciences That 
the Author’s Philosophy Has Received since Its First Appearance’, may suggest that 
Schopenhauer was doing no more than confirming in new forms that which he had already 




the universe was born ex nihilo and consequently that it had a point of commencement 
in time. Now human reason, as Kant (A480-484, B508-512) so admirably informs us 
in his Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, incessantly seeks out the unconditioned, i.e. the causa 
prima – but the realm beyond the empirical world is inaccessible to a physical scientist 
and such a one is therefore obliged to admit that science has its limits: it can teeter on 
the edge of the abyss but it can never, by its very nature, enter into that realm. But 
where empirical investigation is halted precisely at that point metaphysics, according 
to Schopenhauer (1974b: 3), is summoned into action. This can be most conspicuously 
discerned in the fact that science constantly utilises terms which possess no correlative 
objects as such; therefore it is justifiable to ask: what is actually meant by the terms 
“force”, “energy”, etc.? As Schopenhauer (1889b: 219) states in Über den Willen in der 
Natur: 
“Physical science is wont to designate this unknown, inaccessible something, 
at which its investigations stop short and which is taken for granted in all its 
explanations, by such terms as physical force, vital force, formative principles, 
etc., etc., which in fact mean no more than x, y, z.” 
Thus it appears that without metaphysical concepts scientists would not be able to 
explicate certain phenomena in great detail; but these concepts, upon which the 
monumental achievements of science are founded, are themselves exceedingly 
mysterious. They are, as Schopenhauer (1969a: 80) states, qualitates occultae, i.e. 
“occult qualities, necessary but scientifically inexplicable elements of scientific 
explanations of the world” (Cartwright, 2005: 52). The veracity of Schopenhauer’s 
view is corroborated by the fact that, to my knowledge at least, no scientist can actually 
																																																								
how ‘unprejudiced empiricists’ articulated, from a posteriori sources, scientific theories that 
supported his thesis that what we recognise in ourselves as Will is that which is expressed in 
all natural phenomena, his argument goes deeper than this. He analysed the natural sciences to 
show how they lead to his metaphysics, and he argued that his metaphysics completes the 
scientific image of the world by providing an explanation of that which is presupposed and 
unexplainable by science. Consequently, he thought his metaphysics of the Will provides a 
comprehensive explanation of the totality of experiences”. We could be forgiven, therefore, for 
thinking that Magee (1997: 144) never read this little work by Schopenhauer – or if he did, that 




explicate what is meant by the terms “force” and “energy”, their significance in 
scientific theories notwithstanding. 
It will be recalled that in an earlier section I argued that the Will, according to 
Schopenhauer (1889b: 376), is not a qualitas occulta, i.e. an inexplicable X which one 
utilises to explicate certain phenomena. Hence, contrary to Magee’s (1997: 144) 
suggestion one should avoid utilising the terms “force” and “energy” in place of the 
term Will. As Schopenhauer (1969a: 111) states: 
“[…] I should be misunderstood by anyone who thought that ultimately it was 
all the same whether we expressed this essence-in-itself of all phenomena by 
the word Will or by any other word. This would be the case if the thing-in-
itself were something whose existence we merely inferred, and thus knew only 
indirectly and merely in the abstract. Then certainly we could call it what we 
liked: the name would stand merely as the symbol of an unknown quantity. But 
the word Will, which, like a magic word, is to reveal to us the innermost 
essence of everything in nature, by no means expresses an unknown quantity, 
something reached by inferences and syllogisms, but something known 
absolutely and immediately, and that so well that we know and understand 
what Will is better than anything else, be it what it may.” 
Schopenhauer (1889b: 376) reiterates this view when he states: 
“[…] It is fair to let me, as a serious man, only speak of things which I really 
know and only make use of words which I attach a quite definite meaning; 
since this alone can be communicated with security to others, and 
Vauvenargues is quite right in saying: ‘la clarté est la bonne foi des 
philosophes’.291 Therefore, if I use the words ‘Will, [Will-to-life]’, this is no 
mere ens rationis, no hypostasis set up by me, nor is it a term of vague, 
uncertain meaning; on the contrary, I refer him, who asks what it is, to his own 
inner self, where he will find it entire, nay, in colossal dimensions, as a true 
ens realissimum. I have accordingly not explained the world out of the 
unknown, but rather out of that which is better known than anything, and 
known to us moreover in quite a different way from all the rest.” 
																																																								




I am of the opinion that the error of equating the Will with a type of force or energy has 
led, unwittingly, to a miscomprehension of the Schopenhauerian concept of salvation 
through the practice of asceticism. In short, I conjecture that it has led many sincere 
Schopenhauerian scholars to believe that the three foregoing interpretations are 
potentially acceptable ways of construing the troublesome concept of Schopenhauerian 
soteriology. I intend to show that my interpretation – which I consider to be the most 
credible, although not entirely impervious to criticism292 – is at variance with Magee’s 
(1997: 144) understanding of the Will as a type of force or energy. To comprehend why 
this is so – and this ought to be retained at the forefront of one’s consciousness while 
reading the subsequent sections – one need only reflect on the fact that scientists 
maintain that energy cannot, according to the Law of the Conservation of Energy, be 
created or destroyed (Wilson, 1965: 11). But it ought to be evident by now that the Will 
is not a type of energy and consequently it is erroneous to indefensibly apply a scientific 
doctrine to the concept of the Will. 
What I am about to propound shall certainly seem outlandish to those who dogmatically 
retain the superfluous equation of the Will with energy. But I beg my readers to retain 
an open mind for my interpretation is grounded, quite firmly, in Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 272, 400-401) thought; thus it need not be met with hostility or suspicion. In 
short, my postulation states that if the volitions one experiences are a manifestation of 
the metaphysical Will then an augmentation or reduction in the potency of the former 
should likewise correspond to an increase or decrease in the metaphysical realm. 
Before I endeavour to elaborate upon my particular interpretation, I wish to remind my 
readers that Schopenhauer (1969a: 272) argues for the immanent nature of his 
philosophy; in other words, “[…] it makes no claims about anything beyond the 
possibility of experience; it provides an explanation and interpretation of what is given 
in the experiences of the external world and in self-consciousness” (Cartwright, 2005: 
87). Now, if one were to maintain the erroneous view that asceticism solely affects 
one’s phenomenal volitions and not the Ding-an-sich293 then one risks rendering 
																																																								
292 The primary criticism which may be levelled at my interpretation is in fact proof of the Ding-
an-sich being subject to the causal principle. As will be seen, I cannot cogently refute this 
criticism and it may therefore be taken as proof of the Will’s susceptibility to causality. 




Schopenhauer’s philosophy transcendent. In other words, by arguing that the Will as 
Ding-an-sich is distinct from the phenomenal world one unwittingly implies that the 
former is divorced from the latter, and consequently it must exist above and beyond it. 
Now, if one accepts Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 272) claim that his philosophy is 
immanent and, further, that asceticism is able to break the Will (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
382), then one cannot affirm that the Will as Ding-an-sich is impervious to change; for 
the former is merely a manifestation of the latter in time and space, and consequently 
an alteration in the one sphere will undoubtedly affect a change in the other. 
Now according to my interpretation, the sole purpose of asceticism in the 
Schopenhauerian philosophy is to affect a transcendental alteration in the metaphysical 
Will, thereby reducing the amount of suffering in the world. To begin with I believe it 
is necessary to clarify what I intend by the phrase “the absolute dissolution of the Will”: 
as I comprehend the concept each individual is a manifestation of the Ding-an-sich, or, 
expressed slightly differently, every individual possesses a fraction of the unified 
metaphysical Will; therefore, an individual can entirely abrogate his fraction of the 
Ding-an-sich without causing a dissolution of the greater entity therewith.294 This is 
what I take the concept to mean. Now this, I maintain, is accomplished by way of ascetic 
practices, i.e. asceticism is able to cause a contraction in the metaphysical Will. In order 
for us to comprehend how one might affect a transcendental change we must turn our 
attention to the phenomenal realm, which is merely a manifestation of the Ding-an-
sich; consequently, a reduction or augmentation in the potency of phenomenal volitions 
coincides with a decrease or increase in the metaphysical entity respectively.295 
Let us take the example of an addiction in order to further elucidate the way in which a 
volition might be surmounted or augmented. An alcoholic, for instance, may develop a 
resistance to the effects of alcohol and consequently more copious amounts are required 
																																																								
294 It is necessary to mention that the abrogation of one’s portion of the Will cannot be 
accomplished while alive, for reasons previously discussed. In the subsequent sections I shall 
explicate how I think this process occurs. 
295 One ought to recall the fact that Schopenhauer (1969a: 272) emphatically maintained that 
his philosophy is “immanent, in the Kantian sense” (Cartwright: 2005: 127) and not 





each time the substance is consumed in order for the addict to experience the desired 
effects. Now by this I mean, in the parlance of my interpretation, that one’s phenomenal 
desires have been caused to augment. Conversely, once the alcoholic resolves to 
recover from his addiction by abstaining from liquor the process of minimisation 
occurs, i.e. his phenomenal desires attenuate. In other words, although it may initially 
be exceedingly difficult for the recovering alcoholic to refrain from consuming such 
substances, gradually the desire shall attenuate to such a level that it may become 
almost undetectable, i.e. the mortification of a desire diminishes the potency of the 
phenomenal Will by causing it to attenuate. Now, we have seen that Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 100, 1974b: 90) identified the Ding-an-sich with that which we call “Will” 
within our inmost being and I propound, in accordance with his (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
272) claims concerning the immanency of his philosophy, that the reduction or 
augmentation in the potency of a phenomenal volition corresponds to the Will as a 
metaphysical entity: thus the vanquishing of a desire affects a transcendental change in 




I readily admit to four possible criticisms of my conception; the first of which is 
explicitly stated by Schopenhauer (1974b: 312) in Parerga und Paralipomena when he 
writes: 
“[…] The denial of the [Wille-zum-Leben] does not in any way assert the 
annihilation of a substance, but the mere act of not-willing; that which hitherto 
willed no longer wills.” 
																																																								
296 Conversely, of course, if one’s phenomenal desires are caused to augment this alteration 
corresponds to the metaphysical Will as well, i.e. it affects an undesirable transcendental 
change by causing the Ding-an-sich to expand. 
297 Furthermore, I observe in passing that Schopenhauer (1974b: 312) himself fleetingly 
acknowledges the relationship between the denial and the affirmation of the phenomenal Will 




This sentence evokes the notion that it is possible to abrogate the Will and remain alive; 
but as I mentioned such an undertaking seems impossible according to Schopenhauer’s 
(1969a: 382, 391-392) doctrine, because the Will is that which produces every 
phenomenal object and consequently it remains present even in the most austere 
ascetics. Indeed, on Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 411) terms, without the presence of the 
Will a phenomenal object could not possibly exist: no Will, no phenomenal appearance. 
So much then for the first criticism. 
A far more serious criticism may be directed at the fact that it appears that a causal 
connection exists between the saint’s ascetic practices and the Ding-an-sich, or the 
saint’s phenomenal volitions and the metaphysical Will. It goes without saying that 
because the mind imposes the law of causality upon the sensory data received by the 
senses, thereby constructing reality, it cannot subsist in the metaphysical realm 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 435-437). Consequently, how is it possible for asceticism to 
affect a transcendental change if the metaphysical realm is impervious to causality? My 
response, in short, is as follows: asceticism does not directly cause an alteration in the 
Ding-an-sich, but it is, nonetheless, able to do so indirectly.298 
An elaboration of this notion is necessary and consequently I shall attempt to explicate 
it as perspicuously and concisely as I possibly can. The ascetic practices affect a change 
in the saint’s phenomenal volitions, which, in turn, correspond to the metaphysical Will 
as I have shown; causality subsists solely in this former realm, i.e. the phenomenal 
sphere, in which asceticism causes either an augmentation or a reduction in the potency 
of phenomenal volitions, but asceticism can never directly cause the metaphysical Will 
																																																								
298 Here I am attempting to defend my interpretation from the criticism that it is erroneous 
owing to the fact that the Will is susceptible to the causal principle. However, I might equally 
have resolved the difficulty by acknowledging an objective form of causality, thereby rejecting 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 100) claim that the metaphysical Will is impervious to the causal 
principle. In fact, one has to accept the metaphysical Will’s alterability in order for 
Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine to make any sense. This proves that the metaphysical 
Will is not acausal; and it is superfluous whether that is due to an objective form of causality 
or to an indirect influence of the causal principle. Indeed, it is this observation which I take to 
illustrate that the Will is subject to the principium fiendi, and that it consequently cannot be 




to contract or augment. Therefore, there exists no direct causal connection whatsoever 
between the ascetic practices and the Ding-an-sich and yet despite this, an alteration 
still occurs owing to the fact that the phenomenal volitions are equivalent to the 
metaphysical Will. 
But it might enter into the minds of some precocious readers that a causal connection 
exists between the saint’s phenomenal volitions and the metaphysical Will. Here, too, 
no such relation exists for one’s phenomenal desires are equivalent to the metaphysical 
Will – “both are immediately one and the same thing, only perceived in a double aspect” 
(1889a: 93), hence the contraction, for instance, of a phenomenal desire does not cause, 
in the sense in which we are speaking, the Ding-an-sich to contract because that volition 
is the metaphysical Will expressed as a phenomenon.299 
Another potentially damaging criticism may be directed at my notion of the Will as a 
fractionalised entity. Schopenhauer (1969a: 128-129) explicitly states that because the 
Will is not located within the principium individuationis it is unified, and thus: 
“[…] if, per impossible, a single being, even the most insignificant, were 
entirely annihilated, the whole world would inevitably be destroyed with it.” 
Hence one may tentatively reject my interpretation for affirming the fractionality of the 
Will. However, I may be permitted to point out that the Will one discovers through 
introspection is not atemporal as Schopenhauer (1969a: 112-113) had initially claimed: 
our volitional strivings “can be dated and their duration can be measured” (Edwards, 
2009: 170).300 This indicates that the Will cannot be a unity in the sense Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 113) speaks: the temporality of the Will betokens its fractionality. Thus, it is 
erroneous for Schopenhauer (1969a: 128-129) to maintain that the abrogation of the 
																																																								
299 I admit that this argument is highly contentious, but it was necessary to attempt a solution 
of such a pertinent criticism of my interpretation. A far more credible argument is the so-called 
“neglected alternative” which postulates an objective form of causality; I refer readers to those 
sections (viz., 3.4 and 7.8) herein which cogently argue for this view, I shall therefore not 
reiterate those arguments here. 
300 Further thereto, it will be recalled that I argued that the Will is also subject to the form of 
space, owing to its inseparability from the bodily parts it is said to create. Such arguments 




Will in one individual would entail the annihilation of the universe in toto. In 
contradistinction to Schopenhauer (1969a: 112-113), I affirm that the Will is 
fractionalised to the extent that a portion thereof exists in every phenomenal object, 
thus the abrogation of the Will in one individual cannot destroy that entity in toto, it 
merely causes it to contract (which is empirically experienced as an attenuation in one’s 
phenomenal volitions). 
The fourth potential criticism I wish to discuss may be directed at the jargon with which 
I am compelled to describe the phenomenon of a transcendental change; for the concept 
of quantity, it is true, applies solely to the phenomenal world. Such are the limitations 
of language which I am obliged to accept. As the founder of the Schopenhauer-
Gesellschaft, Paul Deussen (1966: 66), observed: 
“It is the misfortune of metaphysics that it has to operate with concepts and 
words which are taken from the empirical order of nature and which can be 
applied only in a certain fresh interpretation to metaphysical matters.” 
Be that as it may, how the metaphysical Will actually contracts or expands is utterly 
unintelligible to our finite minds: phenomenally we comprehend the minimisation of 
the Will as a reduction in the potency of a desire, but in what manner this process occurs 
in the metaphysical realm is unbeknownst to us mortals. However, I reiterate that if, as 
Schopenhauer (1969a: 99-100) insists, one is able to discover through introspection that 
the Will is the Ding-an-sich, then it is not in the least outlandish to suppose that some 
alteration must occur in the metaphysical entity when one experiences an intensification 




My notion that the surmounting of a desire causes a reduction in the potency thereof, 
which in turn corresponds to the Will as Ding-an-sich, illustrates that it is through 
asceticism that one ultimately reduces the amount of suffering in the world (cf. 




entity, has been reduced and consequently a particular portion of it cannot re-manifest 
itself into existence, continuing the senseless struggle that is known as life. 
It will be remembered that the cessation of suffering cannot be a personal matter on 
Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 378-379) account – for if it were ordinary suicide would be 
condonable: each individual has a responsibility to every other and consequently all 
those endowed with altruistic personalities should strive to minimise universal 
suffering (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 378-379). In striking contrast to this view stands the 
ordinary suicide, who is as Julian Young (2005: 195) states: “exceptionally self-
obsessed; [an individual] who [has] become so isolated from the rest of the world that 
it seems to [him] that only [his] own pain matters, indeed that only [his] own pain 
exists”. The ordinary suicide’s egoistical action is an affirmation of the Will 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 398-399) which, according to my doctrine, causes its 
metaphysical form to augment. This is to be lamented because through palingenesis the 
Will, unbroken and resilient, can continue to wreak havoc upon the world, as 
Schopenhauer (1969b: 503) explains: 
“Every new-born being comes fresh and blithe into the new existence, and 
enjoys it as a gift; but nothing is or can be freely given. Its fresh existence is 
paid for by the old age and death of a worn-out and decrepit existence which 
has perished, but which contained the indestructible seed. Out of this seed the 
new existence arose; the two existences are one being.” 
Thus, the phenomenal form of the ordinary suicide might come to an end, but his inner 
essence – the Will – persists; consequently, through palingenesis, it is able to manifest 
and affirm itself anew, thereby continuing the tragedy known as life.  
However, in contrast to the ordinary individual, Schopenhauer (1969a: 411-412) seems 
to intimate that the ascetic saint attains a state to which we should all ultimately strive 
and venerate, viz., a nothingness; as Fredrick Copleston (1947: 178) explains: 
“When death at length comes, [the ascetic saint] will welcome it as the longed-
for deliverance, since, in his case, it is not merely the phenomenal individual 
which ceases with death, but the inner nature is also abolished. ‘For him who 




But how does the Will miraculously dissolve when the ascetic saint perishes? Surely, 
as Schopenhauer (1969a: 382) himself admits,301 the Will, debilitated as it may very 
well be, still exists within the saint and consequently when he dies a portion of his 
metaphysical Will remains intact. As Copleston (1947: 178) continues: 
“It is very difficult to see how this final and complete deliverance is not simply 
a deus ex machina, gratuitously asserted by Schopenhauer, even on his own 
premises. He says indeed that in the ascetic the inner nature exists only in a 
very weak degree, and this ‘slight bond’ is broken by death; but, as long as the 
ascetic is alive, the inner nature is in him, however weak it may be, and at death 
it should, it seems, be ‘re-absorbed’ into the one metaphysical Will.” 
Thus our question now is: can the phenomenal form of the essential being be abrogated? 
Before I can earnestly attempt a resolution of this seemingly impossible undertaking, 
mention must be made of the fact that the Will as Ding-an-sich cannot be pierced or 
singed by an ordinary death. It is in this way that Schopenhauer (1974b: 270-271) 
attempts to console his thanatophobic audience by assuring them that mors non finis:302 
“How can we imagine, on seeing the death of a human being, that here a thing-
in-itself becomes nothing? On the contrary, that only a phenomenon comes to 
an end in time, this form of all phenomena, without the thing-in-itself being 
thereby affected, is the immediate intuitive knowledge of everyone […] 
Whoever imagines that his existence is limited to his present life considers 
himself to be an animated nothing; for thirty years ago he was nothing and 
thirty years hence he will again be nothing.” 
The afterlife that Schopenhauer (1969b: 486) presents is not, of course, the type that 
many religious and spiritual people hope for, i.e. most individuals hope for an afterlife 
in which one’s consciousness and individuality survive the demise of the physical body 
and continue to exist in a disembodied form. As Dale Jacquette (2008: 300) correctly 
observes: “that death is not total annihilation for Schopenhauer is true enough, yet death 
remains the total annihilation of the self, soul, or object in the sense of individual Will 
																																																								
301 “He who has reached [the point of asceticism] still always feels, as living body, as concrete 
phenomenon of Will, the natural tendency to every kind of willing” (Schopenhauer, 1969b: 
382). 




or particular empirical personality”.  Now, despite this fact, many thanatophobic 
individuals might continue to lavish praise on Schopenhauer for this consolatory 
notion, but for the ascetic saint – he who has the blood of a non-Mohammedan Indian 
pulsing through his veins – this thought arouses great despair because the intention of 
the saint is to get at the heart of the matter (the Will), not merely to destroy a 
phantasmagoria (the appearance). But it is obviously erroneous for Schopenhauer 
(1969a: 382) to maintain that when the saint dies his metaphysical being miraculously 
dissolves therewith, because the Will is still present in the most fanatical ascetics 
(Schopenhauer, 1969a: 382) and, consequently, it ought at death, as Copleston (1947: 




It is now left for me to illustrate how this seemingly unattainable ideal, i.e. the total 
abrogation of one’s phenomenal Will (or, rather, fraction of the metaphysical Will), is 
achieved. As I have shown it is unacceptable from a Schopenhauerian (1969a: 398) 
perspective to commit ordinary suicide because such an action is an affirmation of the 
Will; this, I argued, causes the metaphysical entity to augment – which can then re-
manifest itself through palingenesis (Schopenhauer, 1974b: 276). In this way suffering 
is maintained.  But there is one type of suicide for which Schopenhauer (1969a: 400-
401) makes an exception, viz., a voluntary chosen death by starvation: 
“There appears to be a special kind of suicide, quite different from the ordinary, 
which has perhaps not yet been adequately verified. This is voluntary chosen 
death by starvation at the highest degree of asceticism. Its manifestation, 
however, has always been accompanied, and thus rendered vague and obscure, 
by much religious fanaticism and even superstition. Yet it seems that the 
complete denial of the Will can reach that degree where even the necessary 
will to maintain the vegetative life of the body, by the assimilation of 
nourishment, ceases to exist. This kind of suicide is so far from being the result 
of the [Wille-zum-Leben], that such a completely resigned ascetic ceases to live 
merely because he has completely ceased to will. No other death than that by 




since the intention to cut short the agony would actually be a degree of 
affirmation of the Will.” 
It ought to be conspicuous that such a suicide is undoubtedly a denial, as opposed to an 
affirmation, of the Wille-zum-Leben (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 391-392) because the saint 
does not evade the suffering of life, which is now exacerbated by the ascetic practice 
of starvation. I contend that dying by “the most extreme form of asceticism” 
(Cartwright, 2005: 7) dissolves the phenomenal Will which once animated the saint; 
this, in turn, affects a transcendental change by causing the metaphysical Will to 
contract, thereby reducing the amount of suffering in the world. 
Now this process, i.e. the abrogation of the Will, can never be empirically demonstrated 
or corroborated in so far as, from an external perspective, such a death appears identical 
to that of an ordinary one. The only means by which I am able to give proof, as it were, 
of my doctrine is through logic. 
Previously I established that ascetic practices cause a reduction in the potency of 
phenomenal volitions; I argued further that if one adheres to Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 
100) concept of discovering the Ding-an-sich through introspection he shall come to 
the realisation that the reduction or augmentation in the potency of one’s phenomenal 
desires corresponds to the metaphysical Will – consequently, a change in the former 
corresponds to an alteration in the latter. If asceticism has the ability to reduce the 
potency of a volition then it follows that “the most extreme form of asceticism” 
(Cartwright, 2005: 7), which induces death as a foreseen consequence, must possess 
the same ability. But in this case it is the death which is occasioned by the ascetic 
practice of starvation which is of profound significance and we must assume that such 
a death was caused, in contradistinction to an ordinary one, by the dissolution of a 
portion of the metaphysical Will which once animated the saint’s body. 
Following Schopenhauer’s (1969a: 400-401) notions, I maintain that suicide by 
starvation is distinct from all other types of death and suicide in so far as it 
fundamentally alters the Will.303 In other words, suicide by starvation occasions the 
																																																								
303 It must not be thought that one can attain the same outcome by intentionally starving another 
creature to death. For in the act of withholding nourishment, one affirms one’s own Will; thus, 




dissolution of the phenomenal form of the Will, and as a metaphysical entity it is caused 
to reduce in size. In contrast, when the ordinary suicide departs this vallis lacrimarum304 
he has unwittingly exacerbated its suffering and tears by affirming the Will – thus 
causing it to expand as a metaphysical entity. In both instances a transcendental 
alteration has occurred, but the former is to be commended while the latter ought to be 
rejected. 
The individual who perishes by voluntary starvation is liberated from the perpetual 
cycle of palingenesis: at the moment of death the portion of the Will which once 
animated the saint’s body is utterly expunged – the inner essence of such a one is no 
more, neither as a phenomenal nor as a metaphysical entity. The saint has finally 
become, in the parlance of Jainism, a Siddha305 and he is now beyond pain and joy, 
illness and health, birth and death, for his portion of the Will can no longer be re-
manifested into existence.306 As Schopenhauer (1969b: 508) states: 
“[…] to die willingly, to die gladly, to die cheerfully, is the prerogative of the 
resigned, of him who gives up and denies the [Wille-zum-Leben]. For he alone 
wishes to die actually and not merely apparently, and consequently needs and 
desires no continuance of his person. He willingly gives up the existence that 
we know; what comes to him instead of it is in our eyes nothing, because our 
existence in reference to that one is nothing. The Buddhist faith calls that 
existence Nirvana, that is to say, extinction.” 
																																																								
be caused to augment, thereby nullifying any good obtained. A possible exception, and one 
which I doubt would ever occur owing to its absurdity, is that of an “altruistic” individual who 
starves all other creatures to death and then himself commits suicide by way of starvation. 
304 “Vale of tears”. 
305 The word literally means “‘one who has accomplished his goals.’ A term for a soul that has 
attained liberation from the cycle of rebirth” (Wiley, 2004: 197). 
306 It is worth noting that this notion may be characterised in one of two ways: from the first 
standpoint the process may be described as a reduction in the amount of suffering in the world; 
conversely, from the second perspective, one may wish to characterise this phenomenon as the 
ascetic saint attaining a condition of total equanimity, one in which no pain or pleasure affects 
him. Dissimilar as both may appear they are in fact one and the same notion, and consequently 




I have still to observe one final criticism which may be levelled against my 
interpretation, viz., that the abrogation of the saint’s portion of the Will might seem 
superfluous, especially when one takes into consideration the possibility of the Will 
being caused to expand by avaricious individuals. What is the point, one may justifiably 
ask, in the saint causing the Will to contract when a gluttonous individual may cause it 
to expand tenfold? Such a criticism is as absurd as asking a righteous individual why 
he donates to charity and seeks to assist his fellow suffers when his actions cannot 
possibly reduce the suffering of countless others who shall never benefit from his 
virtuous deeds. Such a one is not beguiled by idealistic fantasies – but he knows, and is 
consequently contented by the fact that, even if in a small way, he has contributed to 




In my estimation I have persuasively illustrated that the essential being of the saint can 
only be abrogated through a voluntary chosen death by starvation; in so doing I have 
demonstrated, contrary to what Schopenhauer (1969a: 400-401) maintains, that suicide 
by starvation is not merely condonable but ought to be considered the ultimate ideal of 
his pessimistic philosophy. 
In propounding this interpretation I do not feign to know better than the great man that 
which he intended to say, but the inconsistency inherent in the notion that the Will 
somehow dissolves when the ascetic perishes by natural causes (Schopenhauer, 1969a: 
382) is so palpable that no lover of wisdom could fail to notice it: for how can such an 
event occur if the Will exists, albeit “in a very weak degree” (Copleston, 1947: 178), in 
the most austere ascetic? In order to surmount this inconsistency it was necessary to 
consider the role of asceticism in detail: I thus concluded that the impetus for asceticism 
in the Schopenhauerian philosophy was neither to create a unique contentment for the 
ascetic nor to produce a state of will-lessness whilst alive but, rather, to affect a 
transcendental alteration. This, I argued, is attained in the following way: ascetic 
practices are able to weaken the potency of phenomenal volitions, and this reduction in 




By implication of this foregoing notion I was led to the logical conclusion that the most 
austere ascetic practice which occasions death does so because the portion of the Will 
which once animated the ascetic’s body is expunged. In this case, the Will as Ding-an-
sich has been caused to reduce – for want of a better word – in size; thus a portion of it 
will no longer be re-manifested into existence and, consequently, the world contains a 
little less suffering: 
“[…] with the free denial, the surrender, of the Will, all those phenomena also 
are now abolished. That constant pressure and effort, without aim and without 
rest, at all grades of objectivity in which and through which the world exists; 
the multifarious forms succeeding one another in gradation; the whole 
phenomenon of the Will; finally, the universal forms of this phenomenon, time 
and space, and also the last fundamental form of these, subject and object; all 
these are abolished with the Will. No Will: no [appearance], no world” 







As a definitive conclusion to my exposition I would like to offer readers a final and 
succinct summary of the way in which my dissertation assumed its critical stance and 
the way in which I ultimately arrived at a refutation of Schopenhauer’s theory of 
athanasia. 
During the writing of my Master’s thesis, which was primarily concerned with 
Schopenhauer’s theory of suicide, I made the significant distinction between two types 
of death, viz., an ordinary form thereof and one occasioned by the most extreme form 
of asceticism, i.e. suicide by starvation. It occurred to me that in order for 
Schopenhauer’s soteriological doctrine to make any sense it was necessary to assume 
the heretical notion of the metaphysical Will’s destructibility; for if the Will is 
impervious to destruction then Schopenhauer’s approbation and prescription of 
asceticism becomes either one of egoistical concern or utterly superfluous; both of 
which I find unacceptable. Indeed, the view that annihilation of the metaphysical Will 
is the genuine purpose of Schopenhauer’s approval of asceticism has led me to a unique 
and, I believe, extremely valuable interpretation of his doctrine of salvation, which, to 
my knowledge, has hitherto never been proposed. The notion that the Will can, under 
extreme and exceptional circumstances dissolve, led me to the realisation that such an 
interpretation was at variance with Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia and that it may, 
in fact, be possible to argue that the Will is not indestructible and immortal as 
Schopenhauer claims. It was this particular observation which determined the critical 
nature of my study, for otherwise I might have been motivated, as indeed I initially was, 
to offer a defence of the theory. Of course, I am now doubtful that such an undertaking 
would have produced fruitful results, and I am glad that I rather approached the subject 
from the critical perspective that I have.  
It ought to be evident to readers that Schopenhauer’s doctrine of athanasia is based 
upon two central pillars, viz., the radical idealist position, i.e. that the real world we 
perceive exists, like a dream, solely within our minds, and his claim that the Will is a 
positive characterisation of the Kantian “thing-in-itself”. I believe that I have cogently 
refuted both views in the course of my discussion, firstly, by illustrating, among other 




for often we are presented with disagreeable and harrowing phenomena which the mind 
would not willingly choose to portray to itself; and, secondly, by indicating that the 
Will is in fact a concept, a product of intellectual intuition and located within time and 
space and subject to the causal law, it cannot, in the last analysis, be regarded as 
indicative of the so-called “thing-in-itself”, which is said to be mind-independent. As a 
consequence thereof, I regard my study as definitively refuting Schopenhauer’s theory 
of immortality according to an orthodox interpretation thereof, i.e. one in which the 
Will is entirely identified with the thing-in-itself. Of course, it leaves open the 
possibility of an ineffable immortality upon a maverick interpretation of his philosophy, 
which regards the thing-in-itself as pluralistic. To my knowledge my study on this 
particular topic is the first to be conducted in the secondary English literature; it will 
therefore undoubtedly fill a lacuna in the work undertaken by academics and scholars 
on Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Moreover, in the course of my discussion I have raised 
and critically engaged with numerous points in Schopenhauer’s system, some of which 
have generated novel notions, which might – and hopefully will – also contribute to the 
growing secondary literature on Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In this way I hope and 
believe that my work, and in particular my discussions on Schopenhauer’s theory of 
athanasia and his views on asceticism and suicide, will be of great benefit to current 
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